71 of 76 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Difficult, But Groundbreaking, July 8, 2001
This review is from: Validity in Interpretation (Paperback)
Validity in Interpretation is a groundbreaking book of literary hermeneutics with application to all areas of literature. I first read it in seminary and it has forever shaped the way I look at interpretation of Scripture, or any written document. Hirsch provides a useful set of concepts for literary interpretation and passionately and convincingly argues for his position. The book is an early attack on the nonsense of Derrida and Foucault (and their ilk) and the fashionable literary follies of our day. He makes a vital distinction between "meaning and "significance." Meaning ultimately is dependent on authorial intent. A written document can only MEAN what the author intended it to mean. The author may have been unskilled or even incompentent in presenting his/her ideas, but the meaning forever remains what it meant at creation. Significance, however, is the personal, social, and cultural context in which any reader's reaction to the written text takes place. A given written text may have a significance for an individual or community which goes beyond the original author's intent. This significance may, in some sense, have no direct connection to original intent. It remains valid as "significance" but not as "meaning." Hirsch's approach would also be valuable in the area of legal interpretation. A Hirschian analysis of the constitution or the laws would focus on original intent of the Framers or authors of legislation. It would totally undercut the idea of a "living" constitution. This book is very technical, and a hard read. Nevertheless, it will pay great dividends in learning to the careful reader.
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19 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Hirsch's defense of authorial intent, December 21, 2008
This review is from: Validity in Interpretation (Paperback)
I read this book for a graduate seminar on the philosophy of art. Hirsch opens his book "Validity in Interpretation" with the observation that there is a post-modernist view of "semantic authority," which states that the literature should be separated "...from the subjective realm of the author's personal thoughts and feelings." In addition, Hirsch notes that the phrase "a critics reading" came into vogue in scholarly works soon after W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley wrote an article titled The Intentional Fallacy, which was essentially a "shot across the bow" of the neo-Romantic artworld's belief that an artwork reflects what the artist means or intends it to mean. "The word [reading] seemed to imply that if the author had been banished, the critic still remained, and his new, original, urbane, ingenious, or relevant `reading' carried its own interest." Thus, Hirsch's well-aimed opening attack on the intentional fallacy theory is that this semantic autonomy can lead to an "exaggerated" interpretation in literary criticism, which leads to a weakened objective validity. Hirsch notes that after several decades, the intentional fallacy theory, which argues for authorial banishment, has met with skepticism since the only entity left for determining a text's meaning was the critic.
Leading the charge against the intentional fallacy theory Hirsch argues that there is a vital distinction between "meaning" and "significance." Meaning is dependent on authorial intent. A written text can only "mean" what the author intended it to mean. The author may have unsuccessfully communicated her ideas, but the meaning forever remains what it meant at creation. Significance, however, is the personal, social, and cultural context in which any reader's reaction to the written text takes place. A given written text may have a particular significance for an individual or community, that goes beyond the author's intent. This significance, in some sense, may have no direct connection to original intent.
Returning to examine the difference of textual meaning and authorial meaning brought up by Wimsatt and Beardsley, Hirsch makes an important argument that a text gains its meaning from a string or sequence of words that is understood by the "norms" of public language. A string of words can hold several different meanings, especially in poetry, and only the author will be able to definitively illuminate the meaning. Thus, Hirsch argues that the intentional fallacy theory cannot resolve the fact that a string of words can have several different meanings. When meanings are connected to language, a person is consciously making the connection and based on their cognitive skills; therefore, strings of words may appropriately contain several different meanings for different people. Thus, Hirsch believes that "When critics speak of changes in meaning, they are usually referring to changes in significance." Because of this circumstance, when interpretations of a string of words is in disagreement, I believe the intentional fallacy argument cannot resolve the issue because it is relying on what that string of words mean to different people and not on what the author meant or intended. Therefore, the central problem with the intentional fallacy argument has to do with validity. Any reading of a text is "valid" for the reader. The example that Hirsch uses is the refusal of T. S. Eliot to comment on the meaning of his own writings because he believed that the author losses ownership of his work when it goes out into the public domain. Hirsch notes that there is no indication that Eliot ever chafed at an interpretation of his works or there meanings. However, Hirsch rightly argues, "Eliot never went so far as to assert that he did not mean anything in particular in his writings."
In addition, how can the interpretation of one reader be any more valid than another reader's? Hirsch explores this question when he expertly argues that one must distinguish between "meaning" of a text and the "significance" the relationship a reader has with a text. Hirsch further elaborates on his meaning/significance distinction by explaining "meaning" as the string of words in a text that the author meant to use as opposed to, "significance" which "...names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable." For example, Hirsch astutely argues that, "Verbal meaning is whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed (shared) by means of those linguistic signs." Thus, by distinguishing between "meaning" and "significance" Hirsch is able to effectively imbed the concept of internality in the text itself by arguing that changes in the significance of a text to the author cannot be used as evidence that the text is not the unwavering depiction of artistic intention.
I recommend this work for anyone interested in philosophy, philosophy of art, and textual criticism.
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