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Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality

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Why be moral? Anyone who has ever done any serious reading on the subject has probably been disappointed with how most writers respond to that question. However, in her latest book, VIABLE VALUES, philosopher Tara Smith gives one of the most convincing, rigorous, and readable answers to the question I have ever read. As someone who is NOT an Objectivist or a follower of Ayn Rand, Smith has given me much to think about.

Tara Smith defends the metaethical theory known as egoism, which is the view that morality requires you pursue your own self-interest. However, as Smith convincingly shows, many of the traditional objections to egoism are based on misunderstandings or, more often, caricatures of what egoism entails. Egoism is incompatible with hedonism, materialism, and subjectivism; an act may be pleasurable or may make a person happy and yet not be in a person's interest. Anyone committed to pursuing their rational self-interest must adopt ethical principles to guide them through life. Moreover, though it may initially seem that an egoist would be in competition with everyone else, Smith convincingly shows how this is not the case. By grounding morality on life as the source of value, what is in a person's interest is "flourishing," to live one's life in a life-promoting manner. The egoist benefits when other people flourish.

Perhaps Smith's most controversial claim is her argument rational self-interests never conflict. I haven't decided if I am convinced of that yet, but if she is right then egoism *is* universalizable, thus avoiding one of the traditional objections to egoism.

At any rate, it appears that Smith has answered all of the traditional objections to egoism as an ethical theory. Whether Smith is ultimately correct remains to be seen, however it is clear that Smith has provided rigorous, prima facie answers to those objections. I strongly recommend VIABLE VALUES to anyone interested in the foundations of morality.

« Viable Values » is not about ethics, but metaethics : it will not provide you with a code of values with which to guide your life and actions, but help you answer such questions as « why be moral ? » and « is moral knowledge possible ? »

Do not think that these are very abstract issues which only a professional philosopher would ever consider worth his time. After all, why are *you* moral and how do you know right from wrong ? Do you believe that « you just know » ? Then you are an intuitionist, a position which Tara Smith shows to be untenable. Or do you think that morality is just a matter of agreeing with others on what behaviour is mutually acceptable ? Then you are a contractarian, another invalid position.

On the contrary, as Tara Smith explains, the root of morality is life. You should be moral because you have chosen to live. Morality is a matter of life and death : to choose the bad is to destroy oneself, to choose the good is to flourish.

You might be tempted to shun this book in favour of more popular ones offering concrete rules, but none of these books will give you a good reason to be moral, or a good justification for the code of value they offer. « Viable Values », on the other hand, will make an independent moral thinker out of you, equipping you with the methods and standards by which to judge for yourself.

Moreover, this concise, lucid volume will also direct you to the books that do offer rational moral guidance, sparing you the costly trial-and-error method that has wasted so many lives.

Why be moral? Prof. Smith's "Viable Values" provides the most comprehensive answer to this question that I've seen.

Although Smith unapolegetically follows the philosophy of the late Ayn Rand, she does not simply recapitulate Rand's position. First, Smith provides an original defense of Rand's question "Why does man need a code of values?" Second, she utterly demolishes the life/flourishing dichotomy through a series of extended, thoroughly analyzed examples. But the most rewarding section contains an illuminating analysis of why ill-begotten gains are not values. Her analysis here is explicit enough that it should allow readers to identify how *any* con-artist must be self-defeating.

As an aside, I can't help but defend Smith's thesis against one silly objection--that she provides no reason for an irrevocably suicidal person to live morally. Her answer would be simple: If morality is the art of living well, then a person irrevocably committed to suicide has no more reason to act morally than a person irrevocably committed to poverty has reason to invest wisely. The *reason* to practice any code of action (whether morality or the art of finance) is the acceptance of the *goal* of that practice (whether it be life or wealth). Thus, demanding an ethics that will compel moral action from those who seek never to act again is akin to demanding an economics that will compel good investments from those who've taken a vow of poverty. Following Smith's argument, if you meet an *irrevocably* suicidal airline pilot, don't get on his plane; if you meet a monk who dabbles in the stock market, don't give him a dime to invest. There's no hole in the logic that leads to "seek a pilot who loves life and an investor who loves profits."

Tara Smith begins Viable Values by carefully examining today's dominant schools of moral thought and demonstrating both the lack of and the need for an objective, fact-based answer to the question: Why be moral? Then, using a broad range of examples and anecdotes, she presents the facts that give rise to man's need of morality and ultimately shows that one should be moral because one's life depends on it. That is a good reason to be moral--and a good reason to read this book.

In essence, after exposing the baseless nature of contemporary ethical theory, Smith elaborates Ayn Rand's life-based metaethics and demonstrates that moral values are certain kinds of facts--facts pertaining to the requirements of human life and happiness. She presents a lucid validation of Rand's principle that man's life is the standard of moral value; and she shows that, accordingly, moral action is action that promotes one's life.

In support of her thesis, Smith offers a trove of crucial distinctions, essential integrations, and clarifying analogies. An example of the latter is her apt comparison of the theory of "intrinsic" value to the "look-say" method of teaching reading. Here is a brief excerpt:

"Look-say attaches sounds to particular letter strings and trains students to recognize those strings and pronounce the corresponding sounds. Because look-say does not teach the underlying architecture of words, however, a child acquires no techniques for navigating new words. He is trained to know what to say when he is confronted with words he has already seen but develops no understanding of why strings are pronounced as they are and thus is helpless when faced with previously unseen terms....

"The intrinsic value thesis resembles look-say teaching insofar as it offers no conceptual understanding of value. In renouncing objective criteria, advocates assume the same position as the instructor who points to a word, pronounces it, and prods students to mimic him.... The advocate of intrinsic value insists that he can spot it but provides no satisfactory account of how--and thus no means of verifying his claims.

"[The notion] that we can recognize intrinsic value when it occurs, although we cannot state its conditions....conjures former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's infamous declaration that he might never be able to define hardcore pornography, 'but I know it when I see it.' Such a stance should be an embarrassment to systematic ethics." (pp. 69-70)

Viable Values is an excellent book that should be required reading in philosophy departments worldwide. Unfortunately, however, although it was published over two and a half years ago, it still has not been recognized by Smith's peers or reviewed in an appropriate journal. This is a gross injustice--both to Smith and to students of philosophy.

If you are a philosopher, I urge you to read this book and review it in an academic journal. If you are not a philosopher, I urge you to read it and encourage any philosophers you know to do so as well. Your life depends on it, and if you read Viable Values, you will know why.

The basic question asked in this book is: Why be moral? The author, Prof. Tara Smith reviews and critiques the various historical positions on this question before providing what I consider the only valid answer. This was the answer provided by novelist/philosopher Ayn Rand as part of her Objectivist philosophy. Prof. Smith writes in the last two sentences of the book: "Life sets the standard of value, life is the goal of morality, life is the reward of morality. What stronger answer can one imagine to the question of why we should be moral?"

The meat of the book is devoted to detailed argumentation for the above points and a reader would be well rewarded by carefully reading through those chapters.

This book is a must for moral philosophy courses.

Ayn Rand once described herself as a theoretical philosopher and this seems like an apt description given an examination of her works, which are concerned in the main with outlining a system of thought which she viewed as departing in important ways from much of the tradition of western philosophy. One of the most radical aspects of her thought is her ethics, which argues for a morality of rational self interest, holding that morality exists in the service of life and not vice versa. Some areas of Rand's thought, however, call for further development and defense, in order to flesh out the sketches of these areas given in her published works. This is the task that Tara Smith undertakes in her work Viable Values, which seeks in particular to examine in detail the metaethical foundations of the Objectivist ethics.

If we are undertaking an exploration into the nature of morality we have sound reasons to ask if we have reasons to be moral in the first place, lest we assume without argument that there either are or are not such reasons. Smith examines and rejects in turn the traditional answers to the question "Why be moral?", which she groups under the headings Intuitionism, Contractarianism and Rationalism. By doing so Smith hopes to show how the traditional views fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. This sets the stage for a defense of the metaethical foundations of the Objectivist ethics, and an explanation of how Rand's theory differs from such views and succeeds in providing an answer to this question.

Intuitionism asserts that moral truths are self-evident; they exist "out there" in the world somehow and we can perceive such truths if our moral sight is properly attuned to become aware of them. Such a view, however, runs counter to the obvious fact that people differ in their perception of what moral truths are, both among others and within themselves across time. Upon inspection it becomes fatally difficult to determine how value possesses the nonrelational, objective character that Intuitionism asserts it does. If one person's moral intuitions contradict those of another, what ground is there for determining whose moral sight is the "correct" one? One begs the question if she holds that her moral insights are the ones that somehow intuit the objective moral truths that "really" are "out there". Intuitionism's claims to objectivity, Smith concludes, are unfounded.

Contractarianism holds that our reasons to be moral involve a commitment to a social contract to be moral. Moral behavior, in such a view, is what people have collectively agreed upon to be moral behavior. This view gives way to the sort of moral relativism that invites the kind of behavior that most seeking an objective basis for morality would hope avoid, for there is no denying the validity of moral views that contradict one's own if a separate social contract has deemed such behavior as moral, and one has decided that a social contract is what determines the validity of a set of moral rules. In order to save itself from relativism and hedonism Contractarianism must appeal to notions of rationality that it cannot support (by stepping outside the social contract to provide an objective ground for its views) without losing its Contractarian character.

Rationalism attempts to answer the question "Why be moral?" while divorcing ends from reasons, fueled by, in Smith's terminology, a "hollow" conception of reason. Our reasons to be moral in such a view transcend matters of personal interest. This view differs from Intuitionism's method of grounding moral truths by seeking to ground moral necessity in the nature of rationality itself. You must do what duty or the law compels you to do, because it is your duty to so as such or the law so orders. It makes no sense, however, to speak of a reason for an action without reference to some end that the action will further or hinder the attainment of, and the ultimate end is the life of an individual human being. As Rand writes, the formula of moralistic necessity is "You must, if..." with the "if" standing for Man's choice, and the fundamental choice as far as morality is concerned, writes Smith, is the choice to live and choose the actions that will promote one's life.

Smith's examination of the traditional views can leave a bleak outlook for our prospects of providing a defense and justification for our reasons to be moral. The point of Smith's work, however, is to show how Rand's ethics differ in an important way from most of the tradition of Western philosophy. In essence, Rand's uniqueness as an ethical theoretician lies in her view that morality is by its very nature selfish in outlook. The traditional views place our reasons to be moral outside the self, whether in custom, in what our moral intuitions reveal to us or in the dictates of "reason" itself.

The concept of "life," writes Rand, makes the concept of "value" both possible and necessary. To label an action as either goal-oriented or non goal-oriented is to presuppose a commitment to life and the actions that promote life; otherwise, without such a commitment, Smith writes, no arguments for or against a particular course of action could have any force or generate any binding commitment upon us. Value, according to Rand's theory, is neither an intrinsic property of things (whether this intrinsic value reflects the nature of things apart from of minds or in nature of reason itself), nor the product of social conventions, but reflects the objective relationship that something possesses to a living organism.

Intrinsic value collapses into a variant of subjectivism; it evidently makes no sense to impart value to something as an objective property that it possesses apart from its relationship to the ends of a living organism, for value is inherently relational. To label something as "good" presupposes that it is a good for something.

The choice to live - which is presupposed by the choice to be moral - is fundamental, non-rational. There can be no moral commitment to choose life, for by asking for moral reasons we are revealing a prior commitment to life and to the actions that promote it. Human beings are unique among living organisms in that humans must choose the "good," the "good" being that which furthers the life of a rational being, the "evil" that which is destructive of it.

The goal of being moral is quite simply to live one's life in an optimal fashion. A rational morality tells us which ends to pursue and how to pursue them. To denote this idea Smith introduces the concept of "flourishing", which is the state of one whose goals are arranged in a logical structure that renders one's pursuits the most effective means to the attainment of those goals. "Flourishing" is not a frill but the very purpose itself of being moral - to live one's life in a life promoting manner.

The work does leave many legitimate questions unanswered, mainly those concerning the practical ramifications of Rand's theory. In fairness, such views are beyond the scope of the work, the proper topic of a promised book by Smith on normative ethics. Viable Values is highly abstract, probably more so than what the average reader would expect to read in a book on morality, but not more than anyone willing and able to think in fundamental terms can cope with. How Rand's theory can cope with the questions typically posed in discussions of morality is the proper topic of that future book.

In summary, this work is not only an invaluable addition to the Randian literature, but an important work on moral theory in general. It makes good on the claim that Ayn Rand was an important and original moral thinker.

On reading Ayn Rand's nonfiction, many readers are struck by her impassioned relating of philosophy to life. Ideas, she persuades us, matter. In this, Rand was one of philosophy's best popular salesmen.

In selling her own philosophy, however, she fell short. A systematic, rigorous presentation of her theories was not where her interests lay. The impact: a reasonable enough excuse for academics and others to misunderstand and ignore an original and
worthwhile thinker.

Thus, the value of Tara Smith's *Viable Values*--the most comprehensive case for Ayn Rand's metaethical theory in print--is
that it leaves no excuse for any more excuses. Rand's ethics cannot be dismissed without reading Smith, and Smith's book
permits no easy dismissal.

*Viable Values* does not present a system of morality. Rather, its focus is more fundamental: morality's foundation.
Accordingly, Smith does not start with the usual questions about what kind of morality is proper. Rather, she asks what facts of reality give rise to the possibility of, and need for, morality in the first place. In doing so, Smith knocks out the supports from under the prevalant moral theories of our time, proving them unfounded and clearing the table for Ayn Rand's central insight:
that life, in making the pursuit of values both possible and necessary, is the only rational end goal and standard of morality. Significantly, this argument for bridging the gap between facts and values is inductive, not deductive (which Smith correctly notes could never do the job), and it does not depend on sourceless commandments or "categorical imperatives." Instead,
Smith shows that moral obligation stems from a choice: to live--or not. The choice to live ushers in a host of necessary practical considerations, and hence the whole field of morality, if one is to live successfully. (And if one chooses not to live? Then it's not the case that one "needs" to do anything.)

The rest of the book extends this central theory's implications and answers objections. Some of the highlights are: values'
objectivity; the "flourishing" character of a life lived well, and the distortions resulting from poorly defined distinctions between "quality" and "quantity" of life, and "needs" and "wants"; the need for principles, and why Rand's conception of egoism is not hedonistic, materialistic or subjective; and in what sense a morality of rational egoism does not lead to conflicting interests among men. After these issues are addressed, the book's total case for a life-based morality is nothing if not compelling.

In the final analysis, why read *Viable Values*? Not for a fleshed-out system of moral principles, but for something more
important, because more fundamental: a rational basis for such a system. Even the unconvinced will have something new to
think about, and new arguments to answer, as Smith explains Rand's ideas better than Rand did herself. As for the rest of us: if we do not learn all we need to know for our journey through life, we at least learn the general direction to go. And what's more, we gain confidence in our choice.

Mr. Currie's review is far from the target. He begins doing precisely what he dislikes -- that is, characterizing the position of an opponent and then declaring himself the victor. After that he examines the relationship between Rand's theory of value and the early pragmatists. Absolutely, pragmatists beleived value is rooted in human needs. The point of disagreement is -- in fact -- whether those needs, desires, etc can be objectively examined. THAT question is an epistemological one -- not an ethical question. So, it may be the case that no such view point is possible -- but this book, like all books, makes certain assumptions and then begins the task of investigation.

Mr Currie does not mention any of Smith's analysis on the alternative versions of morality. The work Smith does here is great -- especially on intuitionism and Kant's rationalism.

Currie then argues that Smith does not adequately address the problem of two rationally-selfish individuals having a conflict of interest. He does not understand Smith's argument and thus his explanation is horribly convoluted. Smith's argument is NOT that both people will get the job. Nor is it that one can obtain all that one desires. Her argument is that getting a particular job, or a spouse etc is a reflection of the reality of a given situtation. So, if two people try for a job, the failure can respond to the situation by examining the relevant facts that lead to him/her not getting the job. IE., Do I need more experience, education, etc...

So read the book -- my explanation does no justice to this great -- emerging -- work of ethical theory.

Viable Values by Tara Smith
Thomas M. Miovas, Jr.
11/19/2011

"Viable Values" is an excellent read for anyone concerned with rational values and what code of morality stems from this approach. After surveying modern approaches to values and morality, and dismissing them due to their lack of logic and a rational standard, Tara very thoroughly investigates what is required for something to be an objective value. The topic of the book is meta-ethics - the relationship between the facts of reality and moral codes and values. She demonstrates that only Ayn Rand's ethics of rational egoism is based on the facts of reality and the facts about man. If logic is the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality - which I think it is -- then this book is extremely logical, and very thorough in its scope to discuss and analyze the factual basis of the concept "value" and how only life as the standard gives one an appreciation of the concept. The subtitle of the book is "a study of life as the root and reward of morality" and the book lives up to this. Not only is life the standard, but a proper ethical code has life as the reward for being moral. That is, if one is pursuing those things in reality that are in fact beneficial to oneself, then not only is one being rationally moral, but one gets more life out of one's actions.

There is one drawback to the way the book is written. After bringing up the issue of "Why be moral?" and showing that previous approaches to morality are not logical, she doesn't answer this question until about page 117. Consequently, I would not recommend the book to those who are novices to Ayn Rand. I would say that "Atlas Shrugged" and "The Virtue of Selfishness, " both by Ayn Rand, are pre-requisites because these do not get bogged down in other approaches to morality. In "Viable Values" one can become disheartened that there is no legitimate answer to "Why be moral?" and put the book down before Tara gets to the answer, which would be unfortunate.

I also have one philosophical misgiving about her approach to "Why should one live?" and focusing on acting to gain and or keep rational values. She states that such questions are pre-rational - that is, one has to decide to live one's life before the issue of values and morality become paramount. While I agree with her analysis, I don't agree with the phrasing. In a sense, all of the facts of reality are pre-rational - they come before reason (this is the Primacy of Existence approach) - but that is an awkward way of phrasing it, since I think it implies that rationality is the fundamental standard. Actually, the facts of reality are the ultimate and fundamental standards - and the starting point. The moon orbiting the earth is a metaphysical fact, it is neither rational nor irrational; it just is. Similarly, the choice to focus one's mind on living is a fundamental fact about man. That is, free will in man is a basic fact about his consciousness, and like the moon example is neither rational nor irrational; it just is.

But these misgivings are paltry compared to the immense value of the book and how it analysis the concept of "value" and squarely places it into a logical hierarchy.

I have read this book twice...so far. When I started it, there was only one review about this book here on Amazon and I wanted to supply a deeper discussion. Now, I see that there are 10 or more reviewers who, severally, have done an amazingly objective job of reviewing the book, pulling out most of its themes and strengths for you.
So, let me highlight the fact that in this book you get to see a kind and powerful and careful mind at work. The task of showing how our concept value, the idea that lies at the base of all our moral systems, our motivations and actions, does have a basis in natural facts. Ayn Rand, whose kernel insight Tara Smith defines and defends took a look at reality to see what facts give rise to the concept "value" and she found that the needs and nature of life, its facing the alternative of continuance or extinction, is the ultimate fact which gives meaning to "value". Putting it differently, it is only in relation to the needs of a llving being that any other things in nature can have value.
Ok. How do you weave your way through such a complex study. You need a guide who can lay out each piece of evidence and each step for you to take. Dr. Smith does that with clarity. Yes, you must stay alert in reading each and every sentence. But, if you'll do the mental work to understand, she will deliver a sight to you of an aspect of life that had not been available before.
And, Dr. Smith does that work with you. As she discusses the other main views of the origin of value or moraltiy, she takes pains to explain just what is convincing and strong in those points of view, before she shows the flaws fatal to each of those views. In Chapter 4, where she reveals the root of value in the existence of life, you think, Ok, I get it. But, she's not done. She takes up one possible misunderstanding after another and, when she's finished clarifying, you think, Now I really understand. But, she's still not done. Next, she takes up every objection to her position and each of its terms. By the time she has answered all objections and clarified your grasp of "value" even more, you have enough to win your agreement. Anyone opposed to her theme has a huge job ahead of him.
Whether human flourishing survival are different or just different ways of looking at the task of living a human life is a natural continuation of Dr. Smith's overall theme. But, here what shows through is her own love of life. Some of the examples she uses would be thinkable only to a person who has loved and lived and thought deeply about her own life. And, the benevolent consequence is that you get numerous ideas to wake you up to the peak living possible to you, too.
If you read the essays of Ayn Rand, you'll see that she wrote briefly and in the most essentialized terms. Rand writes in such crystal-clear English that you could miss how essential every word is in covering all the points needed for her subject, but never anything extra. All that is needed for proof is there, but you're finished reading before you know it.
So, how, then, does one remain faithful to a discussion of Rand's views and produce a book the length of Tara Smith's. I think the answer lies in the nature of the thinking method Rand employed, explained in her epistemology and exemplified in all her writings. Rand's approach is not to dwell on the many different uses and possible meanings of a concept. Her method is not to stare out at reality and report what her sensory impressions are. She takes observation of reality seriously and works on it with questions, comparing, trying to integrate one fact with another, always alert for contradictions and ambiguities. In her book on epistemology, Rand talks about how to sift through details to get the fundamentals and the essentials. There is a method at work in all Objectivist topics.
So, the Objectivist scholar, following Rand's lead in her essays, doesn't merely tease out the concepts. Instead, she does what Rand does; she goes back to the facts of reality to see what facts give rise, all over again, in the mind of the scholar, to the ideas and connections Rand says she saw. The job is not as tough as rediscovering the new, as Rand did. It is even tougher. Reality is the source, not Rand's words. So, can one look fresh at the same areas Rand did and see more, see what validates and what contradicts, Rand's conclusions?
Dr. Tara Smith of the Philosophy Department at University of Texas/Austin is not reporting, as in a student paper, what Rand's view is. She is exploring the same subject, using the evidence she sees, making the connections she sees, bringing into the discussion things Rand didn't mention. The fact that this exploration ends up confirming and expanding on what Rand wrote is something Rand would be happy to have inspired. Only this kind of re-exploration of the subject and all the evidence it came from can give one the firm conviction Dr. Smith conveys in the "voice" of her writing. You can tell that her mind was on the evidence and on her own mind's vision of the connections, not on side glaces to Rand.
When you hear Objectivists talking about "chewing" a concept, that process is what they mean.
If you enjoy seeing a mind at work, doing its best to give you a thorough explanation of a "deep" subject, you'll truly enjoy giving some of your thinking time to this book on the roots of morality by Dr. Tara Smith.