Customer Reviews

Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944

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I used this book as the main source for a term paper I recently wrote on Vichy France. Although it is now a bit dated-it was originally published in 1972-it was a groundbreaking work when it was first published. With this work, Mr. Paxton destroyed the myth of the massive French Resistance to the Germans that was propagated for many years after the war, mostly by the French themselves. He thoroughly describes how it was France, not Germany, who sought greater collaboration between the two countries, and that many more Frenchmen than would like to admit wholeheartedly embraced the new fascist policies. And while of course there was a genuine resistance movement, Paxton sees the post-war witch hunt of "collaborationists" as basically a persecution of the guilty by the guilty. To this day, Vichy is still a touchy subject for Frenchmen and Paxton brilliantly exposes exactly why that is. This is an extremely well-written and comprehensive work on Vichy France and I recommend it wholeheartedly.

paxton's book was a breakthrough in that it showed to what a huge extent the vichy regime's odious policies weren't simply imposed by the germans, but were carrying out willingly and represented the revenge of right-wing, catholic, nationalistic france against the left, unions, and jews and other foreigners. but at times the book goes a little too far and borders on cheap anti-frenchness. his denunciations of the vichy regime and the elements of france they represented are well backed up, but he's on much shakier ground when he tries to downplay the role of and support for the resistance and charles de gaulle. overall, a chilling, important book, but it should be read as a book about vichy, and not as a definitive book about all aspects of france under the occupation, as it purports to be.

Robert Paxton is the supreme authority on the Vichy regime. This, his seminal work, was originally published in the 1970s and has been updated with a new preface. Despite the availability of additional data, the book stands with very few qualifications as originally written. Vichy, despite the claims of it's many apologists, neither protected nor served France and the French, with the exception of various professional elites, who seamlessly transitioned from Petain's regime to the Fourth Republic and, in some instances, to the Fifth. Petain and his confreres met little, if any, indigenous resistance because virtually all Frenchmen were disgusted with the Third Republic and craved a more ordered and traditional form of government, an authoritarian one, in a word. Petain was happy to oblige, basing the regime on the assumptions that the war would be short, Germany would be victorious, the (despised) British holdouts would soon be defeated and, most importantly, domestic revolution would be avoided. This last point cannot be overestimated in the conservative, Catholic society of mid-century France. The riots of February 6, 1934 left an indelible impression which Vichy manipulated to to telling effect by playing on bourgeoise proclivities for order, not troubling to clarify the origins of the disturbances. It should be recalled that de Gaulle stood virtually alone. Most Frenchmen, especially those in military and government service chose to support the regime, even to the point of fighting the British in North Africa, not only in relatively well-known engagements at Mers el Kabir, but also in Syria and domestically in Dieppe. Vichy mostly hoped to achieve parity with Nazi allies in a German-dominated post-war Europe, also hoping to retain their colonial empire under exclusive French administration. Paxton recalls all these details and plenty more, along with a welter of statistical detail which somewhat slows the narrative. Even so, the work is exceptional and a classic of the historian's art.

This pioneering book is usually given credit for sparking the boom in scholarly work on Vichy France, though as Paxton points out, the distinguished German historian Eberhard Jackel and some French scholars were publishing similar work at about the same time. Vichy France is also given credit for igniting public discussion of Vichy in France itself. Published initially in the early 1970s, its basic conclusions remain unchallenged. This is a history of the Vichy governments and their policies. Readers looking for a broader look at France during this period should pick up Julian Jackson's book, France:The Dark Years, which provides a more panoramic view.

Paxton examines 4 key prior conclusions about Vichy; that Vichy was imposed by the Germans, that Vichy governments worked to deflect the worst features of German rule, that the Vichy governments were played a "double game" with the Germans, secretly trying to help the Allies; and that the French public did not support Vichy and was waiting only for plausible alternative to resist the Germans. Paxton subjects all these conclusions to destructive criticism. Vichy was widely accepted as legitimate and was initially popular, a result not only of the crushing defeat but also of widespread disenchantment with the institutions and policies of the Third Republic. The successive Vichy governments proceeded to pursue, independent of German direction, their own "National Revolution." A reactionary set of anti-liberal and anti-leftist policies based on a highly conservative version of Catholic authoritarianism, the National Revolution was in large part an act of revenge by frustrated conservatives against what they perceived as particular enemies - Jews, Freemasons, and leftists of all stripes. Paxton makes clear that underpinning the National Revolution was a pervasive and somewhat hysterical fear of disorder and revolution, particularly among the French upper and middle classes. The leaders of Vichy clearly also made the calculation that Germany had won the war and that renewed space for France could only exist in a France as a junior partner in a German dominated European, one in which France retained some independence and its Empire. Paxton details the increasingly desperate attempts of Vichy governments to persuade the Germans of the value of a Vichy led France, removing the Occupation and awarding the French a peace treaty. At points, Vichy pursued hostile neutrality towards the British and might well have declared was on Britain, had they been offered a good deal by the Germans. Paxton does a particularly good job of explaining how important the French colonies were to the Vichy elite and for the Gaullists as well. In fact, Vichy gave Hitler almost everything he wanted; an emasculated French military, an inexpensive occupation, an essentially colonial status for the French economy, the satisfaction of humiliating the French, and the liberty to implement their genocidal policies.

While the Vichy state fell into a period of historical amnesia for about a generation, Paxton has an interesting analysis of some lasting effects of Vichy. One interesting feature of Vichy was the relative importance of civil servants and technocrats in ministerial positions. The Vichy emphasis on technocratic solutions and the exigencies of the war time economy set the stage for the dirigiste economy planning of the post-war period.

Unusually well written, the book has a particularly nice combination of narrative interspersed with thoughtful analysis.

As a Frenchman interested in the gray attitude of my fellow countrymen during WWII, I can only say that this thorough study of the Vichy regime and its general acceptance by the French people from 1940 to 1943,based on numerous factual and statistical data,is an irreplaceable tool that has not been equalled ever since its publication almost 40 years ago. Other reviewers have pointed out the many qualities of this book, therefore I will only stress the main point of Paxton's theory: that French bureaucracy often went beyond what was expected by the Germans, that Pétain, at least until 1943, enjoyed an unprecedented popularity and , most worrying, that a certain type of "realpolitik" made it necessary for De Gaulle to avoid widespread purges of the mid to high-level government administrations in order for the State to continue to function proprerly in the immediate post-war period. The obvious conclusion is that the average Frenchman is no more a heroe or a villain than anybody else;he is just average...

This book was such an important text in its field that I feel it deserves five stars even though I disagree with some of its findings. The French talk of a 'Paxtonian Revolution' to describe the effect this book had on the historiography. Along with Eberhard Jackel's work, Paxton suggested that collaboration was not something which was imposed on the French by the Germans but rather something which the French government actively sought as a means of promoting their own internal political agenda and of finding a privileged place in the Nazi new order. This flew in the face of the work of previous historians who had insisted that collaboration was imposed on an unwilling French government. Paxton's ideas on this have now established themselves as orthodoxy in the field. That historians are still obliged to quote Paxton 40 years on shows what a seminal text this was. The part of the book which failed to stick in the long run is the section which deals with public opinion. He sees public opinion as broadly supporting Vichy and collaboration. No serious analysis of the archives on this question could support such an analysis.

Reviewers who found it a revelation that Vichy grew out of French history instead of being a puppet state set up by the Germans had presumably not read much French history before--Maurras and Daudet's backlash aaginst the Revolution, the Dreyfus Affair, the prewar fascist leagues, even French anglophobia, all well documented and date from long before July 1940. Significantly some of these pre-Vichy French proto-fascists were far from pro-German.

However (and even though scholarship has swung back slightly the other way), this 1970s revisionist account was a major work and is still a "must" for anyone studying pre-1945 France. One can still see the value of the book without concluding "Weren't the French awful?" or "So De Gaulle wasn't their hero during the war".

This book was first written in 1972 when the fifty-year seal on Vichy documents was still in effect, and has been updated since. But Paxton did a very good job of gathering good material from Nazi archives and others to deliver a book which required very little revision once more documents became available.
The book was explosive when first published because it shattered the Hollywood myth of brave French resistance fighters arm-in-arm with the Allied forces beating back their German occupiers. The truth was much more complicated, but basically France was so politically divided in the 1930's that it was impotent in dealing with the threat of a Hitler. That impotence translated into the Vichy government led by Petain and his numerous cabinet officers who were far more likely to assist the Nazis than confront them. Double dealing, scheming, back stabbing, corrupt, duplicitous; the regime was a training ground for the kind of French diplomacy which continues to this day. Numerous attempts were made by the Vichy regime at reaching a lasting peace with Hitler and included proposals for France to be an ally with Nazi Germany's new world order after the Brits and later the Americans were defeated. It was only after the tide was turning against the Germans did the French resistance begin to gain popular support and shift to DeGaulle from Petain and his fellow collaborators. Even the Nazis were appalled by the lack of principle when the French offered up native French Jews for transport to German concentration camps when the Nazis never demanded they be turned over. French workers in Germany freed up enough manpower for Germany to field many more divisions than they otherwise could have been able to. While the same could be said of "neutral" Sweden, without whose willingness to supply the steel needed by the Nazi war machine would have forced Germany to cut back its standing army by hundreds of thousands, at least the Swedes have never tried to cover up the fact that they did it for the money.
This is a very good book, and the kind of historical research which is sorely lacking in many books today which purport to cover history but usually wind up offering a hidden political agenda. For those who are interested in this subject I recommend Chabrol's video "Eye of Vichy" which is an amazingly brave film of Vichy propaganda that put pictures to the words of Paxton's book. With "friends" like France during WWII, we didn't need any enemies. The fact that France was given a permanent seat in the UN Security Council after its role during WWII is a living legacy of Roosevelt's infirmity in his last months.

The book in question was written by Mr Paxton as a thesis for his PHD at Harvard in 1963 and was later published in 1966 by Princeton University.
The infamous Vichy regime rightfully denounced by Mr Paxton enjoyed the offcial embassy of Admiral Leahy helped by the friend and personal representative of President Roosevelt, Robert Murphy [despite the existence of the Free French government in London]. The fact that France is a member of the security counsel of the United Nations results from the fact that the Free French supplied the biggest contingent of men after the launching of Torch [landing in north Africa) and stayed alongside their American allies in the Japanese war.
You should check that, at Yorktown, Washington was actually defeated by the English when the French army and the French fleet captured the British army and fleet... before offering this victory to Washington. There was no lend-lease for the French support to the young American republic and you never heard a French regretting it. It's a matter of style.
You should also check that only the down payment of the Louisianna deal was actually paid because Napoleon got ultimately defeated by the British. France never made a territorial claim for that.
You should learn that despite the infamous Vichy regime which came to power by a coup and not by a democratic vote, the Jewish community of France is the one who survived the most of all the occupied countries (don't believe me check with Raul Hilberg's book), again despite this truly infamous regime.
Of the two friendly country which one should be criticized for its support is a truely open debate.
You should check that the grand father of president Bush was sentenced under the "Trading with the ennnemy act" for his partnership with nazis in mining investments in Upper Silesia, that President Kennedy's father was recalled from his position as Embassador in London for his openly expressed nazi sympathy...
You should however learn that, to this very day, Americans showing their American passports in most of the restaurants of Normandy don't have to pay for their bills because the French are still grateful to the American people.
You should know that the French population, even when they politically disagree with the American government, keep their friendship for the American people intact and their sympathy for young American soldiers on the front. There are many dark periods in American history as well (ask the Japanese Americans for exampple, or the Eastern Europeans offered to Stalin at Yalta for American control over western European economies: cf Churchill's memoirs).
The French do not resent Robert Paxton for his studying of a dark period in French history, but you should also read the cynical view of President Roosevelt toward the dismantling of the French empire reported in "The way he saw it" by his son Elliott.
The French keep saluting the American men and women, for they risked or lost their lives in France, or their blood or just a part of their youth to combat Hitlerite tyrany in what Pressident Roosevelt, after the Tehran conference didn't call "freeing France" ... but "Invasion of France".
Every American is wellcome to France no matter what! Our friendship pre-dates English friendship.
The book of Mr Baxton is an excellent book but it must be completed by "our Vichy Gamble" by William Langer and other readings like Raoul Aglion's "Roosevelt & deGaulle Allies in conflict" to understand France in the second world war.
It is not so clear to know which one of these two friendly countries has a greater work to do for cleaning its own doorstep. It takes more courage and intelligence to listen to one another points, than to spit hate for recently frustrated foreign policy. Leadership is not dominance, friendship is not obedient slavery and patriotism is not narcissic craving for military power.
For avoiding any readers'possible prejudice or misconception, it must be stated that the present reviewer's father, born catholic, spent years in the worst concentration camps for resisting the nazi policy towards Jewish people [he had already been arrested, tortured and deported when America did land in North Africa].
Among the four liberties presented by President Roosevelt were the liberty of speech, the liberty of opinion and the liberty from fear.
Let's drink to Robert Paxton having the liberty to fearfully express, with talent and personality, his political vision on an infamous French regime, and the French having the right of criticizing without fear the foreign policy of their American friends.

The history is good but hard to read without insights into the people and the aftermate after the war.