Customer Reviews

A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military Genius

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1 star:		(2)

 

 

Part of me hates to write a less-than-flattering review about a book like this. Author Edward Bonekemper sets out to paint a picture of Ulysses S. Grant that is contrary to the image of a reckless commander who ruthlessly squandered his men and defeated Robert E. Lee by sheer superiority of resources alone. Instead he claims that Grant was an able and visionary general who had what it took to win the Civil War. I agree with Bonekemper's view and, as such, agree with the book.

So why rate it so low? Well, unfortunately I found little original or compelling in Bonekemper's views. That Grant was not a butcher is an argument that has been set forth several times by many able historians, and the fact that Bonekemper frequently cites them, instead of digging up his own primary research, is evidence of the fact that this was not a book that needed to be written (again). Bonekemper makes particular use of the work of Jean Edward Smith and T. Harry Williams in his analysis of Grant, which begs the question: why not just read their stuff instead?

That's a question I can't answer. To me this book read like a high school book report-a summary of the work of other historians with little original insight. Even the accounts of battles and campaigns were so lacking in detail as to be completely unsatisfying (reading of the battle of Shiloh was particularly painful, as most of the important details of the battle are skimmed over or omitted completely). The unfortunate result, for me, was a book that left much to be desired and just seemed a waste of time.

There are many in-depth analyses of Grant that paint him as a victor rather than a butcher. I see relatively little purpose for this book and really no reason for anyone with an interest in Grant or Civil War history in general to read it.

Historical myth, especially those connected to the Civil War, are not easily changed. Decades of authors have tried to embellish a myth until it is accepted as fact. Mr. Bonekemper does an excellent job of pulling together statistics, details and opinions concerning Ulysses Grant and then analyzing what these really mean. A case is meticulously built that Grant was a brilliant leader and apparently the only general who had an overall view of what needed to be done and how it would be accomplished. He not only understood the military actions needed on the battlefield but the political implications to Washington. Mr. Bonekemper refutes the myth that Grant was a butcher and shows how he generally minimized his overall loses by understanding the "big picture" and changing tactics when needed to overcome his opposition. The book is easy to follow and is highly recommended.

Bonekemper follows in the shoes of JFC Fuller and T. Harry Williams who long ago argued that Ulysses Grant was the preeminent soldier of the Civil War. For nearly 100 years, the rise of the Lost Cause mentality has obscured Grant's true brilliance as a general and his great rival, Lee, has been elevated to near demi-God status. Bonekemper dispenses with such nonsense and shows, point by point, how Grant won the Civil War. He did so because he was a military genius and possessed rare gifts of stubbornness, intelligence, daring, patience and sheer nerve. The fans of Robert E. Lee will be reaching for their smelling salts when they pick up this tome!

The book is not heavy on statistics or details and those who dislike plodding military narratives will still find something to like here. Bonekemper's "Appendix I" is especially interesting, particularly for those who are familiar with Grant literature from the past. It's interesting to read his opinions on some of the recent spate of Grant biographers. Equally impressive is Bonekemper's list of Grant's "Attributes" which he lists in descending order. Among these are modesty, the dis-inclination to constantly demand reinforcements (which is what contributed to McClellan's downfall), and a stubborn tenacity. Bonekemper brilliantly refutes the tired old adage that Grant was a butcher who was injudicious with the lives of his men. Borrowing stats from McWhiney and Fuller, he clearly demonstrates that General Lee lost far more men in proportion than did Grant.

My only criticism is that Bonekemper inexplicably describes Grant as "an alcoholic." He should have known better, because it's simply untrue. Grant drank and imbibed too much early in his army career, almost always when separated from his much-adored wife. He also got drunk on occasion in the ACW, but it didn't interfere with his service career and was borne out of a need to be with Julia. No serious historian of the past 50 years has described Grant as an alcoholic and it's disappointing that Bonekemper follows suit. This is an odd inclusion, particularly when he states that "alcoholism made him a better general." This is a theory borrowed from McPherson and should have been omitted.

Aside from this small lapse, the remainder of the book is a grand exercise in proving what Grant students have long known: this man was one awesome soldier! Kudos to Bonekemper from proving this point so thoroughly.

I found this book thoroughly enjoyable. While I never thought of Grant as a "butcher", it gave me new insight into his merits as a commander and a person. It brought out a number of things that I had read in other contexts relating to the failings of other civil war generals and highlighted the strengths of Grant in avoiding their problems.

It was easy to read and understand. I recommend it highly.

Bonekemper presents a sympathetic, fast-moving portrait of US Grant's exceptional abilities and personal character. I admired Grant more and more while reading this book.

Like many reviewers of Bonekemper's works on the Civil War, I find weaknesses of Bonekemper's presentation to be the dearth of maps to illustrate battles and campaigns, and the partisan presentation of (what should be) objective facts. Bonekemper's education, while excellent, apparently was weak on non-partisan presentation of facts. Throughout this book, Bonekemper focuses on his thesis statement (crudely put, "Grant good, Lee bad") and attempts to hammer it home ad infinitum. This is acceptable as long as objectivity is maintained; when objectivity is compromised, scholarship is compromised.

A good example of this sort of authorial pitfall is Tolstoy's protracted rant (at the end of War and Peace) about the ineptness [?] of Napoleon's generalship. At best, both Tolstoy and Bonekemper, whatever their other virtues, give the impression of being curmudgeonly armchair generals. But Tolstoy was writing fiction while Bonekemper is writing nonfiction: thus Bonekemper cannot afford Tolstoy's self-indulgence and, unlike Tolstoy, Bonekemper does not sequester his armchair generalship from the main body of his work; rather, he weaves it through the fabric of his story.

Just one example: At Spotsylvania Courthouse, the author asserts General Lee's withdrawal of his artillery from a commanding height the night before the battle was a mistake; the author next asserts that Lee's situating his artillery on that same height the morning of the battle was a mistake, too. Why? Bonekemper leaves you to wonder. He doesn't explain. He doesn't bring in any additional information that might have motivated Lee's decision. It's a simple declaration; it was a mistake both times. Take it or leave it. What you're left with is the vague impression that whatever Lee did was a mistake in Bonekemper's judgment. Your repeated encounters with such textual sphinxes gradually erode your confidence in Bonekemper's objectivity.

Contra Bonekemper's thesis ("Grant good, Lee bad") is the obvious fact that Grant's first contact with Lee was at the Second Battle of the Wilderness, in May 1864. By that time, Union numbers in men and materiele were overwhelming; also, the Army of Northern Virginia was no longer what it once had been - Stonewall Jackson and Jeb Stuart both gone by that time.

Being an author of historical nonfiction certainly requires enthusiasm, but it also requires objectivity. Bonekemper scores A+ for enthusiasm, D+ for objectivity.

Recommended with provisos noted.

Perhaps it is the American tradition of rooting for the underdog. Perhaps it is the influence of movies like 'Gone With the Wind' that have created a golden image of the south (In spite of the South's Peculiar Institution - Slavery.) But for whatever reason, Robert E. Lee has been raised to almost God like esteem, while Grant has been considered a drunken butcher.

Of late, the reputation of Lee has suffered some. Incidents like Picketts Charge have been looked more closely in the reliaziation that Lee's most trusted Liutenant, Longstreet recommended against the Gettysburg campaign so heavily.

It is good to see that Grant is getting a new look. He led a masterful series of military campaigns, often over the objections of his superiors such as Hallack. And in the end, he won the war. Dr. Bonekemper does not go into the troubles Grant had as a civilian, either before the war or during his presidency. But after all, this is not a biography of Grant but a military history. Well done, well written, highly recommended.

Whether Grant is an "overlooked military genius" is in itself a doubtful premise - however, this book was very disappointing - lacking depth, analysis, insight or the kind of narrative writing that can render even a well known subject interesting. The complexities of the Civil War are great - just the two months of March and April 1864 alone are worth a book in Grant's career. This is just too simplistic of a book to be taken as serious or even enjoyable reading.

Sooner or later, a student of the American Civil War is confronted with seemingly irreconcilable portraits of Ulysses S. Grant. One paints Grant as something of a vicious dullard, capable only of bludgeoning his enemy to submission with the brute force of vastly superior numbers of Union soldiers. As this picture has it, he sacrifices needlessly the limbs and lives of Union men in repetitive, horrendously brutal attacks upon the cornered enemy who happen to be fellow Americans.

The other image is that of a military genius who prevailed through superior strategy and tactical prowess. Writers advancing this vision contend that Grant recognized and understood the need of the Lincoln administration for battlefield successes to retain popular support for the war effort and win the 1864 election. By focusing on Confederate armies instead of cities, goes this line, he achieved the necessary victories, ultimately bringing the war to a successful conclusion. In doing so, it necessarily follows, Grant succeeded where others had failed, saved the Union and avoided even greater numbers of battlefield deaths.

In "Victor, Not a Butcher" Ed Bonekemper does much to resolve these competing and conflicting images of Grant. Reciting Grant's Civil War record from Belmont to Appomattox, Bonekemper makes a forceful case that Grant was crucial to keeping the Union intact. Bonekemper demonstrates convincingly that Grant actually spent the lives of his men less freely than did his Confederate enemy counterparts. And he provides the numbers to support this assertion. Along the way, Bonekemper provides insightful analyses of the 1864 election and the treatment of Grant by other historians. The later, in particular, assists in understanding why and how these reverse portrayals of Grant developed over time and with the changing lens of historical perspective.

All in all, "Victor" is an enjoyable and thoroughly readable book. It is accessible by novice and expert alike. Both will benefit from Bonekemper's unvarnished recital of Grant's accomplishments and reverses. His unbiased conclusions are persuasive. This reader, for one, is convinced.

One of my favorite figures from American history is Ulysses S. Grant. He was the greatest general of the Civil War, and perhaps in American history, with three Confederate armies surrendering to him. He was not such a great president, though better than most give him credit for being. The corruption in American politics during his administration was not his fault and, in fact, was endemic throughout the country. He did stand up for the rights of the freedmen and the native Americans, and this perhaps along with his victory over Lee accounts for the hostility with which many contemporary and Southern sympathizing historians have treated him. It is all too commonly believed, even today, that Grant was a butcher who defeated Lee by sheer weight of numbers, without regard to the casualties he inflicted.

Therefore, it was a real treat to read Edward H. Bomekemper's Ulysses S. Grant: a Victor, Not a Butcher. Bonekemper shows conclusively that far from being a butcher, Grant was, in fact a master of strategy and misdirection. In his western campaigns, Grant skillfully achieved his goals; the capture of Vicksburg and the Mississippi, driving the Confederates out of Tennessee, etc. with a minimum of casualties. The toll was heavier in the east, against Lee, but as Bonekemper points out, while Grant suffered as many deaths in the eighteen months he commanded the Army of the Potomac as all of the previous commanders had in three years, nevertheless, Grant had developed a winning strategy on a national level, which coordinated with Sherman's march to the sea brought the South to its knees.

Some reviewers have commented that Bonekemper brings nothing new in this book, no new research or any revelations to one already familiar to the course of the Civil War. This is true, but I think it serves as a helpful introduction to a sometimes-neglected military genius.

This book is a short biography of U.S. Grant (see below for a discussion of the book's length). The author provides a brief overview of the subject's life, with his pre-war life consuming one short chapter, and his post-war life being essentially ignored. The remainder of the book consists of a cursory recounting of Grant's campaigns as a general during the Civil War, with the intent of discussing whether he was a good general or not. Well-read Civil War buffs will recognize a remix of the comparitive biography written by the British military historian J.F.C. Fuller 80+ years ago. If the author brings anything new to the subject, it's that he has a good command of the scholarship that's been done since, and considerable statistical analysis of the losses Grant's armies suffered during the war, with an emphasis on comparison with Robert E. Lee. Lee doesn't come off that well in this comparison, as readers of "Attack and Die" and Fuller's book will expect. Neo-Confederate readers and writers will of course protest.

But to return to the book, it's very little in the way of biography and a great deal on the subject of what a good general Grant was. Bonekemper even manages (sort of) to take the edge off of the attacks that Grant himself, in his memoirs, said he regretted, namely the attack at Vicksburg and of course Cold Harbor. Bonekemper insists that Cold Harbor especially has been exaggerated, with some historians putting the Union casualties as high as 11,000, when in fact Bonekemper insists that they should be closer to just above 6,000, with about half that falling in the first assault (where some historians have insisted 7,000 men fell in as little as 8 minutes). Bonekemper argues this and other points eloquently, and I only noted a few times when he seemed to be cutting Grant more slack than was reasonable. In the discussion of the Battle of the Crater, he blames the switching out of the USCT division on Meade exclusively, when most historians agree that Grant was equally responsible.

This book is somewhat deceptive in terms of length. It's 452 pages long, but the actual narrative text is 266 pages in length. There are several long appendices afterwards, one with extensive tables laying out casualty figures for Grant's armies as reported by lots of different historians. Wide margins at top, bottom, and the sides of the pages, wide spaces between the lines, and a large font, mean that this book doesn't have that much content. There aren't that many maps, but the illustration section is paged also, adding to the total in a fashion most books don't. As a result, this is really not a very long book, it just looks that way.

I still enjoyed this book. I tend to enjoy, at times, books that present an argument, as opposed to those that just try and relate a series of events. Yes, argumentative books are biased, but at least you know what the bias is going in. That makes it easier (in my mind, anyway) to spot unreasonable bias, when the author tries to shade the truth to fit their version of events. Frankly, I didn't see that much of that here, and the result is a very interesting book, with a pretty unusual point of view. Highly recommended to history buffs.