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18 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Historical analysis that's actually exciting, September 27, 2004
This review is from: Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler's Panzer Counteroffensive (Modern War Studies) (Paperback)
Victory at Mortain is a comprehensive look at the German counterattack toward Avranches in early August, just following the COBRA breakout in Normandy. Reardon's book is useful, as the battle is under-studied and not widely known. Indeed there is only one other widely available and read book on the subject (Featherstone's Saving the Breakout). Further, Reardon's book is very good in that it provides insights into both German and US command decisions and tactical movements. In this way, it becomes easy for the reader to see exactly how both sides were making decisions, and how those choices directly played out on the battlefield.
Reardon starts his book with two chapters devoted to the situation in Normandy from July to the first few days of August 1944. These chapters show what the German plan for defense was (contain, contain, contain), and how the US breakout from Normandy progressed. This serves to set the context for the rest of the book. The very nature of the breakout served to "offer up" the option of a German counterattack through the Mortain area toward Avranches. This town represented the tenuous link between US Armies (First and Third) and served as the primary logistics/supply rout. Moving south through Avranches, US forces of the Third Army could and did turn west into Brittany and east to threaten the southern flank of the German 7th Army, which was trying to contain the US First Army. A German breakthrough to Avranches would surround most of the Third Army and have the simultaneous effect of solidifying the German 7th Army positions. This would have allowed the Germans to shift more resources to continue to contain the Normandy lodgments. It would have been a stunning blow to the Americans and would have completely derailed the Allied breakout from the vicious boccage country of Normandy.
Of course, this didn't happen. The counterattack (Operation Luttich) failed, largely due to an inauspicious infantry division...the US 30th. Although it got help at key points in the counterstrike against the German thrust from portions of the 2nd Armored Division (on the southern flank) and the 3 Armored Division (on the northern flank), the 30th bore the brunt of the initial onslaught. Being able to stop an entire Panzerkorp (including the vaunted 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions, the 116th Panzer Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, and part of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier division) dead in its tracks is an amazing achievement. Reardon shows us that the German attack failed due to a combination of factors: bad German staff planning, bad German battlefield tactics, tenacious US roadblocks, the aggressiveness of the US 119th, 120th, and 117th regimental commanders, US artillery and airpower, and a bold American (3rd Army) thrust toward LeMans southeast of the battlefield and subsequent drive north to envelope the units that had participated in Operation Luttich in the Falaise Pocket.
Unlike the conventional wisdom about the battle, which focuses excessively on the the struggle for Hill 314 and the trapped second battalion, 120th infantry, Reardon spends more time on the attack through St. Barthelmy, and the northern flank, which represented the Germans' main push. He convincingly shows that the few AT guns and the battalion's worth of infantry holding St. Barthelmy effectively derailed the German plans. Further, Reardon faults German commanders for not bypassing the town, who instead chose to continue to ram against the US defenders. Although the Germans eventually did take the town, the other German units to the north now had an exposed flank. The Germans failed to press hard and stopped their advanced units, which then had to retreat. This action, and armored thrusts around Barenton (southeast of Mortain) were the keys to halting the German advance. Additionally, Reardon faults the Germans for uninspired leadership, for not securing the southeast flank at Barenton, for failing to use recon units in their proper role of info gathering rather than combat units, for failing to coordinate with the Luftwaffe, and for mismanaging artillery assets. These German problems, coupled with good regimental leadership on the US side, added up to a US victory.
Reardon does give pause, however. Had the Germans been more adept in their attack, it's not clear the Americans would have been able to contain them. Reardon notes that the divisional command functions nearly completely failed (or were non-existent). The 30th Infantry Division did not fight as a division, but rather are three nearly-independent regiments. This hampered coordination between regiments, hindered the ability to link artillery and armor assets with the battalions that needed them, and hurt the ability to time the counterattack against the Germans. In the end, bad German tactics and leadership, coupled with a sweep to LeMans to tear open the southern flank of the German army, is what sealed the deal.
This is a very good book. It is a useful history in that it provides an analysis and critique of both sides' command decisions, and displays how those decisions turned out on the battlefield. In my opinion, it is the definitive account of the German offensive at Mortain. My only problem with the book is that in places the text jumps temporally; there are places where a new section of the book will describe events that occurred prior to what was just happening in the previous section. This got very confusing, and at several places I had to jump back about a hundred pages to reference earlier text and maps. With some patience, however, this can be dealt with by any reader.
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13 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Superlative History of a Little Known but Crucial Battle, July 5, 2002
I will admit to being drawn to the ominous cover art when browsing AMAZON on line, however, I was pleasantly surprised to find that this book was one of the best histories of the crucial Normandy campaign that I have ever read. When comparing it to the US Army official history of that period, BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT, I found that the official version of the Battle of Mortain was replete with errors and omissions regarding both the activities of the Germans and Americans. For instance, the author of the official history did not use the S-3 Journal of the 120th Infantry Regiment, a unit that is arguably the centerpiece of the whole battle. When discussing the German perspective, the official history is even further off base. As one may have surmised, Reardon uses a plethora of primary sources and recently published German accounts. The depth of his research is truly impressive. His style of writing is a curious blend of factual narrative and descriptive prose. It personalizes the events yet Reardon does not sensationalize the ugly face of war, confusion, and death. If you are not familiar with the military, I recommend xeroxing his map key and placing it next to you before reading the book. The military symbols may be confusing for the novice WW2 enthusiast. Great book!!
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16 of 20 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Victory At Mortain is a Win, June 16, 2002
The Battle of Mortain has been the subject of very limited coverage by military historians. In short, the Battle of Mortain was an example of a dramatic German counterattack that occurred during the closing days of the Normandy Campaign. The German counterattack launched on August 6, 1944, was halted chiefly by the steadfast and brave actions of the US 30th Infantry Division. Colonel Mark Reardon in his book "Victory at Mortain" details the events of this climatic battle of the Normandy Campaign. Reardon interweaves both operational and strategic events surrounding the battle, but also telescopes down to the personal accounts of German and American soldiers that participated in the battle. Reardon's descriptions of the combat in and around Abbey Blanche and St. Barthelemy are particularly compelling. US Army tank destroyer teams taken initially by surprise by the German counterattack are thrust into a point blank struggle with German Heavy tanks emerging from dense morning fog. "...When news of the loss of No. 1 gun reached Lieutenant Greene, he decided to shift No. 4 gun to cover that sector. Greene gathered up several men from the nearby No. 3 gun to assist in manhandling the three-inch weapon into position. The TD gunners slowly pushed the gun into position, but its field of fire was so poor that Greene decided to move it again. At the second location, the TD crew found that they could not depress the muzzle far enough to engage several vehicles driving up a sunken trail toward them. The men frantically chopped at the hedgerow but could not bring it to bear in time. Rather than risk capture, the gun crew abandoned their weapon after removing the firing pin. Meanwhile, the volunteers from the No. 3 gun returned to their own piece only to find that it had been knocked out. Several wounded men lay nearby so the uninjured soldiers helped them to a small hotel in the center of the village. The makeshift stretcher detail arrived moments before a Panther pulled up next to the building. One American was killed when he unsuccessfully tried to knock out the vehicle with a rifle grenade. A medic stuck a rifle with a white bandage tied to its muzzle out the basement window of the hotel. German infantry cleared the unwounded Americans out of the aid station, herding them toward a nearby apple orchard. The wounded and the medics were allowed to remain in the hotel basement. Greene's No. 2 gun also could not be depressed low enough to engage the infantry and half-tracks moving along a sunken road. The rattle of tank treads on the pavement of the main road, however, alerted the TD crew to the approach of a Panther moving toward the village. Frantically traversing their three-inch gun, the TD crew hit the tank with one round. Trailing a ribbon of black smoke, the panzer continued on before grinding to a halt against the side of a house. A second dark apparition appeared briefly amid the swirling fog, and the gun crew hesitated for a moment before firing. The indistinct shape turned out to be a Panther that opened fire as soon as it spotted the three-inch gun. After putting the No. 2 gun out of action, the Panther also destroyed the half-track parked behind the disabled weapon before continuing into the village..." The book follows the course of the battle chronologically, with each chapter of "Victory at Mortain" being concluded with a section containing Colonel Reardon's insights and conclusions regarding the key aspects of a particular segment of the battle. An example is of Reardon's conclusions regarding the opening phase of the German counterattack include: "...Generalleutnant von Luettwitz's lack of aggressiveness ensured, that the Americans defending the northern shoulder were not confronted with a concentrated divisional attack, but battalion and regimental assaults spread over a wide front. The difficulties that plagued Panzer Division 2 stemmed in large part from the passive manner in which LXVII Panzer Korps coordinated the counteroffensive. Rather than take a position on the line of departure, where he could make critical decisions quickly. General der Panzertruppen von Funck contented himself with repeatedly telephoning Hausser to complain about Generalleutnant GrafvonSchwerin. Preoccupied with emotional matters, von Funck neglected to coordinate a corpswide reconnaissance effort in advance of the counteroffensive that would have detected many of the American defensive positions as well as the gaps between these positions. If XLVII Panzer Korps had conducted preparatory reconnaissance, the counteroffensive might have gained enough momentum to permit the Germans to recuperate from the poorly coordinated opening phase. This course of action, however, presupposes central direction by XLVII Panzer Korps. With effective command and control by the Germans sorely lacking at division and corps level during the critical opening hours, it is no wonder that elements of five panzer and panzergrenadier divisions failed to overwhelm an under-strength American infantry division. Although the panzers physically occupied the same battlefield, operationally they were unable to provide mutual support for each other. The XLVII Panzer Korps plan did not provide for corpswide artillery coordination, the shifting of forces to exploit success, complementary reconnaissance operations, or maneuver options that permitted one panzer division to enter the sector of another for the purposes of outflanking stubborn defenders. Bound by a rigid concept of operation, the Germans did not exhibit the tactical or operational flexibility required to overcome the 30th Infantry Division on the morning of 7 August..." "Victory at Mortain" is an excellently researched insight into a here to for relatively obscure, yet critical aspect of the Normandy campaign. Based upon review of the books bibliography it is apparent that Mark Reardon has relied heavily on personal interviews he has conducted with numerous American and German veterans of the Battle. In addition, numerous archival after-action-reports from both German and American combat units were apparently utilized to bring out rare insights into the battle. I would highly recommend Colonel Reardon's work to students of World War II military history.
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