Customer Reviews

Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

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I bought this book at the Army War College after hearing its author speak to the Army Strategy Conference on "Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power." I have posted 29 pages of notes at Earth Intelligence Network, with a page or two from Jim Locher's brilliant luncheon presentation.

Having spent the evening with this book, and with an understanding of what the Project on National Security Reform will be providing to the next President of the United States, I found the book totally inspiring, and most important for what it represents as proof that "Phase II" of national security reform is not just possible, but likely in 2009.

A few highlights:

1) The service chiefs fought this bitterly, to include lies and deceptions and fabricated studies.

2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Jones, and later Crowe, get high praise for having the gumption to call for reform in the first case, and agree with reform in the second, but they were virtual outcasts for doing so.

3) Senator Sam Nunn will be back. As I look at the make-up of the Project, which also benefits from Newt Gingrich's brilliance and his mastery of history and House protocol, I have a very strong feeling that the follow-on to Goldwater-Nichols, a National Security Act of 2009, is not just viable, but undefeatable.

4) I've known Jim Locher as a thoughtful and courteous person for over a decade, and this book confirms my personal view that he is one of the most loyal, dedicated, intelligent, and responsible individuals we have, totally committed to public service in the purest sense of the word. The reviewer who demeans the author has no basis, in my view, for his negative judgement.

I have just one worry: everyone is beginning to realize that neither John McCain nor Barack Obama have a strong bench, and at the same time everyone I talk to seems to believe they will repeat the long-standing mistake of seeking to implement a single-party executive. This they must not be allowed to do. Please visit Reuniting America to understand the concept of Transpartisanship, in which ALL parties (including Libertarians, Reforms, Greens, and others) share leadership positions so that we might harness the COMPLETE distributed intelligence of the entire Nation.

The Project will provide a preliminary report on Phase II of national security reform in early July 2008, and a longer report in September 2008. Once a President is elected, a complete set of Presidential directives, draft legislation, and recommended amendments to Congressional jurisdictions and protocols, will be provided so that the President might be ready to implement national security reform within 100 days of taking office. We cannot wait for the Quadrennial Defense Review in the second year of the Presidency; those focusing their time on influencing that document would be well-advised to contribute shorter versions of their work sooner to the Project. By 1 May 2008.

In his comments today at the Army War College, the author told us that everyone said this would be impossible; that it was lunatic, and so on. This book is a deep historical account of how good intentions across party lines can achieve the impossible and serve the public. While I disrespect both party machines for failing to control a reckless and arrogant presidency hijacked by the vice president, I do believe that we can create a narrative on the need for reform that the public will accept and then demand of its Congress.

I will miss Barry Goldwater, the last true conservative I remember, but I am, in putting this book down, confident that John McCain and Sam Nunn and others can find common ground. This book proves the impossible can be achieved, and I believe this book is essential substantiation that the next step: civilian professionalization, inter-agency operations and authorities, multinational information sharing, a robust "white hat" capability, and a national open source agency that can influence how $2 trillion a year in other people's money is spent eradicating the ten high level threats to humanity, are all achievable in the near term.

See also my reviews of the following books that complement this one:
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence
Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command
Bureaucratic Politics And Foreign Policy
The Pathology of Power
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
Breach of Trust: How Washington Turns Outsiders Into Insiders
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

This is quite easily one of the best books I've ever read on the creation of public policy. Locher paints a full and colorful picture of the military reform efforts culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I never realized what a role the Beirut/Lebanon operations played in creating an atmosphere in which military reform began to be viewed as necessary, and I found both the strategy and actions used to push the legislation through the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985-86 particularly fascinating. With regards to balancing personal insights and meticulous research, in my opinion "Victory on the Potomac" is unequalled, and I consider it one of the top prizes in my personal library. If your interests include public policy, successful reform attempts or the organization of the U.S. military, you will find this book to be an entertaining and informative treasure.

Any military officer, from any nation in the world, should read this epic story. The lessons are legion. And just because 'the adventure' happens in the 1980s, the truth is that the same battles are being fought today, with the same examples of partisanship, tribalism and the seemingly default position of man 'not to cooperate with his fellow man'.

We need to change that paradigm and this book helps show you how.

This book is an outstanding history of the four year process necessary to introduce meaningful reforms of the command structure into the U.S. Defense Establishment. The process involved courageous champions from the military services, equally courageous and bipartisan senators and congressman, and dedicated and knowledgeable legislative staffers. It is a story of persistence and dedication to the cause of reform in the U.S. Military.

In the wake of WWII the U.S. Congress passed the 1947 National Security Act. This act was meant to unify the U.S. Defense Establishment and enhance inter-service cooperation. Unfortunately, the military services, especially the U.S. Navy, pushed back hard and in the end were able to maintain their services autonomies within the newly created Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In the same way the so-called unified commands were unified in name only. And most seriously the command and control (C2) system under the Act was so convoluted that it contributed to the repeated breakdown of military C2 systems and tragically led to a lot of preventable U.S. military casualties.

Locher provides what appears to be an accurate and authentic history of the execution of a complex process to reform the command structure of the U.S. Military. He also notes that two military officers, General David Jones and Admiral William Crowe were willing to rise of above service parochialism to strongly support this process. But it is the late Senator Berry Goldwater and Senator Sam Nunn of the SASC who Locher singles out for specific praise. Both men put national security well ahead of partisan politics and joined with Representative Bill Nicholls to build a comprehensive reform bill. Yet it was the SASC staff that actually made the reform process move forward. In the end the reformers prevailed and the Goldwater-Nichols act became law. The changes it introduced were important and clearly needed. Both the positions of Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS were considerably strengthened and the military C2 system immensely improved.

The U.S. Navy was strongly opposed to the reform movement and argued that it would destroy the competency of all four services. It would be easy to pillory the Navy as an obstructionist and parochial institution, but Locher does not do this. He is even handed and fair throughout this book. In truth hard fought though the battle over reform was there were no villains of the same magnitude as the two heroes of the story Goldwater and Nunn. The only person in this tale that comes off somewhat dubious is John Lehman then Secretary of the Navy who is portrayed as both devious and disloyal.


This book is an important contribution to the history of the U.S. Military Establishment and Locher did an excellent job. But the book is more than that. It is a blueprint showing how reform can be implemented against large and bureaucratically entrenched organizations. The U.S. Intelligence Community comes immediately to mind.

Fantastic case study of Congress in action. Without tooting his own horn too much, Locher presents a great first person account of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) became law and made the US stronger. This amazing achievement occurred despite a bitter Navy, a stone-walling Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), and a non-committal President (Reagan). Due to a strong bi-partisan relationship between Senators Nunn and Goldwater (among many others in Congress), this needed piece of legislation became law. Locher tells the story from his perspective as a staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee. So perhaps the House side is a little less than thorough. Locher also points out the negative aspects of all those who opposed GNA. Still, Locher is fairer than most people when they are fully committed to a seriously important change in law. Most interesting to me was reading how ineffective Weinberger was as SecDef. He was so unwilling to negotiate that he became largely irrelevant and he missed out on any number of opportunities to have a serious impact on GNA. Locher would probably be the first to say that GNA did not fix all of the problems with the military regarding cooperation in taking on serious missions, but GNA has certainly helped.
Along with Showdown at Gucci Gulch and The System, this is one of three great policy process case studies. Most importantly, it shows how Congress can have a strong influence on the military, foreign policy, and America's national security - even in areas that are normally considered to be the president's prerogative.

Jim Locher tells the fascinating story of how Congress forced the Pentagon to undergo major reform in the mid-1980s. Locher, who was a major participant in the process, tells the inside story of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and really takes the gloves off. Locher is a careful researcher and skillful writer who demonstrates vividly the courage of Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, Congressman Bill Nichols, Admiral Bill Crowe and others. Locher highlights both the brilliance and the manipulative skills of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in the debates and interactions between the Congress and the Pentagon. . My only criticism is that Locher is a bit too critical of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger who did so much to build up the military during the early 1980s. Must reading for all who will work with or within the Pentagon or the Congress in the years ahead

My rating is in the middle because the book should be required reading for anyone who wants to know how Goldwater-Nichols came about, however, at the same time, it is extremely biased in its delivery, analysis and conclusions. The author was appointed by Senators Nunn (D) and Goldwater (R) to be the senior reorganization staffer who, "led the team that helped congress 'get smart' on this complex but critically important subject." Because of Locher's involvement from the Act's beginning through to its approval, which gives him unique insight, he has a vested interest in presenting his justifications for the Act in a positive light. This is best seen in his portrayals of the principals involved; those who supported reform are heroes who were not afraid to stand up to the establishment and the institutionalized bureaucracy. Those who opposed Goldwater-Nichols were more interested in their own power and often presented emotional rather than factual or issues based arguments.

Unfortunately, the book was published in 2002, which means the work was done before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; it would be interesting to see his analysis of the relationship between the SECDEF and the JCS now.

Bottom line: if you're interested in how Goldwater-Nichols evolved, buy the book; I did, and I have no regrets. But read it with a (big) grain of salt.

The book arrived in the estimated time and in the condition advertised by this seller.