LBJ and Vietnam (Administrative History of the Johnson Presidency) [Hardcover]

George C. Herring (Author), Emmette S. Redford (Foreword), James E. Anderson (Foreword)

Book Description

Publication Date: 1994 | Series: Administrative History of the Johnson Presidency

Analyzes why the Johnson administration conducted the Vietnam War as it did, and discusses the concept of a limited war.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

In this compelling analysis of President Lyndon Johnson's management of the war in Vietnam, Herring ( America's Longest War ) proposes that LBJ's style of leadership adversely affected the war's outcome. Characterizing Johnson as "a flamboyant and impulsive man in a situation that demanded restraint," Herring suggests that the president's obsessive secrecy, his urge to control everything and his craving for approval contributed to the failure of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. He maintains that Johnson discouraged the open exchange of ideas in discussions with advisers and failed to encourage cooperation or coordination among those directing the war effort. The air war against the North, for instance, operated separately from the ground war in the South, and the air war in Laos was separate from both. LBJ's most grievous failure, according to Herring, was his neglecting to give strategic guidelines to military and civilian representatives running the operations and pacification programs in the field. Impressively argued, this study constitutes a solid addition to our understanding of the Vietnam War and a president.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Herring, a professor of history at the University of Kentucky and the author of numerous books on war and diplomacy (e.g., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, LJ 7/83), contributes the 11th book to this series on the Johnson presidency. The author critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion, arguing that LBJ's management style was framed by his commitment to fighting a limited war and his inability when setting policy to side with either the hawks or the doves within his administration. Presenting LJB's major policy initiatives from their formulation through implementation, Herring shows that in each instance, the administration's flawed management failed to meet the challenges encountered. This concise, well-researched account offers a unique perspective on previously studied events, making this volume a valued addition to undergraduate and graduate collections. Recommended.
Robert Favini, Bentley Coll. Lib., Waltham, Mass.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 244 pages
• Publisher: University of Texas Press; 1st edition (1994)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0292730853
• ISBN-13: 978-0292730854
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.8 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,879,517 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

George C. Herring is Alumni Professor of History Emeritus at the University of Kentucky. His book in the Oxford History of the United States series, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 won the Robert Ferrell Prize of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and was a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award. A leading authority on U.S. foreign relations, he is the former editor of Diplomatic History and a past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He is the author of America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, among other books. He lives in Lexington, Kentucky.