Customer Reviews

Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency

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People at Central Intelligence are smart. Mistakes are made, but not from being stupid. Most have been from an attitude of "being above it all." But they recognize the human urge to sum up and reflect at the end of a career and give terminal officers time and resources to write history. This book is a good example of what can be done. While the bibliography is limited, the footnotes are wonderful. If I were doing the bibliography I would have included books by John Sullivan (boxing) and Orrin De Forest (Bien Hoa and running by the book.) So you can expect all the benefits of a person having many records to consult and a good sense of what happened from 1954 to 1975. That should be enough to make it important as a scholarly resource. PhD's have been given for less work.

Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam

Gatekeeper: Memoirs of a CIA Polygraph Examiner

But there are details to pick on, especially from who served in Vietnam and was always with the Infantry (one year) or out in the Provinces. I came to see the Saigon warriors as those who would visit our province in the morning, but who always left before evening and who would never ever go to the districts with us to see the work. They knew all about intelligence but never bothered to register agents or even to run name checks. Gregg did serve in Bien Hoa and did good work there, but Saigon was 15 minutes away by car. DeForest had spent time with the Japanese security services and did all of the paper work he knew to do and created more to help his work. For an example "General Sinh" is listed as being police chief in Bien Hoa, but is not listed in the index. Neither is Bien Hoa or Colonel Sinh who ran the interrogation center.

The book mentions contractors used as field officers, but never explains why or what the alternatives were. The Station had limits on how many staffers were allowed to serve and contractors were allowed to fil empty positions. But why not train them? And what about the staff officer who spent a year building model airplanes in his office? How effective was he? Or all the staff officers who refused to go to Vietnam? After a while anyone who was sent was seen to be a "loser" in their division.


The whole contract system created a "second class" who received discrimination, were given the worst jobs and expected to stay loyal. But they did. The traitors (like Ames) were all staffers. But the whole system of contractors and staffers was a mistake. You don't set up someone to fail, if you know better.

The claim that the Delta had the best operations should be read again in the light of Sullivan's book. Most of the super ops were fabrications. In my opinion, the best resource was contacted in Tay Ninh.

By the by, maps on stock paper never look all that good and the shades are just about impossible to tell from each other.

Read this book. It is a valuable part of the record. Use it and consider the conclusions. But do not take them for granted. It could have turned out better.

Read the other side:

Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam
A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam