Customer Reviews

The Violence of Peace: America's Wars in the Age of Obama

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Initially, I was not inclined to purchase this book. Its subtitle suggested a range of focus far too narrow ("America's Wars in the Age of Obama"). And since the author is a liberal Ivy League law school professor (yes, I know that description is redundant in the extreme), I figured this would be another paean to "hope and change" or a polemical indictment of Bush's war policies. But I was wrong.

First, the scope of the book is far greater than Obama's conduct of the three ongoing American conflicts: the Iraq War, the Afghanistan War, and the War on Terror. Yes, Professor Carter does dissect the President's military policies but he does so in the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, drawing upon useful historical parallels and analyzing the views of many of the right's best thinkers (e.g., Judge Posner) as well as those from the left (Jean Bethke Elshtain).

Second, considering the author's own liberal predilections, the book is quite balanced and unfailingly analytical. Carter defends his thesis--that the similarities between Bush and Obama war policies are far greater than the differences (though the subtle differences are important)--convincingly. Further, he bends over backwards to give the Bush Administration a fair hearing. Indeed, I thought he was too kind in his willingness to give Bush the benefit of the doubt on his administration's faith in the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But, as he adroitly notes, even if Saddam had possessed WMDs, that, standing alone, was not justification for the invasion since there was no indication that Iraq intended to use whatever weapons it did possess against us or our allies.

Carter rightly notes, without being cynical, that Obama's aggressive use of predator drones and prisoner renditions is motivated primarily by his realization that the terrorist threats are real and that, above all else, Obama wants to be reelected in 2012. I, think, however, that he dwells a bit too much on Obama's reference to the concept of a "just war" in his Nobel peace prize acceptance speech. This was little more than a rhetorical flourish on the President's part, though I must admit that Carter's discussion of the origins of the "just war" concept was interesting.

I disagree with Carter, however, in his efforts to characterize the Afghan War as a "preventive" or "preemptive" conflict, rather than a war of self-defense (a "war of necessity," as described by both Bush and Obama). He believes the self-defense rationale is inappropriate because, at the time we invaded Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was not engaging in any actual attacks against America. While that may be technically true, we did not know whether another attack was imminent. Moreover, most people will not embrace a definition of self-defense that is limited only to those situations where your adversary continuously, without hiatus, attacks you. The fact that your adversary lacks the resources (e.g., runs out of ammunition periodically) to fire at you unceasingly does not mean that he is only a "weekend warrior," especially when that enemy has a history of attacking your people and property throughout the world. In fairness, Carter isn't suggesting that preventive or preemptive wars are inherently wrong; nevertheless, his concept of national self-defense is far too restrictive.

As you can see, Professor Carter made me think. And you can't ask much more from a book. In an age when the Current Affairs shelves at the local bookstore seem filled mostly with vapid polemics, it was a pleasant surprise to stumble upon a thoughtful examination of the military challenges we face. Highly recommended.

I actually didn't purchase this book but, seeing it in my local library, I scooped it up because the dust cover hinted at a professor (who happened to be unknown to me) approaching the war policies of Obama in a fresh and different way. Given his subject, and the inordinate time he spends discussing just war theory and the obligations laid on America by her superpower status, I regret that this book was written before our involvement in Libya; I think that, much more than Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya would have provided great grist for Carter's mill.

I regret that, in all of his arguments (and they were very intellectually honest and thoughtful), Carter doesn't actually answer the fundamental question of WHY just war theory is a superior way to analyze the decision to go to war or why being a superpower obligates America to be the designated war-maker when there is a moral cause.
The question of why just war theory is appropriate is very important because it is both novel (war has almost never been altruistic) and inappropriate on the surface. Nations that go to war to be morally good have historically never looked back on the action with pride and satisfaction; whether it was the numerous Crusades (only the first of which was successful) to free a Christian holy place from Islam, England intervening in both world wars because Germany's leadership was (in their view) morally bankrupt, or America stepping into many conflicts (Cuba, World War I, Korea, Vietnam), nations invariably look back on the triumph of moral goodness over national self-interest with sorrow. Because this is the case, Carter needed to justify treating moral goodness as the best cause for the resort to war; he did not do so.
The other why that I believe Carter fails to answer is why having the capacity to make war and win war (the essence of being a superpower) obligates America to go to war for a moral end. Commentators on superpower status, thinking of England's rise and fall as an imperial power, have argued that to be a superpower is to have the power to win a great war; accompanying this argument, they have noted that remaining a superpower requires that one never fights a great war. The British Empire did not suffer strategic defeat until it confronted the vast German military machine in continental Europe and was rescued from disaster only by America (who came to bitterly regret her foolishness). When it suffered the same drubbing for the same reason and had to be rescued the same way, it ceased to be a superpower. This is a powerful historical association and with his apparently well-educated perspective, Carter ought to have refuted it or at least convincingly confronted it; he did not do so.

As an aside, and noting that this is merely a personal gripe instead of me believing that it harms the book, I was disappointed that when discussing the circumstances of Lt. Michael P Murphy's Medal of Honor, Carter seemed to be ignorant about the treatment of the same matter in Mark Thiessen's book "Courting Disaster." This disappointed me because being unaware of the treatment let Carter to assert that we do not know whether the Navy SEAL unit to which Murphy belong was influenced by the fear of civilian law in the decision that led to the ambush in which Lt. Murphy was killed; Thiessen's interview with the surviving SEAL made it clear that this was the case. This seemed to me to have very good potential as a place to discuss whether taking normally immoral actions to save your life and the lives of others is acceptable in just war theory and I believe that Carter would have had some interesting and thoughtful contributions to offer.

I believe that if Carter had fought and won those two intellectual contests (or at least made a good showing), the full potential of his book explaining the application of just war theory during the stewardship of Obama would have been realized; it would have been a 4 or 5-star book instead of a 3-star one and would have been a truly great component of the overall constellation of scholarly arguments on this subject.

Amazing analysis of our stance on just and non just wars. Done with detachment and in a way that is non partisan.

Another important philosophical work on why we fight wars, what he criteria ought to be. Should be read by all especially quick draw warhawks. A well wqritten well thought out body of work. Highly recommend.

Excepting its length, this work is actually a fairly tough read au currant...but certainly full of mediate and critical details. The centri-typical problem of any sort of War Theory is relative interest, and collaboration(association). In other words, how accurate and relevant can theory be without some degree of implementation. So of course their seems a great gird of convolution - which is, I assume, what would allow a reader to mistake TVOP for a liberal stance - but in my opinion the work is, in its analytical form, a mediation. I think particular attention should be prayed upon comparisons of jus in bello to game theory given the pretension of police to want to act like soldiers: "The idea is to encourage compliance with the rules, by making the costs of noncompliance too high--in short, to deter breaches." Which is plain, just after a quotation from Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus which must be compared with Blackstone's Formulation and other Formal Law(s) of Majority.
A brilliant mediation and reference work!!!