Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond [Hardcover]

Michael Ignatieff (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0805064907 | ISBN-13: 978-0805064902 | Publication Date: May 1, 2000 | Edition: First Edition

A brilliant analysis of the conflict in Kosovo and what it means for the future of warfare, by internationally renowned journalist and commentator Michael IgnatieffIn the vast tent city that sprang up in Macedonia to house Kosovar refugees, the most coveted commodity was not food or water but cell phones-a lifeline in the chaotic search for missing children, husbands, and parents. This was war at the of the twentieth century: from smart bombs to cell phones, technology ruled. For a decade, Michael Ignatieff has provided eyewitness accounts and penetrating analyses from the world's battle zones. In Virtual War, he describes the latest phase in modern combat: war fought by remote control. In "real" war, nations are mobilized, soldiers fight and die, victories are won. In virtual war, however, there is often no formal declaration of hostilities, the combatants are strike pilots and computer programmers, the nation enlists as a TV audience, and instead of defeat and victory there is only an uncertain game. Kosovo was such a virtual war, a war in which U.S. and NATO forces did the fighting but only Kosovars and Serbs did the dying. Ignatieff examines the conflict through the eyes of key players-politicians, diplomats, and generals-and through the experience of the victims, the refugees and civilians who suffered. As unrest continues in the Balkans, East Timor, and other places around the world, Ignatieff raises the troubling possibility that virtual wars, so much easier to fight, could become the way superpowers impose their will in the century ahead.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

The past decade has kept London-based journalist Ignatieff busy exploring ethnic nationalism and ethnic war. This latest work (portions of which have appeared in the New Yorker and elsewhere) completes an unplanned trilogy that took shape around current events. Like the trilogy's previous two titles (Blood and Belonging and The Warrior's Honor), this book critiques the West's selective use of military power to protect human rights and the failure of Western governments to "back principle with decisive military force"--but here Ignatieff pushes this critique a step further, attempting to explain the paradox of the West's moral activism around human rights and its unwillingness to use force or put its own soldiers at risk: war, he suggests, has ceased to be real to those with technological mastery. Whereas Kosovo "looked and sounded like a war" to those on the ground, it was a virtual event for citizens of NATO countries--it was "a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do." In other words, the basic equality of moral risk (kill or be killed) in traditional war was replaced by something akin to "a turkey shoot." In a series of profiles of major players in the Kosovo crisis (including American negotiator Richard Holbrook and war crimes prosecutor Louise Arbour and Aleksa Djilas, a Yugoslav opposed to the bombing), as well as in other writings--including a fine, concluding essay--the author presents a strong argument on the need to avoid wars that let the West off easily and don't have clear-cut results. Ignatieff offers an original analysis of the nature and repercussions of NATO's Kosovo campaign. Only when we have recognized the seductiveness and failures of virtual war, he warns, can we truly assess the risks and benefits of decisive action. This is a timely and provocative book for the politically astute reader. Author tour.
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the 1999 war in Kosovo, these works represent a worthy first draft of history. Freelance correspondent Judah explores the historical context underlying the Kosovo conflict and explains why NATO went to war in the misguided belief that a brief air campaign would force Slobodan Milosevic to buckle. He attributes the outbreak of war largely to human error on both sides: Serbian leaders refused to admit that their position in Kosovo was untenable, while the West sacrificed its credibility by repeatedly issuing empty threats of force and drastically underestimated the resolve of Belgrade to withstand a few days' bombardment. Ignatieff, a BBC commentator and eyewitness to the war, examines the troubling aspects of what he calls "virtual" war. Modern technology has made the West virtually unbeatable on the battlefield, while evolving notions of human rights have legitimized intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. Yet the detachment of Western citizens from recent wars, compounded by the widespread revulsion for casualties, dictated an ineffective military strategy in Kosovo. Allied aircraft delivered their munitions from 15,000 feet in order to prevent the loss of aircraft and crews. Thus, NATO military operations never addressed the political objectives justifying the war--notably, protecting Kosovar Albanians from Serb forces in the province. Ignatieff's thoughtful analysis helps explain why the West has seldom been able to back its lofty ideals with decisive force. Both works are strongly recommended for all libraries.
-James R. Holmes, Ph.D. Candidate, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, Belmont, MA,
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 176 pages
• Publisher: Metropolitan Books; First Edition edition (May 1, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0805064907
• ISBN-13: 978-0805064902
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.9 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 2.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,150,588 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

47 of 49 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Putting a Brave Face on a Fiasco., April 30, 2000

By A Customer

This review is from: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Hardcover)

A year on from the bombing of Yugoslavia much of Nato's rhetoric has been revealed to be at odds with the reality coming to light about events before, during and after the bombing. If Nato won any victory it was in the area of spin - and that only briefly. Michael Ignatieff has played his small part in that one. The early parts of this book which set out Nato arguments for bombing consequently have a dated air about them. What makes this book interesting, and worth its three stars, is that it is a well written attempt by an apparently informed commentator on Balkan affairs to present the facts and moral arguments in support of the bombing campaign. Unfortunately the arguments are based on 'facts' that are at best contestable, if not occasionally plain wrong, and on the ommission of information, one might have assumed he was aware of, that doesn't support his case. Perhaps his advocacy of internationalism over national sovereignty clouded his view. A debate , included here, about the rights and wrongs of humanitarian interventionsm with Robert Skidelsky, bears out this impression. In the long run his adversary, unburdened by an internationalist agenda, had a better grasp of the issues involved. Kosovo in March 1999 must have appeared as a good place to exercise the new doctrine of "humanitarian interventionism". Nato could prove, in time for its 50th anniversary bash, it still had relevance in the post cold war environment. Drawing the wrong conclusions from the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs prior to the Dayton agreements, Madeline Albright and the other advocates of bombing thought it would be over in a few days. Milosevic chastened, Nato vindicated, a new precedent created for intervention in sovereign states, etc. If it had gone to plan Ignatieff's book, like Nato's birthday party might have been a more triumphal affair. If he starts by banging a drum for intervention by the end he is ambivalent. After 78 days of bombing Nato, in its targetting of the civilian infrastructure had effectively blown apart the arguments Ignatieff lays down as a prerequisite for a moral campaign. Nato credibility had a higher priority than humanitarian objectives. If they were prepared to go to war for the Kosovo Albanians they weren't prepared to die for them. The simple fact Nato was prepared to seed the very environment the Albanians were to return to with radioactive dust from depleted uranium munitions, and with unexploded cluster bombs ( 25,000 at last count) in order to force a victory over the Serbs illustrates the distance between intentions and actions. To his credit Ignatieff visits Belgrade after the bombing to face some of his former Yugoslav friends; notably Aleksa Djilas, son of dissident Milovan Djilas, who are now on the other side of the divide. His long essay 'Virtual War', at the end of the book,is a sober assessment of the practice of waging war with apparent impunity in the age of precision guided munitions. As an initial advocate of the bombing he at least has the courage to face up to the consequences.

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars An interesting series of essays, April 21, 2003

By 

Graymac "graymac" (Applesauce, MO) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Paperback)

I bought this book a couple of years ago but did not get around to reading it until last week, shortly after the war in Iraq ended (more or less). I was curious to see what kind of perspective it would offer not only on the Kosovo campaign but on the war in Iraq. I found it both a useful refresher on a very different battle, the 79 day air campaign against Serbia, and an interesting meditation on modern war.

The front end of this book consists of a series of snapshots of different aspects of the war, along with a couple of arguments Ignatieff has with fellow intellectuals. Several reviewers on this site wrote that they couldn't see the connection between these bits of reportage with the latter half of the book, which is an extended essay on aspects of modern, "virtual" war. I think they're perhaps not trying very hard, as the longer essay quite obviously tackles in a disciplined fashion the themes raised in the reportage--international law, the revolution in military affairs, values, societal support or the lack thereof for political decisions to move toward war.

Ignatieff is often clear-thinking. It is a bit startling to read this book, written in 1999-2000, talking about the merits of regime change in places like Iraq and Serbia/FRY. He is likewise prophetic in noting how the revolution in military affairs created an incentive for the Saddams of the world to seek a countervailing military threat in the form of chemical and biological weapons.

Where he is perhaps a bit less far-sighted is in failing to see that the precedent of a "virtual war" in Kosovo--by which he means a zero-casualty, low-cost war (for the attacking side only, of course), that is not legitimised by international law or blessed by the kind of domestic support that must be whipped up to permit a high-cost, full mobilization "real war", with real casualties on both sides--could be used to support not only human rights' causes but narrower interests.

Overall this is a book well worth reading. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding what goes into a modern war.

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Phenomenal book on the changing nature of warfare, June 28, 2001

By 

P. Bjel (Richmond Hill, Canada) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Hardcover)

This book, written by a unique and highly knowledgeable military historian and journalist/broadcaster (okay, and a fellow Canadian!), is quite simply one of the most memorable books that I have read. Looking for further information on the Kosovo war, I came across Michael Ignatieff's current masterpiece and found something unlike other books.

What is a `Virtual War'? What distinguishes it from traditional `Real Wars'? Simply put, it is the traditional method of warfare, where two (or perhaps more) opponents engage in fighting on battlefields for the sake of securing territory. There are one-on-one confrontations, there is direct killing (justified by self-defense; kill or be killed) and the war is very much a reality to those who fight it, as well as those that work behind the lines to provide the means by which battles can be waged (e.g. armaments and uniform production). Hence, war is a reality in `real wars.' Virtual wars, on the other hand, do not involve such traditional means by which to wage war. In such instances, it is technology that is the backbone of military strength, not personnel. The very word `virtual' is defining of this war: "existing in effect, though not in fact." Those behind the front lines are glued to television screens and press reports; the only sources of information about the wars. Because we see targets within the scopes of missile ranges, we see the effects of aggression. But the location is so far away and beyond the knowledge of the commonplace populace that many of us do not see this as a conflict, or war. We do not know why this war is happening, only that something is happening.

All the crushing (and devastating) weaponry spawns from technological innovation that began toward the end of the Cold War, when the US and the USSR could not outdo each other in the production of nuclear arsenal that, logically, could not be used anytime. There was a stalemate in the arms race, and the only way that it could be broken would be through the production and development of conventional weapons that the opponent did not have. As Ignatieff writes: "The beauty of such weapons was that, unlike the nuclear arsenal, they could be used." On impunity: "From the beginning...technology was in search of impunity. War that could actually be fought had to be as bloodless, risk-free and precise as possible." In Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and most recently Kosovo, there was now a technological capability that made a nation like the US strong, as this technology could actually be used.

Because of this development and revolutionary change, the battlefield has become obsolete. The nature and enactment of warfare (and the targets) have changed for good. In Kosovo, nerve centers became primary targets of strikes. In the past, it was industrial complexes that were primary targets because they were the bloods behind the war machine, producing military hardware. Now, the nerve centers mentioned are command posts, computer and Internet networks because they drive the war machine. "A blinded enemy - without computers, telephones or power - may still have forces capable of attack, but he no longer has the capacity to order them into battle." In the process of hitting such nerve centers in Yugoslavia, NATO knocked out not just television and Internet service providers, but also electricity that powered hospitals, infant incubators and water pumps. In the words of Ignatieff: "...warfare directed at a society's nervous system, rather than against its fielded forces, necessarily blurs the distinction between civilian and military objectives...There is no guarantee that war directed at the nervous system of a society will be any less savage than war directed only at its troops." The blurring of such integral distinction; yet another characteristic of virtual war. The very nature of warfare has changed: "one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war." Virtual war is a dangerous and frightening phenomenon: they do not appear to be real to citizens of nations. Therefore, if impunity is guaranteed and military action is cost-free, what democratic restraints will be there to govern the use of force? "If war becomes virtual - and without risk - democratic electorates may be more willing to fight especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself." Sounds familiar? Look at Kosovo, where NATO claimed that it intervened for the sake of human rights abuses (at least this was the message to the listening and watching public), yet this moral claim is amoral when compounded with NATO's unwillingness to risk its own soldiers' lives. With its unwillingness to take casualties, how can NATO call themselves defenders of human rights?

Hence, the real risks of virtual war are apparent for those that can decipher and plow through the virtual reality into the real. Michael Ignatieff's work tops off with these words: "Only the most devoted attention to what is real can help us to make judgments and take actions which are both responsible and efficacious." It all waters down to reality checks and thoughts for the future; while progression is something to be lauded, it is also something that requires checks and balances in order to hinder it from spinning out of control. Do we have those kinds of checks to really inform more than just a few?

Ignatieff's book left a tremendous impression on my conscience and my mind. Awareness is most certainly defense, just like the adage "knowledge is power." But there can be no hope without some real risk. To quote Ignatieff one more time: "Virtual reality is seductive." Although I had not read that far into Virtual War when this happened, I mentioned the prospect of virtual war to my Dad, who was fixing a window. "I wouldn't worry about it," he told me. "There are too many checks and balances to hinder a maniac from blowing the world up." Only that night, when I closed the book in completion, did it hit me.