Customer Reviews

Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond

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A year on from the bombing of Yugoslavia much of Nato's rhetoric has been revealed to be at odds with the reality coming to light about events before, during and after the bombing. If Nato won any victory it was in the area of spin - and that only briefly. Michael Ignatieff has played his small part in that one. The early parts of this book which set out Nato arguments for bombing consequently have a dated air about them. What makes this book interesting, and worth its three stars, is that it is a well written attempt by an apparently informed commentator on Balkan affairs to present the facts and moral arguments in support of the bombing campaign. Unfortunately the arguments are based on 'facts' that are at best contestable, if not occasionally plain wrong, and on the ommission of information, one might have assumed he was aware of, that doesn't support his case. Perhaps his advocacy of internationalism over national sovereignty clouded his view. A debate , included here, about the rights and wrongs of humanitarian interventionsm with Robert Skidelsky, bears out this impression. In the long run his adversary, unburdened by an internationalist agenda, had a better grasp of the issues involved. Kosovo in March 1999 must have appeared as a good place to exercise the new doctrine of "humanitarian interventionism". Nato could prove, in time for its 50th anniversary bash, it still had relevance in the post cold war environment. Drawing the wrong conclusions from the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs prior to the Dayton agreements, Madeline Albright and the other advocates of bombing thought it would be over in a few days. Milosevic chastened, Nato vindicated, a new precedent created for intervention in sovereign states, etc. If it had gone to plan Ignatieff's book, like Nato's birthday party might have been a more triumphal affair. If he starts by banging a drum for intervention by the end he is ambivalent. After 78 days of bombing Nato, in its targetting of the civilian infrastructure had effectively blown apart the arguments Ignatieff lays down as a prerequisite for a moral campaign. Nato credibility had a higher priority than humanitarian objectives. If they were prepared to go to war for the Kosovo Albanians they weren't prepared to die for them. The simple fact Nato was prepared to seed the very environment the Albanians were to return to with radioactive dust from depleted uranium munitions, and with unexploded cluster bombs ( 25,000 at last count) in order to force a victory over the Serbs illustrates the distance between intentions and actions. To his credit Ignatieff visits Belgrade after the bombing to face some of his former Yugoslav friends; notably Aleksa Djilas, son of dissident Milovan Djilas, who are now on the other side of the divide. His long essay 'Virtual War', at the end of the book,is a sober assessment of the practice of waging war with apparent impunity in the age of precision guided munitions. As an initial advocate of the bombing he at least has the courage to face up to the consequences.

I bought this book a couple of years ago but did not get around to reading it until last week, shortly after the war in Iraq ended (more or less). I was curious to see what kind of perspective it would offer not only on the Kosovo campaign but on the war in Iraq. I found it both a useful refresher on a very different battle, the 79 day air campaign against Serbia, and an interesting meditation on modern war.

The front end of this book consists of a series of snapshots of different aspects of the war, along with a couple of arguments Ignatieff has with fellow intellectuals. Several reviewers on this site wrote that they couldn't see the connection between these bits of reportage with the latter half of the book, which is an extended essay on aspects of modern, "virtual" war. I think they're perhaps not trying very hard, as the longer essay quite obviously tackles in a disciplined fashion the themes raised in the reportage--international law, the revolution in military affairs, values, societal support or the lack thereof for political decisions to move toward war.

Ignatieff is often clear-thinking. It is a bit startling to read this book, written in 1999-2000, talking about the merits of regime change in places like Iraq and Serbia/FRY. He is likewise prophetic in noting how the revolution in military affairs created an incentive for the Saddams of the world to seek a countervailing military threat in the form of chemical and biological weapons.

Where he is perhaps a bit less far-sighted is in failing to see that the precedent of a "virtual war" in Kosovo--by which he means a zero-casualty, low-cost war (for the attacking side only, of course), that is not legitimised by international law or blessed by the kind of domestic support that must be whipped up to permit a high-cost, full mobilization "real war", with real casualties on both sides--could be used to support not only human rights' causes but narrower interests.

Overall this is a book well worth reading. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding what goes into a modern war.

This book, written by a unique and highly knowledgeable military historian and journalist/broadcaster (okay, and a fellow Canadian!), is quite simply one of the most memorable books that I have read. Looking for further information on the Kosovo war, I came across Michael Ignatieff's current masterpiece and found something unlike other books.

What is a `Virtual War'? What distinguishes it from traditional `Real Wars'? Simply put, it is the traditional method of warfare, where two (or perhaps more) opponents engage in fighting on battlefields for the sake of securing territory. There are one-on-one confrontations, there is direct killing (justified by self-defense; kill or be killed) and the war is very much a reality to those who fight it, as well as those that work behind the lines to provide the means by which battles can be waged (e.g. armaments and uniform production). Hence, war is a reality in `real wars.' Virtual wars, on the other hand, do not involve such traditional means by which to wage war. In such instances, it is technology that is the backbone of military strength, not personnel. The very word `virtual' is defining of this war: "existing in effect, though not in fact." Those behind the front lines are glued to television screens and press reports; the only sources of information about the wars. Because we see targets within the scopes of missile ranges, we see the effects of aggression. But the location is so far away and beyond the knowledge of the commonplace populace that many of us do not see this as a conflict, or war. We do not know why this war is happening, only that something is happening.

All the crushing (and devastating) weaponry spawns from technological innovation that began toward the end of the Cold War, when the US and the USSR could not outdo each other in the production of nuclear arsenal that, logically, could not be used anytime. There was a stalemate in the arms race, and the only way that it could be broken would be through the production and development of conventional weapons that the opponent did not have. As Ignatieff writes: "The beauty of such weapons was that, unlike the nuclear arsenal, they could be used." On impunity: "From the beginning...technology was in search of impunity. War that could actually be fought had to be as bloodless, risk-free and precise as possible." In Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and most recently Kosovo, there was now a technological capability that made a nation like the US strong, as this technology could actually be used.

Because of this development and revolutionary change, the battlefield has become obsolete. The nature and enactment of warfare (and the targets) have changed for good. In Kosovo, nerve centers became primary targets of strikes. In the past, it was industrial complexes that were primary targets because they were the bloods behind the war machine, producing military hardware. Now, the nerve centers mentioned are command posts, computer and Internet networks because they drive the war machine. "A blinded enemy - without computers, telephones or power - may still have forces capable of attack, but he no longer has the capacity to order them into battle." In the process of hitting such nerve centers in Yugoslavia, NATO knocked out not just television and Internet service providers, but also electricity that powered hospitals, infant incubators and water pumps. In the words of Ignatieff: "...warfare directed at a society's nervous system, rather than against its fielded forces, necessarily blurs the distinction between civilian and military objectives...There is no guarantee that war directed at the nervous system of a society will be any less savage than war directed only at its troops." The blurring of such integral distinction; yet another characteristic of virtual war. The very nature of warfare has changed: "one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war." Virtual war is a dangerous and frightening phenomenon: they do not appear to be real to citizens of nations. Therefore, if impunity is guaranteed and military action is cost-free, what democratic restraints will be there to govern the use of force? "If war becomes virtual - and without risk - democratic electorates may be more willing to fight especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself." Sounds familiar? Look at Kosovo, where NATO claimed that it intervened for the sake of human rights abuses (at least this was the message to the listening and watching public), yet this moral claim is amoral when compounded with NATO's unwillingness to risk its own soldiers' lives. With its unwillingness to take casualties, how can NATO call themselves defenders of human rights?

Hence, the real risks of virtual war are apparent for those that can decipher and plow through the virtual reality into the real. Michael Ignatieff's work tops off with these words: "Only the most devoted attention to what is real can help us to make judgments and take actions which are both responsible and efficacious." It all waters down to reality checks and thoughts for the future; while progression is something to be lauded, it is also something that requires checks and balances in order to hinder it from spinning out of control. Do we have those kinds of checks to really inform more than just a few?

Ignatieff's book left a tremendous impression on my conscience and my mind. Awareness is most certainly defense, just like the adage "knowledge is power." But there can be no hope without some real risk. To quote Ignatieff one more time: "Virtual reality is seductive." Although I had not read that far into Virtual War when this happened, I mentioned the prospect of virtual war to my Dad, who was fixing a window. "I wouldn't worry about it," he told me. "There are too many checks and balances to hinder a maniac from blowing the world up." Only that night, when I closed the book in completion, did it hit me.

As it is the case with many western jurnalists, conclusions and statements made by Mr. Ignatieff are very shallow. The events since 1999 proved that his conclusions are not worth spending time on reading this book.

Before going on, it is important to point out that Ignatieff is a journalist, NOT a historian. While both are required to check their facts for accuracy, the journalist permits personal opinion and argument to fill in all the holes, something to make the historian dissociate himself from friends in the press.

Let me quote two arguments in the book. "Democracies may well remain peace loving only so long as the risks of war remain real to their citizens." (p. 179) "We keep waging war, not because we want to, but because we have seeded a doubt about our seriousness which only a concerted display of violence. . can eradicate." (p. 205)

If these sentiments seem cogent, this book is for you.

The ex-Yugoslavia is past stomping grounds for Ignatieff, so the conflicts here are dear to his heart. He blames the massacres in Bosnia on "Presidential inaction" rather than on local warlords. His take on Kosovo was to prescribe immediate militarization but then to blame ministers and presidents for side-stepping legislatures and to proceed without UN mandates for this militarization. He calls the bombing of Baghdad in the Gulf War "a light show" and the bombing campaign a "video-arcade game." This idea was the darling of the press in 1991, but the notion is a direct affront to alliance pilots who needed only to look out their windows to see anti-aircraft fire trying to shoot them down. Ignatieff himself speaks of NATO pilots being forced to fly above 15,000 ft and feeling the concussions of near-misses from anti-aircraft fire. Are such realities like a "video-arcade game?" Ignatieff ignores this to paint his warped notion of a "virtual" war.

Ignatieff demanded intervention for Kosovo but then blames how it was carried out. He says the laser-guided bombing was ineffective in stopping Milosevic and so it was. He says how "virtual war" is virtual both to the people dropping the ordnance and those fleeing the bombs. To quote one pilot about Iraq's "no-fly zone" who said that the occasional anti-aircraft shot was the sole thing that reminded him he was "at war" (i.e. a "virtual" notion). Ignatieff fails to realize that once the coalition dominated the skies and knocked out dozens of SAM sites that shots from below were likely to die down. He says of "virtual warfare's victims" that the occasion is like a "spectator sport" (out of the minds and hearts of democracies), something worthy to commemorate by "buying a postcard."

On the whole Ignatieff states a case and then contradicts or refutes himself earlier or later. His rationale is consistent only in isolation. The more he enlarges on his views, the deeper the hole he digs for himself.

This book is not about technology or the way the military fights modern war (per se). It's about disliking fewer casualities, disliking sophisticated weapons, disliking the detachment of commanders and soldiers who are now engaged only at the perimeter, and so on and so on. Pyrhhus and MacArthur and all history's other commanders would gladly tell Ignatieff (who eventually tells himself) that inflicting hurt on the other army without receiving ourselves is only proper tactics. Pity Ignatieff cannot have all wars be his way.

This books presents a very insightful political analysis of the Kosovo conflict ensuring to reflect all sides of the story.

If you decide to read this book, do yourself a favor and skip everything but the last chapter. The book up to the end is a high level overview and includes chapters on the committee approach to target selection, administrative details on persecuting war criminals, and my favorite - the emails of 2 British writers debating their respective positions.

The book brings up occasionally interesting notions such as the international community's right to get involved in a sovereign state's affairs and the double standards that arise when we do choose to get involved (ie why Kosovo but not Rwanda).

But overall the author doesn't seem to have a coherent message other than to say that "the Kosovo conflict was different than past military operations and future operations will likely be different from Kosovo." Even though the author defines Kosovo as a "virtual war", he forgets that it only achieved success when "real war" elements were introduced (such as turning off the lights, dropping the bridges, and introducing ground troops). If there were lessons to be learned from the Kosovo conflict, you won't find them in this book.

Clearly Michael Ignatieff is a gifted writer, but the theme throughout this book did not string together that well. Ignatieff had some great insights into the diplomacy building up to the Kosovo air campaign (i.e. gaining valuable insight into Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy), but some of the observations, particularly those in the last chapter beg questioning.

The repercussions of a zero casualty conflict will reverberate throughout the US defense establishment for years to come and will certainly set benchmarks, warranted or not for future conflicts. But sacrifice in battle will be supported by the American public if the situation warrants. The war in Afghanistan bears this point out to an extent.

The dialogue between Skidelsky and Ignatieff was interesting, as was the return of Ignatieff to Belgrade to meet his longtime friend Aleksa Djilas. This dialogue portrayed the extent to which people such as Skidelsky and Djilas would like to look past the atrocities committed by the like of Milosevic, at the expense of Western intervention.

I rated the book three stars only because I didnt see the common thread throughout the book...merely a series of collected essays that may or may not have had anything to do with the subject "virtual war". THe book does add some interesting insight into Holbrooke's dealings with Milosevic, but could have delved more into discussions with Gen Clark and perhaps Lt Gen Mike Short, the Joint Forces AIr Component Commander, on the extent the "virtual war" was or was not fought both on the battlefield, in the media and in the political realm.

Really a series of sketches of the Kosovo War, followed by a longer essay giving Ignatieff's thoughts on the development of warfare towards the end of the 20th century. The sketches are good, if lacking the depth of an historical work. The best is his meeting with Aleksha Djilas in Belgrade, a visit which must have caused him some trepidation. More recent events, let it be said, have borne out Ignatieff's analysis - I mean the popular revolt in Serbia, the discovery of mass graves, and the extradition of Milosevic to face trial on war crimes charges(something the author explicitly doubted would ever happen). However, the ongoing events reduce the overall value of the work, and the book must be judged by the value of the final essay. Again, this thesis on 'virtual' war - with managed presentation of events to the public, zero casualties, and high tech weaponry, seems to me to be only true so far in Western, particularly US, war-making, and even there the soldiers are reacting with horror to the prospect of replacing a large army with smaller forces armed with high-tech weaponry. The biggest killer weapon in the world is still the AK47!. The other point is the attrition in high-tech weapons - by the end of the war, NATO was running out of smart bombs. Still, thought provoking, and just about worth the price of the book, if war and politics is your sphere of interest. Otherwise, read Misha Glenny or Tim Judah for events in former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Ignatieff's telling of the Kosovo War exploits, no doubt with certain fiscal benefits in mind, his unique role as an experienced reporter, journalist, author and voyeur of the many tragic events of the past decade in former Yugoslavia. He presents a capsule summary, with frequent staccato phrases and unfortunate numerous errors, the events leading up to and the results of the 78 day bombing of Serbia by the US-led NATO. He approaches this story of the US-led purported humantarian intervention by a defensive alliance from a special perspective, namely: that the end goals justifies the means. This is a position which he clearly states is justifiable and which he supports. But he neglects to share with his readership the sad and full facts that the ends in post-war Kosovo are, in reality, far from a multi-cultural and safe environment, even with 40,000 UN troops currently stationed there. The use of depleted Uranium weapons and cluster bombs as well as the destruction of civilian infrastructure was in reality a merciless war which bothers him not a twit. His discussion of the this high tech virtual war is a camoflage to distract readers from the realities of the war crimes committed by the US-led NATO. I found this book a quick read with little challenge in identifying the mis-statements or mis-representations of the history of this affair.