Customer Reviews

Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat

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Obviously, General Clark is not out to win a lot of friends with the publication of this book, a damning account of how politics and war make, at best, awkward bedfellows and at worst, the potential for inadvertent sabotage.

More telling (for me, anyway) than the tone of the book, which shows how political claptrap can tie a commander's hands from committing intelligently (no lessons learned from previous conflicts?), Clark shows throughout the entire book that everything we have been taught regarding the basic principles of warfare, from Sun-Tzu to Clausewitz and beyond, have been completely done away with in the Bosnian conflict. Through technology in our weaponry, the delivery platforms, the intelligence, and most pointedly, in our communications networks (particularly the media), by which we more or less spoon-fed Milosevic our every move well in advance, thus eliminating the vital element of surprise.

Another notion that has brought angst to most Americans is that of the "no-civilian-casualties" conflict. Clark echoes, point-blank, the same words that every commander throughout the history of modern warfare has muttered - war is hell, and people will be killed, combatants and non-combatants; that's the nature of war. With smart technology at our feet, and brilliant weapons technology knocking at the door, we have come to expect that firing a missile onto a bridge where a bus is passing will somehow have allowed the bus to escape unharmed. It's not possible now, nor will it be possible in the future. The weapons, as Clark states, can only be as perfect as not only the people who develop them, but as the people who upload them, arm them, test them, engineer them, and ultimately fire them. I would take it a step further and add that the weapons are only as good as the intelligence which feeds them.

Clark has written a book that deserves recognition as a bold step in Warfare Theory literature, and should be on the Airman's and Soldier's official reading lists for officers and enlisted alike.

Every citizen should read this book so they can instruct their elected representatives and vote for military reform. As things now stand, we will lose the war on terrorism over time because of the perennial flaws in our system that this book identifies.

Don't Bother Us Now. The U.S. political system is not structured to pay attention to "early warning". Kosovo (as well as Croatia and Serbia beforehand and later Macedonia) were well known looming problems, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War, both Congress and the Administration in power at the time said to the U.S. Intelligence Community, essentially: "don't bother us anymore with this, this is inconvenient warning, we'll get to it when it explodes." We allowed over a hundred thousand to be murdered in genocide, because our political system was "tired."

"Modern war" is an overwhelming combination of micro-management from across the varied nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a reliance on very high-tech weapons with precision effect that are useless in the absence of precision intelligence (and the lawyers insist the intelligence be near-real-time, a virtual impossibility for years to come); and an obsession with avoiding casualties that hand-cuffs our friendly commanders and gives great encouragement to our enemies.

Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces--but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do--have become--and I say this advisedly--the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a "seam" between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control.* The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction--the obstacles to success in war--are largely of our own making.

Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was fighting a three-front war at all times: with the real enemy, with the media, and with Washington--his NATO commanders were the least of his problems.

Technology Loses to Weather and Lacks Intelligence. Throughout the book there are statements that make it clear that the U.S. military is not yet an all-weather military, and has a very long way to go before it ever will be. Aligned with this incapacity is a high-technology culture that suffers from very weak maintenance and an almost complete lack of intelligence at the level of precision and with the timeliness that is needed for our very expensive weapons to be effective. Nothing has changed since MajGen Bob Scales wrote his excellent Firepower in Limited War, pointing out that artillery still cannot be adequately supported by the intelligence capabilities we have now.

Strategic Mobility Shortfalls, Tactical Aviation Constraints. Although General Clark judges the air war to have been a success, and an essential factor in facilitating "coercive diplomacy", he also communicates two realities about U.S. military aviation: 1) we do not have the strategic aviation lift to get anywhere in less than 90-180 days, and his request for a 75 day mobilization was not possible as a result; and 2) our tactical aviation assets are so specialized, and require so much advance preparation in terms of munitions, route planning, and so on, that they cannot be readily redirected in less than a full day. A full day. This is simply outlandish.

We Don't Do Mountains. No statement in the book hurt me more than one by an Army general telling General Clark that his plans for the ground campaign could not be supported by the U.S. Army because "we don't do mountains" This, in combination with the loser's attitude (no casualties) and the general reluctance of the services to put their high-tech capabilities like the Apache at risk in a real war, sum up the decrepitude of the U.S. military leadership and the Revolution in Military Affairs-Andrew Gordon in Rules of the Game has it exactly right-the post Viet-Nam and post Cold War era has left us with a bunch of high-tech chickens in control of military resources, and we need to find ourselves some rat-catchers able to redirect our military toward a lust for man to man combat in every clime and place-and the low-tech sustainable tools to do the job.

General Clark's concluding words, on page 459: "In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace. The discrete service programs didn't always fit together technically. And (sic) the officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers." Are we ready? No.

General (Retired) Clark writes the best account of the tensions and competing demands of senior military leaders trying to bridge the divide between politics and military operations. He also clearly explains the linkages between our national security strategy (NSS) and national military strategy (NMS). As an insider during the Dayton Peace Accords, he had the benefit of understanding the development of a NSS with regard to the Balkans. He was able to transmit his unique insights during Dayton into an effective military campaign to bolster the credibility of NATO and keep soldiers from needlessly getting injured.

Anyone on the staff or getting ready to assume a political office which relates to our NSS should read this book to understand the frustrations of competing demands placed on military commanders in a highly complex environment. Likewise, all future field grade officers should read and understand General Clark's insights. Given the complex nature of military engagement and the blurring of strategic, operational, and tactical realms due to new technology and the media, military leaders would do well to study this book. Warfare has changed in many substantive, as well as subtle ways. Thoughts on the subjects that General Clark exposes could save allied soldiers lives in the future.

This book is a great addition to any military library and those interested in strategic thinking.

General Wesley Clark has done an outstanding job of providing a blow by blow account of Operation Allied Force - the NATO effort to halt the genocide in Kosovo and oust the Serbian military and police units responsible for those atrocities. The blow by blow account, however, one can get from other books and articles written on NATO's first armed intervention since its founding. Where "Waging Modern War" shines is in Clark's thoughts and perspectives on waging war in close co-operation with other nations. It becomes painfully obvious that coalition warfare is not easy since one has to make constant compromises in order to please most of one's allies that might not have the same political agenda. In the case of Kosovo Clark did not only have to contend with the Italians, Germans, British, and, of course, the French but also his peers in the Pentagon. The fact that the Pentagon and the National Command Authority (Clinton and Cohen) could not agree on a common policy further complicated the air war against Serbia. This is once again an acute question when one hears the allegations of Rumsfeld and others taking the uniformed leaders of America's military for a ride in Iraq.

The reviewer only has one true objection to this book - the lack of historical background. Clark spends few words on the origins of the Kosovo conflict. One day the Serbs are suddenly very angry at the Kosovo-Albanians and decide to forcibly remove them from Kosovo. That is weak. But the rest of the book is truly amazing.

Rumour has it that Clark wrote this 450-page book in 4 weeks. I don't doubt it since this is clearly a modern warrior with large capacities for free thought and diligent work.

General (retired) Clark writes an excellent piece on both the events leading up to our entry into Kosovo and the continued decline of the American warrior spirit.

I served seven months in Kosovo with KFOR 1B on Camp Monteith. General Clark's book answers many of the questions we all had while patrolling the trash strewn streets of Kosovo, "Why the hell are we here?". General Clark gives a great lead up to the Serbian aggression in Kosovo and the Albanian provocations which we once again see in Macedonia. His thoughts are well written and easy to read. Starting with the Dayton peace accords, which he was a key player in, Clark takes us through the twisted negotiations and difficulties of the Balkans. His story shows the inherent difficulties in coalition warfare and how I (and thousands of other soldiers) eventually arrived to put "boots on the ground." The other interesting aspect of this book is to watch how the military was severely restricted, almost to the point of endangering American lives, to protect a weak and unclear political agenda. Not only did General Clark have to fight Serbs, NATO, the air power pundits and the media, he also had to fight against his leadership in SecDef Cohen. A great read and interesting story about NATOs first war. Lets hope we never have to go through an experience like the Kosovo Campaign again. Buy this book. You'll throughly enjoy it! -CPT S

The author presents a personal accounting of his time as SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe). Clark's writing style is very easy to read -- you don't need to be a military expert to understand him. This account is chronological, even sometimes hour-by-hour, and reports on how we got into a war in Kosovo, and why certain key decisions were made.

You will be amazed at the revelations Clark makes about Serbian security and intelligence capabilities, Milosovic's character (or lack thereof), tensions within NATO, and the complexities of US military operations. I could hardly put this book down.

Sometimes, however, the book reads as a personal defense. He often blames problems with negotiations or operations on higher-ups, or on inherent structrual problems with the SACEUR position. Any reader should know that many people in the military do not view Wesley Clark with high esteem, and blame many of the problems during Kosovo specifically on him. I personally found Clark's version of events generally believable, but I wait for history to pass the final judgement.

Although it is primarily a memoir chronicling General Clark's experiences during Operation Allied Force (the air campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis), it is also a sobering look at waging war during the 21st Century. General Clark offers a revealing look at political intrigue in the Pentagon and the State Department during the second Clinton administration. More importantly, he demonstrates how such intrigue had an adverse impact on his duties as NATO's supreme military commander in Europe. Clark makes a strong case that NATO's involvement in future European conflicts will require mutual consensus among NATO members; a difficult political minefield he successfully navigated. Furthermore, he also stresses the need for more flexible, more mobile, American military forces in future wars. Needless to say, his splendid prose is probably unsettling news to some Pentagon and State Department planners. Without a doubt, this is an important book for military historians and one which should be read by those involved with - or interested in - American military strategy and tactics for the 21st Century.

Gen Clark has given an excellent first-hand account of the internecine politics between the regional warfighting CinC (in this case CINCEUR/SACEUR) and the National Command Authority. In a day and age of rapidly expanding communications, which allows Washington DC to have insight as it never has before, the regional commanders are increasingly finding the management of public opinion and of the political leadership as difficult as managing the campaign itself.
The insight provided on differences between the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself reinforce this dilemma.
Gen Clark has been a key player in the Balkan military/diplomatic scene since the Bosnian conflict, and its somewhat tenuous resolution at Dayton; culminating with the war in Kosovo. His personal relationships with many of the leading political figures in the region only add weight to his narrative.
From a strictly military perspective, it would have been interesting to have seen more on his relationships with his senior commanders, but overall, a well written book, which will add yet another dimension to the history of this complex area of Europe

Clark has written an excellent book on the politics of coalition warfare. However, there is precious little in the book on the actual mechanics of one of the most important air campaigns ever waged. Kosovo was the first conflict, in which air power alone determined the out come of the war. The introduction of weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and other GPS guided weapons totally revolutionized the effectivness of airpower, effectively delivering what air power enthusiasts have been promising since the days of Billy Mitchell and Curtis Lemay.

I for one hoped to find out more about the air campaign but was sorely disappointed on this count. Nothing in the book about how the Serb's managed to obtain the Nato Air Tasking Order (ATO) in advance thereby greatly enhancing the danger to Nato pilots. Also only a few lines devoted to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, an event of huge political significance. That the Chinese Embassy was the only target in the whole campaign nominated by a certain intelligence agency in Langley Virginia, underscores how woefully unprepared that organization is to support U.S. military operations.
Nonetheless, despite the books shortcomings it does give an insiders view into the politcs behind the Kosovo Campaign. Most disturbingly it illustrates how the Service Chiefs and Chairman of the JCS seemingly undermined the spirit if not the letter of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which was supposed to enhance the powers of the regionals CINCs. This was perhaps the most disturbing element of the book. Of particular concern was how the Army Chief of Staff used his influence to deny Clark the use of Apache Helicopters deployed to Albania. Truly a pathetic tale. At any rate if your interested in the politics of coalition warfare you will love this book. If you want details on one of the most important Air Campaigns ever waged, one that in many ways was a precursor for the Afghanistan Campaign, you will be disappointed. Come to think of it, though, could we really expect an Army 4 Star, to write in glowing terms about Air Power?

This book is formally an autobiography, but pays scant attention to the first 50 years or so of the author's life. Instead, Clark has written a strong account of his involvement in the two Yugoslav wars that took place in the 90s; first the Bosnia war, where he worked as a military adviser to Richard Holbrooke, and then his role as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in the Kosovo war a few years later.

These two roles gave Clark insight into the interactions of the objecives, often quite distinct, of military and political leaders. This was particularly true of his work as SACEUR (NATO commander), where he was the focal point of that tension, reporting to the defense ministers and heads of state of the various nations while leading the various armed forces. He also has a good deal to say about the practical issues in integrating units from different countries in a single operation, along with the longstanding problems of integrating the capabilities of the traditionally rival American services. This was, for me, the most informative part of the book, and would certainly make it essential reading for any officer or diplomat interested in this topic.

Clark also has a good deal to say about the institutional problems he had in Washington and the Pentagon. The Pentagon leadership, in particular, hostile to the idea of fighting an enemy that wasn't in the Middle East or East Asia and even more hostile to the current President, undermined Clark repeatedly and then, when the war was successfully completed anyway, arranged for his reward to be getting fired.

The book was clearly actually written by Clark without use of a ghost. This isn't always an advantage - Clark lack's the professional writer's eye for the telling detail so instead sometimes gives us too many details that add up to too little information. But in the end, a book written by the actual actor in these events tells us more than a book written with a smoother style by a ghost.