When then-Major Fred McNeill (who has since passed on) served as an O-2 FAC in the Central Highlands of II Corps during 1972, he operated out of Pleiku into Cambodia, Laos, and even extreme southern North Vietnam. In the spring of 1972, he was tasked to direct an airstrike in support of an ARVN firebase on a mountain top northwest of Kontum. The ARVN had deployed a reconnaissance patrol, composed of about 100 ARVN troops and 20 US Army advisors, along an extremely rocky and absolutely barren ridgeline that stretched south from the firebase. Once well away from their base, they began taking intense fire from an entire company of NVA regulars that were scaling the sides of the ridge from both directions.
A-37 in revetment
When McNeill received the orders for a dawn close air support mission, the only available tactical aircraft was a pair of A-37Bs from Bien Hoa. . .Kontum was at the limit of their combat range. The squadron commander, Colonel Weed, and his wingman agreed to fly the mission, and McNeill asked them to bring all the napalm they could carry (four 750-pound canisters apiece). McNeill arrived in the target area at first light and contacted the pinned-down patrol. They were completely surrounded with no way to dig in or find cover on the rocky ridge. Casualties were already running to 30 percent and they were about to be overrun completely.
The rules of engagement prohibited dropping napalm within 100 meters of friendly troops unless the troops were safely dug in. However, the patrol leader insisted that McNeill direct the napalm attack. . .they were going to die, anyway, if he did not. To be sure there was no misunderstanding or later recriminations, McNeill recorded the approval and the patrol leader’s name on his standard-equipment tape recorder.
As the A-37s reported overhead and ready for the attack, with no excess fuel for subsequent attacks, McNeill briefed them carefully and told one of them to drop on the north side of the ridge and the other on the south side of the ridge. McNeill placed one marking rocket on each side of the ridge to mark the point where he wanted them to start laying down the napalm. He gave final attack directions to Colonel Weed and his wingman and then gave them a post-attack heading for a direct route to Pleiku, the nearest suitable airfield.
The Army radio operator keyed his microphone to say something just as the napalm from the A=37s began to explode. As the initial explosions died out, McNeill could hear the troops whooping and hollering through the still-keyed mic. . .the napalm had been laid precisely on target without hitting a single ARVN or US Army soldier. The NVA immediately broke contact and pulled back — after losing up to 300 of the own troops to the napalm. The A-37s zoomed away and took up their heading for Pleiku with their fuel state dwindling.
O-2A in revetment
When McNeill landed back at Pleiku, he discovered that Colonel Weed’s wingman had ran out of fuel on the runway and had to be towed to a parking spot for refueling. That night in the Pleiku bar, neither of those Dragonfly pilots was able to buy his own beer. . .every Pleiku pilot was too impressed with their performance that day!
Posted in A-37, Dragonfly, Forward Air Control, o-2, skymaster, usaf, vietnam
