Customer Reviews

War in the Air 1914-45 (Smithsonian History of Warfare)

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Murray in War in the Air 1914-1945 takes an seldom used approach to describe a period in miliatry history where technology and military theory advanced at a rapid pace. By choosing to discuss the First World War, the Interwar years, and the Second World War in one continuum, it is easier to trace the developments in technology, strategy, and tactics (wood to metal, biplane to monoplane, scouting to ground support to strategic bombing, naval scout to capital ship)

The one major shortcoming of this approach is that it does isolate some of the developments from the overall global course of events. For example, the decision not to develop strategic bombers by the Luftwaffe is not given any emphasis, despite being a critical strategic error. Also there is strangely little mention of the possible role of jet propulsion which appeared at the end of the war. Though developed years earlier, this important technology was not given emphasis because of other strategic concerns.

In brief: a very good book in the series from Cassell concerning the rise of Air Power. Both airwar buffs and generalists will enjoy this book, but there will be some points where the experienced reader will be left wondering.

Murray's concise yet thorough review of air warfare's development from infancy through adolescence will provide any neophyte the necessary perspective to later delve into more specialized subjects, yet his insights also prove interesting to those already familiar with airpower's history.

The book is full of useful information. The chronology yields a panoramic view of the subject. Planes are beautifully illustrated and well-drawn maps allow the reader to better envision the distances involved and flight paths taken. Contemporary photos abound. Perhaps most helpful to those interested in learning more about the subject is the bibliography found in the back.

The significance of Murray's conclusions may be better understood by those who are somewhat versed in the periods' theaters and battles, but that should not deter those new to the subject matter. Where most military histories rely on the reader's previous understanding of events, this book stands well alone. All in all, War in the Air 1914-1945 is a valuable addition to anyone's library, new readers and veterans alike.

This book has it all. From the start of aircraft warfare, to World War two, it explores the advances in air combat during the two World Wars, providing a detailed history of the battles over Europe and the Pacific.
This book includes pictures of battles, planes and maps, along with how each power utilized their defenses and tactics. It covers every region of study in World War I and II, and it shows how air changed warfare forever.
Being a World War II history buff, I found this book very attractive. No long amounts of text but diagrams to show what happened, when and where. This is an invaluble resorce to anyone who is interested in this subject.

As others have stated, this is a good survey of the period that emphasizes technological developments and draws on Murray's previous work. Unfortunately, Murray makes a major error in his well-illustrated description of the "Immelman" maneuver. While named after World War I German aviator Max Immelman, there are actually two completely different maneuvers that went by that name, the one perfected by Immelman in World War I and a completely different one used in World War II. The illustration shows shows a World War I aircraft executing the World War II version: a rolling half loop that would have torn a World War I aircraft to pieces.

As bad as a book can be considering the significance and potential interest of the topic: This work is part of a series of short histories of aspects of the 20th century, but Mr. Murray has no gift for compression nor does he write well. But, above all, Mr. Murray is factually challenged. I know well only one area of those that he covers, namely the Pacific War, and specifically the Battle for Leyte Gulf, but in that area Mr. Murray is stunningly inaccurate, with error following error. Furthermore, and astonishingly, Mr. Murray is just as inaccurate in the more comprehensive book that he published with Allan R. Millett the following year, A War to Be Won. In the circumstances, I must follow the the editor's maxim that if one part of a book that you know about is unreliable, the quality of the rest must remain in doubt. This book doesn't even deserve one star.