The War for America, 1775-1783 [Paperback]

Piers Mackesy (Author), John W. Shy (Introduction)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 1, 1993

The events of the American Revolution signified by Lexington, Bunker Hill, Valley Forge, Saratoga, and Yorktown are familiar to American readers. Far less familiar is the fact that, for the British, the American colonies were only one front in a world war. England was also pitted against France and Spain. Not always in command of the seas and threatened with invasion, England tried grimly for eight years to subdue its rebellious colonies; to hold Canada, the West Indies, India, and Gibraltar; and to divide its European enemies. In this vivid history Piers Mackesy views the American Revolution from the standpoint of the British government and the British military leaders as they attempted to execute an overseas war of great complexity. Their tactical response to the American Revolution is now comprehensible, seen as part of a grand imperial strategy.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Mackesy’s War for America still stands as the classic account of the British conduct of the American Revolutionary War. Based on extensive research in British archives, it embodies the mature judgments of a masterful military historian."—John W. Shy

(John W. Shy )

"An important book that no serious student of the War of Independence can afford to neglect."—American Historical Review

(American Historical Review )

About the Author

Piers Mackesy is a noted historian who lives in Scotland. John W. Shy is a professor of history at the University of Michigan.

Product Details

• Paperback: 569 pages
• Publisher: Bison Books (February 1, 1993)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0803281927
• ISBN-13: 978-0803281929
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #522,923 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

62 of 62 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Am. Revolution as viewed by the British Government, August 12, 1997

By A Customer

This review is from: The War for America, 1775-1783 (Paperback)

This is one of the best non-introductory books available on the American Revolution. In addition to providing an excellent military history , the book clearly describes the issues faced by the British government in trying to deal with the revolution in the context of a world-wide empire. The military and logistic problems facing the British administration were truly formidable. While the book never demeans the American achievement, it clearly lays out the difficulties faced by the British in raising, maintaining, and supplying an army across 3,000+ miles of ocean in an era of sailing ships and limited government powers. It also shows how the European diplomatic environment, particularly the threat of war with France, limited the options available to the British. In addition to all of the above, the book is extremely well written, a pleasure to read.

12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The War for America: 1775-1783, February 9, 2008

By 

Eric Williams (South-Eastern Pennsylvania) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The War for America, 1775-1783 (Paperback)

The War for America: 1775-1783 by Piers Mackesy. 1964. 565 pages.

This book presents the history of the war from a British point view. Given that it is from a British point of view it covers the war in its entirety from the causes and collision on the green in Lexington, MA to the final shots exchanged in India some eight years later.

The scope of this tome is at the strategic level. This will make it a bit of a surprise for most American readers who are used to the tactical and the operational when it comes this truly global conflict. Global in that the action takes place not just in North America, but also: The East Indies, The West Indies, Central America, The Caribbean, Gibraltar, Minorca, The English Channel, The Atlantic, Africa, and of course India.

In fact the percentage of text which actually covers the operations in North America which most Americans are familiar with is only about 25% of the book. Because it is a strategic overview there is much of the political wrangling which shaped the strategy and limited it as well. This means that readers more familiar with land operations are in for a whole lot of naval history in this book.

The highlights of this book besides its readability given the complexity of the topic are the focus on logistics. As any scholar of war in the American tradition knows logistics trump tactics. This book provides a keen insight into British abilities, failures and accomplishments when trying to fight a global campaign. Of note is the revelation that most British supplies from shovels, bullets, uniforms and even food for the operations in North America were shipped in from the home islands some 3,000 miles away. The logistical achievement of crown forces is a marvel given the limitations they faced when compared to modern abilities.

I must admit that my own familiarity with the naval actions, the island conflicts with Spain, the Dutch, and the French as well as the political shapings was very limited until I read this text. This did help me with my own focus (Campaigns of 1777 and conflict on the NW frontier) as it helped place the choices, plans, and actions into the complete context of British goals and aspirations. What clearly stands out is that the British lacked an agreed on coherent strategy for subduing the rebellion. This was a result of many in the government having no stomach for the conflict or sympathy for the ideals. The fluctuation between a land and a sea based strategy and between kindness and cruelty mixed in with the economic considerations seemed to be situations which the British largely worked out after the war was done in preparation for their struggle against Napoleon.

Mixed in with the conflicted aspirations was a disbelief that the Americans could actually win the conflict until the French joined in. There was among the British military and politicos a constant under appreciation of the American militia and Continentals which has it roots in the Seven Years War. This under appreciation contributed to their over valuation of the loyalists numbers, support and abilities. It is clear that the British did understand though how close the Americans were to total dissolution in 1780. Though even with that understanding they still really did not understand Washington or his army. Washington though not discussed at any length in this text seems to plague the British as they never really grasp this man and his role. This is natural considering that the British were far more concerned about the French and their abilities and intentions.

Though it must be admitted that many modern Americans simply fail also to grasp the centrality of Washington and the role that played and the role that he continues to play. As the song plays out:

"Yet think not thirst of glory unsheathes our vengeful swords To rend your bands asunder, or cast away your cords 'Tis heaven-born freedom fires us all, and strengthens each brave son, For him who humbly guides the plough to god-like Washington."


The text is accompanied by a good appendix listing troop strengths and locations for various years.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A non-traditional study in strategy and management, June 17, 2009

By 

T. J. Graczewski "tgraczewski" (Burlingame, CA United States) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The War for America, 1775-1783 (Paperback)

I work in a corporate environment, mainly with MBAs. This is one of the very few substantive history books I would actually recommend to my co-workers as professional reading.

"The War for America" focuses on British leadership and decision making during the period of the American Revolution. The author, Piers Mackesy, clearly lays out the objectives of his book this way: "first...to examine the making and executing of strategy in one of England's great eighteenth-century wars, and to create a detailed model of the machine at work; the second, to judge a war Ministry in the light of circumstance rather than results."

In my experience, the challenges and dilemmas that emerge from the narrative apply directly to present day large-scale business enterprises: the danger of a fixed and narrow view of a competitor; the struggle of allocating scarce resources based on imperfect information; the damage caused by personal friction and poor communication between key executives; and the paralysis resulting from differences of opinion over the primary strategic objectives.

To begin with, Mackesy makes it clear that the British never really understood "the market" they were competing in. The overwhelming consensus at Whitehall (and Paris) was that the rebel cause was flamed by a tiny, vocal clique and that a silent loyalist majority was just waiting to be led back to the sovereignty of the crown. This assumption was foundational to the initial British strategy of cutting off rebellious New England from the rest of the colonies and then the southern invasion designed to rally what was supposed to be widespread and deep loyalist sentiment. The North ministry held on to this belief despite accumulating evidence to the contrary, just like a product manager who never questions the basic assumption that a large customer base wants what he's selling.

Next, to continue with the business analogy, the British lost control of the main channel to market - seapower. The global war that commenced with, but was not limited to, the American Revolution was the only war in the 18th or 19th century that the British did not have naval supremacy. The combination of French and then Spanish and then Dutch naval power - both military and commercial - dramatically expanded the area of operations for the British Navy while gravely limiting the options available. The British could simply not be everywhere at once: defending the home islands; securing trade convoys back from the spice islands; resupplying Gibraltar; keeping the French and Spanish fleet at anchor at Brest and Cadiz; protecting the Leeward Islands in the eastern Caribbean; protecting Jamaica; threatening the Spanish Main and holding West Florida; defending India; and, of course, defeating the American rebels. The British were able to compensate somewhat with their tactical development and near monopoly on copper-bottomed vessels, which greatly added to the speed and durability of their ships, but it was not nearly enough.

This lack of sea control was exacerbated by poor and untimely intelligence on French intentions and naval movements. The British did not want to commit resources until they knew what the French were doing and that meant ceding the overall initiative to King Louis XVI. Moreover, there was an exaggerated fear (led by Lord Sandwich of the Admiralty) of the threat to the British home islands, which tended to delay or prevent the dispatch of adequate naval reinforcements to America and the West Indies. Rather than shaping the war to fit their strengths and objectives, the British allowed the French (and Americans) to set the tone and tempo of operations.

Finally, the British had to deal with the additional burden of fighting the war with a deeply divided war cabinet. The aggressive secretary of state for America, Lord George Germain, and the bellicose King George III were pitted against the conservative, but competent Lord Sandwich, all while the ostensible leader of the government, the passive and ineffective Treasury Secretary, Lord North, looked on helplessly. Meanwhile, a rather large, distinguished and vocal opposition hammered relentlessly on the Ministry in Parliament and in the press. The story plays out like a dysfunctional multinational corporation confronting serious threats to disparate global markets while the board of directors, CEO, founder and key operating executives are all at each others throats and the largest institutional shareholders are filing lawsuits and are disparaging the company in the media.

All told, this is a dense, but highly readable account of strategy-making and executive leadership on a grand scale. It is highly recommended to the history buff and corporate executive alike.