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The War for America, 1775-1783

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This is one of the best non-introductory books available on the American Revolution. In addition to providing an excellent military history , the book clearly describes the issues faced by the British government in trying to deal with the revolution in the context of a world-wide empire. The military and logistic problems facing the British administration were truly formidable. While the book never demeans the American achievement, it clearly lays out the difficulties faced by the British in raising, maintaining, and supplying an army across 3,000+ miles of ocean in an era of sailing ships and limited government powers. It also shows how the European diplomatic environment, particularly the threat of war with France, limited the options available to the British.
In addition to all of the above, the book is extremely well written, a pleasure to read.

The War for America: 1775-1783 by Piers Mackesy. 1964. 565 pages.

This book presents the history of the war from a British point view. Given that it is from a British point of view it covers the war in its entirety from the causes and collision on the green in Lexington, MA to the final shots exchanged in India some eight years later.

The scope of this tome is at the strategic level. This will make it a bit of a surprise for most American readers who are used to the tactical and the operational when it comes this truly global conflict. Global in that the action takes place not just in North America, but also: The East Indies, The West Indies, Central America, The Caribbean, Gibraltar, Minorca, The English Channel, The Atlantic, Africa, and of course India.

In fact the percentage of text which actually covers the operations in North America which most Americans are familiar with is only about 25% of the book. Because it is a strategic overview there is much of the political wrangling which shaped the strategy and limited it as well. This means that readers more familiar with land operations are in for a whole lot of naval history in this book.

The highlights of this book besides its readability given the complexity of the topic are the focus on logistics. As any scholar of war in the American tradition knows logistics trump tactics. This book provides a keen insight into British abilities, failures and accomplishments when trying to fight a global campaign. Of note is the revelation that most British supplies from shovels, bullets, uniforms and even food for the operations in North America were shipped in from the home islands some 3,000 miles away. The logistical achievement of crown forces is a marvel given the limitations they faced when compared to modern abilities.

I must admit that my own familiarity with the naval actions, the island conflicts with Spain, the Dutch, and the French as well as the political shapings was very limited until I read this text. This did help me with my own focus (Campaigns of 1777 and conflict on the NW frontier) as it helped place the choices, plans, and actions into the complete context of British goals and aspirations. What clearly stands out is that the British lacked an agreed on coherent strategy for subduing the rebellion. This was a result of many in the government having no stomach for the conflict or sympathy for the ideals. The fluctuation between a land and a sea based strategy and between kindness and cruelty mixed in with the economic considerations seemed to be situations which the British largely worked out after the war was done in preparation for their struggle against Napoleon.

Mixed in with the conflicted aspirations was a disbelief that the Americans could actually win the conflict until the French joined in. There was among the British military and politicos a constant under appreciation of the American militia and Continentals which has it roots in the Seven Years War. This under appreciation contributed to their over valuation of the loyalists numbers, support and abilities. It is clear that the British did understand though how close the Americans were to total dissolution in 1780. Though even with that understanding they still really did not understand Washington or his army. Washington though not discussed at any length in this text seems to plague the British as they never really grasp this man and his role. This is natural considering that the British were far more concerned about the French and their abilities and intentions.

Though it must be admitted that many modern Americans simply fail also to grasp the centrality of Washington and the role that played and the role that he continues to play. As the song plays out:

"Yet think not thirst of glory unsheathes our vengeful swords To rend your bands asunder, or cast away your cords 'Tis heaven-born freedom fires us all, and strengthens each brave son, For him who humbly guides the plough to god-like Washington."

The text is accompanied by a good appendix listing troop strengths and locations for various years.

I work in a corporate environment, mainly with MBAs. This is one of the very few substantive history books I would actually recommend to my co-workers as professional reading.

"The War for America" focuses on British leadership and decision making during the period of the American Revolution. The author, Piers Mackesy, clearly lays out the objectives of his book this way: "first...to examine the making and executing of strategy in one of England's great eighteenth-century wars, and to create a detailed model of the machine at work; the second, to judge a war Ministry in the light of circumstance rather than results."

In my experience, the challenges and dilemmas that emerge from the narrative apply directly to present day large-scale business enterprises: the danger of a fixed and narrow view of a competitor; the struggle of allocating scarce resources based on imperfect information; the damage caused by personal friction and poor communication between key executives; and the paralysis resulting from differences of opinion over the primary strategic objectives.

To begin with, Mackesy makes it clear that the British never really understood "the market" they were competing in. The overwhelming consensus at Whitehall (and Paris) was that the rebel cause was flamed by a tiny, vocal clique and that a silent loyalist majority was just waiting to be led back to the sovereignty of the crown. This assumption was foundational to the initial British strategy of cutting off rebellious New England from the rest of the colonies and then the southern invasion designed to rally what was supposed to be widespread and deep loyalist sentiment. The North ministry held on to this belief despite accumulating evidence to the contrary, just like a product manager who never questions the basic assumption that a large customer base wants what he's selling.

Next, to continue with the business analogy, the British lost control of the main channel to market - seapower. The global war that commenced with, but was not limited to, the American Revolution was the only war in the 18th or 19th century that the British did not have naval supremacy. The combination of French and then Spanish and then Dutch naval power - both military and commercial - dramatically expanded the area of operations for the British Navy while gravely limiting the options available. The British could simply not be everywhere at once: defending the home islands; securing trade convoys back from the spice islands; resupplying Gibraltar; keeping the French and Spanish fleet at anchor at Brest and Cadiz; protecting the Leeward Islands in the eastern Caribbean; protecting Jamaica; threatening the Spanish Main and holding West Florida; defending India; and, of course, defeating the American rebels. The British were able to compensate somewhat with their tactical development and near monopoly on copper-bottomed vessels, which greatly added to the speed and durability of their ships, but it was not nearly enough.

This lack of sea control was exacerbated by poor and untimely intelligence on French intentions and naval movements. The British did not want to commit resources until they knew what the French were doing and that meant ceding the overall initiative to King Louis XVI. Moreover, there was an exaggerated fear (led by Lord Sandwich of the Admiralty) of the threat to the British home islands, which tended to delay or prevent the dispatch of adequate naval reinforcements to America and the West Indies. Rather than shaping the war to fit their strengths and objectives, the British allowed the French (and Americans) to set the tone and tempo of operations.

Finally, the British had to deal with the additional burden of fighting the war with a deeply divided war cabinet. The aggressive secretary of state for America, Lord George Germain, and the bellicose King George III were pitted against the conservative, but competent Lord Sandwich, all while the ostensible leader of the government, the passive and ineffective Treasury Secretary, Lord North, looked on helplessly. Meanwhile, a rather large, distinguished and vocal opposition hammered relentlessly on the Ministry in Parliament and in the press. The story plays out like a dysfunctional multinational corporation confronting serious threats to disparate global markets while the board of directors, CEO, founder and key operating executives are all at each others throats and the largest institutional shareholders are filing lawsuits and are disparaging the company in the media.

All told, this is a dense, but highly readable account of strategy-making and executive leadership on a grand scale. It is highly recommended to the history buff and corporate executive alike.

A good history of the British side of the American Revolution World War. Not an easy read, but full of good info. It answered some questions I had that I couldn't get from the usual sources.

Along with Higganbotham's The War of American Independence, Mackesy gets my vote for the best single volume work regarding the Revolutionary War. When this book was first published, it is my understanding that it filled a much needed void in scholarship: the British side of the Revolutionary War. This book is a must read for students of the era. It deals with British policy and strategic thought throughout the war and demonstrates the global nature of the war for Britain. Truly understanding the Revolutionary War would be impossible without understanding the global context of British decision making regarding her Thirteen colonies, particularly once the war expanded in early 1778 to include France. Highest recommendation for the student already familiar with the events of the conflict.

This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs. The goal of Piers Mackesy's The War For America 1775-1783, was to examine the political and strategic decision-making conducted by England's cabinet ministers during the American Revolution. Mackesy very ably articulated the enormous geo-political challenges that faced Prime Minister Lord North's government, which has rarely been written about in American Revolutionary War history books. Mackesy astutely proved his thesis, that how North's government decided to meet their empire shattering challenges from "hot spots" on several continents had ultimately and negatively affected how they would prosecute the war against the American colonists.

North's government, spearheaded by the analysis of the situation by his Secretary of State for America George Germain, insisted in not fighting a protracted war in America, which would require large troop levels, naval support, and logistical needs that England could not afford both economically and strategically. Germain wisely foresaw that a protracted war would entice England's enemies, France and Spain, to ally with the American colonists and attack England's other colonies. This was a geo-political situation that England could ill afford. Instead, victory would be achieved by dealing a quick and decisive military blow against the rebels, and by capturing important political centers; such as, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. It was believed that these gains would break the back of the rebellion, and lead to colonial citizens demanding reconciliation with the "mother country." Mackesy found there were several flaws to the English strategy for the war in America. "The first was the restraint imposed on English policy by the aim of reconciliation. The second was the hardening of the American resistance" (35). North's government misjudged the force structure requirement necessary to deal a decisive military blow to the American rebels; thus, they became sucked into a protracted war. This fact made other English colonies vulnerable to attack from France and Spain in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and in India as well as placing England itself in perilous danger of invasion. As Mackesy stated in his conclusion, "If England could have won command of the oceans, the game would have been in her hands. France would have been unable to deploy her military power beyond the seas" (512).

Throughout the book, Mackesy expertly highlighted the multitude of failures of the English government in dealing with its strategic crisis. The government misread the political will of the American colonists. Lord North often lacked political resolve and was a poor leader whose cabinet ministers were more often then not more interested in engaging in political turf wars then getting much needed troops and supplies to their theatres of operation. These problems, coupled with generals and admirals who often lacked a sense of urgency all led to England's military resources becoming stretched too thin; thus, it is no wonder that her fight against the American rebellion ultimately led to defeat. This reader found Mackesy's well-researched and documented account of the English government's decision-making process to be a most important book for any history student who truly wants to understand the strategy, tactics, and geo-political challenges that ultimately shaped the outcome of the American Revolutionary War.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.

Not written with the "light reader" in mind, this classic work by British historian Piers Mackesy was originally published in 1964 and assumes the reader brings to the effort both a working knowledge of 18th century geopolitics as well as a good grasp of the written word - have your thesaurus handy. The author's theme that domestic politics both informs and impedes strategic decision-making during times of national crisis makes this book relevant in the context of the current crisis in U.S. geopolitics while also providing the reader with a perspective on the American "rebellion" little appreciated by a people raised on cursory histories of the struggles of the Founding "patriots."

Good perspective from the British view, but not what one might call a page turner by any means....

One of the things you can gain from reading history is a new, different outlook on familiar subjects. While I was generally familiar with the events of the Revolutionary War, Piers Mackesy's The War for America not only provides an illuminating view from the English side, it gives an object lesson in how knowing the events of history can help one avoid making similar mistakes.

I have always wondered how England, one of the super powers of the day, could have lost this war to a group of undisciplined farmers. Mackesy provides a detailed account of the problems facing the English and the decisions which led to their defeat. The book is painstakingly annotated throughout and shows a depth of research that gives credit to the efforts of the author.

It is written from the English point of view, with detailed descriptions of the English leaders' strategies, their internal politics and how they responded to the events on the ground. Be ready for a wealth of detail concerning English politicians, their relationships, culture, and how all these factors affected their actions in pursuit of the war. This strength is also its weakness: it would have been a stronger book if more information had been given about the strategies of the Colonial forces and the other European nations in the conflict.

The book was written in 1964 as the US involvement in Viet Nam was just beginning. The similarities between the difficulties faced by the English and the difficulties the American forces faced 200 years later and a continent away were too clear to be overlooked. Perhaps if the problems faced by the English had been better absorbed by our military leaders, we would have pursued a different path.

While occasionally Mackesy's roots show through in his semi-apologetic descriptions of the English side's problems and losses, all in all it is a well written and dispassionate description of the times and the conflict. I recommend it for readers looking for a deeper understanding of the Revolutionary War and of the problems faced by any nation attempting to impose its will on a foreign population.

I agree with the other reviewers who praise this book. They have already done a good job summarizing it, so I won't bother. I will say that I found Mackesy's book well-organized and his arguments compelling. I enjoyed reading it very much and feel that I have a much broader view of the American Revolution than I had before.

As editor John Shy points out in his introduction to this edition, British historians refer to the American Revolution as the American Revolutionary War or the War of American Independence. These names already hint at the broader view I mentioned. Like the Seven Years' War that preceded it, the American Revolution was a global war. While American accounts of the war do acknowledge the importance of France's entry into the war, they often only focus on the participation of the French military in the North American theater and the financial assistance provided by the French government. However, the struggle between the English, French and Spanish navies for dominance in the West Indies and the European theater were strategically more important than the battles in the Carolinas and Virginia that Americans are more familiar with; in fact, the over-extension of the British navy across all these theaters set the stage for the defeat of the British at Yorktown.

Readers looking for additional books about British politics during the American Revolution might want to consider "The American Revolution" written by George Otto Trevelyan between 1897 and 1914; it is available in a one volume abridgement edited by Richard B. Morris. However, Trevelyan was not a trained historian and brought his own Whig bias to his treatment of King George the Third, Lord North, Lord George Germain, and other British politicians of the period such as Charles Fox and Edmund Burke. The last two get much more attention from Travelyan than from Mackesy since they were in the opposition and therefore not directly involved in the conduct of the war.