Contemporaries considered Edward III of England `the wisest and shrewdest warrior in the world', but he has not fared so well in the estimation of modern historians, many of whom have argued that he was a fine tactician but a poor strategist. This is despite the fact that by 1360 the English had become the foremost martial nation of Europe; that famous victories had been won at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Crécy, and Poitiers; and David II of Scotland and Jean II of France were Edward's prisoners, and the French, with the Treaty of Brétigny, had agreed to surrender a third of their kingdom to his sovereign rule in exchange for peace.In War Cruel and Sharp, Dr Rogers offers a powerfully argued and thoroughly researched reassessment of the military and political strategies which Edward III and the Black Prince employed to achieve this astounding result. Using a narrative framework, he makes the case that the Plantagenets' ultimate success came from adapting the strategy which Robert Bruce had used to force the 'Shameful Peace' on England in 1328. Unlike previous historians, he argues that the quest for decisive battle underlay Edward's strategy in every campaign he undertook, though the English also utilized sieges and ferocious devastation of the countryside to advance their war efforts.
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Editorial Reviews
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Among the great medieval military leaders, Edward III may be the least studied. That is, until this excellent book... --Choice
An impressive and lively study...should certainly help to make historians rethink some of the established assumptions about... medieval warfare --Reviews in History
Exhilarating...persuasive...an impressive and compulsively readable book, illuminated by vivid citations from the sources...enlivened by a combative style. --History
An impressive and lively study...should certainly help to make historians rethink some of the established assumptions about... medieval warfare --Reviews in History
Exhilarating...persuasive...an impressive and compulsively readable book, illuminated by vivid citations from the sources...enlivened by a combative style. --History
About the Author
Clifford J. Rogers is Assistant Professor of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.
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10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A New Look at Medieval Warfare,
By
This review is from: War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Warfare in History) (Hardcover)
It's been a while since I've enjoyed a book as much as this one.Clifford Rogers provides a detailed analysis of Edward III's campaigns from 1327 through 1360, including his early campaigns in Scotland, through the first invasions of France in The Hundred Years War. He does so in an effort to show that, contrary to what other authors have said, Edward III's campaigns in France were not dominated by an effort to simply devastate the countryside and so undermine the authority of the Valois Kings in France, but rather that he actively sought battles with the French in order to bring about swifter, more decisive conclusions to their conflicts. While Rogers does not use this work to attempt to dispel the more general thesis that Medieval Military Commanders sought to avoid War at all costs, it certainly invites a re-examination of other campaigns to see how well that theory holds up. And for those who continue to hold the outdated view that medieval warfare was without detailed strategy, and that military commanders of the time were without understanding of comprehensive military strategy, this serves as yet another nail in that particular coffin. Keep in mind that this work discusses the campaigns as a whole - with less emphasis on individual battles. If you are looking for detailed battlefield accounts, other works would be more profitable. I won't provide a blow-by-blow outline of Rogers' narrative here. Instead I will note the most positive aspects of this work. First and foremost is the reliance on contemporary and near-contemporary sources. This work is copiously footnoted (and the footnotes are important - take time to read them) with accounts of chroniclers that accompanied the various armies, providing frequent evidence that Edward was actively seeking battle and was extremely disappointed when he couldn't bring the French to one. Second, Rogers goes into great detail covering the political aspects of these campaigns. He discusses the Franco-Scottish alliance, Phillip VI's confiscation of some of Edward's continental holdings when he was a minor, Edward's rights to the Kingship of France, the Papal efforts toward peace and the various alliances that were formed and broken throughout the 33-year period, and the implications of all of these for the War. Third, he takes time to explain the historiography of the studies of Edward's political campaigns and goes on to refute the findings of other authors that Edward sought to avoid battle at all costs. I won't swear that he has proven his case as this is not the medieval period I am most familiar with - however he has provided a great deal of evidence in support of his view. Fourth, he also goes into great detail regarding logistics. He discusses the difficulties Edward had in raising money for the early stages of these wars, the role that finding food and water, and foraging for these while on campaign, played in the various campaigns, and how the vagaries of the ability to supply his force and, most of all to secure lines of retreat, played in how aggressively he tried to bring the French to battle. My quibbles with this book are few and not of great relevance to its overall aim. First, several times Rogers offers that "The first duty of a good lord was to defend his vassals ..." p13. I am not altogether certain this is true. Quite often the first requirement of a good lord was, IMO, to retain an effective fighting force and the loyalties of his nobles. Now these two are related, but not necessarily the same. Second, I found less evidence for his repeated assertions that Edward III sought battle largely through his faith in "the judgement of God" whereby the victor on the field placed his faith that the army held in God's favor would win. I'm not saying this wasn't a primary focus of Edward - just that I found it less fully proven. Personally I feel that Edward's willingness to seek battle with a numerically superior French army was more due to his possession of a more experienced force, his possession of longbow archers for which France had no good answer and, most of all, his faith in his own ability as a commander. Beyond this, the book is well-written, IMO it is fairly fast-paced and provides a great deal of detailed information. It provides an excellent new look at the Wars of Edward III in particular, and of Medieval Military Warfare in general.
4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
One of the best in depth histories of the military prowess of Edward III,
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This review is from: War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Warfare in History) (Hardcover)
Read this for graduate history course in medieval history.Clifford J. Rogers has written one of the best in depth histories of the military prowess of Edward III. The British king who was primarily responsible for the longbows' success was Edward III, who reigned for fifty years. In order to gain a clear picture of why the longbow enjoyed its tactical success on the battlefield under the leadership of Edward III and his commanders, it is necessary to study Edward III's record regarding the logistics, recruiting, and training of the longbow men during the Hundred Years' War. The available records during the reign of Edward III, help to flesh out a really good understanding for historians concerning the lengths he went through to build Britain's first professional army using the longbow as its primary weapon. Rogers delves into the logistical needs necessary to supply Edward III's invasion force. The requirement on localities to provide longbow men with weapons was very demanding. Edward III made great strides to take on the fiscal responsibility of equipping his army. This actually provided him with two advantages--that of quality control of weaponry, and reducing manufacturing cost through economy of scale. One example of how enormous a task it was to prepare for war comes from the armory records at the Tower of London. In 1359, the clerk of the armory is ordered to put bowyers (longbow makers), and fletchers (arrow makers), to work for the king, under penalty of imprisonment if necessary, if they were non-cooperative. Between 1353 and 1360, the armory added to its stores, 15,300 bows, 4,000 bow staves, and 24,000 sheaves of arrows. Each sheave contained twenty-four arrows; thus, this order equates to 576,000 arrows in all. In March 1345, 15 Sheriffs were issued orders to supply the Tower armory with, "3,000 bows, 8,400 sheaves of arrows and 20,000 bowstrings." By looking at supply records leading up to the battle of Crecy, Rogers was able to surmise several important factors about the supply of arrows. Each longbow man had an allotment of 60 arrows for the battle. The average arrow weighs 4 oz., so to supply 7,500 longbow men it took nearly a half-million arrows weighing 55 tons. This supply was easily transportable in some 60 one-ton carts from the port to the army. These figures can cast little doubt on the fact that the king was constantly writing back to England throughout his campaign in France ordering more supply of arrows and bowstrings. These facts about arrow supply gives one a good picture of just one facet of the monumental logistical, organizational, and planning skills necessary to support Edward III's invasion force of about 15,000 men crossing in ships numbering some 700 to 1,000. Rogers has done outstanding work in publishing recruiting information from both primary sources and other historians' work to explain the methods necessary to fill the ranks with soldiers. Edward III refined the recruiting methods that his predecessors had in place to fight the Welsh and Scottish wars. Unlike his predecessors, who just wanted a lot of bodies, Edward III had his commissioners of array looking for particular skill sets such as longbow men and mounted archers. The two methods Edward III employed to build his army were commissioners of array and an increasingly popular program known as contracts of indenture. Though Edward III had hoped to raise 20,000 fighting men, most historians agreed he recruited about 15,000, which was no small feat for his day. The commissioners of array for each town or county usually numbered three to four men, who themselves would eventually go off to fight in the war. Each town or county would have a quota of men they were expected to raise and equip for war. Across the board, most of the towns and counties provided one-half to two-thirds of their quotas. The counties were largely responsible for recruiting longbow men on foot, and the towns had to supply a mix of both longbow men on foot and mounted longbow men. As a for instance, Kent was required to raise 280 men and Norfolk 200. In reality, the numbers of men actually going to war was somewhat less due to several factors. Some of the men would prove to be unfit for service when they appeared for muster. However, the record shows that there were complaints from commanders in the field about the condition and physique of soldiers sent to them. No doubt, undesirable men were recruited in order to help quota numbers. The granting of service exemptions was numerous usually accompanied by the applicant paying a fee to buy himself out of service. One such request shows an Otto de Halsale paying 4 for an exemption. Just like modern times, some men just simply did not show up for the muster call. It is interesting to note that the commissioners met with little resistance from town and country folk during the time of recruitment. The estimation among historians is that some 9,000 out of the 15,000 men that went ashore in Normandy were recruited through commissions of array. Unlike the French, who used many mercenaries from other countries, such as Italy, Edward III's army was recruited from men from the British Isles. Rogers notes in his research that, "What commissions of array produced was quantity, not quality." Thus, an increasingly popular method of recruitment to fill the ranks was contracts of indentures. This system had nobles and bannerets (knights who were entitled to lead their own men into battle) raising their own troops, which they then hired out to the king, on a contractual basis. In addition to the normal pay, these men were often promised quarterly pay bonuses and shares from war booty. About 5,000 men were recruited in this fashion at the start of the invasion. Rogers research proved that, "The spread of the longbow into the north and west of England, which increasingly became the preferred recruiting ground for archers, was facilitated and sustained by prospects of employment and profit..." Rogers found that the indenture system grew during the conduct of the war. Many men who were brought to war under the array system, would sign an indenture contract after their term under the array system was completed. In fact, men would see which commanders had more battlefield success, and would clamor to sign on with the more successful commanders. No doubt, the lure of money was a motivating factor for these men. This meant that the indentured ranks were filling with war-hardened veterans, thus making them a formidable fighting force. If any weapon system is to be a force multiplier and weapon of mass destruction on the battlefield, then it must have soldiers properly trained to employ it. The longbow is no exception to this rule. From the age of seven, English boys were practicing with their longbows. The longbow man was not a peasant who owed service or allegiance to a noble. Instead, he was a free man who was rightly paid for his services. These were strong muscular men with a robust build enabling them to pull a 125 lb. bow. Using a longbow was not an innate skill; it was honed and improved through years of training. The young bowmen were constantly under the watchful eye of veterans during training. The veterans knew how easy it was to fire at static targets, as opposed to an enemy knight bearing down on them mounted on a charging steed. "Over the course of hundreds of years it has been proven that the best manner of using a bow is to use the same force for every shot regardless of whether the target is close or far away." All archers were taught to find a spot on their face, usually the chin, that they would draw the bowstring to touch. This gave them the ability to standardize their draw and shot power. Longbow men held all their shots the same amount of time. As they gained experience, the time needed to prepare and aim their shot became shorter. In addition, the longbow men were armed with swords or axes as well, and often joined in the hand-to-hand combat as the battle progressed. "The whole history of English warfare from the middle of the twelfth century to the end of the fifteenth century proves that the flower of her infantry was the archers." Edward III's strategic and tactical abilities were on full display during the Hundred Years' War. One of the most important tactical innovations that Edward III instituted to increase the fighting capability of the English army before the start of the Hundred Years' War was the introduction of mounted archers to its ranks. Mounted archers rode ponies for quick transport to the battlefield, and then they would dismount to shoot their longbows in battle. Undoubtedly, Edward III learned from the previous one hundred years of his predecessors' fighting the Scottish, that too many times the Scots outmaneuvered the English; thus, they escaped from having to fight a battle advantageous to the English. Edward III was going to do all he could to make sure that this did not happen to his army. Rogers' research shows muster records from 1334 listing mounted archers for the first time as part of Edward III's expedition into Scotland. This was Edward III's second largest campaign against an enemy during his reign. The expedition served as an excellent opportunity for Edward III and his army to prove their new tactics, which they would put to good use a dozen years later in France. Crécy was the sight of the first major battle of The Hundred Years' War and was a rousing success for the invading English army of Edward III. The battle, which took place on just two days in August of 1346, was emblematic of the tactical successes that the British enjoyed at the battles of Poitiers and Agincourt. "Crécy was fought upon principles learnt by experience in Scotland; after Crécy the same principles had to be... Read more ›
5.0 out of 5 stars
A TRIUMPH OF SCHOLARSHIP,
By
This review is from: War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Warfare in History) (Hardcover)
The title of this book is taken from Sir John Fastolf's memorandum of 1435, concerning the war in France. Fastolf advised that the English should revert to the strategy adopted by Edward III and the Black Prince in the fourteenth century: they should mount armed raids (chevauchées), instead of continuing to rely on either the strategies of conquest or static defence; yet his advice was never followed. The days of the raid were over and, since nothing else worked, the English were driven from France in 1453. The highest watermark of English conquest proved to have been reached in 1360, not 1422.Yet Professor Rogers's groundbreaking book, a triumph of scholarship, is not mainly concerned with Fastolf's strategy, but with battle. This is refreshing, because we have heard too much in recent years of the idea that `battles were few and far between in the Middle Ages'. There may be some truth in that, but it rather depends on what one means by a battle; and, however infrequent they were, battles were very important. The main thesis is that Edward III was a `battle-seeking' general, one who deliberately sought to fight the French in set-piece battles, despite the fact that he could not be certain of victory. This is so contrary to the strategy advocated by the Roman Vegetius (in his `Art of War') that it would cause one to question whether that treatise was as widely read in the Middle Ages as we have come to think. In addition, is it really very likely that Edward III was deliberately seeking to `take on' the French in a major set-piece battle in 1346 (this being the classic case for study)? The circumstances would suggest that it was more likely that, like Henry V in 1415, his aim was to bring his army safely or home, or at least to Calais, and that he was trapped by the French (albeit that in each case the outcome was a triumphant victory). However, the book did give me cause to re-assess my assumptions. Professor Rogers has marshalled so much evidence that one has to doubt whether it is ever safe to rely on what one might think of as probability, even `inherent military probability'. Stephen Cooper
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