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War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism

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I have now finished the book but the number of negative reviews posted here still suggests that half a review by someone who has read the book carefully was better than what else is on offer so far. I have not altered my comments since reading the rest but have a few additional observations. This is a personal story of Feith's career in the DoD, before and during the Iraq War. He comments on contacts with others but he does not offer general statements or philosophy about matters that he is not personally familiar with. He does, however, offer some conclusions at the end about what was done well and what the mistakes were. He is honest about identifying his opinions and what he believes to be facts. This is a source document for the history that will be eventually written, hopefully fairly, about this period. I marked a number of sections because they impact the mythology of the war as illustrated in the other reviews and comments.

He is critical of Colin Powell, and especially, Richard Armitage, who seemed not to be as concerned with the post-Saddam situation yet who resisted anyone else treading on their turf. His first skirmish was in 2002 (page 173) when he attempted to set up an office, called Office of Strategic Influence, to counteract the Islamist propaganda about why violent jihad was becoming a threat. Some went back to the old "root causes" excuse yet the Saudi hijackers of 9/11 were upper middle class educated men. His effort came to naught when the office was attacked in a strategic leak from within the administration, followed by a sensational NY Times article that accused them of planning to spread false information. Another similar article was printed recently about another DoD effort to reach Muslims with honest information. In his conclusions, he points out that we still do not have any serious effort to counter jihadist rhetoric.

He refutes (page 197) another charge, prominent in another review here, that Chalabi was a "creature" of DoD and Feith was his "sponsor." One would think that the fact the Chalabi has been a major official in the Iraq government would put to rest that old CIA smear but it lives on on Amazon pages. He tells the story of CIA incompetence and the firestorm created when a 20-year DIA expert on his staff wrote a critical briefing (page 265) pointing out how CIA had ignored links between Saddam and al Qeada before the war. On page 278, he recounts another example of State's conflicted thinking where they advise against an "occupation" but their antipathy toward the "externals" (exiles like Chalabi) leads them to plan for a "many year" occupation and rule before an Iraqi government can be set up. The insurgency gained force from resentment at that policy. He points out with some understandable satisfaction that the "externals," including the Kurds who CIA predicted would not be accepted by other Iraqis, constituted almost the entire interim government that took over from Bremer and the CPA in 2004.

He has some mixed opinions about Paul Bremer, pointing out how Bremer took too much authority, resisting any consultation with Rumsfeld, his superior in the chain-of-command, and made a number of serious mistakes. The most serious one was excluding the Iraqis from governing their own country for as long as he did. The insurgency might never have gained the support of so much of the Sunni population had the "Occupation" not been so obvious.

I don't say this is the last word and Feith seems to resist many generalizations. This is an objective account and very valuable. He has his deficiencies. The most serious is the fact the he never mentions the tribal nature of the Iraqi society. This was a major mistake in the early history of our post-Saddam attempts to govern the country and fight the insurgency.

I have read many books on this subject and the ones I respect, beginning with The Threatening Storm by Kenneth Pollack, all mostly agree. For example, another review here mentions Bob Baer and his book about Aghanistan and Gary Berntsen and "Jawbreaker" also about Afghanistan. I have read both books and Baer, in particular, dismisses his CIA bosses pointing out the lack of language skills in CIA. This lack, and the ignorance of the culture, was a major factor in the CIAs poor performance in Iraq and is discussed by Feith. He is chiefly critical of CIA implying that their information was better sourced than it was. They concealed how few assets they had in Iraq (none) and led others astray who placed more faith in their reports than was warranted. Better to confess ignorance than mislead.

The dissent, like some of the other reviews here, comes with plenty of invective and obscenity but few facts. I still think this is an important book that anyone trying to understand our policy on fighting militant Islam should read. I'm sure Feith is evening a few scores here but he marshals lots of facts and refers to other documents to support his conclusions. This is an essential book, not least because he is such a controversial figure. The abuse he has taken from partisans is outrageous. At one point (page 388) he mentions a particularly odious slur attributed to Colin Powell by Bob Woodward in which Feith's office in the DoD is described as "a Gestapo office" ignoring the fact that Feith's father was a Holocaust survivor. Powell denied making the remark and apologized to Feith, whom he had known for 20 years, but the tone was set.

From http://www.slate.com/id/2192696/

A Tale of Two Tell-Alls

IF YOU WANT TO READ A SERIOUS BOOK ABOUT THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, LOOK TO DOUGLAS FEITH.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, June 2, 2008, at 11:40 AM ET

When Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill defected from the Cabinet in 2002 and Ron Suskind told O'Neill's story of being surrounded by fools, Michael Kinsley observed that the president deserved all he got from the book. Anyone dumb enough to hire a fool like O'Neill in the first place ought to have known what to expect. So it goes with the ludicrous figure of Scott McClellan. I used to watch this mooncalf blunder his way through press conferences and think, Exactly where do we find such men? For the job of swabbing out the White House stables, yes. But for any task involving the weighing of words? Hah! Now it seems that he realizes, and with a shock at that, that there was a certain amount of "spin" or propaganda involved in his job description. Well, give the man a cigar. Beyond that, the book is effectively valueless to the anti-war camp since, as McClellan says of the president, "I consider him a fundamentally decent person, and I do not believe he or his White House deliberately or consciously sought to deceive the American people."
Bertrand Russell's principle of evidence against interest--if the pope has doubts about Jesus, his doubts are by definition more newsworthy than the next person's--doesn't really justify the ocean of coverage in which the talentless McClellan is currently so far out of his depth. For one thing, he doesn't supply anything that can really be called evidence. For another, having not noticed any "propaganda machine" at the time he was perspiring his way through his simple job, he has a clear mercenary interest in discovering one in retrospect.
If you want to read a serious book about the origins and consequences of the intervention in Iraq in 2003, you owe it to yourself to get hold of a copy of Douglas Feith's War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. As undersecretary of defense for policy, Feith was one of those most intimately involved in the argument about whether to and, if so, how to put an end to the regime of Saddam Hussein. His book contains notes made in real time at the National Security Council, a trove of declassified documentation, and a thoroughly well-organized catalog of sources and papers and memos. Feith has also done us the service of establishing a Web site where you can go and follow up all his sources and check them for yourself against his analysis and explanation. There is more of value in any chapter of this archive than in any of the ramblings of McClellan. As I write this on the first day of June, about a book that was published in the first week of April, the books pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Boston Globe have not seen fit to give Feith a review. An article on his book, written by the excellent James Risen for the news pages of the New York Times, has not run. This all might seem less questionable if it were not for the still-ballooning acreage awarded to Scott McClellan.

Feith was and is very much identified with the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, and he certainly did not believe that Saddam Hussein was ever containable in a sanctions "box." But he is capable of separating his views from his narrative, and this absorbing account of the interdepartmental and ideological quarrels within the Bush administration, on the Afghanistan and Guantanamo fronts as well as about Iraq, will make it difficult if not impossible for people to go on claiming that, for instance:
1. There was no rational reason to suspect a continuing Iraqi WMD threat. Feith's citations from the Duelfer Report alone are stunning in their implications.
2. That alternatives to war were never discussed and that the administration was out to "get" Saddam Hussein from the start.
3. That the advocates of regime change hoped and indeed planned to anoint Ahmad Chalabi as a figurehead leader in Baghdad.
4. That there was no consideration given to postwar planning.
It's also of considerable interest to learn that the main argument for adhering to the Geneva Conventions was made within the Pentagon and that the man who expressed the most prewar misgivings concerning Iraq was none other than Donald Rumsfeld. Feith doesn't deny that he has biases of his own. One of these concerns the widely circulated charge that his own Office of Special Plans was engaged in cherry-picking and stovepiping intelligence. Another is the criticism, made by most of the neocon faction, of Paul Bremer and the occupation regime that he ran in Baghdad. In all instances, however, Feith writes in an unrancorous manner and is careful to supply the evidence and the testimony and, where possible, the actual documentation, from all sides.
Without explicitly saying so, Feith makes a huge contribution to the growing case for considering the Central Intelligence Agency to be well beyond salvage. Its role as a highly politicized and bewilderingly incompetent body, disastrous enough in having left us under open skies before Sept. 11, 2001, became something more like catastrophic with the gross mishandling of Iraq. For these revelations alone, this book is well worth the acquisition. (I might add that, unlike McClellan, Feith is contributing all his earnings and royalties to charities that care for our men and women in uniform.)
I don't know Feith, but I can pay him two further compliments: When you read him on a detail with which you yourself are familiar, he is factually reliable (and it's not often that one can say that, believe me). And his prose style is easy, nonbureaucratic, dry, and sometimes amusing. If a book that was truly informative was called a "tell-all" by our media, then War and Decision would qualify. As it is, we seem to reserve that term for the work of bigmouths who have little, if anything, to impart.

Like many of my neighbors, I scraped the faded American flag decal off my back window in, oh, about 2005 when I became disgusted with the war in Iraq. Two questions kept popping up in my mind: "Why are we still in this?" and "Why didn't the planners see this mess coming?"

Like many, I had forgotten (or perhaps had never really understood) the purpose of the war which I think Feith summarizes best in one of his chapter titles: "Change the Way We Live, Or Change the Way They Live". His explanation took care of my first question.

Feith's book takes long strides to answer the second question, and it was well worth my time. Without a doubt this book is from Feith's viewpoint, as it should be. As he recounts, others disagreed with his views. But even if you disagree with Feith's viewpoint, you should read this book. After reading it, I am grateful to Doug Feith for this book, not to mention his service to this nation.

The New York Times and Washington Post have steadfastly refused to review this book, which is a strange form of flattery for Douglas J. Feith. Having printed numberless falsehoods and distortions about Feith, these guardians of the truth as they want it known, do not want the actual truth disseminated, the truth contained in "War & Decision".

It is indeed lamentable that so few will read this book. First, the subject is too serious for most people. They will continue to rely on newspapers, magazines, blogs and so on. Second, reading Feith's book requires dedication. While well written and eminently comprehensible by virtually any reader, it is packed with detail and detail to the uninterested becomes quickly tedious.

Fortunately, though the Times and Post have declined to review "War & Decision", many other honest people have - and the conclusion has been generally that Feith has written the first serious history of the Iraq war. It is comprehensive. It covers the planning, the execution, the aftermath. It is unsparing in praising the successes - and lamenting (as well as explaining) the failures.

Many myths and outright lies of the mainstream media and left-wing are exposed here and supported not only with profuse sourcing, but in some cases with copies of the actual documents as well. No anonymous sources as you would find in a Woodward book or a Times or Post article.

It will take dedication to work your way through the entire book and, frankly, I doubt that it is totally comprehensible with a single reading. This book invites scholarly researching and multiple readings. Considering the importance of the events to our era and the future, one can only hope that other similar histories - honest and detailed - will be forthcoming in the future from other participants in the events. But, in reality, I doubt that there will be many for few will be willing to hold as reflective a mirror to themselves as Feith does.

Feith tells us much. Colin Powell and the miserable Richard Armitage come badly here as they justifiably should. L. Paul Bremer is the object of much, far too polite, scorn. The generals, Rumsfeld, Bush himself, everyone is responsible in one way or another for the failures. More importantly, perhaps, Feith also identifies who should receive credit for the successes - and there were many with quite possibly more to come.

The student of history will note the differing environments in which policy was decided upon during WWII, Korea, Vietnam and now Iraq. Feith doesn't say so, but it is clear that the Congress of the United States over the years has intruded where it doesn't belong and has tied the hands of the current and future Presidents in terms of defending the nation. The mainstream media, firmly held in the hands of the left-wing, seems to hate the United States more than the nation's enemies.

The State Department, CIA and Department of Defense have become unelected branches of government, with entrenched anonymous bureaucrats who are unaccountable and unknown to the public, but who play a large and dangerous role in deciding or shaping policy. One need only look at the war that Feith describes between State, CIA and Defense.

I wish Feith had produced a second companion volume "Iraq For Dummies" or something along those lines so more people might be drawn into reading what he has to say. It is an adventure in truth.

Feith explodes the myths that there were no reasons to be concerned with Iraqi WMD efforts, that the war was about oil or George W. Bush's ego, that there was no post-occupation plan and so on. All of these points are explained and documented.

It is difficult, frankly, to write a concise review of this book. There is much information in its 600-plus pages (including notes) and since so few people will actually read it, there is a desire to spread as much of its content as possible.

The reality is that if you are concerned with the United States and its future and want to understand why invading Iraq was a brave and proper decision, read this book. It tells the whole story, warts and all.

Jerry

The sheer magnitude of misinformation concerning the run-up to and the current U.S. policy in Iraq is simply withering. FINALLY, an insider not only lays everything out for anyone seriously interested in looking and understanding (which doubtless will exclude much of the dominant, old-line media), but one who provides significant documentation for everything he says! That fact alone is worth the price. Barak Obama, et al, should take a break, and read this book!

Unlike the fact-free, free-standing assertions of many (most?) books (and, significantly, of politicians from both Parties) on this subject, Secretary Feith thoughtfully has provided a web site (www.waranddecision.com) containing easy (one-click) access to the unclassified versions of the documents upon which his tome relies.

One may disagree with Iraq policy, in comfortable reflection based on a degree of knowledge concerning past events, but this book sets forth in engaging, easy-to-read narrative, what was happening and when. It leaves no excuse for the sort of ignorance that is so pervasive in discussions of these issues. Yes, yes, sometimes the presentation can be tedious; but isn't that in the very nature of policy? Especially Middle East Policy?

Far from being an "Apologia-Pro-Vita-Sua" exercise, Secretary Feith frankly sets forth where and when he could have made better "calls." This, alone, is refreshing -- especially if one has slogged through, or is familiar with the vacuous, ego-driven volumes of Zinni and McClelland (Franks is another story).

All in all, this is The Essential Read on this subject. It should be on every serious history reader's shelf. It is an unparalleled single point of reference on the matter.

I read the book and think it presents a persuasive and illuminating case for what went on during this period. It is heavily documented and corrects many errors in the popular media.

It is far more important than the "make some money" books based on emotion and a dearth of facts--like most of the negative reviews. One wonders whether those "reviewers" really read the book--few of them offer substantiated criticisms of what Feith reports.

This is a must-read for anyone who wants to get a firsthand view of the origins of the State/CIA war on Defense and eventually Bush 43. According to Feith, it began because Rumsfeld vehemently objected to Gen. Jay Garner hiring a staff composed nearly entirely of State Dept. officials.

If you've only gotten your accounts of the war behind the war from the major media, you need to read this book. If you've followed it via the alternative media, you're probably familiar with many of the anecdotes and facts related herein (such as State wanting a long-term American presence in and dominion over Iraq, while Defense wanted something like the eventual Iraqi temporary administration years before it finally happened; or State's willingness to sacrifice American lives just so long as they could have any possibility of Chalabi not gaining power). Even so, you'll find it a good read.

Perhaps the most interesting correction to the record (one that was new to me) is the idea that Garner was not fired, but was always intended to be a stop-gap, and that the disastrous reign of Paul Bremer was at Rumsfeld's recommendation. Only after his appointment did Bremer apparently forget he reported to the SecDef and became infatuated with pursuing State's policies rather than those of the administration. Bringing an end to Bremer's megalomania only happened after a self-aggrandizing editorial in the Washington Post, run without any apparent clearance from anyone in his chain of command.

Feith does a good job portraying most of those he was able to observe closely. Rumsfeld is brusque, brilliant, and difficult. Rice is always looking to triangulate and please everyone. Powell consistently is reported as saying one thing in the media and then denying it to Feith and his colleagues. Armitage uses the media to wage a near-coup against the President. The lone cipher in all this is Wolfowitz; he's nearly a ghost in the book, and you'll learn nothing about the man from it.

All in all, a solid read, and highly recommended.

Finally, an honest, cogent telling of the thinking within the Bush Administration in the days following 9/11. Not everyone agreed on the proper response but a workable strategy was developed based on the information at hand. The logic seems inescapable - a major injury to the American people had been sustained and it was clear that the threat of further attacks was growing, not diminishing. The government of the US has a core responsibility to meet and prevent further attacks and that's what they did.

The tests of a report, whether in a book like this or in the day-to-day media coverage, are how well the story appears rational and in agreement with other knowledge of how the world works and, in the long run, how well can predictions based on those reports hold up to events. The media's version of events in real time never hung together and seemed to conflict with other understandings. The political opposition to the Bush Administration was clearly contra-factual in most respects. This book however makes its cases clearly and with logic and precision. It just makes sense, especially in light of current conditions.

Where I would take a differing position from Feith and Rumsfeld is in the matter of how important it was that Iraq's government would be democratic. Feith seems to have advocated, and still advocates, that something less than democracy in Iraq would serve the US well enough. The State Department did take a longer view although they over-romantized it in their arguments. I think Bush made the right decision to think the long game and push for a sound basis for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The book also highlights the importance of the next president's choice of Secretary of State. The prime task will be bending the bureaucracy to the will of the elected leadership and making it a team player. I read where Obama is floating Joe Biden for the job!

I won't gush over Mr. Feith's writing skills. I found it easy enough to read but he has a style honed in the writing of interoffice memos and PowerPoint presentations. Certainly good enough but his background shows.

If one reads only one book on post-9/11 decision-making, read this one. My respects (and thanks) to Mr. Feith!

`War & Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism` by Douglas Feith

Mr. Feith does a remarkable job of recounting his - all firsthand - experiences from his tumultuous time serving the country at the Pentagon as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In this thoroughly researched, meticulously footnoted and highly readable memoir of 5 historic years, many of the myths propagated (those that the author was party to and had refuting documentation) in the media regarding Pentagon decision making, war strategies and policy are completely debunked. The book also remains critical of the key players - including Feith himself, as well as Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Powell, Armitage, Franks, Bremer, Rice, Cheney, of course President Bush, and others. The character of Donald Rumsfeld is also extremely well covered in this book with enough new information for anyone interested in current affairs and the players shaping the events of our time.

It may very well be decided that, after finishing this book, you simply disagree with the strategies and policies adopted by the Pentagon, and subsequently, the Bush administrations prosecution of the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and the "global war on terror". I think this would be just fine with the author. The narrative may serve to reinforce beliefs you've held to date, and conversely, reverse your thinking. Mr. Feith works hard to lay out the foundation of the decision making processes and attempt to put to rest some of the erroneous Pentagon reporting which took place during his tenure. Additionally, credit is certainly provided where credit is deserved to those reporters who maintained accuracy, even in highly critical situations.

I did not close `War & Decision' with the impression that I had just digested a tract penned merely to win a convert to a particular philosophy or policy. I was left, rather, with a clearer picture of this story (which is documented in its entirety) and an opportunity to make up my mind as to whether my countries policies and actions were properly conceived, examined, and executed. I don't think the author is worried whether the reader will agree or disagree, only that he or she is now privy to the first, first-person Pentagon perspective, which was painstakingly documented. Douglas Feith provides the facts coupled with his opinions (which he does not mask) which you use to assess one of the most important subjects of our time.

I'm sure there are folks who will scoff at even the mention of reading anything by Douglas Feith - I think that's a shame. It is my firm belief that anyone serious about gaining additional perspective into the Pentagon during this ever important period would be well served by picking up 'War & Decision' and taking the time to glean these important insights. In addition, all of the author's proceeds are being donated to charities which support our troops - anyone with a heart should feel good about the unparalleled return on that investment!

- Johnny

At last, a sensible, informed history from one of the responsible participants in these events.

I think it is skilfully written and I found it a joy to read, not just for the language mastery and informed history, but for the careful clarity, perspective, humility and sensitive care in purpose. I think it is a valuable insight into some truly capable people in action; standing up, discerning and doing the right thing, and doing their best, even when its really challenging, even when there is voluminous opposition, and when the stakes are very, very high. People who will find a way to rise and meet a challenge no matter how high, and some who don't. I found it exciting and inspiring to read, and a wonderful example of how to behave well that I will treasure.

Clearly, the integrity of the free world was in some fine hands here.

I loved it. Thanks.