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War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare

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I read the first edition of this book which was published in 1965 - so I don't know whether this edition is a revised one. Remember that, at the time the original one was published, the Vietnam War was still on - and Che Guevara was still alive & very much active. So the first edition does not make any reference to either the greatest triumph of guerrilla warfare, defeat of the vastly superior US forces to the peasant army of the Vietcong and North Vietnam; nor its dismal failure in almost all other parts of the world, symbolically represented in Che's death in Bolivia. This was the time when everyone thought that guerrilla warfare was the wave of the future; and there were a number of books on its theory and practice. There was Che's own "Guerrilla Warfare", Regis Debray's "Revolution of the Revolution", Carlos Marighella's manual on urban guerrilla warfare, etc (I remember seeing at least a couple more books which came out during this period). There were also books on counter-insurgency, mostly by ex-US Special Forces experts, most of which confidently predicted that US victory over the guerrillas in Vietnam was just a matter of few months :->
However, what sets Taber's book apart from these other books is the non-partisan approach he took in writing on the subject. He is virtually the only writer in this area who discusses Grivas, one of the rare non-leftist guerrilla fighters, in any length. Many people seem to forget that guerrilla warfare has no essential connection to leftist political movements. It is just a method of warfare available to political movements of all hues (as is evident from a perusal of the manual of insurgency for the Nicaraguan Contras prepared by the CIA). Taber discusses the method rather than the politics, and I think we should give him full marks for a very clear exposition of the theory of unconventional warfare, the necessary conditions for its success, and why it has failed so often. He uses case-studies drawn from as wide a field as Ireland, Vietnam, Greece and Indonesia. He also discusses why counter-insurgency is such an expensive proposition and can never completely succeed by itself - something that is very topical in today's age. All in all, an excellent introduction to a fascinating topic.

There have been a lot of books on guerrilla warfare. They typically fall into one of two categories. Those by Americans are written by university or military types who have studed irregular warfare from an academic or counter guerrilla war aspect. (Example, the forward to this book by Bard E. O'Neill of the National War College.) The other class of books are those written by practictionners who are not American such as Che Guevara. This book was written by an American serving with Castro's forces during the revolution in Cuba.

The book was first published in 1965 and became a classic. Long since out of print, the occassional rare copy that became available was quickly purchased at any price. Now Potomac Books has reprinted the original book, with as stated, a new forward.

If you are headed to Iraq buy it, it will give you a better understanding of what's going on. If you're interested in Iraq, buy it before it is gone again. If you're in the media, don't bother, your interest is ratings not reporting.

As a college professor who has taught the history of unconventional warfare for many years, I cannot rate this book any higher. It is outstanding. While Taber uses examples from the past, it still provides a lucidly clear understanding of guerrilla warfare. I only wish it had been "must" reading for the Bush administration. Maybe we would not be in the predicament we are currently facing in Iraq.

Despite the fact the text is a bit dated its teachings remain highly relevant to the contemporary reader. This is not a book of specific tactics, as Taber himself will explain in chapter 10. Most of the specifics of guerrilla war will have to be learned extemporaneously according the conditions in which the guerilla finds him/herself fighting in;"The guerrilla is, above all, an improviser" (pg. 154). Instead what is given is a detailed history of what led to the success or failure of previous guerrilla campaigns and the lessons learned from their outcomes. Written in the heyday of the guerrilla, Taber looks at dozens of case studies; from Grivas in Cyprus to Castro in Cuba, and of course the authors of the classics of guerrilla war and warfare in general, such as Mao, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz.

I'm rather impressed that so much knowledge could be crammed into just 200 pages, but this text is well worth to read to understand the history of guerrilla warfare and for better comprehension of contemporary insurgency. Once again, although the book is a bit dated, there are few that have been written since its release that challenge Taber's command of the subject. Since it was written before the close of the Vietnam war it unfortunately does not touch down on the most successful use of irregular tactics in history, which is a shame because I'm sure Taber's thoughts on the subject would be valuable. Even if Vietnam had been mentioned though it would only further vindicate many of Taber's findings anyway. I'm truly amazed that such a wealth of information can be transmitted so succinctly; and to top it off, it's a fast and enjoyable read.

This book is older having been published in the 60's, but one of the best works on guerrilla war that I have read. The book looks mostly at the Cuban rebellion with Castro. There are other case studies including a look at the intensifying war in Vietnam. For those who want to learn about small wars this is an important work to read. And even though this work is old, it still can be applied to current conflicts in the middle east and Africa.

Seeking to learn more about guerrilla warfare, I read Che's Guerrilla Warfare and Mao's On Guerrilla Warfare, yet I felt somewhat unsatisfied with each of those works and purchased Taber's War of the Flea hoping for better. Taber's work far outshines the works of Che and Mao. Taber has the advantage of not having a legend to defend and draws from both works, as well as The Art of War by Sun Tzu. Taber focuses not only on the Marxist inspired revolutions of recent times, but also on the revolutions of national liberation in Palestine, Cypress, and Ireland. Through all of these, he demonstrates how the application of the philosophy behind Guerrilla warfare presents the organized state or foreign colonist with only the prospect of political and/or military defeat.


The lessons in Taber's work are as true today as they have been throughout time. They are lessons that Americans should learn. One cannot win a war against guerrillas. One can either pull out, reach a negotiated defeat, or expend one's precious time, resources and the lives of the young in a hopeless struggle descending into inevitable defeat.

Although this book is supposed to be a classic study of guerrilla warefare is sorely needs to be updated with modern tactics. One glaring flaw is the lack of appreciation for modern communications. The focus of this book is the success of communist guerrillas in central and south America. There are little modern additions. What about the Islamic rebellion in Iran? What of the guerrilla activities in the US during the Vietnam war? Everything in this book seems to end with Castro. The basic tactics of the guerrilla are explained over and over: attack only where the margin of success is high to convince a skeptical population that a tyrant is not omni-potent. Methods that worked well for Castro won't work today. Unfortunately, these tactics are much more difficult to employ in modern times. The reactionaries have invested heavily in new technology. For example, the advantages of night attacks are largely ended.

This book needs an updated companion. Perhaps during the aftermath of the next revolution a new more relevant text will be written. I look forward to that publication.

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Well written and easy to read book that brings to light a war type that has existed since warfare itself. This book discusses guerrilla warfare and its aspects, that are still applicable to todays conflicts. I believe there is a huge misunderstanding on "guerrilla warfare", especially among the military. The author highlights that there is so much more to the war than just the "hit and run" ambush fighting. This book is referenced in many other books (guerrilla, counterinsurgency, low-intensity, or small wars) and military manuals.

Recommended for all ground troop leaders.

Oddly enough the US Military refuses to study and learn from Guerrilla wars we've been in. They all want to fight WWII all over again. That's why they loved Desert Storm 1. Now they are in Iraq and can't get out of it. The politicians and generals and people at the Pentagon ought to be made to read these books ever few years.
A good read.

First published in 1965 and recently re-issued, this book is written by the only American who was with Castro instead of the CIA at the Bay of Pigs. In retrospect, and given that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles used their CIA training to assassinate John F. Kennedy (see Someone Would Have Talked: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the Conspiracy to Mislead History, this American is clearly a just man and a wise man.

There are two bottom lines to this book:

1. No indigenous people have ever lost, in the very long run, to foreign occupiers. See also The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People

2. The win-win for both democracy and capitalism is to do away with unilateral militarism, immoral capitalism, and predatory "false" democracy that embraces dictators rather than publics. See Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy; Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions; The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project); Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror; and Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025, among others.

The author ends the book with three recommendations for US foreign policy that I for one happily adopt:

1. Abandon all forms of military assistance

2. Declare an Economic "New Deal" for the Third World starting in South America and the Caribbean and Central America.

3. Embrace the Revolution, and live up to our Constitutional ideals of justice and liberty for all.

The author packs numerous pearls of wisdom, firmly rooted in ground truth, into this book.

1. Governments assume they are legitimate when they are not, they assume a monopoly on force while ignoring crime. Legitimacy and morality are strategic assets that most governments have abandoned. Cf. The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.

2. Terrorism has been the logical asymmetric response of the poor and down-trodden since time immemorial. The author points out the hypocrisy of Israel, which was founded on the basis of terrorism against the people, claiming that terrorism targets non-combatants, while we ignore the fact that the US Air Force bombs entire villages of non-combatants without a second thought.

3. Class war produces the conditions that spawn successful revolutions, which the author is careful to define as those revolutions that have or can acquire popular support. The corruption at the top, and the poverty at the bottom, eventually collide.

4. Guns are the least important tool of the guerrilla (and all of the guns are provided by the occupying power or the illegitimate military). Guerilla operations are a state of mind, a spreading awareness of the possibilities of ultimate invincibility, firmly founded in root legitimacy.

5. The author points out the two fallacies to avoid, both heavily characteristic of current US operations in Iraq:

a. Revolutions and insurgency are NOT a conspiracy, e.g. Iran may be aiding the insurgency in Iraq, but at root the insurgency is home grown and will continue until the US is driven out.

b. Counter-insurgency is NOT about tactical "methods." The long war is about the will and rights of the people everywhere. As General Smedley Butler, USMC concluded, War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti=Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It

6. The author is a gifted writer. He points out that conventional armies are burdened by a dependence on bases and "things" (vehicles, weapons systems) while the guerilla is "liberated" by their poverty, able to move past roadblocks by simply walking in the jungle 100 meters to the left or right. Conventional forces focus on patrols and real estate. The guerilla focuses on the message and the public.

7. The guerilla is a voice, a message. The fact that the guerilla exists means that the political process has FAILOED. The primary asset the guerilla has is not a weapon, but their relationship with the community of people within which they survive.

8. The author believes that in the era of globalization, the laboring class has been empowered but does not fully realize its power to carry out a legal general strike, to demand labor unions, to not consume products whose "true cost" is onerous.

9. The guerilla is militarily weak but politically strong and economically dangerous. I continue to marvel at the idiocy of Dick Cheney in seeking to capture Iraq's oil and intimidate Iran (Persia) while ignoring the fact that ten oil pumping stations in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, if blown up, can take oil to $200 a barrel overnight.

10. Three conditions are cited as being necessary for a revolution:

a. No other alternative.

b. Cause is compelling.

c. Possibility of success.

11. A general strike by the public can follow an armed insurrection, or stand on its own as a clear signal to the government that it has lost its legitimacy and authority. I cannot help but feel that the United States of America is today badly in need of a legal ethical general strike by the public that continues until Dick Cheney resigns from office and Congress declares an end to our unilateral militarism around the world.

12. The essence of guerilla warfare is to take the profit out of oppression and occupation (colonialism, corruption by corporations) with a clever strategy that is clearly and publicly enunciated, and popular as well.

13. Time, space, and will favor the people over any occupying force. Occupiers lose twice:

a. Their presence provokes anger in the people.

b. They supply the insurgents with all the arms, ammunition, food, and other supplies needed (this is one of two dirty little secrets of the US occupation of Iraq; the other is that we have returned 75,000 of our honorable men and women to America as multiple amputees who are not being well served by the Veteran's Administration).

14. US *talks* about hearts and minds but *spends* only on death and destruction. We are still not serious about global stabilization & reconstruction, humanitarian assistance & disaster relief.

As I put the book down on the flight back from Tampa, I thought to myself that this author is completely correct in pointing out that terrorism is of, by, and for the indigenous people, and it is neither deviant nor apart from the fabric of the society it seeks to save. The author also points out that terrorism is vastly less costly than conventional war in every sense of the word: dead, wounded, collateral damage, destruction of infrastructure, and financial as well as moral cost. The author makes it quite clear that the USA is in *denial* when if fails to understand that an insurgency is a civil war, not a conspiracy or communist or terrorist inspired "conspiracy."

The latter half of the book provides a series of truly absorbing and sensible "lessons learned:"

1. Algeria taught us that urban areas can be occupied and dominated by torture, but at a cost so huge that the occupying government is weakened politically and economically. Cheney remains in denial on this point.

2. The three "failures" of indigenous revolution in the short term:

a. Philippines, government combined social work with amnesty and land grants that took away the basis for revolution among the Huks.

b. Malaysia, the insurgents lacked a rural base with its own food production capability, and could be isolated.

c. Greece, the guerillas lost contact with the public and lost militarily by engaging conventionally.

The author cites Sun Tzu in pointing out that there is nothing "modern" about terrorism or warfare. It is all based on deception and competing claims to legitimacy. He lists six conditions for a successful revolution in his conclusion:

1. Valid popular grievances
2. Sharp social divisions (or ethnic)
3. Unsound or stagnant economy
4. Oppressive or illegitimate government
5. Moral leadership within the guerilla movement
6. A foundation on the truth rather than lies

For the 27 secessionist movements in America, the author notes as have others that anytime an empire is engaged in a far-off debilitating military campaign, internal secessions are easier to accomplish.

In my view, the USA is clearly vulnerable to precision sabotage of the kind that Peter Black, Winn Schwartau, and I discussion in the early 1990's. We were ignored, and today our infrastructure is ten times to a hundred times more likely to collapse from its own decrepitude that from "enemy" action. The two "mainstream" political parties are so corrupt they have run American into the ground (Cf. Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It

I may never be Director of National Intelligence, since I am predisposed to tell the truth, the whole truth, and that is best gotten with the 96% of the information that the secret world refuses to notice. However, if I were, we would have three objectives and three objectives only:

1. Terminating all dictators through buy out plans they cannot refuse.

2. Ending all corruption by any government, organization, or individual.

3. Providing free connectivity and free on demand education in all languages to all people, with hundreds of millions of volunteer tutors able to education the five billion poor "one cell call at a time."