War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 B.C. [Paperback]

William V. Harris (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0198148666 | ISBN-13: 978-0198148661 | Publication Date: August 1, 1985

Between 327 and 70 B.C. the Romans expanded their empire throughout the Mediterranean world. This highly original study looks at Roman attitudes and behavior that lay behind their quest for power. How did Romans respond to warfare, year after year? How important were the material gains of military success--land, slaves, and other riches--commonly supposed to have been merely an incidental result? What value is there in the claim of the contemporary historian Polybius that the Romans were driven by a greater and greater ambition to expand their empire? The author answers these questions within an analytic framework, and comes to an interpretation of Roman imperialism that differs sharply from the conventional ones.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Marks a major advance in our understanding of Roman imperialism."--Times Literary Supplement

"Recommended for undergraduate and research libraries....All subsequent studies of Roman imperialism will have to take account of this book."--Choice

Product Details

• Paperback: 312 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (August 1, 1985)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0198148666
• ISBN-13: 978-0198148661
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.5 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #582,724 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Roman Wars and Imperialism, March 10, 2008

By 

J. James - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 B.C. (Paperback)

This book attempts to explain the reasons for Roman wars and imperialism from 327 to 70 BC. It makes extensive use of ancient literary sources as well as modern works. Harris challenges the old theory that the Romans were reluctant imperialists whose empire expanded in response to external threats (Luttwak 606). His thesis is that the Romans were both consciously and unconsciously aggressive imperialists. The book examines the origins of Roman wars, not the fighting that took place in them. Since it is not a military history it does not matter that Harris is not a military historian, and war is too important an issue to be left to military historians.

The book's structure is analytical rather than narrative. In the first chapter Harris argues that war was an integral part of Roman society. Military success was the highest means for an aristocrat to obtain glory, and military service was willingly accepted by the commoners (Briscoe 86). In the second chapter he argues that the ruling class was aware of the economic rewards of successful warfare, i.e. booty, land, and slaves, and this also influenced Rome's warmongering. In the third chapter Harris carefully analyses the ancient sources, especially Polybios. The sources indicate that expansion was a conscious aim of the Roman ruling class (Luttwak 606). This is followed up in the fourth chapter where it is argued that wars were always designed to increase Roman power, even if Rome did not immediately annex the territory. In the final chapter Harris argues that Rome's ius fetiale did not preclude aggressive wars. He provides a survey of Rome's major wars in this period and concludes they were all antagonistic (Briscoe 86).

Most scholarly reviews for Harris's book assert its importance on the topic of Roman imperialism. But they also insist that he has overstated his argument, and has made many mistakes in his analysis. Briscoe writes, "The facts presented in the first two chapters are incontrovertible, though the argument is sometimes overstated." (Ibid ) Oost writes, "...if Frank's sin was to give the Romans the benefit of every doubt, H.'s seems to be to give them the benefit of no doubt." (Oost 82) The reviewers mostly agreed with Harris that the old theory of defensive imperialism, favored by such historians as Mommsen, Holleaux, and Frank, is wrong. The reviewers, however, disagreed with his isolated treatment of Rome. Briscoe noted that Rome's opponents in the east, Philip V and Antiochos III, occupied much of their reigns with aggressive wars (Briscoe 86). They disputed Harris's claim that Rome's actions, whether direct or indirect, were all aggressive and almost always in the wrong. North remarks that identifying the aggressor of any war is a difficult task, and with the nature of our sources for this period of ancient history, it is impossible to prove Rome was always the aggressor (North 2).

The book makes a number of good points and provides well-reasoned arguments to support them. Overall, the first chapter is the most interesting and useful where it discusses Roman attitudes towards war, both popular and aristocratic. On occasion, however, Harris does go overboard. Although never claiming that any of Rome's opponents were better morally, he is overzealous in trying to prove Rome was almost always the aggressor. The nature of the evidence--which is often prejudiced and inadequately detailed--is insufficient for that purpose (North 2). His case seems flimsy and strained for wars in which the Romans did not annex the conquered land or methodically exploit it (ibid). Other states in the Mediterranean were very warlike, but Rome simply proved to be the best at it.

For a student of Roman history this is an important book. It broke new ground and provided an extreme view on the topics of Roman wars and imperialism. It claims that the Romans were both consciously and unconsciously aggressive imperialists. This can be used to find a mean between his theory and those of earlier historians like Mommsen and Frank. The latter historians wrote when Europeans held sway over most of the globe and blatant imperialism was acceptable; Harris was a product of the Vietnam era. This book should be required reading for students of Roman Republican history.

Works Cited

Luttwak, Edward N. "Review: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William Harris." The American Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 3. (June 1980), p. 606.

Briscoe, John. "Review: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William Harris." Classical Review, New Ser., Vol. 30, No. 1. (1980), pp.86-88.

Oost, Stewart I. "Review: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William Harris." Classical Philology, Vol. 77, No. 1. (Jan., 1982), pp. 81-83.

North, J. A. "Review: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William Harris." The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 71. (1981), pp. 1-9.

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The economic motivation of Roman imperialism during the Republic, June 7, 2006

By 

T. J. Graczewski "tgraczewski" (Burlingame, CA United States) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 B.C. (Paperback)

I can't believe that I'm the first person to review this remarkable, classic work on war and the Roman Republic. William Harris offers a comprehensive and credible argument against the conventional academic perspective that Roman expansion was motivated predominantly by the quest for external security. That thesis, which was largely presented by the ancient authors, such as Polybius, and reinforced by modern scholars argues that Rome expanded its borders throughout the Mediterranean in the last three centuries before the Common Era primarily to mitigate border threats. The lure of plunder or economic expansion had little to nothing to do with the incessant warfare the Republic engaged in, according to this theory.

"War and Imperialism in Republican Rome" is a learned assault on that argument; with Harris taking the stance that greed and economic exploitation were actually the driving forces behind Roman conquest.

Harris claims that previous assertions about the absence of economic motivations to Roman foreign and military conduct are completely without validity. He does note that there is very scant reference to economic motivation in the classical works, but he explains that away with two arguments: 1) the economic motive was discussed in private, never in an open forum; and 2) many of the writers, like Polybius, are unabashedly pro-Roman and subscribed more moral motivations to their actions.

Harris claims that plunder of neighboring territories was a regular form of Roman behavior and under Roman financial control during the period 327-220BC. The acquisition of slaves had a direct, material impact on the local Roman economy, according to the author and he cites the nine new temples built between 302 and 291 as evidence of the financial impact of plunder.

The acquisition of new land was an even stronger motivation for Roman imperialism during this period before a money-based economy was established in Italy. And it is this lack of money that Harris says explains why the Romans exacted no tribute and generally took a hand-off approach to administration, which others have used to show that economic exploitation wasn't the driving force behind expansion. Harris claims that if the Romans would have extracted tribute if the could, and as it was they were maximizing their gains from the new territory. (This argument for the lack of imperial organization falls a bit short, in my opinion; innovative organizations and triumph over obstacles was a Roman specialty, not a handicap.)

Although Harris bucks tradition in maintaining that the Romans systematically plundered the new territories between 327-220 to the benefit of the state and thus an economic motive was present from at least the mid-republic, he sides with the conventional wisdom in believing that modern concepts of mercantilism had little to nothing to do with it. Thus, he claims the economic ambitions of the aristocracy was limited to land and plunder (such as slaves) and didn't include trade or natural resources. From time to time the Senate was willing to help a group of merchants, but overall that concern did not drive policy, he says.

In investigating the motives of imperialism from an economic perspective, Harris addresses three different actors or beneficiaries: the state; the senators; and the common man.

First, he considers the state. Harris rejects claims made by others that the empire was largely a "loss leader" before the acquisition of Asia in the first century. He claims that more than just Sicily served as profit centers, and cites Spain with its rich mines and indemnity payments as an example. The major increases in public works beginning in 183 BC he attributes to an increase in imperial revenues, which also eradicated the heavy debt of the Second Punic War. He also mentions the public subsidies on grain in the years around 200 as an example of the economic and political interests of the state coincided nicely. Harris doesn't explain sufficiently why people refrained from cashing in on Cyrene and Egypt but overall believes that imperial revenue was sought. He directly rejects Badian's argument that Rome collected revenues in the provinces out of inertia.

Second, Harris considers the senators. Overall, the senators' self-restraint in the second century was famous according to Harris. But as the cost and competition for office increased so did the desire to profit from empire. In the past the aristocrats, like everyone else, derived wealth from the empire in the form of plunder on campaigns. Harris claims during this "plunder stage" aristocrats had to maintain a delicate balance between self-restraint and self-promotion of that self-restraint. By 146 BC, however, all this changed as the possibility of peaceful enrichment in the provinces offered a highly attractive alternative to vicious plunder. Even still, large and palpable expressions of avarice were frowned upon and the Lex Claudia had a moderating effect on the behavior of provincial governors. But, Harris argues, the aristocrats could benefit economically from the empire in ways that were less direct. One major source of economic motivation, he claims, was slave supply. The huge slave market in the Mediterranean region needed to work the aristocratic estates or mines was big business. Harris states that Rome took slaves on such a scale that it approaches the Spartan/Helot relationship (my opinion anyway). Indeed, he claims that this drive for slaves is the explanation offered up by Marxist historians. Although Harris highlights slaves and the slave trade as providing a fundamental influence on Roman policy of expansion, he doesn't give it the central importance the Marxists do. Also, Harris clashes with other scholars over the significance on the ban to grow vines in Transalpine Gaul in 154. For Harris this is a clear example of the economic interests of the wealthy aristocratic land owners (who needed the slaves) influencing Roman foreign policy to their benefit. But, Harris does acknowledge that certain limits were put on the ability of the aristocrats to profit from the empire. Two notable examples are the well-known prohibition on senators from engaging in business concerning public contracts and provincial governors were prohibited from purchasing slaves in their home province. In concluding on the economic benefits in motivating senators, Harris states private gains were clearly sought out and weren't merely incidental side effects of military victory. This holds for both the individual senator and the state as a whole. Just because the ancient authors dismiss such economic motivation doesn't mean it didn't exist, according to Harris. The fact is, he says, economic benefits of empire were widely known and understood fact of the imperial system and simply wasn't debated openly. In sum, economic gain was "a factor of the greatest importance in predisposing senators to take aggressive and interventionist decisions in foreign policy, and sometimes it had a direct effect."

Third, Harris addresses the people of Rome. Harris again clashes with scholars here, arguing that the publicani benefited tremendously from the expanding empire and used their clout to push along expansion in Asia, where profit beckoned. Although, according to Harris, the efforts of politically powerful publicani met with success in getting the free harbor at Delos in 165 and the destruction of Corinth in 146, overall their influence in shaping external policy was minimal. More than anything, they capitalized on the expanding opportunities, rather than actively lobbying for them. Thus, Harris, in the end, agrees with Badian that the Senate held control of foreign policy firmly, although publicani influence probably grew after they were put in the juries in the 140s.

As far as the average man is concerned, Harris attributes some of the difficulties in raising troops for campaigns in the second century as proof that citizens were growing disgruntled with the blatant profit seeking of military expeditions. However, they were always interested in signing up for campaigns that offered riches for the average soldier. But, in the end, Harris concludes that popular clamoring for more territory or opportunities for plunder had little if any effect in hastening expansion.

This is an impressive piece of scholarship, skillfully presented. No serious student of the Roman Republic should be without it.

3 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Greek and Latin required., August 17, 2009

By 

steven langston "searcher" (Kentucky United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 B.C. (Paperback)

Be warned. Harris includes whole paragraphs of Greek and Latin quotations without translation. That left a lot of blanks in the text. That's mean spirited of an author.