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War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History: 1500 to Today

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A decade ago, the defense policy community was a buzz about an emerging "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) - a discontinuous change in the nature of warfare generated by the information revolution whose potential was so clearly demonstrated by the overwhelming advantage that precision guided munitions and operational awareness conferred to US forces in the Gulf War of 1991.

Today, the increasingly low-tech, irregular nature of the current Global War on Terror and, more recently, the frustrating experience of counterinsurgency in Iraq, have seemingly diminished the importance of the RMA and discredited its most vocal proponents. This is unfair and unfortunate as the notion of periodic, major transformational change in military technology and operational capabilities is certainly sound. Moreover, it is a concept that anyone serious about military history or international affairs ought to be familiar with and consider seriously. There is no better introduction to the topic than "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today" by Max Boot.

There are several reasons to recommend "War Made New." To begin with, author Max Boot is a superb talent and, in many ways, was the ideal person to write the first general overview of the RMA concept and a sampling of the many historical case studies that support the theory. As a long-time lead defense reporter for The Wall Street Journal, Boot possesses a sophisticated understanding of current defense policy and national security strategy. Better yet, he writes with the same engaging and lucid style of other defense journalists that have written best-selling full-length books, such as David Halberstam, Tom Ricks, and Neil Sheehan. Prior to "War Made New," the RMA had been a subject only written about by academics and policy wonks. This book should take the RMA and the classic RMA case studies to a mainstream audience.

The book is broken up into five parts. The first three parts review distinct RMAs from the past half-millennium. In "The Gunpowder Revolution" Boot covers the dramatic increase in the destructive capacity of gunpowder weapons that emerged in the late 15th century, the tactical changes developed by the Dutch and perfected by Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War to maximize the rate of fire and overall impact of hand-held and mobile artillery firepower, and the parallel creation and stunning growth of standing professional armies throughout Europe during the period that led to the first stage of western imperialism in the 18th century. The author uses the examples of the British defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588), two major battles of the Thirty Years War (1631-32), and a less familiar episode in British India (1803) to illustrate how and why technological, doctrinal, and organizational change had profound impact not just on the course of a battle, but the outcome of war, the development of societies, and the fate of history.

The second part addresses "The First Industrial Revolution" where Boot covers engagements as diverse in time and place as the battles of Koniggratz in the Franco-Prussian War (1866), Omdurman in modern-day Sudan between the British and the native Mahdi Army (1898), and the shocking Japanese naval victory over the imperial Russian fleet at Tsushima (1905). The period between 1850 and 1914 is generally seen as the "railroad, rifle, and telegraph" RMA and Boot generally adheres to that thesis, although he stresses that the advantages conferred by early industrial technology were by no means the sole property of Western European states, a message that applies to any technological revolution that spawns an RMA.

The final historical part covers "The Second Industrial Revolution" and addresses the dramatic and non-linear changes that occurred during the interwar period in land warfare with the advent of armored warfare, at sea with the ascendancy of aircraft carriers as the new capital ship of fleet engagements, and in the air with advent of strategic bombing. The case studies that Boot writes here on the German invasion of France (1940), the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor (1941), and the US air campaign against Tokyo (1945) have long been the staple of modern RMA theory.

These first three parts account for nearly three-quarters of the book. Each case study is crisply written and makes a compelling point. That said, Boot offers no radical reinterpretations of what an RMA is or in anyway fundamentally challenges the conventional wisdom that developed amongst RMA proponents during the 1990s. Many of the case studies he provides have been written about extensively before and make essentially the same arguments. Boot's main value added is the fluidity of his prose and how he ties five centuries of history into one coherent and convincing argument.

The final two parts of the book covers the present and future. The fourth part addresses "The Information Revolution" and, unlike the first three Revolutions, is entirely focused on one nation - the US victory in the First Gulf War (1991), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2002), and the US invasion of Iraq (2003). Here, Boot focuses on the conventional aspects of each engagement where US firepower and advanced technology played a decisive role in defeating enemy forces. He concedes that much of the advantages of information age weaponry has little relevance to the messy, day-to-day conduct of counter-insurgency, but spends little time pondering if and how the information RMA has any relevance to current low intensity operations around the world.

The final part offers an overview of "Revolutions to Come" and highlights the military potential of cyberwarfare, nanotechnology, robotics, and the military use of space. This section reads like grist for a science fiction book and should prompt analysts to reflect on how future technology may impact the conduct of military operations decades from now.

Despite the broad historical and technological sweep of Boot's case studies, he consistently stresses five points. First, despite the focus on technology in the subtitle and the role new technology plays in every chapter, Boot stresses that technology alone does not and cannot make an RMA. True discontinuous change is driven by the combination of new technology with new tactics and organization, thoughtful leadership, and perhaps most importantly, an efficient and effective centralized bureaucracy able to nurture and promote innovation. Second, Boot cautions that nations ignore RMAs at their peril. Every major city-state or nation-state that failed to embrace and support new military technology, doctrine, and methods have seen their relative position in the international balance of powers significantly diminished. Third, mastery of an RMA may convey distinct battlefield advantages, but ultimate victory or defeat hinges on wise political decisions and diplomacy. Fourth, the military advantages to a nation in excelling in an RMA are enormous, but history has demonstrated that it is very difficult to maintain a lead for long. Competent and resourceful competitors will learn and adapt, and are quite likely to take fuller advantage of more recent developments in technology and operations. Finally, Boot notes that the pace of innovation is speeding up. In the past, an RMA could take several centuries to completely unfold. Today, it is likely to happen in several decades.

In sum, military transformation and the RMA is a concept informed readers of history and current events ought to be well acquainted with. There are certainly many divergent, but credible and thoughtful opinions on the matter. "War Made New" is no doubt sympathetic to the RMA argument and clearly sees former secretary of defense Rumfeld's military transformation push as the correct and necessary path for present-day policymakers to pursue. Whether today's intelligence analysts and operators accept all, part, or none of the RMA concept is not nearly as important as more fully understanding the theory, the many historical examples that purport to support it, and how and why it may impact contemporary or future military operations. There is no better place to start than Max Boot's "War Made New."

If you have read Jared Diamond's book, "Guns, Germs, and Steel", Max Boot's book "War Made New" is a must read to help further explain why western civilization came to dominate the world in the late 19th century. The book is well written and explains why major battles had the outcome they did.

Not only are the battles explained but the social organization of the countries participating in the battle are also discussed, which helps explain that not only were the weapons used, a major cause for the resulting battle, but the social norm of the country played a major role in determining the battles outcome.

Example, how could Japan go from a feudal country in the mid 19th century to a major naval power in the early 20th century, defeating Russia in a major naval engagement off the coast of Korea and Japan? Mainly by the Japanese society making a 90 degree turn in their thinking and actively pursuing industrialization.

I highly recommend this book, not only for its history but also to help explain the world politics today.
Jim

Max Boot has written a fascinating account of the impact of technology on war over the past five centuries. In turn, although peripherally for the most part, Boot also examines the impact of war on various societies during the same period. Boot breaks the period down into four technological revolutions: gunpowder, the first and second industrial revolutions and finally the advent of the information age.

To establish perspective, Boot begins with the campaign of France's Charles VIII to take Italy. The innovation was the creative use of artillery to batter down fortress walls. Boot' point is that though cannon had been around for a while, it was the innovative use of them that changed the face of warfare and, at the same time, the nature of Italian social structure by dooming the city-state.

Boot is careful to point out that military technology is not the only factor to consider, but rather that the deployment of technology was not a certainty and that generally the first force to effectively implement technology revolutions generally gained dominance for some time.

To illustrate his point, Boot uses twelve battles, most of them essentially forgotten by all except the student of history. Boot is a masterful writer. To illustrate the rise of the gunpowder age, he writes of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the battle of Breitenfeld and Lutzen and, most illuminatingly, the battle of Assaye in 1803. In the latter example, Boot shows how the adoption of gunpowder by the Europeans led in turn to its ability to colonize and dominate the planet.

The impact of the First Industrial Revolution is illustrated in the 1866 battle at Koniggratz (which demonstrates the impact of railway logistics in allowing a formerly inferior power to become dominant); the battle at Omdurman in 1898, explaining again how the small forces of European powers could prevail when vastly outnumbered and the naval battle of Tsushima where Japan made it clear that the industrial revolution was not confined only to Europeans.

The territory becomes more familiar with Boot's examination of the impact of the Second Industrial Revolution on military affairs. Here, the German attack on France in 1940, the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor and the American aerial offensive against Japan in March, 1945 are examined.

Only sixty years removed from the dramatic innovations of WWII, it is breathtaking to see how military affairs were influenced by the second industrial revolution with its inventions of airplanes, electronics and other technologies. One of Boot's best examples is how Germany, while weaker in terms of material in 1940, was able to better implement available technology. Boot uses the example of the aerial attacks on Japan to make another point: that technological advantage can pass swiftly from one society to another.

Boot makes clear how dramatically the "Information Revolution" has changed the face of warfare. His last three examples are the Gulf War of 1991; Afghanistan in 2001 and the current conflict in Iraq. The changes that information technology have wrought are breathtaking when put into perspective by Boot.

Of greatest interest to the contemporary reader, perhaps, is Boot's discussion of the consequences of the information revolution on warmaking and the possibilities of tomorrow's technology. These last discussions are, frankly, frightening for Boot makes it absolutely clear that no nation has been able to retain dominance through its use of technology. Boot does not declare that it is impossible, but rather sets forth a cautionary survey of how technology has given the advantage to one or another nation for a period of time before another nation made better use of it. In particular, Boot cautions, the information revolution makes it possible for non-nation actors to make technological war without traditional structure and therein is a great source of danger to the existing social order.

"War Made New" is a very worthwhile addition to the military enthusiast's bookshelf as well as that of the historian and observer of the social order.

Jerry

War Made New is one of the best books I've read this year.

The book covers the technological revolutions that have swept through military history in the last 500 years, beginning with the gunpowder revolution at the end of the Middle Ages that concentrated military power in the hands of kings, as the nobility largely could afford neither cannon nor the rebuilding that was necessary to keep medieval castles from being sitting ducks for those cannon.

The first industrial revolution, beginning in the 19th century, brought far larger armies, thanks to much more rapid economic growth; more rapid movement and better command and control, thanks to railroads and the telegraph; more potent arms such as the Maxim and Gatling guns, and far more powerful battleships.

The second industrial revolution brought, tanks, aircraft carriers, and heavy bombers.

The information revolution of our own time brought smart bombs, stealth aircraft, and vastly improved communications.

Each of these revolutions altered the balance of power in favor of those countries that were the first to exploit them effectively, such as the English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 or the blitzkrieg tactics that overwhelmed France in 1940.

American mastery of information technology allowed the 1991 Gulf War to be a cakewalk and yet, fifteen years later, what is, militarily, the only significant country in the world is struggling mightily against enemies in Iraq that are not even nation-states, for the new information technology and electronics can be exploited effectively and cheaply by them. And the United States military, especially the elephantine Pentagon bureaucracy, has been reluctant to develop the needed skills and expertise in counter-insurgency warfare. The military wants to fight tank battles when there are no more tanks left to fight.

One of the lessons that Boot draws in this book is that, over and over again, the losers in the last war and inferior powers are far quicker to exploit the possibilities of new technology than are the victors and dominant powers. The English mastery of the new cannon-dominated naval warfare helped doom the Armada. The Germans after 1918 developed the new offensive capabilities provided by closely integrated armor and air power, while France assumed that defense, as it had been in World War I, was still king. And the United States, after Vietnam, profoundly changed its military culture for the better.

Boot uses several battles as examples. Some of these, such as the Spanish Armada, are known to every school child. Others, such as the Battle of Königgratz (1866), which established Prussian dominance of the German-speaking world at the expense of Austria, have been largely forgotten.

War Made New is one of those books that had me saying, "Ah hah, now I understand" over and over again.

Max Boot's War Made New is a survey of the various military revolutions which have altered the course of warfare since the late 1400s. To illustrate his arguments he chooses certain battles, some well known but others more obscure, and describes them in great detail, but without bogging down in "technospeak" which so often leaves non-specialists out in the cold.

Basically Boot's arguments boil down to this: Technology is always changing, and the countries which recognize this and learn to make use of the latest developments are invariably better off than their opponents, even if they are otherwise poorer, less populated, or worse off in other ways. Boot conveniently provides summaries of each segment of his book to help his readers review his main points and focus on his main argument.

Probably the most valuable sections come at the end, where Boot analyzes the recent Iraq fiascos critically and points out the major mistakes made there. We are always preparing to fight the last war, but it is to be hoped that Boot's work is being read and taken seriously by those who are making war plans now.

This historical survey of warfare is a useful contribution to anyone who wants to understand the evolution of a modern military organization and the forces that have impacted this evolution. Boot offers several examples of battles and campaigns since the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to illustrate the effects of the four Revolutions in Military Affairs. This book is well researched and easily written for historians, professional military personnel, and those involved in defense policy formation and review.

After taking a foreign policy class, I realized that my knowledge of military history is woefully lacking. While this book is not designed to be an introduction to military history, Boot is a lucid writer who avoids confusing jargon, which made the book an excellent primer for me.

For me, the best part about War Made New was that it managed to explain why military victories have such a great effect on world history. In most history classes I've ever taken, victories are explained by looking at economics and cultures. However, these arguements do a poor job explaining why, for example, France and Britain fell to the Nazis in 1940. Boot's explaination (that Germany, while poorer and weaker had a better military organization) was much more satisfying. Boot manages to work similar miracles with his explanation of the Spanish Armada and the Russo-Japanese War.

Boot's coverage of modern military history is certainly more controversial, but as a novice, I found it extremly interesting - Boot explained, in laymens terms, why it is that America has the best military in the world. Indeed, after reading Boot's book, I was so fascinated by the administrative set-up of the US Military, that I started telling my Syrian roommate about what components of military administration our college should adapt. Needless to say, she was not impressed...

Most of these postings seem to have been made by connoisseurs of military strategy and technique - but as a novice, I found this book extremely enlightening.

I found War Made New to be an unusual combination of a wealth of historical information and an easy read.

Did you know that --

Breech-loading rifles that had proved their enormous value in wars in Europe were available at the time of the Civil War but the U.S. Army's head of logistics refused to provide them to the infantry?

The masterful use of technology was at the heart of Prussia's expansion in the latter half of the 19th century?

From the 19th century onward Prussian/German soldiers had wider latitude in how to carry out their missions than did the soldiers of all other nations' armies?

After the Battle of Midway the Japanese Navy was hampered by a lack of competent airplane pilots due in large part to an early decision by Japanese admirals about pilot training?

I didn't until I read War Made New.

Max Boot's latest book, "War Made New" presents a survey of several important battles that, in the author's estimation, altered the course of military history. To qualify for inclusion, something about the battle required at least an element of historical "uniqueness", to wit, a new application of existing technology; decisive application of a new technology; new strategy/tactics or a combination of the above.

The author's hypothesis was that nation-states with new or newer technology coupled with appropriate intelligence and thoughtful application will triumph; neither technology alone, nor combined with a larger population, or with a more dynamic economy or larger standing forces will suffice. The equation for success is: technolgy + preparation + advanced strategy/tactics + excellent leadership = battlefield success. While this is hardly a startling proposition, the number of books that really survey the topic and appeal to the general readership are few. Most, as for example those of Martin van Crevald, languish in obscurity for all but specialized readers.

In brief, the book addresses the questions posed by the author. It does so with a minimum of arcane military jargon. It does so with appropriate background an explanations. It does so with thorough and generally comprehensive references. It tests alternative explanations. It avoids the superficialities which often plague encyclopedic survey works. It maintains the general reader's interest, though it hardly keeps to a thriller novel's pace. It avoids the recently fashionable emphasis on "asymmetrical warfare", to wit, an exigis on the dire perils of a modern military force haplessly hamstrung by a few dedicated guerillas/terrorists/special forces units creating havoc with RPGs, IEDs and "information warfare". However, this important topic receives only glancing attention.

The book's shortcomings are few. Illustrations were sparse as were maps. The concluding segment appeared to owe a debt to the Tom Clancy school of military analysis (evoking all sorts of space-age weaponry, much of which is likely to evaporate in budgetary ether).

In summary, this book is a highly worthwhile survey offering another perspective on the role of technology and society as they intersect on the battlefield. As Martin Windrow wrote in his detailed study of Dien Bien Phu, "It is one of the central human tragedies that war is not an aberration-it is what human beings do." As such, it is worthy of study and this book ought to figure into a careful student's readings on the topic.

This is a very ambitious book that is written by an expert in national security affairs, yet it falls considerably short of its intended purpose. According to Max Boot, its author, the book is intended to trace the history of the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) since the "age of gunpowder" (circa 1500) and illustrate the role technology has played in those revolutions. Fair enough. Such a history would be extremely useful in understanding the current RMA that is spluttering along within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Yet as Boot himself points out technology is only one facet in any RMA. Indeed the role of technology in any RMA is best understood in the context of other facets driving the revolution. Also as Boot himself makes clear the term "revolution" means radical change, but not necessarily rapid change. Therefore the RMA events he recounts often represent changes that have occurred over many years rather than abrupt shifts in the way things are done. This book is filled with sound observations like these.

Unfortunately Boot appears unable to apply his own observations to his execution of this work. He all but ignores factors other than technology in his discussions of RMA events. More importantly, he does not accurately describe the RMA events that he has chosen to illustrate his arguments. For example, in the section on the RMA he calls the "First Industrial Revolution" he uses the Battle of Sadowa (1866) in the Prussian-Austrian war as one of his illustrations to demonstrate the effect of that RMA on warfare. Yet in his description of the battle he discusses the impact of the Prussian breech loading rifle (the needle gun) on the battle, but ignores the fact that the Austrian artillery proved superior to the Prussians and that this led Prussia to adopt the first large scale use of breech loading field guns (used effectively in the Franco-Prussian War). In the same manner he fails to note the development of the Prussian General Staff as part of the RMA that had a profound contribution to the Prussian victory at Sadowa. Further, how can a discussion of this RMA be complete without mentioning the technical contribution of Alfred Krupp, who among other things developed a breech loading system capable of being used in even large caliber guns? This is example is fairly typical of the way Boot has executed this study and shows a marked lack of refelction.

Are these minor points in such a sweeping history? The answer is no, not if the author is trying to give a comprehensive view of effect that technology has had on successive RMA's over a five hundred year period. The book could have been a important contribution, but is not.