18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
RMA for the masses, April 24, 2007
A decade ago, the defense policy community was a buzz about an emerging "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) - a discontinuous change in the nature of warfare generated by the information revolution whose potential was so clearly demonstrated by the overwhelming advantage that precision guided munitions and operational awareness conferred to US forces in the Gulf War of 1991.
Today, the increasingly low-tech, irregular nature of the current Global War on Terror and, more recently, the frustrating experience of counterinsurgency in Iraq, have seemingly diminished the importance of the RMA and discredited its most vocal proponents. This is unfair and unfortunate as the notion of periodic, major transformational change in military technology and operational capabilities is certainly sound. Moreover, it is a concept that anyone serious about military history or international affairs ought to be familiar with and consider seriously. There is no better introduction to the topic than "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today" by Max Boot.
There are several reasons to recommend "War Made New." To begin with, author Max Boot is a superb talent and, in many ways, was the ideal person to write the first general overview of the RMA concept and a sampling of the many historical case studies that support the theory. As a long-time lead defense reporter for The Wall Street Journal, Boot possesses a sophisticated understanding of current defense policy and national security strategy. Better yet, he writes with the same engaging and lucid style of other defense journalists that have written best-selling full-length books, such as David Halberstam, Tom Ricks, and Neil Sheehan. Prior to "War Made New," the RMA had been a subject only written about by academics and policy wonks. This book should take the RMA and the classic RMA case studies to a mainstream audience.
The book is broken up into five parts. The first three parts review distinct RMAs from the past half-millennium. In "The Gunpowder Revolution" Boot covers the dramatic increase in the destructive capacity of gunpowder weapons that emerged in the late 15th century, the tactical changes developed by the Dutch and perfected by Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War to maximize the rate of fire and overall impact of hand-held and mobile artillery firepower, and the parallel creation and stunning growth of standing professional armies throughout Europe during the period that led to the first stage of western imperialism in the 18th century. The author uses the examples of the British defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588), two major battles of the Thirty Years War (1631-32), and a less familiar episode in British India (1803) to illustrate how and why technological, doctrinal, and organizational change had profound impact not just on the course of a battle, but the outcome of war, the development of societies, and the fate of history.
The second part addresses "The First Industrial Revolution" where Boot covers engagements as diverse in time and place as the battles of Koniggratz in the Franco-Prussian War (1866), Omdurman in modern-day Sudan between the British and the native Mahdi Army (1898), and the shocking Japanese naval victory over the imperial Russian fleet at Tsushima (1905). The period between 1850 and 1914 is generally seen as the "railroad, rifle, and telegraph" RMA and Boot generally adheres to that thesis, although he stresses that the advantages conferred by early industrial technology were by no means the sole property of Western European states, a message that applies to any technological revolution that spawns an RMA.
The final historical part covers "The Second Industrial Revolution" and addresses the dramatic and non-linear changes that occurred during the interwar period in land warfare with the advent of armored warfare, at sea with the ascendancy of aircraft carriers as the new capital ship of fleet engagements, and in the air with advent of strategic bombing. The case studies that Boot writes here on the German invasion of France (1940), the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor (1941), and the US air campaign against Tokyo (1945) have long been the staple of modern RMA theory.
These first three parts account for nearly three-quarters of the book. Each case study is crisply written and makes a compelling point. That said, Boot offers no radical reinterpretations of what an RMA is or in anyway fundamentally challenges the conventional wisdom that developed amongst RMA proponents during the 1990s. Many of the case studies he provides have been written about extensively before and make essentially the same arguments. Boot's main value added is the fluidity of his prose and how he ties five centuries of history into one coherent and convincing argument.
The final two parts of the book covers the present and future. The fourth part addresses "The Information Revolution" and, unlike the first three Revolutions, is entirely focused on one nation - the US victory in the First Gulf War (1991), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2002), and the US invasion of Iraq (2003). Here, Boot focuses on the conventional aspects of each engagement where US firepower and advanced technology played a decisive role in defeating enemy forces. He concedes that much of the advantages of information age weaponry has little relevance to the messy, day-to-day conduct of counter-insurgency, but spends little time pondering if and how the information RMA has any relevance to current low intensity operations around the world.
The final part offers an overview of "Revolutions to Come" and highlights the military potential of cyberwarfare, nanotechnology, robotics, and the military use of space. This section reads like grist for a science fiction book and should prompt analysts to reflect on how future technology may impact the conduct of military operations decades from now.
Despite the broad historical and technological sweep of Boot's case studies, he consistently stresses five points. First, despite the focus on technology in the subtitle and the role new technology plays in every chapter, Boot stresses that technology alone does not and cannot make an RMA. True discontinuous change is driven by the combination of new technology with new tactics and organization, thoughtful leadership, and perhaps most importantly, an efficient and effective centralized bureaucracy able to nurture and promote innovation. Second, Boot cautions that nations ignore RMAs at their peril. Every major city-state or nation-state that failed to embrace and support new military technology, doctrine, and methods have seen their relative position in the international balance of powers significantly diminished. Third, mastery of an RMA may convey distinct battlefield advantages, but ultimate victory or defeat hinges on wise political decisions and diplomacy. Fourth, the military advantages to a nation in excelling in an RMA are enormous, but history has demonstrated that it is very difficult to maintain a lead for long. Competent and resourceful competitors will learn and adapt, and are quite likely to take fuller advantage of more recent developments in technology and operations. Finally, Boot notes that the pace of innovation is speeding up. In the past, an RMA could take several centuries to completely unfold. Today, it is likely to happen in several decades.
In sum, military transformation and the RMA is a concept informed readers of history and current events ought to be well acquainted with. There are certainly many divergent, but credible and thoughtful opinions on the matter. "War Made New" is no doubt sympathetic to the RMA argument and clearly sees former secretary of defense Rumfeld's military transformation push as the correct and necessary path for present-day policymakers to pursue. Whether today's intelligence analysts and operators accept all, part, or none of the RMA concept is not nearly as important as more fully understanding the theory, the many historical examples that purport to support it, and how and why it may impact contemporary or future military operations. There is no better place to start than Max Boot's "War Made New."
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16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Why the western civilization dominated, March 29, 2007
If you have read Jared Diamond's book, "Guns, Germs, and Steel", Max Boot's book "War Made New" is a must read to help further explain why western civilization came to dominate the world in the late 19th century. The book is well written and explains why major battles had the outcome they did.
Not only are the battles explained but the social organization of the countries participating in the battle are also discussed, which helps explain that not only were the weapons used, a major cause for the resulting battle, but the social norm of the country played a major role in determining the battles outcome.
Example, how could Japan go from a feudal country in the mid 19th century to a major naval power in the early 20th century, defeating Russia in a major naval engagement off the coast of Korea and Japan? Mainly by the Japanese society making a 90 degree turn in their thinking and actively pursuing industrialization.
I highly recommend this book, not only for its history but also to help explain the world politics today.
Jim
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15 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Five centuries of technology impacting on the art of war, November 27, 2006
Max Boot has written a fascinating account of the impact of technology on war over the past five centuries. In turn, although peripherally for the most part, Boot also examines the impact of war on various societies during the same period. Boot breaks the period down into four technological revolutions: gunpowder, the first and second industrial revolutions and finally the advent of the information age.
To establish perspective, Boot begins with the campaign of France's Charles VIII to take Italy. The innovation was the creative use of artillery to batter down fortress walls. Boot' point is that though cannon had been around for a while, it was the innovative use of them that changed the face of warfare and, at the same time, the nature of Italian social structure by dooming the city-state.
Boot is careful to point out that military technology is not the only factor to consider, but rather that the deployment of technology was not a certainty and that generally the first force to effectively implement technology revolutions generally gained dominance for some time.
To illustrate his point, Boot uses twelve battles, most of them essentially forgotten by all except the student of history. Boot is a masterful writer. To illustrate the rise of the gunpowder age, he writes of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the battle of Breitenfeld and Lutzen and, most illuminatingly, the battle of Assaye in 1803. In the latter example, Boot shows how the adoption of gunpowder by the Europeans led in turn to its ability to colonize and dominate the planet.
The impact of the First Industrial Revolution is illustrated in the 1866 battle at Koniggratz (which demonstrates the impact of railway logistics in allowing a formerly inferior power to become dominant); the battle at Omdurman in 1898, explaining again how the small forces of European powers could prevail when vastly outnumbered and the naval battle of Tsushima where Japan made it clear that the industrial revolution was not confined only to Europeans.
The territory becomes more familiar with Boot's examination of the impact of the Second Industrial Revolution on military affairs. Here, the German attack on France in 1940, the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor and the American aerial offensive against Japan in March, 1945 are examined.
Only sixty years removed from the dramatic innovations of WWII, it is breathtaking to see how military affairs were influenced by the second industrial revolution with its inventions of airplanes, electronics and other technologies. One of Boot's best examples is how Germany, while weaker in terms of material in 1940, was able to better implement available technology. Boot uses the example of the aerial attacks on Japan to make another point: that technological advantage can pass swiftly from one society to another.
Boot makes clear how dramatically the "Information Revolution" has changed the face of warfare. His last three examples are the Gulf War of 1991; Afghanistan in 2001 and the current conflict in Iraq. The changes that information technology have wrought are breathtaking when put into perspective by Boot.
Of greatest interest to the contemporary reader, perhaps, is Boot's discussion of the consequences of the information revolution on warmaking and the possibilities of tomorrow's technology. These last discussions are, frankly, frightening for Boot makes it absolutely clear that no nation has been able to retain dominance through its use of technology. Boot does not declare that it is impossible, but rather sets forth a cautionary survey of how technology has given the advantage to one or another nation for a period of time before another nation made better use of it. In particular, Boot cautions, the information revolution makes it possible for non-nation actors to make technological war without traditional structure and therein is a great source of danger to the existing social order.
"War Made New" is a very worthwhile addition to the military enthusiast's bookshelf as well as that of the historian and observer of the social order.
Jerry
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