War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars [Hardcover]

Richard N. Haass (Author)

Book Description

Release date: May 5, 2009

When should the United States go to war?

It is arguably the most important foreign policy question facing any president, and Richard Haass -- a member of the National Security Council staff for the first President Bush and the director of policy planning in the State Department for Bush II -- is in a unique position to address it. Haass is one of just a handful of individuals -- along with Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Bob Gates -- involved at a senior level of U.S. government decision making during both Iraq conflicts. He is the first to take us behind closed doors and the first to provide a personal account. The result is a book that is authoritative, revealing, and surprising. Haass explains not only what happened but why.

At first blush, the two Iraq wars appear similar. Both involved a President George Bush and the United States in conflicts with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. There, however, the resemblance ends. Haass contrasts the decisions that shaped the conduct of the two wars and makes a crucial distinction between the 1991 and 2003 conflicts. The first Iraq war, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of neighboring Kuwait, was a war of necessity. It was limited in ambition, well executed, and carried out with unprecedented international support.

By contrast, the second Iraq war was one of choice, the most significant discretionary war undertaken by the United States since Vietnam. Haass argues that it was unwarranted, as the United States had other viable policy options. Making matters worse was the fact that this ambitious undertaking was poorly implemented and fought with considerably more international opposition than backing.

These are the principal conclusions of this compelling, honest, and challenging book by one of this country's most respected voices on foreign policy. Haass's assessments are critical yet fair -- and carry tremendous weight. He offers a thoughtful examination of the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy: how it should be made, what it should seek to accomplish, and how it should be pursued.

War of Necessity, War of Choice -- part history, part memoir -- provides invaluable insight into some of the most important recent events in the world. It also provides a much-needed compass for how the United States can apply the lessons learned from the two Iraq wars so that it is better positioned to put into practice what worked and to avoid repeating what so clearly did not.

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Haass (The Opportunity), president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell, offers a combination of memoir and analysis on two wars that, he says, began in 1990: Desert Storm, the response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Haass describes Saddam's attack on Kuwait as undertaken in the face of U.S. efforts to persuade him to stand down. The 2003 war emerges as a consequence of 9/11, a radical initiative to oust Saddam and restructure the Middle East. In a pattern common to senior advisers without ultimate responsibility for decisions, Haass repeatedly describes perceptive memoranda ignored and perceptive insights rejected by those at the levers of power. He claims neither prescience nor precognition. Instead he presents himself as a realist and a moderate, preferring diplomacy to force while recognizing the necessary synergy of soft and hard power. Haass concludes that the first war succeeded because its limited aims were accomplished: Iraq was defeated and Kuwait's sovereignty restored. Whether or not Iraq eventually stabilizes, the second war ultimately failed because it was neither necessary, desirable nor just. Bungled execution only highlighted the waste of finite moral and material resources. Wars of choice are not inevitably mistaken, Haass concludes, but they are best avoided. (May)
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From Booklist

Given the recent elections and other positive gains in Iraq, it seems premature to call the Second Gulf War a disaster. However, there is an emerging consensus that the current war was unnecessarily launched and that the subsequent occupation was poorly planned and implemented. Haass served Bush I as senior director of the National Security Council from 1989 to 1983 and was director of policy planning for the State Department under Bush II. Privy to the planning and execution of both Gulf wars, Haass paints a stark contrast between them. He asserts that the first war was one of necessity, since diplomatic options had proved futile and Saddam Hussein’s control of Kuwait was a clear threat to our national security. He also illustrates how a patient, competent administration carefully got diplomatic ducks in a row before acting. Haass views the second war as one of choice, planned to transform the nature of regimes in the area. More disturbingly, he reveals an administration that, at the highest levels, refused to seriously consider alternatives to war. A devastating insider account. --Jay Freeman

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 352 pages
• Publisher: Simon & Schuster; First Edition edition (May 5, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1416549021
• ISBN-13: 978-1416549024
• Product Dimensions: 1.3 x 6.2 x 9.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (42 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #277,403 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #40 in Books > History > Military > United States > Operation Desert Storm

More About the Author

Dr. Richard Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations, the preeminent independent, nonpartisan organization in the United States dedicated to the study of American foreign policy. Until 2003, Dr. Richard Haass was director of policy planning for the Department of State, where he was a principal adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell on a broad range of foreign policy concerns. Confirmed by the U.S. Senate to hold the rank of ambassador, Dr. Haass served as U.S. coordinator for policy toward the future of Afghanistan and was the U.S. envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. He was also special assistant to President George H.W. Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council from 1989 to 1993. Dr. Haass is the author or editor of eleven books on American foreign policy and one book on management. He regularly writes and speaks on global issues. A Rhodes scholar, he holds a BA from Oberlin College and both master and doctor of philosophy degrees from Oxford University. He has received honorary degrees from Hamilton College, Franklin & Marshall College, Georgetown University, Oberlin College, Central College, and Miami Dade College.

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

34 of 41 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A Brilliant Personal Memoir April 23, 2009

By James D. Zirin

Format:Hardcover

This is an important memoir of the two Iraq wars. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, was a member of the National Security Council advising President George H.W. Bush on Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. He was later a State Department adviser to Colin Powell on the second Iraq war in 2003. He viewed the first war as a "war of necessity" that we had to wage to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait; he viewed the second war as a "war of choice" where the objectives kept changing. In both roles, Haass sought to speak truth to power. In the second case, power didn't listen when he urged that we defer the invasion and give smart sanctions a chance to work.
The book is a poignant personal memoir as well, as Haass ties his connection to powerful historic events with dramatic changes in his own life--marriage and career decision.
All who lived through this cataclysmic period should read this highly readable and riveting book.

8 of 9 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars Good insider stories, but found book hard to read June 21, 2009

By Alberto Vargas TOP 1000 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Vine™ Review (What's this?)

Richard Haass brings a unique perspective by having been involved directly in many aspects of the planning of the two gulf wars. During the first Bush administration he was more of an insider than in the second administration, but in both cases he was working directly with the likes of Powell, Rice, Bush I and II, etc.

This is essentially a personal memoir pivoted around the two wars, which were the most important events in the author's career as a policy expert and diplomat. As such, the conclusions about the wars are pretty conventional, i.e. the first war was justified and necessary, while the second one was not. What is more interesting are the little details and stories about the various government meetings and diplomatic trips.

Ultimately I found the book hard to read; it just did not draw me in. I like books that have illustrations, photos or charts, and chapters that are well organized by topic. This book was just an unbroken linear narrative, much of it filled with minute details of meetings between people whose names I didn't care to know.

I would recommend this book only to die-hard foreign policy junkies. The rest of us may found it a little dry and boring, with little original insights into the wars.

11 of 14 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Foreign Policy Insights May 10, 2009

By Alan Dale Daniel VINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Vine™ Review (What's this?)

The author was a high placed advisor in the George H. W Bush (Bush I) administration and was in the inner circle of the decision makers during Gulf War I (GW I). He was part of an influential think tank during the Clinton Administration. During Gulf War II (GW II)the author was again a part of the administration, but a secondary player in the state department. He was not part of the inner circle of decision makers. Thus, the author was much closer to the decisions during Gulf War I, but much further away during Gulf War II. In a way I think it made the book somewhat uneven, because his insights into GW I were much better than GW II. None-the-less, the book is excellent in nearly every respect. I disagree with the author's reasoning about GW II, but that in no way detracts from the author's analysis of the two wars.

Mr. Haass's insights into the cost of ongoing crisis are invaluable. My own research for my Master's Degree substantiate his thoughts about exhaustion and poor decisions. My research confirms that after a rather short period of time under stress, people start making errors, and those errors increase exponentially as time goes on. The author makes this point strongly, and those in power (as well as us common folk) need to pay close attention to this insight. There are several such insights in this book, and those alone are worth the price of admission. His personal insights about the costs of government employment are fun (his postponed honeymoon).

As a diplomat, the author believes in assembling large numbers of partners before going forward in the international realm, and he feels working through international organizations is also necessary - not just desirable. As such, he feels the US went about putting together the first Gulf War correctly. The war was supported by the international community, the UN was behind the effort, the effort was limited, and the war achieved its purpose without high US costs. The fact that our enemy began breaking the agreements after the war was over was no reason to start another, because the breaches were not all that significant.

Gulf War II was an unnecessary war, and one that should have been avoided, according to the author. He feels the second war should have been avoided because a good analysis would have shown its risks, and it would have shown what was to be gained was much less than hoped for. The fact that the international community wanted nothing to do with the second war was a key indicator that we were doing something wrong. He also fears that to reach any kind of acceptable result in GW II, the US will have to be in Iraq for decades and expend enormous amounts of money. At this point in time, his prediction looks accurate.

The best thing about the author is his ability to admit his errors. Most unusual in a government official. Plus, he sets the record straight about Bush II lying or otherwise misleading people about the purposes for GW II. The author simply believes the administration was mislead by its own philosophy and its own inability to see the usefulness of taking another road to control Iraq. The author's perceptions into how government operates are terrific.

Good book.

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