Customer Reviews

War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars

5 star:		(13)
4 star:		(15)
3 star:		(9)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

This is an important memoir of the two Iraq wars. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, was a member of the National Security Council advising President George H.W. Bush on Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. He was later a State Department adviser to Colin Powell on the second Iraq war in 2003. He viewed the first war as a "war of necessity" that we had to wage to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait; he viewed the second war as a "war of choice" where the objectives kept changing. In both roles, Haass sought to speak truth to power. In the second case, power didn't listen when he urged that we defer the invasion and give smart sanctions a chance to work.
The book is a poignant personal memoir as well, as Haass ties his connection to powerful historic events with dramatic changes in his own life--marriage and career decision.
All who lived through this cataclysmic period should read this highly readable and riveting book.

Richard Haass brings a unique perspective by having been involved directly in many aspects of the planning of the two gulf wars. During the first Bush administration he was more of an insider than in the second administration, but in both cases he was working directly with the likes of Powell, Rice, Bush I and II, etc.

This is essentially a personal memoir pivoted around the two wars, which were the most important events in the author's career as a policy expert and diplomat. As such, the conclusions about the wars are pretty conventional, i.e. the first war was justified and necessary, while the second one was not. What is more interesting are the little details and stories about the various government meetings and diplomatic trips.

Ultimately I found the book hard to read; it just did not draw me in. I like books that have illustrations, photos or charts, and chapters that are well organized by topic. This book was just an unbroken linear narrative, much of it filled with minute details of meetings between people whose names I didn't care to know.

I would recommend this book only to die-hard foreign policy junkies. The rest of us may found it a little dry and boring, with little original insights into the wars.

The author was a high placed advisor in the George H. W Bush (Bush I) administration and was in the inner circle of the decision makers during Gulf War I (GW I). He was part of an influential think tank during the Clinton Administration. During Gulf War II (GW II)the author was again a part of the administration, but a secondary player in the state department. He was not part of the inner circle of decision makers. Thus, the author was much closer to the decisions during Gulf War I, but much further away during Gulf War II. In a way I think it made the book somewhat uneven, because his insights into GW I were much better than GW II. None-the-less, the book is excellent in nearly every respect. I disagree with the author's reasoning about GW II, but that in no way detracts from the author's analysis of the two wars.

Mr. Haass's insights into the cost of ongoing crisis are invaluable. My own research for my Master's Degree substantiate his thoughts about exhaustion and poor decisions. My research confirms that after a rather short period of time under stress, people start making errors, and those errors increase exponentially as time goes on. The author makes this point strongly, and those in power (as well as us common folk) need to pay close attention to this insight. There are several such insights in this book, and those alone are worth the price of admission. His personal insights about the costs of government employment are fun (his postponed honeymoon).

As a diplomat, the author believes in assembling large numbers of partners before going forward in the international realm, and he feels working through international organizations is also necessary - not just desirable. As such, he feels the US went about putting together the first Gulf War correctly. The war was supported by the international community, the UN was behind the effort, the effort was limited, and the war achieved its purpose without high US costs. The fact that our enemy began breaking the agreements after the war was over was no reason to start another, because the breaches were not all that significant.

Gulf War II was an unnecessary war, and one that should have been avoided, according to the author. He feels the second war should have been avoided because a good analysis would have shown its risks, and it would have shown what was to be gained was much less than hoped for. The fact that the international community wanted nothing to do with the second war was a key indicator that we were doing something wrong. He also fears that to reach any kind of acceptable result in GW II, the US will have to be in Iraq for decades and expend enormous amounts of money. At this point in time, his prediction looks accurate.

The best thing about the author is his ability to admit his errors. Most unusual in a government official. Plus, he sets the record straight about Bush II lying or otherwise misleading people about the purposes for GW II. The author simply believes the administration was mislead by its own philosophy and its own inability to see the usefulness of taking another road to control Iraq. The author's perceptions into how government operates are terrific.

Good book.

AD2

Haass had high level policy positions dealing with the Middle East in both Bush I and Bush II administrations. He was thus well placed to understand the how and why of going to war against Iraq both times. He did NOT have any operational role, and was not involved in millitary planning or execution for either war.

His book is highly readable, and adds the policy perspective to the plethora of books describing the more operational issues in both wars. Thus, this is a valuable addition to the rapidly growing library of books on the two Iraq wars.

That said, the policy perspective has some inherent limitations. He honestly admits tht he has no clue how the decision to go to war in Bush II was made. he was doing policy papers, and then all of a sudden, they were completely irrelevant, the decision having been made. He is also willing to criticize some very close friends (Rice does not come accross well), but not the overall process.

His bottom line, which is apparent from the title, is that the first war was right, the second wrong. Hardly a radical position these days. Whether you agree with him or not (which I do not), it is a book well worth rading for an understanding of how policy gets made (or should get made)--at least in the area of foreign affairs.

I think Haass does a good job detailing why war was necessary in 1991, but not in 2003. He was a policy advisor in both Bush administrations, so he should know. The senior Bush took pains to get both the Congress and world community on board for the fight to liberate Kuwait in 1991. Bush Junior did not, and its shows in our world ranking. We are now considered a pirate nation doing what is good for us, and not being fair to the rest of the world. The war of choice also cost us over 4,000 lives, and a trillion dollars and has yet to play out in Iraq. It has also cost us resources which should have been devoted to the War in Afghanistan. Haase is right. We made mistakes and misjudged what could be done.

This is a great book for those interested in recent Middle East history. It shows where United States does right, and where it does wrong. We will be living in the aftermath for some time.

There are so many problems with this book, it's hard to know where to start...

I'll say that the concept is fantastic: Someone who was on the inside of each Bush administration during two different Iraq wars writing a memoir of each war. I'm not sure if a case study looking at the two wars has even been written, so the concept and the idea that inspires this book are fantastic. However, as soon as Haass puts pen to paper, the whole thing falls apart. What should have been a fascinating look at these two wars quickly devolves into a mixture of Monday-morning quarterbacking and delusions of grandeur.

The plain and simple fact is that Haass had little to do with the planning and execution of the first Iraq war and even less to do with the second. Despite this fact, he gives the audience the impression that he was a consquential figure in both instances. In the first half of the book (which covers the 'good' war in Haass' opinion), he rides the coattails of Bush 41, Jim Baker, and Brent Scowcroft, and in the second half (the bad war), he postures as the ignored voice of reason. To cut straight to the quick, Haass put out a book on Iraq at a time when such books sell reasonably well in an attempt to make himself visable beyond the DC policy and government community. This is a self-serving book if there ever was one, and I wouldn't recommend it to anyone. If you've read even a cursory amount about the wars, you won't learn anything new from the book. If you haven't read anything about the wars, there are at least 50 other books you should read before this one.

This book also seemed to serve the purpose of taking pot shots at people who have disagreed with Haass at some point in time. Throughout the book, he makes snide or otherwise backhanded comments about Condi Rice, Colin Powell, Jim Baker, and Brent Scowcroft, among others. He never misses an opportunity to take a shot at someone and if there were two words to describe this book, the phrase 'sour grapes' comes to mind.

The subtitle of the book: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, is the only possible way to excuse its content, but the fact that a large portion of the book isn't a memoir but rather an account of events in general that had nothing to do with the author makes it hard to use this as a justification.

In order to try and offer something that has not already been said about this book, I will make some comments from the perspective of someone who does not often read in this genre. Also, I had very little knowledge about Mr. Haas and his political positions prior to reading this, so I started with as open a mind as one could expect. Fortunately, and surprisingly, Haas' own accounting comes across as sincerely objective, and with as little political bias as can be expected for someone with such deep Washington connections.

First of all, this was an excellent read. It held my attention all of the way through, and the writing style was pleasant and interesting. Obviously Mr. Haas is an intellectual, and it comes through in his writing, but not in a bad (obfuscating) way that you might expect from an academic. It was more obvious to me from his analytical skills, and the ability to express his thinking about complex issues into words that non insiders can understand.

Other than the refreshing lack of partisanship, what I found most interesting about the book was to learn about the real inner workings of policy decision, how the top level decision makers interact with their "seconds" and "thirds", and how all that comes together as one unified (usually) front to us, the public. FASCINATING for someone like me who had no clue about these details. As I read, I found myself wishing for more details...and I imagine Haas left out a lot of things he considered mundane, or too small to mention, that to me (or an outsider) would be extremely interesting. After all, cues and clues to the real character of our leaders are often in the smallest details in my opinion.

I highly recommend this book even if you aren't a politics wonk, or even know what a "wonk" is. It's written well enough, and objectively enough that any level of reader could gain insight into the inner workings of our White House during crises/war. That to me, at least, is extremely interesting and rewarding as a citizen.

Kudos again to Haas for maintaining an extremely balanced presentation of material that is so highly charged, politically.

Easily 4/5 stars, and probably a 4.5 if I could.

"War of Necessity, War of Choice" by Richard N. Haass is a memoir that provides valuable lessons about the decision making processes surrounding the two Iraq wars. Although one might expect a somewhat dry style of writing from a person who has honed the fine arts of diplomacy and policy making, Mr. Haass' perspective is consistently interesting and occassionally surprising. The book serves as a valuable tool for students, historians and general interest readers who wish to gain profound insight into recent American history.

As one of only a few people working at a high level within the administration during both Iraq wars, Mr. Haass is well-positioned to compare and contrast the two conflicts. Mr. Haass shares the methodologies he used to assess the myriad foreign policy challenges that confronted the two Bush administrations, including how he played an active role in developing strategy and engaging in dialogue with international statespeople. Drawing from these experiences, Mr. Haass concludes that the first Iraq war was a necessity whereas the second was a poor choice that has resulted in a number of adverse long-term consequences for the U.S. in terms of its prestige and power.

Mr. Haass provides insight into the personalities of a number of key people, helping us understand more about how they reached decisions; among them, two people are held in the highest esteem. Mr. Haass respects president George H. W. Bush, Sr. for his maturity and conviction during the Gulf War, which he regards as a good decision that was essential to stabilizing the international community in the wake of the Cold War. Colin Powell is praised for his fortitude in trying to steer a moderate course of action prior to the second Iraq war, although he argues a bit unconvincingly that the Secretary of State made the best possible choice (including his ill-fated presentation on the floor of the United Nations) given the flawed nature of the intelligence available to him at the time.

Mr. Haass has decidely mixed opinions about some of the others who occupied the inner circle of power. The author lauds George W. Bush for his knack for quickly sizing up people's intentions while remaining very critical of the president's decision to initiate the second Iraq war. Mr. Haass writes that his friendship with Condoleeza Rice became strained as she grew ever more ideologically rigid and closed ranks with the president. On the other hand, it must be said that Mr. Haas paints a rather grim and sinister portrait of Dick Cheney, whose cynical demeanor could be glimpsed during rare moments in the first Bush administration and was later allowed free reign when he assumed the office of the vice president. Mr. Haass also seems particularly resentful that Mr. Cheney's office assumed outsized powers, recklessly bending the decision making process to his vantage in favor of war and to the detriment of others who were recommending alternative solutions to the Iraqi problem.

Mr. Haass considers himself to be a political centrist, and that is probably a fair assessment. If the pros and cons were more carefully weighed in the cool, professional manner that he proposes, no doubt the U.S. could significantly improve its policy decisions -- but it is worth noting that centrists can sometimes be wrong, too. To his credit, prior to hostilities began in the second Iraq war Mr. Haass carefully delineated what would be needed to achieve success in the mission; unfortunately, this memorandum was largely ignored by top-level decision makers. However, when it became clear to Mr. Haass that the administration was bent on justifying war by any means, would it not have been reasonable for him to resign (if not Mr. Powell as well), given that such an objection might have been the last best chance of stopping a war he believed to be wrong?

In any case, Mr. Haass' book is destined to become an go-to source for readers interested in American policy making during the two Iraq wars. I highly recommend this intriguing book to everyone.

The title of this book, " War of Necessity, War of Choice" is a pretty good tip off that this book, written by Richard Haas, is an interesting viewpoint from one of the few people to be an intimate of both Bush 41 and the Gulf War, and Bush 43 and the Iraq invasion.

Haass worked from the perspective of the White House during the first Bush Administration alongside Condi Rice during the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. He then worked in the State Department under Colin Powell during the Bush 43 Administration. His two positions almost reflect the differences described in the two administrations!

I suspect a reader looking for justification of a Cheney led cabal inside the White House in 2001 looking to get the United States into war in Iraq will be sorely disappointed in this book. It is not a "told you so" story per se. This is a sober treatment of the subject, although it is clear no love is lost between the VP and this author to be sure.

Rather, it seems that Haass has written a book that portrays the first Gulf War as a effort that was well-planned, and executed. The success of the Gulf War went beyond the military effort (which clearly was exceedingly successful), but also the political dimension and the multilateral effort involved. Some of that is reflective of the people and ideology of the people involved in both administrations according to Haass.

Frankly, although Haass is a good writer, it seemed like this part of the book is the fifth person recounting a story that four others have already told and the facts are well known. It may be interesting to those who are not well versed in the lead up to the Gulf War. However, to a reader like myself who has read much of the standard canon of the Gulf War (The Commanders, A World Transformed, and memoirs by Schwarzkopf, Powell and others) much of this part of the book seemed like the fifth recounting of the same story. Interesting, but not groundbreaking.

When it comes to the Iraq War, this book become much more interesting in the author's descriptions of the battles being waged between the POTUS, VPOTUS, State, Defense and the intelligence agencies.

The most interesting facts are really about how "critical mass" grew after 9/11/01 in leading this nation to war. Rather then an account of personal tidbits about the major characters in the Bush 43 Administration, this book is more of primer into how bureaucracies function and reliance on assumptions, anecdotal evidence, and misguided belief can lead to bad policy decisions and messes like the Iraq War. There are certainly some recriminations here regarding decisions both personal and regarding the Bush Administration. Haass doesn't appear to be settling scores, but rather analyzing how this nation has fought two wars with Iraq in a way that would never have been anticipated in 1990.

If a reader is looking for juicy gossip about major figures, this is not the book to read. While he offers portraits of people like both Bush 41 and 43, Powell, Cheney, Rice and others, this is not a book about personality. Nor is this a book full of vindication for the author (who admits to plenty of mistakes). It does offer some reasoning into battles being waged between the above figures during the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Instead, this book a well-written account about one of the most major foreign policy decisions made in the aftermath of 9/11 that was certainly not well thought or planned (given the current administration treatment of stimulus dollars this seems to be constant trait of all administrations in dealing with a crisis - decisions are made with a hope that success will inevitably be the result).

In short, a sober, worthwhile book about an intensely important subject. I wish the author had written a book of more detail and honesty in personal account, but it was not to be. Yet, a worthwhile read.

How you react to this book may depend on how you view the last Administration and the last Iraq War. If you believe that that the war was justified and that the Bush Administration acted honestly upon the best information that could be obtained, you will see this book as a liberal "I told them, but they didn't listen to me" screed. If you believe that the last Iraq War was unjustified and the the Bush Administration bordered on or embraced illegality, you will see this books as a damning indictment and proof that the true voice of reason was ignored.

Beyond these two political viewpoints lies the book itself. The book is your standard political memoir: it is politically motivated and driven. As in any political memoir written by by an active member of the political process (in this case through advising and non-elected positions), this book is a 300 odd page justification of why the author did or did not do what he did as well as the adverse consequences of his opinions being ignored.

If you are of the political bent and enjoy reading political memoirs, buy this book. If you are looking for a objective look at the differences between the two Iraq wars and the two Bush Presidencies, I would pass this one by.