4.0 out of 5 stars
World Citizenship As Both an Option and Obligation in Averting Nuclear Warfare, August 6, 2010
This review is from: War No More: Eliminating Conflict in the Nuclear Age (Paperback)
Last year marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto that sought to put the world on guard about the dangers of the hydrogen bomb. The last surviving signatory to the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was Joseph Rotblat, who died August 31, 2005. In 1995, Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.
During World War II, Joseph Rotblat participated in the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. An Encyclopædia Britannica article on his Nobel prize explains that "Although he was uncomfortable about participating in the creation of an atomic bomb, Rotblat initially believed that the weapon would be used to deter only a German threat. After learning in 1944 that it would be used to contain the Soviet Union, a World War II ally, he left the project...." Upon returning to England in 1945, Rotblat left defense work for medicine. He served as founding secretary general and later as president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957, and at which key scientists and other people from different countries could confer about the peril of nuclear weapons facing the world. In his capacity as a physics professor and a medical physicist at St. Bartholomew's Hospital Medical College (1950-76) both part of the University of London, Rotblat was dedicated to directing attention toward the biological hazards of nuclear radiation and the severity of fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.
Robert Hinde, CBE of Cambridge University, is the author of many books and articles in psychology. He earned a degree at Oxford University in 1950. In 2003, Robert Hinde and Joseph Rotblat together published their book, War No More.
The book addresses the planet's current state in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It features many great tables, or charts, pertaining to matters ranging from the varying levels of the super-powers' nuclear warhead stockpiles to the principal nuclear arms control treaties to estimates of military deaths in individual wars during the last sixty years.
Since this book is an earnest endeavor to address in a thorough and organized fashion the issue of weapons of mass destruction, many of its most fundamental prescriptions are bound to sound basic to the point of seeming somewhat banal. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that "Any attempt to discuss ways of preventing war must address very basic issues, and in so doing lays itself open to accusations of mushy idealism." In War No More, the authors have clearly opted for erring in the direction of invoking moral truisms as a small price to pay if there is even the slightest chance of their contributing to a discussion prompting the global community to eventually compel the world's political leaders to heed such moral considerations. They also make the interesting point that, in the prevention and alleviation of conflict, "Often the success of such efforts may be unknown to the wider world just because the criterion of success is simply that nothing happens."
In any event, Hinde and Rotblat urge their readers to understand the absolute need to abolish war if humanity is to endure in this nuclear age. Their position is that "the very possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. Their enormous destructive power, inflicted on civilians even more than on the military, would make their use unforgiveable [sic]." The authors expressly credit Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein with having taken the initiative for international action on this front. And as was the view of Russell and Einstein fifty years earlier, Hinde and Rotblat proclaim in their book that "The only solution is international agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons."
The Pugwash Movement was an outgrowth of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. The original goal of the Pugwash movement had been the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and war as such. From its inception, the movement was sidetracked by its immediate mission of preventing the Cold War from becoming a hot war. In the wake of the Cold War, Pugwash's efforts were able to be redirected toward its original objectives of averting war as such.
Hinde and Rotblat concede the ease with which people can be pessimistic about the prospects of abolishing war. However, the formidable challenge posed by such a task is deemed "no excuse for inaction." They cite historic instances in which humanity has overcome the apparently impossible, and they stress the urgency both of identifying war's causes (with a view to eliminating them) and of developing alternative means of resolving conflicts. Not only weapons of mass destruction but even conventional weapons of war are continually becoming more devastating. And the current state of technology renders wars much less feasible to contain, or isolate.
There is discussion of how wars come in various forms and can elude exact definition. Wars' causes, as a result, are no less diverse and difficult to pinpoint. In any case, Hinde and Rotblat are of the view that there is no scientific basis for concluding that war is an inevitable part of human societies' conduct.
Of course, a sole, indispensable, common denominator to all wars is the availability of weaponry. For centuries, societies have formulated their foreign policy in the light of the Roman dictum "If you want peace, prepare for war." However, as Bertrand Russell warned the world in 1916, "when the means of offense exist, even though their original purpose may have been defensive, the temptation to use them is likely, sooner or later, to prove overwhelming." Hinde and Rotblat discuss how "during the Cold War years there was a general assumption in the West--still widely accepted today--that the possession of nuclear weapons prevented a Soviet military attack. This is one of the deliberately propagated myths of the Cold War. Careful studies by reputable historians from the West have found no evidence for this assertion." The authors also reflect on how "Thousands of these [nuclear] weapons are kept in the arsenals, presumably for deterrence purposes,...but sooner or later they will be used deliberately. There is a historical precedent for this: the reason the Allies began developing the atom bomb during the Second World War was specifically to prevent its use by Hitler, yet nuclear weapons were used against Japan as soon as they were made." In fine, the doctrine of deterrence is part of the problem rather than the solution.
The authors argue that humans are not essentially aggressive or war-prone, but they are essentially disposed to aggressive self-defense in response to warlike conditions. "Often secular ideals of patriotism and territorial rights are closely interwoven with religious ideals, so that support for the `Just War' is derived from a mixture of the sacred and the secular." To be sure, religious fervor is certainly conducive to warfare, and "Religious labels are especially dangerous in that they both legitimize war and portray it as a sacred endeavour." In addition to people's identification with religious labels comes their indignation and vengeance stemming from the perceived mistreatment of their ancestors, which facilitates conflict.
According to Hinde and Rotblat, people are clearly all too susceptible to political, religious, and ethnic manipulation when it comes to motivating them to support wars. Moreover, the vested interests of the military-industrial-scientific complex are geared toward anything but the prevalence of peace. It is also noteworthy that, as far as the typical citizen's reaction to war is concerned, the sense of "duty" looms increasingly large as one traces the history of warfare from pre-agricultural communities to modern ones.
In the 1980s, the nuclear physicist Edward Teller persuaded Ronald Reagan to pursue space-based ballistic missile defense systems. The Pugwash movement criticized this Strategic Defense Initiative on two counts. First of all, no technology is completely effective. Secondly, since anti-ballistic missiles are more expensive to manufacture than offensive missiles, a simple increase in the volume of offensive missiles would be the predictable upshot. The movement to develop ballistic missile defense systems subsided after Reagan but was considered with some seriousness by the Clinton administration when the U.S. Senate's Republican majority was championing it. With the George W. Bush administration, however, the zeal for promoting such systems has been rekindled.
Hinde and Rotblat discuss how "The tragedy of Rwanda was due in part to the feeling that it was a far-away country, and that happenings there were not so important to the West. From some perspectives, this is a matter that may have grown worse since the end of the Cold War because, while the international political climate was still a major determinant of international politics, wars were mostly proxy wars for the two major power blocs. With the end of the Cold War, the major powers have simply lost interest."
Hinde and Rotblat discuss how, at one time, over 40 per cent of people ranked nuclear weapons among the most crucial issues. Since the end of the Cold War, though, the percentage of people associating this urgency with nuclear weapons has plummeted to about 1 per cent. There is a grim irony here, and the authors express their grave concern with the turn that the George W. Bush administration has caused things to take:
At the time of writing, in 2003, the general world situation is far from being a happy one; indeed, as far as the nuclear peril is concerned it is much worse than would have been expected 14 years after the end of the nuclear arms race. With the end of the Cold War, and the termination of the ideological divide between East and West, the imminent danger of a...
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