War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more
Qty:1
  • List Price: $19.00
  • Save: $1.69 (9%)
FREE Shipping on orders over $35.
Only 1 left in stock (more on the way).
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com.
Gift-wrap available.
FREE Shipping on orders over $35.
Used: Good | Details
Sold by apex_media
Condition: Used: Good
Comment: Ships direct from Amazon! Qualifies for Prime Shipping and FREE standard shipping for orders over $25. Overnight and 2 day shipping available!
Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items.
Have one to sell? Sell on Amazon
Flip to back Flip to front
Listen Playing... Paused   You're listening to a sample of the Audible audio edition.
Learn more
See this image

War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir Paperback – Black & White, June 1, 1998

ISBN-13: 978-1883642464 ISBN-10: 1883642469 Edition: New edition

Buy New
Price: $17.31
15 New from $10.54 35 Used from $0.61
Amazon Price New from Used from
Kindle
"Please retry"
Paperback, Black & White
"Please retry"
$17.31
$10.54 $0.61
Free%20Two-Day%20Shipping%20for%20College%20Students%20with%20Amazon%20Student


NO_CONTENT_IN_FEATURE

Save up to 90% on Textbooks
Rent textbooks, buy textbooks, or get up to 80% back when you sell us your books. Shop Now

Product Details

  • Paperback: 288 pages
  • Publisher: Steerforth; New edition edition (June 1, 1998)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 1883642469
  • ISBN-13: 978-1883642464
  • Product Dimensions: 5.1 x 1 x 8.3 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 12.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,077,496 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Adams, an intelligence analyst with the CIA, discovered evidence in 1966 that the number of Vietnamese communist soldiers in Vietnam was closer to 600,000 than the 280,000 count made by the Pentagon. Unable to persuade CIA director Richard Helms to convene a board of inquiry, he unsuccessfully took his appeal to Congress and the White House, then resigned from the agency in '73 to write this account of the affair. His central argument is that General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, had deliberately overlooked some 300,000 Vietcong militiamen in order to buttress the government line that the U.S. was winning the war. In 1980 Adams was hired as a consultant for the CBS documentary The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception , based largely on the evidence he had uncovered; the film caused Westmoreland to file a much-publicized libel suit against the network, with Adams a co-defendant. Westmoreland dropped the suit before it went to jury. Adams died in 1988, leaving the memoir unfinished, but far enough along to explain how the CIA and top military brass--with White House encouragement--misled the Congress and the American people about enemy strength before the 1968 Tet Offensive. The expose offers a convincing inside look at CIA analytical techniques during the Vietnam war.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Library Journal

Adams was the CIA analyst whose persistence led to the making of the controversial CBS documentary, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," the program that landed CBS in an equally famous lawsuit with Gen. William Westmoreland. In this memoir, he takes us behind the scenes to see what might be called "The Making of a Deception: The Inside Story." Initially, Adams charged that the CIA had underestimated Vietcong military strength. Quitting the agency in 1973, he undertook his own investigation, a lengthy labor cut short by his death in 1988. Though not completed, his book is more than a rehash of yesteryear's bureaucratic battles-and more even than delicious inside gossip. Adams paints a fascinating and personalized picture of the back-room, political wartime CIA. While experts and ex-spooks will debate the reliability of Adams's story, readers will find it fascinating. Some of his tales are worth the price of the book alone. Recommended for informed readers.
Henry Steck, SUNY Coll. at Cortland
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

More About the Authors

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

4.8 out of 5 stars
5 star
8
4 star
2
3 star
0
2 star
0
1 star
0
See all 10 customer reviews
Share your thoughts with other customers

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

15 of 16 people found the following review helpful By William Gawthrop on April 26, 2002
Format: Paperback
War of Numbers is an essential book for intelligence analysts as well as students of the Vietnam War. Adams provides key insight to strategic policy failure. In order to fully appreciate Adam's contribution to the intelligence history of Vietnam, it is important to understand that wars are fought by nations in the pursuit of interests and that for Americans, the decision to go to war should address seven considerations: Problem Identification, Interests Assessment, Objective Identification (including End State Assessment), Strategic Self Appraisal, National Power Assessments of The Enemy, Strategy Development, and the Identification of Gaps between Policy and Means.
Adam's book addresses errors in the National Power Assessment phase which had a negative cascading effect in subsequent decision making. Flawed enemy strength calculations contributed to flawed strategy development which contributed to a gap between policy and means. When Adams identified the flaw, the Johnson Administration was too heavily committed to a war of attrition to tolerate public exposure of the gaps between policy and means. Strategically, telling the truth about the numbers of enemy forces would have required larger commitments of U.S. forces increasing the strain on public support for the war. The strength of Johnson's political will and McNamara's quantitative analysis approach to war deeply affected the way the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, counted the enemy (called, Order of Battle).
MACV kept three sets of books; The first set of OB was the official version sent to Washington. The second set belonged to the OB Analysts themselves, and the third set was a blend of the first two.
Read more ›
Comment Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful By A Customer on June 9, 1998
Format: Paperback
As a student in Political Science, it is rare to find and interesting and faithful account of Vietnam. Adams gives us both in this book. I thought it was going to be a purely statistical book of this and that. What I got was the story of a man's mission to find the truth in a sea of deceit. Adams methodically plots out the discrepancies in the Order of Battle and tells of his own fight to get the numbers somewhere close to realistic. It was also heart-wrenching in a way becasue Adams was driven from a profession that he loved. He was as much a war hero as the brave young men who actually fought, because his fight was to give 'our boys' a level playing field. I would strongly recommend this book to any student of political science, Vietnam, or anyone who likes a good spy novel.
Comment Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again
8 of 10 people found the following review helpful By Amazon Customer on June 21, 1999
Format: Hardcover
Adams' book is not so much a book about Vietnam as a chronical of what happens when intelligence units and agencies report what the commanders WANT to hear. The CIA and J2 of MACV in Adams' book become pawns in the politics of Vietnam. They ignored facts and basic tenents of intelligence reporting. The agencies feared reaction to the facts and its possible effect on public sentiment to US involvement. Because of that they purposely, according to Adams, reported and knowingly maintained false information.
Even more disturbing are Adams' insights into the CIA of the middle and late Sixties. Though deeply entrenched in war in Vietnam, they seemed to take an overall cavalier approach to the mission. Adams notes after Tet-1968 there were "considerably less than 6" CIA agent handlers in Vietnam who spoke vietnamese. These same case officers received a grand total of 2 hours orientation on Vietnam and their enemy prior to assignment.
This book is a MUST read for intelligence personnel, policy makers and anyone who wants to learn how, the hard way, not to run an intelligence organization.
Comment Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful By A Customer on November 21, 1998
Format: Hardcover
I expected not to finish this book, given my previous lack of interest in Vietnam-War history, but I found that the story transcended its milieu and beyond that drew my interest to a key period of recent American history. I imagine that fans will counsel students of history and political science to read it, and they probably should as an interesting nuance from more high-level views provided by more famous luminaries like Westmoreland, McNamara, et al, but I found this fascinating from a different standpoint: how one individual struggled to keep his intellectual integrity in the face of massive institutional pressure not to. There are lots of melodramatic movies that seek to capture the situation more cleanly, but this book, in chronicling one man's true-life experience, did it better and with more resonance than any film I've seen. As a young person who works with "numbers" myself, I understand how frequently people try to manipulate them and use them as persuasive devices for major decisions.
Comment Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful By ROBIN MCCALL on July 15, 2011
Format: Hardcover Verified Purchase
This is an outstanding book about the Vietnam War, because it explains why there were so many problems during and after the Tet Offensive of 1968, even though the US and South Vietnamese allies ended up winning all the battles. In spite of the lack of military acceptance of Adams strength numbers, which are well documented in this book, the numbers are now generally accepted by historians as accurate, and most historians attribute this military/presidential sleight of hand as a major reason that LBJ refused to run for president again, and that the American public turned against the Vietnam War, after the truth was revealed.

Until I read this book I did not understand why the CIA had higher numbers than MACV. The book also explainded the reasoning behind Westmoreland's law suit against CBS and Sam Adams. Colonel Hackworth's "Introduction" is the best summary of this book. If you are not yet sure that you want to buy it, read his introduction and you will know for sure.

One reviewer described this book as one that shows what not to do in intelligence work, but it also shows what you should do. Adams showed the CIA how his detailed analysis could forecast problems in Africa, and he was praised for that analysis. He applied the same technigues in Vietnam, and was ignored because his analysis disagreed with too many high level military and political people.

I love this book and I bought a hardback copy for my Vietnam collection. I was in Vietnam from Feb 1967 to Feb 1972, and until I read this book, I could not understand some of the things that happened, even after years of research on the Tet Offensive and its aftermath.

Wikipedia says that 'the Sam Adams Award is given annually by the Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence, a group of retired CIA officers, to an intelligence professional who has taken a stand for integrity and ethics. It is named after Samuel A. Adams, a CIA whistleblower during the Vietnam War.'
Comment Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback. If this review is inappropriate, please let us know.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again

Customer Images