Customer Reviews

The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge Middle East Studies)

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(5)

 

 

It's unfortunate that the editor of this volume felt it necessary to close the book with an epilogue by a big name. At least some of the articles are better than that.

The most interesting piece, I think, is Landis on Syria's involvement in the 1948 war. Landis in fact contradicts the title of the volume -- "The War for Palestine" -- when he shows that Palestine and Palestinians were the last thing on Syria's mind in 1948 (and probably since then).

By looking at the diaries and unofficial documents of the president and prime minister of Syria during 1948, and by seeing what they had to say about why Syria was in the war in the first place, Landis makes obvious that it was FEAR OF JORDAN (and, of course, Great Britain), rather than any love of Palestinians, that pushed Syria into a conflict it most certainly knew it would lose.

In short, Syria was scared to death that Jordan's King 'Abdullah was about to fulfill his "Greater Syria Plan," namely the Jordanian annexation of Syria and Damascus. The animosity between Amman and Damascus is an old story, but Landis shows how Arab nationalism in the name of the Palestinians was the sheerest of cheesecloths with which simple Arab backstabbing was covered up.

The overriding concern of Syria, at least, was not to be pushed into the sea by Jordan. Not for the last time in Middle Eastern history, the Palestinians were only an easy PR excuse to mobilize troops -- first for Jordan, in an effort to impose the Greater Syria Plan, and then for Syria, in an attempt to stop it. Underneath it all, Landis argues that the hate that inspired the 1948 war was Arab vs. Arab.

Until the 1948 war is seen for what it was -- namely an Arab civil war, a war of Arabs against themselves -- the location of Israel in that war will never really be understood. And, I dare say, until the Arab countries honestly confront this war over Arab identity and nationalism, Israelis and Palestinians will continue to be the excuses -- the sheerest cheesecloth -- with which Arab governments cover over their weaknesses and ugly internecine stuggles.

I give the book five stars for Landis alone.

These essayists (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Rashid Khalidi and Edward Said and others), consider all previous historical accounts "Zionist propaganda," as Yehoshua Porath observes in his important summer, 2002 review in Azure. Actually, this book is propaganda, not the reverse. These essays weakly attempt to recast Israel's 1947 and 1948 fight for survival --- and fail.

There is nothing new to the idea that Israel instigated the flight of Arabs from Israel in 1947 and 1948, but the falsity of these accusations has been proved time and again by extensive historical research since 1948. Israel did not deliberately expel Arabs.

Taken on together, or case by case, such claims are easily disproved. Inhabitants of Saffuriya, for example, accuse Israel of ethnic cleansing. But in the 1930s, the village hosted anti-Jewish radicals and in 1948 it was headquarters for Arab Liberation Army leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who ignored the June 11, 1948 U.N. truce. Thus inhabitants fled en masse, expecting "revenge for their numerous onslaughts upon Jews," --- before the IDF captured the village, according to historical documents, military orders, oral testimonies and diaries cited in Yoav Gelber's Palestine 1948 (p. 165).

These authors also accuse Israel by selectively citing certain items but neglecting critical contextual factors that disprove their allegations.

Contrary to this book's contention, "civil war in Palestine" did not "break out" on Nov. 30, 1947. The "outbreak" wasn't spontaneous, but a well organized series of Arab riots and attacks targeting Jewish communities and people after Arab commanders, leaders and neighboring nations rejected the U. N. Partition Plan--which Israel had just accepted.

These authors, like many other anti-Israel dogmatists, harp on 100 Arabs killed at Deir Yassin. They neglect to mention that the village was a militant stronghold, and was central to Arab attacks on the roads to Jerusalem, intended to cut off the city's access to Jews. Iraqi combatants had settled in Deir Yassin, and joined local aggressors. Arab men dressed in women's clothes and opened fire. They weren't innocent civilians. Likewise, Arabs at a Haifa refinery murdered 50 Jewish civilian co-workers on Dec. 30, 1947 and Arabs slaughtered 80 civilian Jewish medical workers and professors on Apr. 13, 1948. The sole motivation were the victims' Jewish faith.

For his part, Rashid Khalidi focuses on 1948 Palestinian Arab failures--criticizing Jerusalem Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini. Yet he ignores Haj Amin's alliance with Hitler, his wartime refuge in Berlin, his anti-Jewish Berlin radio broadcasts, and his personal request that Hitler refuse to spare 400,000 Hungarian Jews in exchange for military supplies. Haj Amin also elicited a Nazi promise to exterminate Israel's Jews. Nor does Khalidi mention Palestinian Arab murders of all but two 131 prisoners who surrendered at Etzion Bloc.

Avi Shlaim claims that Jewish soldiers vastly outnumbered 25,000 Arab soldiers. But as Porath notes, Israel's Jewish people totaled no more than 750,000, could find no more fighters, and exhausted their resources mounting their self-defense, while seven Arab nations opposing them could easily have drafted far more soldiers from their combined populations of more than 50 million.

Finally, comes the late Edward Said, writing on his family's "flight" from Jerusalem's Talbieh neighborhood. The details confirm--like many 1948, 1949 and 1950 Arab newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, U.N. and Arab League statements and personal Arab accounts--that Arab leaders' urgent calls for Palestinian flight, resulted in massive, voluntary urban Palestinian departures. Said claims to have been forced to leave. His own details contradict him.

Despite these essayists claims, 1947 and 1948 Arab attacks on Jews were very significant, and existential threats, just like frequent publicly announced plans to destroy Israel at its birth.

--Alyssa A. Lappen

The reason why this book is very controversial in Israel is because it attempts to shatter all the myths surrounding the 1948 victory of the Jewish community in establishing a de-facto state without consideration to the Palestinian population. Myths such as "a land without people for a people without land", "arabs flee the fighting voluntarily", "Israel's victory is a miracle given that 5 arab states attacked concurrently" and "Israel accepted the 1947 UN partition while the Arabs rejected it", are proven to be false through a series of references to British and Israel archives that have been recently de-classified.

I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in learning how lies can be craftly fabricated and propagated down generations. I am pleased that some historians in Israel are accepting that the existence of Israel to fulfill the right to self-determination for the Jews can not be moraly justified if it deprives the Palestinians of their very same right, nor can this state expect itself to survive in peace and harmony if its grave mistakes are not recitifed.

Part of the beauty of this book is that it takes things one step further. Re-invigorating the debate by looking more closely at the relasionship between rhetoric and practice, history and historiography, responsibility and blame, this book is a collection of essays, covering all of the major players during the dramatic 1948, except Lebanon, that works to bring the revionsionist history one step further, past politics of myth-breaking and into the re-construction of the history of the 1948 war that is more aware of the conflicting agendas, interests, and strategies.

Despite the fact that this book contains work of the 'New Historians' it contains their strongest arguments rather than their weaker ones. The New Historians have tried to examine the history of Israel in a critical matter, trying to re-examine key events and re-write portions of them due to new research. In some cases such as Pappe this has meant a distortion of the historical record, however in the case of Morris and Parsons this has merely meant a true excavation of the historical record.

This is a collection of short essays, most of which are in book form elsewhere. Parsons deals with the Druze relationship and efforts by both the Druze and the Zionists to craft a shared history, Morris examines the refugee problem and Shlaim looks at the 'collusion' with Jordan. A good taste of newish history of Israel, however some of the work is a bit dated today. This book does not stand alone, it examines a few key elements of the conflict, there are better books on the 1948 war, for instance O'Jerusalem, or Genises 1948.

Seth J. Frantzman

Israel has won most of the propaganda battles over the story of its formation and its version of history has come to dominate current thinking. In recent years ironically a group of Israeli historians known to the world as the Revisionists have been exploring this history and suggesting that previous histories are inaccurate self-serving myths.

This book is an attempt to look at the war that gave rise to the creation of Israel as a state. The book is a collection of articles and with the exception of one article written by Benny Morris is rather leaden and academic never the less it raises some interesting issues. The last chapter by Edward Said moves away from academic objectivity and is a bit of pro-Palestinian propoganda but the other articles are interesting.

The basic foundation myth of Israel is that following the United Nations passing a motion supporting a partition plan, hostile Arab states invaded the area and were defeated by a heroic outnumbered Israeli army. Local Arabs reacting to calls from the invading powers left the area to become refugees. Their plight was self inflicted their claims to have their property returned were thus somehow illegitimate or irrelevant.

What the book shows is that most Arab states were reluctant to intervene and were not in a position to do so effectively. What in fact happened was that two wars occurred. The first prior to May 1948 saw the Haganah crush the local Arab forces. This led to strong pressure for the surrounding Arab states to intervene. However the surrounding states for their own reasons were reluctant to do so. Syria was more concerned about possible aggression from Jordan. Jordan had been busy negotiating a secret deal with Israel to occupy those parts of Palestine which were designated Arab. The Egyptians did not have the military capacity to launch a military action and it only occurred when Farouk overruled objections of his military commanders. At all times the Haganah had an advantage in numbers and was soon able to gain a decisive advantage in heavy weapons.

Benny Morris again shows that the flight of the Palestinians was not due to mythical broadcasts and his new essay is a significant departure from his earlier work suggesting that violence played a greater role than he previously suggested.

The book also makes it clear how the war altered the history of most of the Arab states. The failure of the Arab armies destroyed the legitimacy of those regimes who took power after de-colonisation. This in turn led to military coups in most Arab countries and started a tradition by which the military routinely became involved in politics. It also distorted the economy of these states as arming for further wars with Israel became a significant priority.

An interesting if book although it is rather dry and distinctly non riverting.

This book only quotes leftist Israelis and Arabs. No mainstream Israeli historians are considered. The book takes a side while claiming to be an unbiased historical work.

The historian's task is continually to reappraise existing adn new
evidence, rather than to tranmit a set of already "fixed"
facts. For some reason, when this process is applied to the
"wrong" subjects it is labelled
"revisionism". Anyway, this book is a rather tame
reevaluation of various Zionist myths - such as the idea that the
Palestinian Arabs left of their own accord rather than being forced
out by Zionist colonisers. It is indeed welcome to see such facts
revealed, although they have been known and accepted in Israel for
some time.

I recommend "War and Remembrance" by Israeli historian Yehoshua Porath in the summer 2002 issue of Azure on the subject of this book. The revisionist historians in it have attempted to tell "new" history of Israel and consider the entire previous historical record to be propaganda for the Zionist cause. In this book, Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Rashid Khalidi and Edward Said consider Jewish conduct in the 1947 and 1948, how the Jewish people defeated seven Arab armies, if the Jewish people were outnumbered and if they intended to expel the Arabs.

They dismiss all pre-revisionist Israeli history as a "quest for legitimacy," not honest accounting. That's pretty wild, because as Porath says Israeli universities and professors have supported views like these "for some time now" and have been honest about Israeli history. Yigael Alon and Israel Galili wrote the Book of the Palmah that gave Walid Khalidi material to argue in 1959 that the Dalet Plan was "the master plan of the Zionists" for wholesale expulsion of Palestinians and the 1973 History of the Hagana included the Dalet Plan's whole text.

Porath says the charge that Israel carried out a deliberate and systematic expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs is not "remotely substantiated by the extensive research that has been carried out in the last few decades."

They take material very selectively from the fringes of Israeli archives. Based on that, Porath says anyone could "make outrageously false claims"-- that Israel's victory resulted from "an imperialist conspiracy or an overwhelming advantage in manpower and arms." He says that is what these editors do, and I believe him, since he knows the Israeli record as well as any historian alive.

The book says the Arabs failed because they had no unified command, allying all the Arab forces. They were driven apart by intense disputes between their nations and the Arab regimes were afraid to send large forces to the front. That's not news. As Porath points out, it has been in traditional histories by people like Nathaniel Lorch and Meir Pa'il for a long time.

A chronology on the book's first few pages lists November 30, 1947 as "outbreak of civil war in Palestine." Porath says it would be more proper to call the `civil war' "an assault upon the Jewish civilian population undertaken by the Palestinian Arabs" after they rejected the UN Partition Plan passed and accepted by the Jewish people the day before.

This book wants readers to think that 100 Arabs killed at Deir Yassin was the only massacre. It wasn't. Porath mentions other massacres too--the December 30, 1947 murder of about 50 Jewish Haifa refinery workers by their Arab co-workers and the April 13, 1948 massacre of more than 80 Jewish doctors, nurses and Hebrew University workers on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem.

Rashid Khalidi's essay on Palestinian Arab failure in 1948 covers Jerusalem Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, not very politely. Here's another oversight. Husseini was, in Porath's words, "an ardent and influential supporter of the Nazis and the Holocaust." A day after Hitler rose to power, Husseini gave Jerusalem's German Consul "his blessings in the name of `three hundred million Muslims'," and urged the Nazis to take the whole world. He spent "much of the war" with the SS and Heinrich Himmler and in 1943 and 1944 talked Himmler out of trading Jewish lives for millions of dollars and military hardware. The Jews were murdered and at Husseini's request, the Nazis promised genocide for the Jews of Palestine, too.

Porath's review points out another of Khalidi's oversights. The Jewish defenders of the Etzion Bloc who surrendered to the Arab Legion of the Kingdom of Transjordan were treated under formal rules of war. But nearly all the 131 people who surrendered to Palestinian Arabs were murdered. Only two survived.

At the same time, Jordanian forces in Jerusalem removed from the city all the Jewish residents, numbering about 100,000. Porath wonders if anyone could "seriously examine the war of 1948" without noticing that a significant Arab minority stayed in the part of Palestine that became Israel, while those parts of the country that fell under the Jordanian or Egyptian rule "became Judenrein."

In another essay, Avi Shlaim considers the number of fighters on each side. Porath calls it "a remarkable study in scholarly distortion." By taxing itself to the limit, Palestine's Jewish community managed to gather 35,000 soldiers by mid-1948, a number that reached 95,000 by early 1949. That compared to 25,000 Arab fighters. Shlaim claims Jewish fighters outnumbered Arabs at every stage of the war. Porath says this is not true. "Shlaim himself admits that the Arab states sent only a small portion of their armies" to Palestine and could have sent far more had they wished.

Besides that, Porath tells us that Shlaim "ignores the huge difference in manpower reserves available to each side." By early 1949, Israel had at most 750,000 Jewish residents, compared to 50 million in the 7 Arab states in the war. Israel's Jewish people had taxed themselves to the maximum. The war had ground their small economy and "vital industries" to a halt. But "the Arab states, by comparison could have fought the war indefinitely without seriously affecting their citizens' way of life."

Finally Columbia University professor Edward Said offers a personal account of his family's departure from the Talbieh neighborhood of Jerusalem. Porath says this is most useful in its unintended effect. Traditional Israeli histories always claimed that urban Palestinians left their homes voluntarily as they wearied of the war. Khalil al-Sakakini provides one of the best such accounts of his family's departure from Katamon in Jerusalem, but there are many others in the Israeli and British sources of the time. Porath says that Said's account "matches the testimonies of Sakakini and many others like him, and serves therefore to confirm further the traditional account."

I didn't like this book at all. But if I had any doubts, Yohoshua Porath sealed it for me.

This book has helped me discover the source of the tragedy that Israel is living in. I encourage Jews, Christians, Muslims and others interested in peace to learn about the history of this great land from alternative sources as a prequisite to finding a way to live together.