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War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires

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There has been a trend of late of publishing multi-disciplinary books with an ambition of rediscovering history, economics, sociology, whatever, or even of creating a new science, which have met commercial success. In particular, it seems that as soon as you talk about "evolution" you double the sales of your book. "The evolution of wealth" and "Guns, Germs and Steel", both excellent books, come to mind. This book seems to be surfing that wave and explicitly aims at being the next Jared Diamond (says the publisher). Unofrtunately it doesn't quite get there.

It's difficult to find a thesis in this book. It claims to be a scientific model of history but it's mostly descriptive verbiage. Most of it is pedestrian historical narrative (which admittedly could be interesting to someone who knows little about world history), with a few analytical points (sometimes just summarizing someone else's book) thrown in from time to time. The part exposing the author's belief in free will is particularly naive and reads like an undergraduate philosophy dissertation. I suppose that the author's main thesis is the fact that empires tend to be built from areas located on meta-ethnic frontiers - which makes sense, if only because that's where the good armies are, but promoting it to a Universal Law of History is excessively pompous. Likewise, the asabiya concept, while not totally useless, is purely descriptive ex-post. Besides, the expression of those ideas is vague and lacks rigour.

There are some interesting points. The best chapter in my view is the one on the 14th Century (largely inspired by Barbara Tuchman's Distant Mirror), explaining how Europe resolved its overpopulation problem by murderous warfare, and its inequality problem ("top-heavy" society) by the elimination of the elites either through the legal assassination of the richest nobles (England) or by purging the nobility in military defeats (France). The parallel with the end of the Roman senatorial class at the beginning of the Principate is interesting and makes me think the of the way Mr. Putin has been recovering the People's economic assets from the Oligarchs in Russia. The observation that inequalities have been increasing in the US since the 1960s could perhaps help us determine the time of the next revolution...The part on social capital in chapter 13, essentially a summary of various theories on the subject (Putnam), is very interesting as well.

Finally, contrary to what seems implied by the publisher, the book makes no use of quantitative models. The author only briefly mentions a simplistic wealth distribution model with inheritance in a population which has little in common with the main discourse.

It is a socially accepted idea that a common enemy unites. It's common sense to us, but the facts of how pervasively a common enemy can cause a nation to unify has never been laid out clearer in any book I have read.

Turchin presents many cases of different people bonding together and energized by an unsettled frontier or a frontier under seige. Empires such as Rome, France and the Carolingians and the Holy Roman Empire are prime examples of nations who rose by being surrounded by enemies. These nations were forced into action for their own survival. Turchin does a fine job of backing up his theory with detailed accounts of the rise of these empires. Turchin uses the Arabic term "asibaya", a term that roughly means "unity and cooperation" to describe nations that had unified.

The second part of the book deals mostly with the fall of empires. Many of these empires fell - interestingly enough - because of the common bond breaking down internally. Turchin attributes much of this to class divisiveness, i.e., the rich getting richer, the poor getting poorer and the eventual collapse of the upper class as a result, as they could no longer live off of the poor. This resulted in not only the poor revolting, but also the upper class battling with each other.

For the most part this is a well written book, however the author tends to jump around a bit from chapter to chapter, which at times makes the book hard to follow. This is a minor price to pay, however for a book this well researched and informative. I'll chalk up any disorganization in the book to his inexperience in writing history books of this scope.

Turchin treats the pre-capitalist dynamics in much the same way that Marx does. In fact, Turchin refers to Marx in numerous places. Say what you want about Marx, but he had a clear understanding of how people and classes of people interact.

One obvious mistake in his writings, though - He attributes Voltaire's famous quote about the Holy Roman Empire ("It wasn't holy, it wasn't roman and it wasn't an empire") to Marx, which is indeed incorrect.

Alex Alaniz's otherwise excellent review fails to mention Turchin's core concept of 'asabiya' (Chapter 4). First developed by the fourteenth century thinker, Ibn Khaldun, asabiya broadly connotes social solidarity. Similar, more narrowly-based concepts include social capital (Robert Putnam) and the idea of military fighting spirit as a force multiplier.

Turchin puts asabiya at the heart of his historical dynamics, from asabiya's forging in initially fractious tribal groupings, chronically stressed at the edge of existing empires, through to the empire-building power of egalitarian high-asabiya groups, through to the decline of empire as class-stratification erodes social bonds in the empire's decadent period.

Turchin traces an 'asabiya gradient' in the United States, from high in the north to low in the south, which he associates with the corrosive legacy of slavery. Steven Pinker's 'Blank Slate' made similar remarks about the lower social solidarity in the US South, although Pinker saw this as resulting from the Southern 'honour culture' which, as he saw it, had resulted from the pastoral, rather than farming background of the earliest colonists. Pastoralists have to treat others as potential enemies since their mobile assets (e.g. cattle) are so easy to steal - a reason for low asabiya.

It would be interesting to know whether Turchin's more technical books have developed mathematical models/simulations of inter-society dynamics in which asabiya is a key parameter.

Although Turchin's many examples and models have been drawn from pre-capitalist agrarian societies, the fundamental concepts seem eminently applicable to contemporary events (Turchin chances a few asides, but not a systematic framework). I would guess that what we're seeing here are the opening movements of an exciting, insightful and controversial research programme to come.

There have been many attempts to write laws for a world history. This is another try.

What the writer's theory is that large empires start off along what he calls metaenthic frontier. This is a region that separates two or more peoples that do not get along. This conflict is often genocidal. On each side of this border people unite to face the deadly enemy on the other side. Whatever the argument people have is seen as minor compared to the enemy they face on the other side. Overtime an **asabiya** forms which is a collective will and unity. As a group gains this **asabiya** it often gains in power and goes on to form a state or empire. In time as the empire gains in power and wealth, the differences between the have and have-nots grow. Soon the state starts to fall apart as it **asabiya** declines.

I confess that I have doubts about some of his history. For example I am not aware the Romans had such hatred for the Gauls as the writer claims. Early Romans went to war almost every year, Livy's list of Roman conflicts is filled with such battles and wars with neighbouring people. Rome gained this **asabiya** not with its conflict with Gauls but with its conflict with its neighbours. Later with Punic. It was Cathage not Gaul that Cato finished his speeches in the Senate with the phrase "Furthermore, it is my opinion that Carthage must be destroyed". The cry 'Hannibal is at the gates' was used to frighten naughty Roman children. After Cathage, Rome went after many other people first before taking on the Gauls.

Nor am I convinced the Byzantine Empire was a new empire. The Byzantinians saw themselves as Roman.

Nor am I sure the early history of the French and English states are centered on these metaenthic frontiers as he claims. Again it appears the main enemies were locals that ethnically were close to themselves.

Having said this, I did find many of discussions interesting. In an agricultural where wealth centers on land, I can agree that different classes in a society are greatly affected by changes in workers availability, salaries and rents. Since often, it is the upper-class that is the main consumers, I found in particular fascinating how such conflicts as the Roman Marcus and Sulla help to reduce the weight on society by killing them off.

Some of the comments I disagree with as I am a believer in the great man in history. If say Alexander the great had not been, there probably would never have been a Macedonian Empire, the Persia would probably have survived. Much of our history would be different. Even modern history, would be completely different if say Bismark, Marx, Lenin or Hitler had not lived.

I found disappointing the book has little discussion of the mathematics promised. I was hoping to read something about it here. This maybe different for you though.

Poor Arnold Toynbee identified a few patterns, but his woeful explanations totally ignored many things, technological change being foremost. But now we have "War and Peace and War"!

Peter Turchin's superb book explains what keeps empires, nations, and even tribes together and allows them to be more than just transitory collections of random people sharing a culture. Extremely well written, the book illustrates its thesis at every turn with compelling historical examples and occasionally amusing biographical details. But the stress is on asabiya (accent on the second syllable, I think), and its fundamental importance for a group's very survival (though his data really allows him to press the case only for "empires"). The concept is related to "social capital" and also to Fukuyama's "trust", but fully warrants the use of Ibn Khaldun's own special term.

Finally someone has drawn together the real threads of explanation of the typical cyclic behavior of pre-modern nations. Though he does in the last chapter apply his findings to the post-1800 world, he acknowledges that things have changed and the traditional patterns apply less now.

Altogether a totally engrossing and very important book, written in such a manner that makes it hard to put down.

I read Peter Turchin's Historical Dynamics around five years ago. This book is billed (at least informally) as the "non-math" version. I wasn't sure if I would like this version as much since I am the rare reader that finds math arguments easier to parse than word arguments (at least in domains which I'm comfortable). However, I enjoyed the richness of detail that Turchin weaves into his story (already cognizant of the mathematical argument working hard backstage).

Whether his model of historical dynamics is more useful than others is an empirical question and not thoroughly explored. However, Turchin clearly hopes to inspire others to join the fray with competing models.

I am eager to revisit his earlier book with a better understanding of the details behind the equations.

There are already several fine reviews, so I will only suggest reading the following works (all of them interesting works dealing somehow with war, the state or empires) in addition to this book: 1) "War in Human Civilization" by Azar Gat (war explained, not just narrated); 2) " Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall" by the same author but far more complex to read; 3) "Understanding Early Civilizations" by Bruce Trigger (a great comparative review of early civilizations); 4) "History of Government" by S.E. Finer; and 5) Political Thought: 5.1. and 5.2: "The West and Islam. Religion and Political Thought in World History" plus "A World History of Ancient Political Thought" by Antony Black.

Peter Turchin is a highly respected evolutionary biologist who has specialized in the synthesis of theory and empirical data (see his book Complex Population Dynamics for his work in that area). He has now turned the skills he honed explaining animal societies to human societies, and particularly to explaining the rise and fall of empires. In broad terms I would describe his approach as Malthus meets Marx meets social constructionism meets evolutionary game theory. While his model is strictly applicable only to agrarian empires, his explanations of phenomena such rising income equality, intra-elite conflict, and even increased demand for university admissions, resonate so strongly with modern society that it is clear that a modified version of his model will go a long way towards explaining our current political and economic circumstances. There are few aspects of his work that are individually wholly new; Turchin's contribution is a rigorous synthesis of historical case-studies with evolutionary theory and quantitative empirical evidence. His work has the potential to transform our understanding of "macro" social issues in the same way that behavioral economics has transformed our understanding of decision making at the "micro" level. I'll go out on a limb and predict that Turchin will eventually win a Nobel prize in economics.

I'll provide a quick overview of Turchin's work, but this synopsis doesn't do it justice; if you find my overview implausible, please read his books for yourself.

How groups manage to escape the prisoners' dilemma and cooperate is a central question of evolutionary biology. Turchin argues that the social construction of "other" along meta-ethnic frontiers (which are often defined in terms of factors other than ethnicity, in particular religion), is necessary to enable group cooperation which allows empire building. This is why empires almost invariably arise along frontiers. A ruling class with a high potential for collective action ("asabiya" - a term Turchin borrows from the 14th century political philosopher Ibn Khaldun), will expand while financing its wars by taxing the peasants. In the early days of the empire, the elite are relatively austere warriors, and low population densities allow peasants to produce a significant surplus, so elite requirements do not overburden peasant production. As population densities increase, the surplus produced per peasant decreases because each has less land, but at the same time rents charged by the elites increase as land becomes scare. Peasants become poorer, though the elite continue to do well. Wealth inequality increases, and eventually the peasant base cannot sustain the high expectations of the growing elite population. Consequently, some of the elite class find themselves without land to sustain their lifestyle, while others become extremely wealthy due to control of scarce resources. This gives rise to intra-elite conflict. Social cohesion declines due to increasing inequality, both between elite and peasant classes and within the elite. The result is that peasants who are desperate and weakened by poverty are drawn into elite infighting. A combination of civil war, famine and plague reduces the population of the weakened state. The population decline ultimately leads to lower food prices and increased wages for the poor, but the loss of social cohesion is not so easily reversed. The recovery is thus impeded by continued infighting, and sometimes an outside group with higher asabiya takes over before another expansion phrase is triggered.

Turchin has three books developing his approach. "War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations" is the popular introduction. It describes the approach without any math or equations, and applies it to a range of historical empires. This is the place to start for a general introduction, particularly if you are not mathematically inclined. However, it is not formally rigorous and will not convince you if you are sceptical. "Secular Cycles" (with Sergey Nefedov) supports the theory with quantitative empirical data. It applies the model to two cycles in each of England, France, Rome and Russia. This is the book to read if you are comfortable with numbers and need to be convinced by empirical evidence. "Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall" provides the theoretical framework, discussing, for example, why an explanation of cyclical dynamics requires a feedback loop. It is quite mathematical, and while you don't have to work your way through all the equations, you should be comfortable with mathematical models generally. Turchin's model was inspired by Jack A Goldstone, "Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World." This is also an excellent book. It is written in a more traditional historical style; the model is informal, rather than formal, and the argument is supported by historical analysis of particular revolutions, rather than by quantitative data. In these respects it is similar to "War and Peace and War," though it is substantially longer. If you are looking for an extended analysis in a more traditional style of social history, this a great book.

This review pertains to all three of Turchin's books, and I am posting the same review for all of them.

Interesting book, written with enough open mindness to survey very different cultures and historic times, without the eurocentric / anglosaxon bias common to many historians. The basic premise is believable and some examples work very well. Unfortunately, the author has not resisted the scholarly temptation of assigning universal value to his postulates, so some examples are questionable when not openly meaningless. A fair evaluation would be, Turchin's theory holds water and is believable, but it should be regarded as one of the causes that collaborate in the creation or destruction of empires, as opposed to "the" cause.

This book describes a plausible model of how conflict between hostile cultures such as Islam versus Christianity can create the kind of large-scale cooperation (asabiya) needed to create empires, and that the absence of a nearby border with such a conflict results in the decay of that empire.

It is very hard to evaluate how accurately he analyzes the evidence for his theory without a really complete knowledge of the history of several empires.

Asabiya resembles what Fukuyama calls trust, but is stronger, and includes some willingness to risk ones life for other members of ones society. Turchin implies that this is a desirable quality (although I can't recall anything explicitly saying that). I wonder whether the wars it contributes to outweigh the benefits. The answer might depend on the extend to which it is possible to have trust without much asabiya (Turchin's analysis suggests a pessimistic answer).

Much of the book contains standard style histories, mostly of times and places that haven't received much attention. I often found these parts annoying because I couldn't figure out which parts contained evidence for Turchin's model, and most of them didn't seem important enough for me to remember.

He suggests that inequality within an empire reduces its stability. Most of this isn't very original nor backed up by much evidence. One idea that I hadn't heard before involves the upper class intentionally reducing the asabiya of lower classes, especially with extreme forms of inequality such as slavery. It seems quite likely that the upper classes sometimes attempt this. But the other parts of the book suggest that this may backfire - conflict normally increases asabiya. Turchin writes as if geographic separation between the conflicting cultures is needed for this effect, but it isn't obvious to me why.

The book is in some ways gloomy, suggesting that it would take an alien attack to create a big increase in worldwide cooperation. But he does leave some hope that recent technological changes may have made his model obsolete.