Customer Reviews

War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945

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Author Miller has justly received many honors for this book which present the US planning for response to any Japanese aggression against the United States during the period between World War I and World War II. Miller also wrote another book, "Bankrupting The Enemy" about the US economic actions concerning Japan leading up to the war that is equally high quality and required reading for World War II historians.

Outside of the plans themselves representing various schools of thought among Naval strategists, thrusters, defensivists, cautionaries, etc., the political situations in the United States with respect to limitations on military capabilities are covered thoroughly. Often the planning foundered on the reality of inadequate resources, rendering official strategy rather feckless in hindsight. Politicials were simply not up to the task of providing military preparedness, and it was not until Roosevelt was able to obtain a major naval expansion through Congress in 1937 that sufficient force would be available for a strategy for victory starting as early as 1943.

Although the author makes the case that the Rainbow-5, the last pre-war Plan Orange, was followed in the main to victory, the most disturbing element was the sacrifice of the Philippines inherent in the planning but not communicated to MacArthur or the officers or men in the Philippines. Troops were sent to the Philippines to sacrifice themselves, unbeknownst to them. Plans to relieve the Philippines were simply not realistic given the resources of the Navy, even if there had been no losses at Pearl Harbor. This is clear from Miller's book, and an indictment of the American arm-chair admirals, generals and politicians involved. This lesson went unlearned for the future, as the Army's Berlin Brigade was defenseless throughout the Cold War, and truthfully its only purpose was to die so that American public opinion could be mobilized against the Soviets.

One is ultimately led to the conclusion that War Plan Orange was successful more due to the limited options available to the planners than to any inherent brilliance in planning. The adjustments during the War such as invading the Marianas to supply a long-range bombing base tended to be more decisive than the pre-war plans. Nonetheless, Rainbow-5 provided an effective starting point and should not be underestimated.

A side point is that the author apparently does not believe that Truman would have invaded Japan if there had been no atomic bomb. As he writes, "... it is questionable that after 292,000 American deaths in all theaters of World War II, any president would have accepted carnage on that scale (of the invasion) as the only option for ending the war." Interesting point. I guess the belief the the American public can't sacrifice or has limited staying power in a conflict is alive and well. Maybe even true.

Author Edward Stanley Miller has expertly distilled the political and military conditions of each era of war planning for the Pacific Theater. Using a plethora of original references to illustrate contemporary reasons for each era of stratagy, Mr. Miller has done a yeoman's job. The text is logical (a difficult task to identify all of the ebbs and flows of the various planning bodies of the time)and informative. The supporting tables, charts and maps are helpful but could have been expanded. Additional maps of Midway, Corregidor and various other key locations would have enhanced the text. Considering the main thrust of this scholarly work however , any lack of illustrative aids is not a major handicap. This book serves as a benchmark for U.S. military and geopolitical stratagy in the greater Pacific area for the first half of the twentieth century.

War Plan Orange dispels many of the myths surrounding a supposed plan for an Armageddon type clash between the Navies of the USA and Japan before WW2 actually broke out.
The Author is a little confusing at first. He has a tendency to leap from this year to that, then back to here and over to there, with a side reference to some other period. There were sections of the first few chapters where I was not sure if I was in the right time continuum. However he eventually settles down about half way through, after which things proceed in a far more orderly cronological order.
That is not to say valuable information in the first half, is not able to be gleaned from this excellent work. It can be. You just might need to keep reminding yourself which year he is currently addressing.
Over all the author tells a story of contingency planning. All nations engage in it just in case something happens. It also enables naval planners to determine the sort of ships required in the event of a future naval conflict.
While the contingencies are often battered about by different lines of thought from a whole range of naval people as the years progress, one thing is clear. The US Navy worked out what their likely requirements were if Government sent them to war. This came in the form of permanent bases, advanced base equipment, ships and stores. But these issues then also required a means by which to deploy those things and where.
The author has done some incredible research and unearthed volumes of reports that must have been gathering dust for decades.
In doing so he shows how a navy goes about planning for what might be required of it. Even when peace reigns, these things have to be allowed for, but the longer it reigns, the more people get to effect the plan. Yet over all, the things they forsee, and the plans they make, do in many cases, turn WW2 in the Pacific into an emulation of what these men had thought out during previous decades.
Cleverly, the author concentrates on the US Navy. There are no side distractions into what the Japanese thought. Even when it turns into plan Rainbow to reflect more countries involved, plus allies, he remains true to his course. Therefore, although armed with 'hindsight', the reader finds himself in the position of the planners as they must have wondered, what the other side were wondering. We know what eventually happened. We do not know from this book, how the Japanese side of it was planned. So the reader is as in the dark as the planners were, which I felt produced a good element into the study of this particular part of history.
The book is strongly recommended for any naval historian, or indeed any historian looking at the land side of the Pacific war. For those who like a bit of lighter reading, it may prove a bit too heavy. But I would still advise those with an interest in WW2 in the Pacific, to give it a try. You will find it incredibly informative.

Too often these days both fictional and "factual" scholarly and media representations of military personnel falls into two categories: buffoons or renegades. Edward S. Miller explodes the myth that the interwar military planners were a bunch of buffoons and the actual combatants who won the war against Japan a bunch of brilliant innovators. War Plan Orange reveals the careful, thoughtful debate and study that went into Pacific War Planning for 48 years. In the final analysis, about the only mistake the interwar planners actually made was to underestimate time and resources required (something that happens with every campaign). As to basic strategy, their work was sound. The campaigners of WW2--some of whom helped with interwar planning--did nothing innovative, they simply executed a good plan proven through much wargaming and study.

Edward Miller's "War Plan Orange" is a well researched and effectively written book on the United states Navy's plan of action against a naval threat from the Empire of Japan. He covers the plan from it's initial design, through it's many changes, and through the point where it was "taken off the self" and executed.
While the sneak attack by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor might have destroyed a large portion of the physical fleet. One thing they could not touch was this plan and through it's use as the foundation for the US response, the defeat of Japan was assured. Let's hope that we still make plans that prove this effective.

War Plan Orange is one of the best books on background to WW II in the Pacific Theater of war. Simply put, War Plan Orange is the blueprint the US used to win the war with Japan. Other plans could have been used that may have led to disaster, but the adoption of War Plan Orange was the key to victory in the Pacific. The Plan predicted the course of the war with great accuracy, and one must read this book to understand how that accuracy was obtained.

The book starts with an overview of the plan and its development from 1906 forward. Then a chapter is devoted to each aspect of the plan; for example, one chapter focuses on the aggressive plans desired by charismatic admirals and another chapter talks about the conservative plans developed by staff and demanded by Congress because of budget constraints. How this clash of plans was reconciled is a most interesting story.

The writing is clear and concise. Each chapter is finely focused. The various personalities and their impact on the plan are thoroughly discussed. The budgetary constraints are laid out as a key part of the planning process. Overall, the development of the plan and its impact on the war in the Pacific are described well.
Anyone who is interested in the Pacific war or WW II must read War Plan Orange. It is an easy fast read and will enhance one's knowledge of the war and of American war planning as few other books can.

AD2

Too often these days both fictional and "factual" scholarly and media representations of military personnel falls into two categories: buffoons or renegades. Edward S. Miller explodes the myth that the interwar military planners were a bunch of buffoons and the actual combatants who won the war against Japan a bunch of brilliant innovators. War Plan Orange reveals the careful, thoughtful debate and study that went into Pacific War Planning for 48 years. In the final analysis, about the only mistake the interwar planners actually made was to underestimate time and resources required (something that happens with every campaign). As to basic strategy, their work was sound. The campaigners of WW2--some of whom helped with interwar planning--did nothing innovative, they simply executed a good plan proven through much wargaming and study.

This is a very detailed study of the evolution of US war planning from the turn of the century through the end of WW2. It is a great book for students of strategic level planning

In this book author Edward Miller documents the evolution of War Plan Orange (WPO), the plan that started around the turn of the twentieth century and whose purpose was to provide the U.S. navy with a blueprint for victory in the event of war with Japan. Japan was codenamed "Orange" and Miller refers to Japan as Orange throughout the book. WPO's official lifespan was approximately 1906-1941 and was the result of a remarkable synthesis of competing ideas as to how such a war should be conducted. Miller documents in detail the history of the different ideas and factions that affected WPO throughout its thirty-five years in development. He calls the two main schools of planning "thrusters" and "cautionaries." In the event of war thrusters wanted to race across the Pacific for a quick decisive showdown and cautionaries wanted to move gradually across the Pacific, establishing secure bases as they went.

The most illuminating portion of the book is the last few chapters wherein Miller evaluates how much of WPO was implemented during WWII and what parts of it were eschewed due to specific circumstances. For example, WPO called for an offensive through Micronesia, starting at the Marshall Islands and proceeding westward through the Carolines. It never called for MacArthur's southwest Pacific offensive through the Solomons and New Guinea, but after Mac captured Manus in the Admiralty Islands with its excellent large anchorage, the WPO-prescribed capture of Truk in the Carolines was no longer necessary.

Any Pacific war enthusiast will derive value from this book. It will reveal the ideas behind many of the decisions made by U.S. planners during the war that are not presented clearly in other sources. It will also demonstrate that although technological advances sped up the pace of operations, the grand strategy of WPO as originally conceived differed very little from the actual course of the Pacific war in WWII. Highly recommended.

Eye opener! Really connects known history of the Pacific War in WWII to the unknown history of pre-war American naval planning. Demonstrates that American Pacific "grand strategy" in WWII was well thought out as a result of 40 years of debate and discussion within the US Navy and with the US Army. Almost every key Admiral and most senior staff officer in the US Navy had worked on Plan Orange at least once, and often many times before 1941. Although the details of the real fighting were usually different than conceived in the pre-war plans, the general circumstances were remarkably similar. Thus, grant strategy in the Pacific War was more effective due to the huge amount of study and reflection that occurred in the years preceding the conflict. Nice counter-example to the normal "fighting the last war" syndrome so common in most pre-war war planning histories. The US Navy and US Army really were intellectually prepared for the War in the Pacific. Once they had the equipment and people they needed to fight, the outcome was all but foregone.

The connection between technology and operational plans is discussed as well. War Plan Orange evolved, and included provisions for future evolution, based on technology available at the time. As aircraft, submarine, and ship capabilities (mostly range) improved, planning changed to accommodate.

A good companion book is "Agents of Innovation", which profiles the US Navy's General Board in the 1920's.