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At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975

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At War in the Shadow of Vietnam by Timothy N. Castle was the result of extensive research the author conducted for his doctoral dissertation. The author's thesis is that the U.S. was involved in a secret war in Laos from 1955 to 1975. This covert war was kept secret because of the agreement that was reached in 1954 that forbid foreign involvement or military aid to the area. Castle interviewed hundreds of both current and previous military service personnel, from the U.S., Laos and Vietnamese governments. He also interviewed personnel from the U.S. run Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition he was able to wade through hundreds of declassified documents which described U.S. involvement in Laos and Vietnam during these years. He begins with the question of why Laos was so important to the U.S. and after a brief introduction and background history of Laos, Castle outlines U.S. involvement through the supply of food, medical aid, as well as weapons and military aid to Laos.
Castle's history is brief but essential to the overall story he is telling. Laos was under the control of Thailand from the late 18th century until the late 19th century when it became part of French Indochina. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, agreements were drafted that required the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region. A group known as the Pathet Lao, which was a Communist, nationalist movement and organization in Laos, was given, as a result of these agreements, free reign to establish itself in Laos's two northern provinces. However, the Viet Minh or North (Communist) Vietnamese, in spite of this agreement, never really withdrew from the border areas of Laos. They effectively controlled and directed all Pathet Lao movement. Castle admits that this paved the ground for North Vietnam to control the Communist regime while the U.S. controlled the non-Communist regime in Laos. Therefore, it was in response to North Vietnam's control of the Pathet Lao that prompted covert U.S. involvement in Laos. Castle says it was covert because it was totally against the 1954 Geneva Conference for the U.S. to supply either non-military or military aid to Laos.
Castle writes extensively about the American airline, Air America, which was used by the U.S. in its effort to keep the North Vietnamese and Communism out of Laos and especially South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were funneling troops into South Vietnam through Laos and Air America was an effective tool against this threat. He writes, "The CIA's proprietary airline, Air America Inc., was established, along with the 4802d JLD, at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. The role of Air America in the supply and movement of troops and refugees, as well as in clandestine missions and search-and-rescue operations, was a vital component of the overall U.S. effort (2)."
Castle proceeds to show that U.S. aid, both non-military as well as military, was the thrust of their effort to prevent all of South East Asia falling to Communism. He says that the Soviet Union was supplying aid to the Communists and the U.S. felt compelled to do it's best to prevent such aid. This of course resulted in the threat of a confrontation between the two superpowers. He writes, "By December 1960 the conflict in Laos had, tragically, developed into a war supported by competing external forces. Moreover, the increasing levels of Soviet and American air power in Laos underscored the unyielding determination of Moscow and Washington to support their surrogates...(25)."
Castle begins by asking the question of why Laos was so important to the U.S. and through the interviews and declassified materials, he attempts to answer that question. The overall answer is that the U.S. simply feared that Communism, left unchecked, would eventually topple all of South East Asia. Castle says that U.S. involvement was so extensive only because the U.S. simply did not believe the Laotians were able to combat the Communist threat. He writes, "The possibility of American military intervention in Laos evinced a well-founded Pentagon conviction that the Royal Lao Army (FAR) was incapable of defending the kingdom. Recent intelligence reports showed that Pathet Lao soldiers, joined by North Vietnamese `advisers,' were easily achieving daily territorial gains against the Royal Lao government (30)." Therefore, the U.S. felt it had to send military aid and supply military training to the Royal Lao government.
Castle then concludes by stating that he believes the record proves that U.S. aid "fell miserably short (128)." The result was a war--in Vietnam--that the U.S. could not possibly win. It was a war in Laos in the shadow of Vietnam. Castle writes, "This examination has shown, however, that Laotian neutrality was never achieved (135)." However, Castle says that, whether or not American policy toward Laos was a failure, "depends upon one's criteria (135)." Some believe it was a huge victory, while others a huge failure. Regardless, Castle writes, "America's war in Laos, hidden from public view for so long, deserves greater study (137)."
Castle's work for the most part is difficult reading. Unless one possesses a unique understanding and historical perspective of South East Asia, as well as being well versed in military terms and strategy, this is not easy reading. However, Castle has offered a unique perspective of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. For that reason alone I believe it fits well into this assignment. Castle draws extensively from primary and secondary source material as well as declassified military documents as evinced by the nineteen-page bibliography. The student of the war in Vietnam should find this work useful, and the thirty-seven pages of notes excellent research material.

At War in the Shadow of Vietnam by Timothy N. Castle was the result of extensive research the author conducted for his doctoral dissertation. The author's thesis is that the U.S. was involved in a secret war in Laos from 1955 to 1975. This covert war was kept secret because of the agreement that was reached in 1954 that forbid foreign involvement or military aid to the area. Castle interviewed hundreds of both current and previous military service personnel, from the U.S., Laos and Vietnamese governments. He also interviewed personnel from the U.S. run Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition he was able to wade through hundreds of declassified documents which described U.S. involvement in Laos and Vietnam during these years. He begins with the question of why Laos was so important to the U.S. and after a brief introduction and background history of Laos, Castle outlines U.S. involvement through the supply of food, medical aid, as well as weapons and military aid to Laos.
Castle's history is brief but essential to the overall story he is telling. Laos was under the control of Thailand from the late 18th century until the late 19th century when it became part of French Indochina. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, agreements were drafted that required the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region. A group known as the Pathet Lao, which was a Communist, nationalist movement and organization in Laos, was given, as a result of these agreements, free reign to establish itself in Laos's two northern provinces. However, the Viet Minh or North (Communist) Vietnamese, in spite of this agreement, never really withdrew from the border areas of Laos. They effectively controlled and directed all Pathet Lao movement. Castle admits that this paved the ground for North Vietnam to control the Communist regime while the U.S. controlled the non-Communist regime in Laos. Therefore, it was in response to North Vietnam's control of the Pathet Lao that prompted covert U.S. involvement in Laos. Castle says it was covert because it was totally against the 1954 Geneva Conference for the U.S. to supply either non-military or military aid to Laos.
Castle writes extensively about the American airline, Air America, which was used by the U.S. in its effort to keep the North Vietnamese and Communism out of Laos and especially South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were funneling troops into South Vietnam through Laos and Air America was an effective tool against this threat. He writes, "The CIA's proprietary airline, Air America Inc., was established, along with the 4802d JLD, at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. The role of Air America in the supply and movement of troops and refugees, as well as in clandestine missions and search-and-rescue operations, was a vital component of the overall U.S. effort (2)."
Castle proceeds to show that U.S. aid, both non-military as well as military, was the thrust of their effort to prevent all of South East Asia falling to Communism. He says that the Soviet Union was supplying aid to the Communists and the U.S. felt compelled to do it's best to prevent such aid. This of course resulted in the threat of a confrontation between the two superpowers. He writes, "By December 1960 the conflict in Laos had, tragically, developed into a war supported by competing external forces. Moreover, the increasing levels of Soviet and American air power in Laos underscored the unyielding determination of Moscow and Washington to support their surrogates...(25)."
Castle begins by asking the question of why Laos was so important to the U.S. and through the interviews and declassified materials, he attempts to answer that question. The overall answer is that the U.S. simply feared that Communism, left unchecked, would eventually topple all of South East Asia. Castle says that U.S. involvement was so extensive only because the U.S. simply did not believe the Laotians were able to combat the Communist threat. He writes, "The possibility of American military intervention in Laos evinced a well-founded Pentagon conviction that the Royal Lao Army (FAR) was incapable of defending the kingdom. Recent intelligence reports showed that Pathet Lao soldiers, joined by North Vietnamese `advisers,' were easily achieving daily territorial gains against the Royal Lao government (30)." Therefore, the U.S. felt it had to send military aid and supply military training to the Royal Lao government.
Castle then concludes by stating that he believes the record proves that U.S. aid "fell miserably short (128)." The result was a war--in Vietnam--that the U.S. could not possibly win. It was a war in Laos in the shadow of Vietnam. Castle writes, "This examination has shown, however, that Laotian neutrality was never achieved (135)." However, Castle says that, whether or not American policy toward Laos was a failure, "depends upon one's criteria (135)." Some believe it was a huge victory, while others a huge failure. Regardless, Castle writes, "America's war in Laos, hidden from public view for so long, deserves greater study (137)."
Castle's work for the most part is difficult reading. Unless one possesses a unique understanding and historical perspective of South East Asia, as well as being well versed in military terms and strategy, this is not easy reading. However, Castle has offered a unique perspective of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Castle draws extensively from primary and secondary source material as well as declassified military documents as evinced by the nineteen-page bibliography. The student of the war in Vietnam should find this work useful, and the thirty-seven pages of notes excellent research material.