Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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88 of 91 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Ghosts of Vietnam Haunt 1990s American Foreign Policy, October 11, 2001
I had a professor who defined journalism as "history written in a hurry." In his sequel to The Best And The Brightest author David Halberstam uses the journalist's tools - personal interviews and background research - to explore how the shadow of Vietnam and the Cold War shaped the United States' foreign policy during the 1990s. What emerges, is a thoughtful, portrait of the United States from the perspective of its foreign policy decisions. It is a book written for thoughtful citizens; a book that, clearly, was not written in a hurry; a book that unearths the struggles, egos and the political maneuvering among the key figures in The White House, the State Department and the military. Halberstam shows how the decisions of Vietnam War Veterans, like Colin Powell and Anthony Lake, and those who were not, like President William Clinton, influenced American politics and policy. Lesser-known players who contributed to the picture were not overlooked. Halberstam notes that the irony of the Gulf War was the wrong branch of the service and the wrong military leaders were celebrated at its conclusion. Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell received ovations for their humiliation of an allegedly mighty, but now bedraggled Iraqi Army. If one man was responsible, he notes, it was an innovative air force strategist, Colonel John Warden. At the time of the Gulf War, Warden was the head of a top-secret air force group working within The Pentagon and represented a group of younger military officers who were eager to adapt military thinking and planning to the uses of the new technological advanced weaponry. The major opposition to his thinking came not from the army or even civilians, but rather senior officers in his service branch, especially three and four star generals attached to the Tactical Air Command. They believed the airpower was there to support the army on the ground. They despised Warden and his ideas. As luck would have it, when General Schwarzkopf requested an air plan for Desert Storm, Warden's senior officer was on leave and the request found its way to his desk. Roy Gutman, an American reporter who happened to be in Yugoslavia in 1991 and was starting to write what would be a series of prophetic dispatches for Newsday, the Long Island, New York daily, is another unknown player. Stationed in Belgrade from 1973 to 1975 as a Reuter's correspondent, he had embraced what he termed as "the golden age of Tito", a Serbo-centrism that tempered the vision of many western diplomats and journalists. On his return in 1991 he saw signs that Yugoslavia was becoming a different country. An interview with Vojislav Seselj, an ultra nationalist Serb who had once been jailed by Tito for his ethnic views and was known for his personal cruelty, convinced the journalist that something sinister was about to happen with its likely epicenter as Banja Luka, a city in Northern Bosnia, which time which prove to be the home of the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing. Halberstam's search for the real story behind the headlines gives the reader clear insights into why events in the Balkans, Haiti and Somalia reflect American foreign policy and politics. He discusses the wariness of the U. S. military to ever be caught again in a ground war lacing clear objectives, the frustrations of political leaders who never served in the military and their effects on American commanders in Kosovo. On the last page of the book, the author allows himself a glimpse into our future, which in light of the events of September 11, 2001 proves tragically prescient. Writing in May, 2001, Halberstam, allows himself to speculate about the need for a missile shield, what he terms "a high-tech Maginot Line, the wrong idea at the wrong time." He notes that intelligence analysts believe "the threat to an open society like America c[o]mes from terrorists, rather than the military power of rogue states" which themselves present an exceptional target. The author has carved a unique niche for himself. His books are the product of four to five years of research, a luxury few, if any other journalists are indulged. The emerging portrait of the United States is vivid and full of human detail.
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17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Halberstam's second most important book., November 28, 2001
This was a tough read because of the authors too frequent clauses within nearly every sentence. Also, there are many names to remember, and the publisher could have provided a map of the region in question. Otherwise, I would have given this book a full 5 star rating.
That aside, this was an exceptionally good book on the recent Balkan war that was fought by NATO. The Balkan war is notable in military history for being the first war waged and won strictly through the use of air power. It is also considered Pres. Clintons greatest foreign policy success. As military history, the book is a worthwhile read. The author, however, ventures beyond the military aspects to tie in the political, historical, sociological, and psychological countenance of the individuals involved with the campaign. I found it of particular interest to read about the pettiness of the military structure as it related to the president, and its own field commander. The author is not shy in offering his analysis of each major character, but he remained even-handed. He, for example, described the power of Gen. Powells personality, but who also used his position to prematurely close discussion on important international issues. He similarly discusses other major characters (especially Clinton, Gore, Gen. Clark and Bush I). The author does not attempt to present the most encompassing story of the war, and he is generous in citing authors of very recent publications including the recent memoirs of NATO commander Clark. The serious student will be able to find greater detail of the Balkans, the diplomacy, and the Serbian genocide from these other authors. What the author does provide, is incorporating his forty years of experience as a student, and commentator of domestic and international policies. He also ends the book ( I believe published prior to September 11th) with a comment about the governments pre-occupation with the missile defense system instead of understanding that terrorism is the more likely threat. For anyone who believes that foreign policy, is as simplistic as a Tom Clancy novel would have you believe, then this is a much needed read. But be aware, that no one comes out looking too good in this very thoughtful story with long term implications for world peace and security.
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21 of 22 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Superb Investigation Of Foreign Policy & Politics, May 23, 2003
For those of us who marveled at former journalist David Halberstam's masterful account of the ways in which the personal biographies and contemporary history fatefully intersected to produce the disastrous American incursion into Vietnam in 1970's "The Best And The Brightest", his recent (2001) tome "War In A Time Of Peace" is the long-awaited sequel and companion piece on the ways in which the ghost of our involvement in southeast Asia yet haunts America's role in foreign affairs in the late 20th century. As in the previous work, Halberstam's trademark insights into the ways in which personal ambitions and private agendas fuel and contort the political processes of which American foreign policy is a part make this book memorable and worthwhile. For example, his observation's on former Secretary of State Madeline Albright's arrogant attempt to nation-build in Somalia makes it easier to understand lapses in our policy there that led to the now-famous firefight chronicled so brilliantly in "Blackhawk Down", resulting in several dozen American causalities and hundreds if not thousands of dead and wounded Somalis. His brilliance is in showing how these individual personalities interact, often clashing based on the existential circumstances they find themselves embroiled in. Thus does Army General Wes Clark find himself embroiled in a very difficult conundrum in the Balkans, facing both an intransigent enemy and an uncertain and indecisive command structure by way of both President Clinton and the Joint Chiefs. One marvels at the ways in which Halberstam entwines the details of the personal biographies of a play card of figures ranging from Clark to Colin Powell to Madeline Albright to Richard Holbrooke to Anthony Lake to James Baker to Dick Cheney with the cross-cutting issues and circumstances that eventually come to comprise contemporary history. In so doing he brings history to life, making its study both more interesting and more relevant, showing how particular individuals and their own personal political, philosophical, and social baggage and predispositions animate the interactions at the government's highest levels. Sadly, it also chronicles how petty, venial, and subjective such decision-making can be, as in Albright's arrogantly misguided decision to try to force a motley collection of feudal Somali warlords into experimenting with democracy. What makes all of this even more interesting and more intriguing is how he then overlays the ways in which many of the chief players and architects of the American foreign policy decisions in the Balkans were affected by their roles in the war in Vietnam, whether it be as a calculating conscientious objector like Bill Clinton, a government official like Anthony Lake, or a then young Captain and Lt. Colonel by the name of Colin Powell. In this fashion we come to see the lingering impact the war in Vietnam had in shaping and propelling the course of events in the 1990s. Indeed, the shattering affect the war had on both the Defense Department and the State Department and the kinds of men and women that came to administer and manage them can be seen in the quixotic unfolding of American foreign policy as it meandered aimlessly from position to position over the intervening decades without any seeming central focus or evident grand strategy. Thus, over the smoldering coals of the memories of the American defeat in Vietnam, the foreign policy of the American government circled cautiously around the perimeters of meaningful involvement, desperate to avoid any commitment that might draw it into another inconclusive and unpopular ground war, even when confronted with the sensational and melodramatic facts of another holocaust being systematically conducted by the Bosnian Serbs on the ground in the Balkans. This is a wonderful book, a book superbly researched, documented, and written, and it is certainly one I can highly recommend for students of contemporary history. Enjoy!
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