Customer Reviews

War Without Garlands: Barbarossa 1941/42

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4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(1)
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1 star:		(1)

 

 

The author, a serving colonel in the British airborne, takes his title from the German expression "kein blumenkrieg" denoting the difference between the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 from the earlier easy conquests in the West. Unlike the relatively easy conquests in the West that were followed by parades with flowers, the early victories in Russia did not result in glorious parades. Kershaw weaves numerous German and Soviet diary and letter accounts in with cogent analysis to present a "soldier's account" of the massive German invasion of the USSR.

It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive account of Operation Barbarossa. The contributions of Axis allies are almost totally ignored, with little or no mention of the Finns, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Italians and Spanish troops who participated in Operation Barbarossa. The six German divisions in Finland that attempted to take Murmansk and the bloody siege of Odessa are also ignored. Most of the focus is on ArmeeGruppe Center's area of operations, with much less detail on ArmeeGruppe North's efforts to take Leningrad or ArmeeGruppe South's advance to the Dniepr River and beyond.

The author's main contention is that the main philosophy of Blitzkrieg - surround enemy armies and they will surrender - did not work in the USSR. The Wehrmacht surrounded numerous Soviet armies but Russian resistance in hopeless pocket battles caused horrendous German losses. Kershaw asserts that the Germans were "victored to death" in the pocket battles around Minsk and Smolensk in July-August 1941, suffering over 100,000 troops killed. As Kershaw states, the extended pocket battles "broke the tempo of Blitzkrieg". The German OKH staff then failed to realize how badly their own units had been hurt in the pocket battles when they ordered Operation "Typhoon", the final push to Moscow in October 1941. Soviet losses had been heavy, but the Germans underestimated Stalin's ability to mobilize new forces. Atrocious winter weather and dogged Soviet counterattacks then brought the weakened Wehrmacht to its knees just outside Moscow. All told, the Wehrmacht suffered 219,000 dead and 730,000 wounded in the nine months between June 1941 and February 1942 (Kershaw fails to mention that about 25% of the wounded would be returned to duty in a few months). Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensiveness tends to undermines Kershaw's hypothesis. He provides statistics on German personnel losses but not on replacements, which makes it difficult to determine how much the Wehrmacht was actually degraded. Statistics on German tank losses also would have been useful; for example, Germany lost 1,805 PzIII and PzIV tanks in this nine-month period, but they built 1,955 in the same period. The idea that "the seedcorn of Blitzkrieg" was lost in 1941 is premature, given the ability of the Germans to mount large-scale Blitzkrieg-type offensives in 1942 and 1943. Certainly the Germans were hurt badly, but the Wehrmacht still had a lot of fight left in it after the defeat before Moscow.

Finally, the author's constant references to the "easy" campaigns in France and the "war without garlands" tend to become irritating and deceptive over time. While naïve German soldiers may have believed that Barbarossa would be over in 6-8 weeks like the earlier Blitzkriegs, it is doubtful that this sentiment was as widespread as the author claims. Kershaw ignores the fact that the simultaneous Afrika Korps campaigns in Libya were also fought without garlands and also exceeded the six-week paradigm. Anti-partisan campaigns in Yugoslavia would also be more "war without garlands". In implying that the German soldier of 1941 was psychologically conditioned to believe in campaigns that only last six weeks and then resulted in victory parades, Kershaw is painting a psychological weakness that did not exist. Most armies that start wars expect a quick decision, whether it was the Union Army in 1861 or the Kaiser's army in 1914, but they do not fall apart when this overly-optimistic assessment does not become reality. As for the "garlands" aspect, most German soldiers in December 1941 would probably have preferred a hot bath, warm socks and a good meal to a victory parade with flowers. This book is a valuable addition to an East Front library, but it must be tempered with other sources for balance.

First and foremost this book provies the reader with a view of the Barbarossa campaign through the eyes of the soldiers and civilians involved. Relying heavily on first person accounts (mostly personal diaries) the author does an excellent job conveying the "look and feel" of the campaign. The experiences of both sides are covered well.

The second contribution of the book is a critical and well supported analysis of why the German invasion failed. The author presents the theory that the Germans were "victored to death" in the huge encirclement battles that took place during the summer and fall of 1941. Unlike their western counterparts, the Russian soldiers fought to the finish when surrounded, thereby inflicting severe casualties on the German infantry.

I found the most interesting analysis to be an examination of the German high command's absolute failure to master the logistic requirements of the campaign. Kershaw does an excellent job outlining the real failure of the Germans - the battle of supplies.

Overall I enjoyed this book very much and highly recommend it to the casual reader as well as the serious student of the Eastern Front.

There are numerous books written about the Russo-German war but none that I have seen which offer vivid detail to the degree of War w/o Garlands. The accounts of the fighting are well researched and enable the reader to grasp both the large perspective as well as that of the individual soldier very effectively. I particularly like the inserts from soldiers' letters and diaries.

While there are many excellent works on the Eastern front most tend to be fairly dry, the exception being some of the better first-person accounts, and those often lack strategic overview. Kershaw's book fills the need in this area quite well, at least regarding the first year of that titanic struggle. Weaving diaries, after-action reports and interviews he paints a grim picture of a year-long, unending hell for those involved.

Many books on this subject tend to make the summer of 1941 appear to be a cake-walk for the Germans. While I don't consider myself an expert, I'd always felt that '41 had to have been at least the EASIEST year for them. After reading Kershaw's book it is obvious that the Soviets provided no easy years. Although many authors have given convenient excuses for Hitler's failure to gain victory in '41, ie: the appearence of T-34/KV1 tanks, onset of winter, Hitler's bad decisions, etc. Kershaw's book makes it obvious that another factor must be considered, that is the tenacity and determination of the Soviet army.

One of the stories in the book is about a group of Russian wounded in no-mans-land, German medics attempt to provide aid, and the wounded fire at them, throw grenades and resist in any way possible. Although this behavior appears almost beyond comprehension, one must bear in mind that they were resisting an invader who to them had attacked without provocation.

As others have pointed out, much of Kershaw's accounts come from the German side, the reason for that is this IS a book about the German side of that war. That said, he provides a good amount of info and accounts from the Soviet side as well, making the book, I felt very balanced. I feel the book is a great, fast-paced read that actually puts a "face" on the brutality and horror of the first year of the greatest conflict this world has seen.

While not offering any new or startling revelations concerning the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Kershaw draws on the words and images of the individual, common soldier to illustrate the mounting horror of a campaign doomed from the outset. The result is a masterpiece of the common man, a celebration of war from the perspective of the simple soldier, the view from the blood-soaked mud of the battlefield.

For readers in search of a serious study of the effects of war on the human psyche, the Kershaw's masterpiece will satisfy your curiosity. This is an analysis of the influence of war on the human condition. For the reader truly interested in the human domain of war, this is a worthwhile purchase.

Kershaw has a masterpiece here, and this book will explain in graphic detail the difficulty faced by the Landser in a 6 month period, from the start of the invasion until the end of December of 1941 and early 1942. Much of the book highlighting the words of the soldiers themselves, who had a clarity of thought in describing the horrendous and excruciating pace in few words of the bitter fighting against a foe who often proved to be suicidally brave, inflicting casualties to a German army unprepared for the level of intensity they faced in this alien foe, in this alien land, one that went on and on forever into featureless steppe, and when slogging over the top of a hill one could look out and see many more ahead, with little else surrounding the never ending march. Tired and exhausted from continual movemment to support the Panzers as they encircled yet another number of Red Army Divisions, and without the infantry the pockets could not be collapsed. The trapped Soviets inside the circle would often charge forward in mass attacks in attempts to break out of this pocket, and their bodies piled up all around German machine gunners. Some would fight it out to the end and the result were companies depleted of both seasoned officers and NCO's from the brutal amount of resulting carnage.

Some accounts tell of Soviets fighting a desperate attack to break out of these pockets and being on the verge of breaking through thin German ranks only to suddenly stop and sit down, obeying an order given from a safer distance inside the pocket by a superior officer to instead surrender. The Germans simply had no idea they would be facing this kind of enemy, one they could not make sense of and was very hard to defeat, fighting on in hopeless situations. Soviet armor is much discussed, and had the Red Army tank crews had the German Panzer crews training and tactics they likely could have inflicted staggering losses. As it were the training of Panzer crews would usually defeat the technical superiority of their T-34 tanks.

The severity that followed the German advance (looted and burned villages) would lead to an escalation of violence by both partisans and the Red Army. Many German POW's were later found dead with genital mutilations and eye gougings. This predictably lead to a further increase of atrocities from the Wehrmacht or SS in response, and the Soviet fate was no better. Only 3 of every 100 Red Army prisoners would survive themselves, most of them starved to death.

The post that the author refers to also contains Soviet letters and diaries, much of it retrieved from the dead bodies of the Soviets and somehow this information has been preserved for posterity. The power of the speech of these soldiers, both German and Soviet, says volumes in only two or three sentences. They convey a hell that will show the reader that in the first week of December this was clearly a soon to be defeated German army. Their supply chain was served mainly by only two rail lines and non-stop Luftwaffe flights. Soon they would lose their air superiority, despite enormous early losses of Soviet aircraft in the opening months as surprise allowed thousands to be shot on the ground.

Motor convoys had to deal with seas of mud and later arctic tempatures, and horse drawn transport that saw entire companies of horses die from overwork, exhaustion and exposure. All of these reasons, to include an enemy that knew the countryside and was prepared for it, further weakened the German supply chain. Much of the Germans winter clothing was stolen from Soviet homes and POW's. Newsreels and newspaper accounts of nothing but "glorious victory" were soon looked at with skepticism from a German nation that responded to appeals from Goebbels himself for warm winter clothing, and the post from the soldiers to their families, it is their words, letters, diaries and conversations of these soldiers themselves that give the power of imagination to this book, as it is their words that describe it so well, and Kershaw uses this post quite often throughout the entire book. It is a look at war through the eyes of the Landser, often in their words, junior officers and enlisted mainly.

Army Group Centre, who's advance is usually examined, contains both the discussions of Guderian and other generals who clearly are aware of what the OKW in Berlin has no concept of: The Divisions are now mere skeletons of what they once were.

Superb book, highly recommeded.

Almost all of the books by professional historians on Barbarossa consist of slabs of text, poor maps and the same old photos.

Kershaw's book may have faults but it gives a unique (in my experience) and chilling sense of what it was like to be on the ground during this enormous series of battles. Apart from being a very clear exposition of what the generals were up to, the horror faced by the troops at the sharp end (from their letters) is made so clear that I found I could only take a few pages of it at a time.

This would be the one book I would recommend to someone wanting to know about the Eastern Front.

Just finished reading this book. It is in the class of "in deadly combat", "panzer aces", "ostfront 1944" and "forgotten soldier" as THE best sources for the scale and intensity of this war. Highly recommended, especially for the moving diary entries from both sides of the battle.

As a big fan of the writer (It Never Snows In September, a great book), I was looking forward in reading this title. Kershaw gets into various first person accounts in weaving his account of the opening of the "Ostfront", which blend into a wonderful story. The writer uses mostly German, and a few Soviet accounts of the action. While no new ground is covered for the serious reader, it will augment your knowledge of the operation.

Kershaw has done an excellent job presenting the Eastern Front from the ordinary German soldier's point of view. I learned three main points from the book. First, the German soldier was a willing participant to the invasion. Many considered it a crusade. Second, the Russian army put up a much better resistance than generally pictured in most Western accounts of the campaign. Soviet leadership was the primary reason why the Germans were so successful. Third, the Germans lacked the resources to defeat the Soviet Union. Kershaw illustrates well how Soviet troops bypassed by the panzers were able to continue to fight and cause losses for the Germans. The German Army had difficulty in keeping their forward troops supplied. Also, the primitive roads of the Soviet Union caused innumerable problems for the Germans. This is one of the best books I have read on the Eastern Front and World War II. Highly recommended.