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Warranted Christian Belief

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There are two different types of criticism commonly given against Christian belief - one type is what Alvin Plantinga calls the De facto objection, which says that Christian belief is false because the evidence has proven it so - the other type (that is becoming more and more popular) is the De jure objection (the subject of this book) which claims that Christian belief is irrational, intellectually unacceptable, or morally suspect - irrespective of whether it is true or false. The beginning of the book discusses the difference between the De facto and De jure objections, and like the whole book it is very clear and illuminating -- The exact opposite of what you will read in this review --

Part 1 (Is there a question) begins by discussing (or searching for) some of Kants arguments concerning the impossibility of referring to anything beyond the world of experience -phenomena. Many others have taken up this 'argument' claiming that Kant proved that the language we use when speaking about the phenomenal world can not speak about the transcendent. Apparently, when the Christian speaks about God, ascribing properties to him -like infinite, ultimate- he is talking nonsense.

Part 2 (what is the question) deals with what is meant by an objector when he says that Christian belief is irrational. After much consideration the most plausible answer is found in Marx & Fraud -the same basic type of objection can be found in Nietzsche and Durkheim too.

In Part 3 Plantinga further develops his model for warranted Christian Belief (even if you have never read the other two books in the series - or God and other minds - you'll still be able to understand). This part of the book is the main response to the masters of suspicion (M&F), showing the futility of their objections. There is also a real good critique of naturalism found here (updated from warrant and proper function).

The final part of the book deals with potential defeaters for Christian belief -- different kinds of scripture scholarship, postmodernism & pluralism, suffering & evil. This book is clear and intelligent (with humor mixed in) it's definitely worth reading.

Plantinga has devoted his scholarly life to answer the question whether the Christian faith can be justified, and this book is the fruit of forty years of excellent work. How can the Christian faith be justified? The usual answer is to give arguments for the truth of Christian convictions (from popular writers like Josh McDowell to first rate philosophers such as Richard Swinburne). Plantinga took a different route by asking: what is justification (or warrant for knowledge)? Why must Christians prove his convictions based on principles accepted by non-Christians? The first part of the book review and refute different theories about how Christian faith may be justified (e.g. evidentialism) or dismissed (e.g. Marx and Freud). The second part argues that experience of faith of an ordinary Christian is a perfect justification for the Christian faith, unless one can show that the Christian faith is likely to be false. The third part looks at reasons for arguing Christian faith is likely to be false (biblical criticism, pluralism, evil and suffering). Plantinga think that the truth of Christian faith cannot be demonstrated or proven, but he provides coherent and compelling reasons that faith is a sufficient justification for Christian belief. The arguments sometimes get very complicated, but Plantinga is exceptionally clear and precise and this work is more accesible to non-philosophers than his previous works.

In WCB, Plantinga repeatedly refers to Alston's PERCEIVING GOD as "magisterial." Alston's book is indeed that. But Plantinga's own work in this volume is that and more.

WCB is a philosophically sophisticated defense of even the simplest (and least sophisticated) faith. He challenges a very common objection to Christian belief: "I am not in a position to say whether Christian theism is true or false (who could know a thing like that?), but one thing I do know is that it is not warranted." Plantinga argues, successfully, I think, that this position itself is without warrant. Why? For the simple fact that *if* Christian theism is true, then believers probably *are* warranted even in simple faith. A serious challenge to warrant must therefore include a serious challenge to the truth of the belief.

Warrant is whatever, when added to true belief, yields knowledge. And Plantinga carries into the WCB discussion the results of the prior two volumes. A belief is warranted when it is the product of a belief-producing mechanism that is (a)functioning properly (b) truth-aimed, and (c) functioning in the epistemic environment for which it was designed to acquire truth.

This account seems to do the best job of making sense of those sorts of basic beliefs that all of us hold without having inferred them from other beliefs. I remember that it rained yesterday. What is my evidence that this memory is reliable? From what more basic and certainly known belief may I infer this? Nothing, really. Indeed, it is logically possible that I was brought into existence by a malevolent cartesian deceiver only five seconds ago, equipped with merely *apparent* memories of yesterday's rain, a particularly happy childhood, and even of having actually typed the beginning of this review (this, too, came into existence partially finished and entrusted to me to complete it). Of course, if I am the victim of such a ploy, then my memory belief is *not* the result of a properly functioning, belief-producing mechanism, and I am not warranted.

But I take it that I am warranted in remembering yesterday's rain. In fact, I am not at all on thin ice in saying that I *know* that it rained yesterday. Assuming that (a) it really did rain and (b) my recalling it now is due to the fact that I saw it (or was told about it by my truthful wife, or some other reliable way of knowing) then my memory belief is indeed warranted and counts as knowledge.

Suppose that God *does* exist just as believers maintain and that, further, God's presence is experienced in some immediate way. Calvin spoke of a *sensus divinitatus*--a sense of the divine--that was a part of the original cognitive equipment of all humans (and which was damaged when we were collectively dropped on our heads in the Fall). Suppose that faith amounts to a sort of restoration of this faculty. I take in the summer night sky in the South Dakota Badlands and this occasions spontaneous thoughts about God's creative activity. Or I commit some shameful deed and am impressed with the thought that God disapproves of what I am doing. Are such beliefs warranted? According to Plantinga, they are warranted in precisely the way that my memory belief is warranted **IF** they are true.

Beyond the notion of the *sensus divinitatus,* biblical Christians believe that the Holy Spirit bears a kind of internal witness, engendering love for God and bearing witness to the Scriptures that they are true.

A critic may challenge all such beliefs by alleging that (a) they are held in the absence of anything that looks like evidence and (b) they are readily explained away on some social science explanation. The Freudian explanation of religious belief, for instance, is that it is natural but it is the result of a belief-producing mechanism that is not truth-aimed: wish-fulfillment. But the critic is in a position to know this *only* if he already knows either that God does not exist (which would certainly get in the way of his doing things like creating, disapproving, or bearing witness) or, at least, that God is not, in fact, making his presence known in these immediate ways.

In short, the de jure objection that the belief is not warranted cannot be offered apart from the de facto objection that the belief is false. Such criticisms thus beg the question against the believer.

In the film, Field of Dreams, Kevin Costner's character, Ray, built a baseball diamond in his cornfield, and ballplayers from the past, including Shoeless Joe Jackson, emerged out of the corn to play. Ray, his wife and their daughter could not only see the players, but carried on conversations with them. Ray's brother-in-law saw nothing and, further, was convinced that Ray and his family had either gone crazy or were pulling some sort of hoax.

Suppose, with the plot, that the ballplayers *really were* there, and Ray believed that they were because he perceived them directly, say, through some additional and extraordinary faculty. Given the story and Plantinga's account, Ray is warranted in believing that he is talking to ballplayers. Indeed, he knows that he is. Can he *prove* to his brother-in-law, on the basis of whatever evidence is available to his brotherf-in-law's ordinary faculties? No. But how does this affect the question of whether his belief is warranted? Can I *prove* my memory belief to be true on the basis of some other faculty, such as perception or reason? Maybe not. But must I be able to do so in order to be warranted? Of course not.

Why, then, should anyone suppose that Christian believers are warranted in their beliefs only if they are able to infer those beliefs from evidence that is available to ordinary faculties?

Plantinga argues along such lines that Christian belief is warranted. Along the way, he takes up discussions of potential challenges to his account. The book opens with a discussion of a view that is prevalent at many divinity schools: that Kant established once and for all that human language cannot refer to God. Gordon Kaufmann offers a rehashed version of this, followed by a rehashed version of his rehashed version. Plantinga's interaction with Kaufmann's work is sheer delight. So is his discussion of John Hick's view of Religious Pluralism, which, as Keith Yandell once quipped, is "in danger of becoming canonical" in religious studies departments.

The book concludes with several potential "defeaters" to Plantinga's model for warranted Christian belief. Some argue that the sheer fact of religious diversity strikes a blow. Others press various arguments from evil. Plantinga's discussion of Paul Draper's version is a gem (as is Draper's version itself, to be honest).

He also takes on a version of the Great Pumpkin Objection, calling it "Son of Great Pumpkin." The basic GPO is what may well have occurred to you as you reflected on Plantinga's model: *anyone* from *any* perspective can claim that her beliefs are warranted. Even Linus could claim that his belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic and warranted without appeal to evidence. You'll have to read Plantinga for yourself to decide whether this objection sticks.

This is a rewarding read, very much worth the effort of 500+ pages. It is also highly entertaining, as Plantinga is a sprightly writer--even when in the midst of the most rigorous argument.

I've only recently completed a careful reading of WCB and, as you can probably tell, am still in a sort of "honeymoon period" with the book. Plantinga has persuaded me--a former dyed-in-the-wool evidentialist--that his account of warrant is the correct one. If I think of any telling objections you'll be the first to know.

After a month of mulling over this book I'm still not sure if I've digested it enough to give it a sufficient review, but I'll give it a try. Alvin Plantinga is the most important and influential evangelical philosopher of the last half-century, and Warranted Christian Belief (hereafter WCB) will probably end up being seen as his most important work, especially when taken along with the two earlier works in his "Warrant" trilogy, "Warrant and Proper Function" and "Warrant: The Current Debate." But WCB is important not because it is some sort of magnum opus of proof that Christian belief is true (these would fall under what Plantinga calls the "de facto question") but because it provides a defense of Christian belief as being rational, justified, and warranted (the "de jure question"). Plantinga goes to great pains to define these terms. What does it mean, for example, when someone says a belief is irrational? Here he is at his best, as he is essentially defining the terms of the debate. Plantinga is an epistemologist, and thus his primary task as a philosopher has been the study of knowledge: what it is and how we get it. The Warrant trilogy has dealt with the idea of what actually constitutes a justified belief. In other words, it has dealt with the question of under what conditions an individual has an epistemic right to hold a certain belief or belief system. Thus you will find no defenses of the empty tomb here, nor any complex argument for God's existence. These are answers to the de facto question, but not the de jure question.

The main tenets of WCB are two: (1) the sort of claims that Christianity makes are candidates for real knowledge on the basis of the fact that they are no more irrational, or unjustified, or unwarranted than many other types of beliefs we hold, such as the reality of other minds and (2) if Christianity is true, then there is a way in which such beliefs could be warranted for an individual, even in the face of a lack of hard proof. Indeed, one of Plantinga's main goals is to show that Christian belief is warranted without such proofs. He goes about this task with humor and wit, and I think he largely succeeds. He also tackles the difficult corollary questions of whether finite beings can even have real knowledge of an infinite, personal God and whether or not higher biblical criticism and the existence of evil constitute defeaters for classical Christian theism.

Although this book is aimed at an intellectual audience and is written in many areas using the tools of the analytic philosopher, there is something else here of great value for Christian believers: a proposal for how Christian beliefs are actually developed. This was a great help to me. I was powerfully converted to Christ at age 19, but since then I have struggled much with whether or not Christian belief (and the Bible, in particular) are true. According to evidence, I may be able to form a strong belief based on probability that, for example, the Easter tomb was really empty and the disciples really did believe that Jesus Christ had risen from the dead since they were willing to die for that belief. Then, based on that knowledge, I could come to a belief that it would then be probable that Jesus was who He said He was, the Son of God, and then by that knowledge to come to a belief that it would then be probable that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, justification by faith, the exclusivity of salvation through Christ, the baptism of the Holy Spirit, etc. are all true. But all of this is based only on probability and not certainty, and Plantinga shows (using the probability calculus) that it wouldn't make much sense to form beliefs in this way since a probable belief based upon another probable belief based upon yet another probable belief (and ad infinitum...) does not constitute a belief system that, in the end, is very probable at all.

Thus Christian belief, if true, is most likely formed in another way. This is not to say that evidentialism (the view that Christianity can be proven based on evidence) does not have value, because it certainly does. But we all know that those who adhere to classical Christianity never came to believe those tenets in this way. Plantinga posits something called the "A/C Model" for the way in which Christian belief is formed. "A" stands for Aquinas and "C" stands for Calvin. The model begins with the sensus divinitatis of Aquinas and Calvin, the idea that God built in a sort of spiritual sixth sense that alerts us to His presence and significance. The sensus divinitatis exerts itself when we see a sunset over the mountains, for example, or when we ponder the vastness of the cosmos. But according to the A/C model, the sensus divinitatis is only a beginning point, a starter, for Christian belief. The real work is done by the Holy Spirit, who affects the mind of the believer (overcoming the damaging effects of human sin on the mind), causing him or her to believe the great doctrines of the faith.

Plantinga's point is that the classical Christian view does provide a way in which knowledge of God and the plan of salvation can be communicated to man, and it is not a way which necessarily involves proof or evidence.

"But wait a minute," says the critic, "what if I don't believe in the Holy Spirit or the sensus divinitatis? That wrecks the whole system, doesn't it?" If someone asks that question, then he does not understand what Plantinga is claiming. His claim is not that his model is some sort of proof of Christian theism, but that the de facto question can not be separated from the de jure question. In other words, you can't claim that you're agnostic to whether Christian belief is actually true but that you know it isn't rational, or justified, or warranted.

Taken as it is, WCB is very effective. Plantinga is essentially providing the supreme negative apologetic for Christian belief - in other words, a defense of believing in Christianity against intellectual attack - instead of a positive apologetic that attempts to prove that Christianity is true.

_Warranted Christian Belief_ by analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga is the third book in Plantinga's trilogy on warrant and is perhaps the most important. Plantinga (a theist, Calvinist, and member of the Reformed Church) is perhaps one of the most important analytic philosophers of religion today and is definitely one of the most important theistic philosophers. While this book is the third book in a trilogy, unlike the other books in the trilogy it is longer and more detailed in scope. Further, Plantinga notes that he tries to make the discussion in this book independent of that presented in the previous two books (_Warrant: The Current Debate_ and _Warrant and Proper Function_), but the book obviously follows in the sequence (and also may be considered a sequel to Plantinga's _God and Other Minds_). Thus, this book may be read independently. Plantinga makes the point that this is a work of both apologetics and philosophy, but it is also a work of philosophy of religion, and in particular Christian philosophy. Thus, it will include reference to Christian belief in the same way that a philosophy of physics book would include reference to physics.

To begin with it is necessary for Plantinga to explain what he means by Christian belief. Plantinga maintains that Christian belief (or "mere Christian belief") includes two components: the theistic component (that God exists, is a person, and has certain attributes) and the Christian component (that human beings are mired in sin and require salvation, that this was attained through the suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that Christ is the Second Person of the Trinity). In this book, Plantinga will consider two types of objections to Christian belief - the de facto objections (that Christian belief is false) and the de jure objections (that Christian belief is unwarranted). The de jure objection, "I do not know whether Christian belief is true or not, but I do know that it is unwarranted given modern understandings, etc.", is a common one, but as Plantinga will show there are no de jure objections independent of the de facto objections.

An objection that is commonly made to Christian belief is that there is no question at all (that is that the certain attributes of God make Christian belief impossible). This is the objection of Kant (that our concepts do not apply to God), in one interpretation of his thought. It is also the objection of other more modern theologians such as Kaufman and Hick. Plantinga begins by showing that the objection of Kant fails because of certain problems in the so-called antinomies that he presents. Plantinga then turns his attention to claims made by Gordon Kaufman and John Hick, showing the weakness of their claims (and the essential worthlessness of their "theologies"). The question is then concerned as to exactly what is the question of Christian belief. Here, Plantinga begins by considering "Justification and the Classical Picture". Plantinga explains classical foundationalism and evidentialism in the work of John Locke. Plantinga notes how Locke distinguished between opinion and reason and maintained that one should try to live by reason. This implies a deontological understanding; in which, we have a duty to conform our beliefs to reason. Among other things, it is also maintained that certain of our beliefs are "properly basic" and that every belief is either properly basic or derived from beliefs which are. However, the classical pictures runs into difficulties; in particular, it encounters the problem of self-reference, in that there is no easily apparent way for it to justify itself. Plantinga considers some variations on the classical picture (in particular, he notes that Christian belief may be justified in a properly basic manner). Plantinga next considers rationality, and he devotes a considerable amount of space to a discussion regarding William Alston, Christian Mystical Practice (CMP), and rationality (as seen in Alston's important book _Perceiving God_). Plantinga also considers the notion of warrant and the "complaints" of Freud and Marx (others such as Nietzsche are not considered because their "complaints" are regarded as falling into the same category and as being over-the-top and less than rational). The discussion of Freud revolves around the central idea that Christian belief involves the process of "wish-fulfillment". This discussion is particularly funny when the actual theories of Freud are presented (because Freud made some rather absurd claims regarding patricide, among others). The discussion of Marx revolves around the idea that Christian belief results from an unjust society (and is the "opiate of the people"). Plantinga shows how both of these ideas are problematic and how neither of them shows that Christian belief is without warrant. In the next section of this book, Plantinga considers the fact of warranted Christian belief. In particular, he presents what he calls the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model) which argues that Christian belief may be properly basic (and relies on a "sensus divinitatis"). Plantinga considers various ways in which knowledge of God may be possible, and his discussion here is heavily indebted to William Alston. Plantinga also notes the role of sin and natural knowledge of God (sin interferes with our knowledge of God). Plantinga also shows that the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question. Following this, Plantinga considers the cognitive consequences of sin. In particular, he shows that sin has noetic effects (in that it may cause the sensus divinitatis to malfunction). Plantinga also considers the case of sin and skepticism (this is the radical skepticism of a David Hume for example) and sin and naturalism. In the case of naturalism, Plantinga provides a powerful probabilistic argument showing that given naturalism and evolution it is unlikely that sense perception will be reliable. Plantinga also considers a rejoinder of this to the effect that the same applies to the theist (the "tu quoque" objection), but he shows that this is not the case provided Christian belief is assumed. In the next section, Plantinga extends the A/C model by showing how faith leads to cognitive renewal (and thus the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis). Plantinga also emphasizes the role of Scripture in the attainment of faith. Plantinga presents a probabilistic argument for Christian belief (relying no the fact of Christ's resurrection), but ultimately rejects this argument, concluding that he does not know a good argument for Christian belief and that such things must be known through faith. Plantinga next considers the testimonial model as well as various objections presented to his model. In particular, Plantinga makes the point that Christian belief is not like a scientific hypothesis (which is the claim of many atheists including the late John Mackie). In the final section of this book, Plantinga considers the possibility of various defeaters for Christian belief (facts we know now which may make Christian belief unwarranted). Plantinga concludes that while none of these defeaters actually defeat Christian belief, that it is possible that such defeaters exist, though they are extremely unlikely. Plantinga considers such defeaters as those presented in modernistic Scripture scholarship (distinguishing between traditional biblical criticism and historical biblical criticism - which may be one of three types: Troelschian, Duhemian, or Spinozistic). Plantinga shows how all of these forms of historical criticism fail to provide a defeater because they disregard the sensus divinitatis. Platinga also considers arguments making use of postmodernism and pluralism. In particular, Plantinga finds that postmodernist claims about truth would provide a defeater for Christian belief if they were true, but that they are in fact self-refuting (Plantinga considers for example Rorty in this respect). Plantinga also shows how claims to epistemic arrogance are also found in pluralism and agnosticism, making the fact of a plurality of religions fail as a defeater for Christian belief. Finally, Plantinga considers the so-called problem of evil (or "problem of suffering"). Plantinga considers both the logical question (does evil contradict the existence of God) and evidential arguments, but he finds all of these to be problematic. The only argument that appears to carry any weight in this respect is a brute appeal to emotion. But, Plantinga shows how this may also be resolved within theism (bringing up in particular the trials of Job). Finally, Plantinga concludes that such objections to Christian belief do not provide defeaters and that there is good reason to believe that Christian belief has warrant. He ends by noting that Christian belief also appears to be true.

This book is one of the most important works in modern analytic theistic philosophy. Plantinga's arguments are well-presented and logically rigorous. For those who claim that Christian belief is irrational or lacks warrant given our current knowledge, these arguments presented here are sure to challenge them.

This book is excellent. Plantinga systematically reviews current objections to the fundamental Christian faith providing a intense review of these possible defeaters. People such as Freud, Hick, Kaufmann (Gordon), and Kant are all discussed. This book provides an excellent defense of orthodox Christianity and the ability to still accept such beliefs in the 21st century. However, this book does not provide any offensive attacks which would strenghten Christianity, which left me somewhat disappointed. Nonetheless I am just being hyper-critical. This book is a must read for any serious Christian apologist or defender of the faith.

I've had this book for several years but never got around to reading it. There was always a commentary or a systematic theology or something that demanded my attention. But I got involved in reading this book while trying to minister to a young guy who was very much romanced by German romanticism (especially Schopenhauer). Plantinga's systematic dismantling of Kant and his followers' position on whether one can know God enabled me to meet his objections.

After the first two chapters, the book became a very easy read - in fact, I didn't read much of anything else until it was finished. Analytic philosophy can be horribly dry, but Plantinga has a great sense of humor in this work. It's hilarious in places (see the 'son of Great Pumpkin' argument, his discussion of what the word 'fundamentalist' really means), but well-argued everywhere. I am no philosopher, but having read and understood Plantinga's work, I feel competent to at least present a cogent alternative to some of the most common objectives to the Christian faith. This book is a steal at $30.

Because so many others have acclaimed the work Plantinga provides the reader I will only add to the reviewers the following:
The book uses two font sizes to aid the reader in distinguishing the technical arguments from the less technical or summary arguments. Plantinga, as is expected, provides keen insight into the problem with the atheistic claim that Christian belief is irrational. Just as JL Mackie's evil argument was destroyed by Plantinga's Freewill Defense, so too is the accusation that Christian beliefs are irrational. This book is easily read by the trained philosopher and by the casual reader.

Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) examines the rationality of religious (particularly Christian) belief. WCB is the third and final instalment in the author's trilogy on the issue of warrant. Plantinga is a highly respected philosopher within the realms of epistemology and the philosophy of religion - he is also arguably one of the most significant philosophers of the late Twentieth century.

Traditionally, the philosophy of religion has dealt with two broad arguments against religious belief; the evidentiary argument (de facto) and the rational argument (de jure). The de facto approach examines the various arguments (e.g. ontological, cosmological, teleological, revelation and the existence of evil) and makes a probabilistic assessment with regard to the likelihood of a theistic worldview. The de jure approach focuses on the question of whether the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God is in itself irrational.

For those familiar with Plantinga WCB is similar to his other writings - characterized by uncommon analytical rigour, moments of clear brilliance and the occasional meander. On the latter point, the author's digression into the views of Jonathon Edwards while well handled added little (from my perspective) except to make a dense tome even more daunting (others may find more value in this aspect). WCB's significance, however, lays it its rigorous examination and counter to the various de jure arguments against Christianity. Indeed, in my view, Plantinga is successful in arguing that there is no compelling de jure argument that is independent of the de facto argument.

Several decades ago Plantinga played a leading role in putting to rest the argument that the existence of evil and God were logically incompatible (this argument is now largely centered on a less compelling evidentiary / probabilistic tact). Only time will tell if he is as successful with regard to addressing the de jure argument against Christian belief. All to say that it is a powerful and important work within the field of religion.

Overall, I highly recommend the book. Without exaggeration, it is one of the most powerful books I have read (what that says about me I'm not sure). In fairness it is probably of most interest to students of philosophy and theology, however as other reviewers have noted the educated lay reader (especially Christians) can also find great value in it.

Note: Some print problems in the book I purchased from Amazon - alternating pages at the back of the book were blank.

A very excellent book in Christian epistemology. It's written in a very clear, lucid, and sometimes humorous language. Although it's the last three of Plantinga's Warrant series, without the knowledge of the other two, someone will still get the comprehensive message of the book. If you're a Christian of any sort, you'll find it strengthening. If you're not, you'll find it challenging.
Just small caution, though, when one read this book, always keep in mind the distinction between the de jure objection and the de facto objection. Notwithstanding that both are inseparable, Plantinga's main purpose is to address the de jure objection. Failure to keep it in mind will cause someone to easily misunderstand the primary content of the book.