Customer Reviews

The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the Civil War

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(9)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(4)

 

 

First, a caveat: If you say, "War of Northern Aggression", hold dear the Lost Cause, and celebrate Massa Robert Lee's birthday as a high holy day, you should avoid this book altogether rather than read it and go on to write an emotional review raving against it and giving only one star. This book dares depart from the usual hagiographic treatment of Lee, suggesting that some of his actions were less than genius, and that some were brutal mistakes. Trust me, if you consider this sacrilege, please avoid this book.
As for everyone else, this is an outstanding book - the freshest take on the Civil War that I have read in years. Buell ignores the received wisdom on such giants as Grant, Lee, Sherman, Hood, and Jackson, and goes back to original sources to reconstruct the actual men behind the legends. His take on these generals is sometimes controversial, usually enlightening, and always interesting.
Buell focuses on three pairs of generals - Grant and Lee, Thomas and Hood, and Barlow and Gordon. This devise works well to allow him to examine each major phase of the war in both the eastern and western theaters. By including the lesser known Barlow and Gordon, Buell is also able to contrast the West Point trained professionals to volunteer generals who made up such a large segment of those who served in the Civil War.
Grant and Lee, in particular, come in for reassessment in Buell's work, and both suffer somewhat from it. This, however, is not character assassination, but a valid reexamination of undeniably great men, assessing them by their actions rather than the legends that have grown around them. You might not totally agree with all of Buell's conclusions, but they may make you reassess what you think you already know.
One of the high points of the book is the treatment of General George Thomas. One of the greatest generals of the war, Thomas has been often overlooked for many reasons (including the fact that he was a Southerner mistrusted by the North, he did not get along well with Grant, and he died shortly after the war leaving no memoirs.)What you read here will leave you hungry for more information on the great forgotten man of the Civil War.
Buell writes well, his prose moves swiftly, and though he covers the general's actions in many battles, he never gets bogged down in the details that are more appropriately left to books that cover a particular campaign.
Read this book and you will discover something almost as rare as a Burnside victory - fresh ideas about the Civil War.


Theo Logos

Mr. Buell has written an engrossing,controversial work that analyzes the combat generalship of Grant, Lee, Thomas, Hood, Gordon and Francis C. Barlow. Buell's basic argument is that the supremacy of southern generalship is more myth than fact. Buell's treatments of Grant, Gordon,Hood, and Barlow are all well done but hardly controversial. Buell makes a very strong case for Thomas who saved the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga and thus became known as the "Rock of Chickamauga". Buell paints a picture of Thomas as a hard-nosed,unassuming general whose command of logistics, communications, and cartography were unmatched by most of his contemporaries. Buell seems to be saying that Thomas's Virgina roots, his uneasy relationship with Grant, and his quiet manner have conspired to deny him his just recognition as a truly great Civil War general. Buell's treatment of Lee is unabashedly negative. Buell skewers Lee for vague orders to his commanders,disregard for the importance of logistics,and frontal assaults that drained the Confederacy of its meager manpower resources. Polemics or just looking at the facts? Judge for yourself. Robert E. Lee may not be the nearly faultless general immortalized by Freeman, but I strongly doubt that he is the fool described by Buell. Two final comments. Buell asserts that the physical condition of the southern troops going into the Battle of Sharpsburg made them almost unfit to fight. He further lambastes Lee for allowing his army to degenerate into unchecked marauders in their retreat to Virginia. I have not seen those points in other works on the Sharpsburg campaign. Finally, Buell writes movingly of the personal lives of Gordon and Barlow. Read this book if for no other reason than to stimulate reconsideration of your own assessments of these men.

I'm usually loathe to read Civil War tactics books, which often bog down into regimental numbers and the verb "flank." But Buell kept me going through this one. I was attracted at first to his attention to George Thomas, who was one of my heroes growing up, but I stayed for the duration.

Truth be told, it's a well-written book that makes its (controversial) points very effectively and tells a couple of good stories in the process. Thomas -- easily the most underrated general in this or any American War -- is given his due, and other Union commanders are treated fairly.

And as these other reviews will show, not everyone will agree with Buell's thoughts on Lee, but having read the book and corresponded with the author briefly in 1997, they are sincere and well-thought out -- a good counterpoint to the traditional view of the CSA.

As with all books focusing on George Thomas, The Warrior Generals has an atmosphere of tragedy and injustice, perhaps reflecting its subject's sad life too well.

Presented as a study of contrasting leadership styles of six Civil War generals, the book soon becomes a thinly disguised iconoclasm of the leadership qualities of the Confederacy in general and Robert E. Lee in particular. In spite of a cult status that admits no flaws, Lee certainly was human and did make mistakes during the course of the war. Still, Lee was a far cry from the senile, doddering old fool that the author describes during the Wilderness campaign as having to be led out of harm's way so his troops can get on with the battle. (The author admits to synthesizing this account from several sources, but it is hard to see how he did so from the works cited. The account of the same incident by one of his other subjects, Gen. John B. Gordon paints a very different picture.)

Early on, the author states that Lee's success in outwitting his opponents was not due to genius but rather, due to his "readiness to fight by unorthodox rules and to exploit developing opportunites." (Sounds a lot like genius to me.) Later, he says that Lee planned his battles based on circumstances as he wished them to be and when they were otherwise, Lee ascribed it to "God's will." The same trait is also attributed to Grant. Throughout the book, the author praises traits in other generals that he criticizes in Lee.

U.S. Grant is is exposed as a better politician than a general. The justification for this is that unlike other generals, Grant recognized the political necessities of the war and tried to accomodate the wishes of Lincoln in its prosecution. But given that the President of the United States is the Commander In Chief, it would appear that Grant is faulted for doing what his predecessors did not do: comply with the wishes of their superior. Apparently Grant's biggest flaw was his supposed jealousy of George H. Thomas.

George Henry Thomas is held up to be the best general in the Civil War. This may be true as Thomas rarely has received the recognition he deserved. The author's admirati! on for Thomas is evident, and the criticisim of other generals casts them in such a shadow as to make Thomas shine like the sun. Thomas does not need such aritficial enhancement and the ploy does him a disservice.

John Bell Hood, by comparison, does not fair well. An excellent division commander, Hood was definitly beyond his capabilities in command of an army. He may have been adequate for Corps command but he did not lead a Corps long enough for us to know. Why Hood was chosen as a subject is a mystery other than the fact that the destruction of his Army at Nashville by Thomas made him a convenient foil.

The most intriguing comparison is the one developed with the least depth: Francis C. Barlow and John B. Gordon. They had both similarities and differences and not nearly enough attention is paid to either. At Gettysburg, when Barlow was thought to be mortally wounded, Gordon sent for Barlow's wife under a flag of truce but no mention is made of this. Other than comments on how Barlow changed the way he deployed troops while Gordon did not, one gets the impression that the two generals are included because they happen to be part of the story when the author is castigating Lee.

This book could have been much better if written with more objectivity. The choice of subjects, the haphazard development, the lack of adequate references to support his views, and the careless geographical errors easily corrected by looking at a battlefield map do not enhance the author's credibility. He has does exactly what he faults Lee for doing and writes about things as he wishes them to be.

Thomas Buell, in his "The Warrior Generals" attacks some of the "marble men" of the Civil War, notably Lee and to a lesser extent, Grant. Of the six generals compared and contrasted by Buell, Lee comes out worse by far. While some pro-Lee partisans would be shocked and possibly offended by Buell's very blunt criticisms of Lee's generalship, he does raise some very interesting points. George Thomas is Buell's favorite, and he comes out best from this book. In particular Thomas's use of improved weapons, supply, communications and advanced tactics endear him to Buell. I found myself surprised by the fact that Thomas has been remandered to footnote status with all of these advances. Buell's book will either generate large amounts of praise or venom from readers. Either way it will force most Civil War buffs to reconsider their opinions about the accepted ratings of Union and Confederate generals.

While it is true that followers of the Lost Cause Myth have distorted Robert E. Lee's generalship into a hagiography of unattainable perfection, I object to Mr. Buell's movement of the pendulum so far in the other direction. His comments on Lee's religious beliefs fail to take into account the pervasive importance of religion in the mid- 19th century South; they follow in the footsteps of Martin Sheen's portrayal of Lee in "Gettysburg," as the addled old man unable to make a decision of his own, constantly resigned to "God's Will." While Lee had his faults and certainly made some incredible mistakes at various times, I believe his abilities far outweighed those faults. His constant audacity, penchant for seeking the enemy's weakest point and attacking it, defensive genius and ability to coax great achievements out of mediocre subordinates must rank him with history's greatest generals. Anyone interested in further reading on Lee would do well to delve into the massive compendium "Lee: The Soldier." It presents many different sides to the Lee argument and draws both from modern scholars and the General's contemporaries.

Aside from what I believe to be a flawed view of Lee, this is an interesting book. I especially liked the treatment of John B. Gordon, one of the finest division- level commanders in either army, and the well- deserved praise of Thomas. I hope that Civil War neophytes will not stop their reading with this book, but will use it as a springboard to more detailed studies.

This is an intriguing book, although not without some controversy. The method is to examine three pairs of generals, one each from the Union and Confederate armies--East and West--at different levels of command. The two top generals at the end of the Civil War, Ulysses Grant and Robert E. Lee are one pair. Two generals of armies in the West--George Thomas with the Union and John Bell Hood with the Confederates--are profiled and compared. Finally, two generals in the East--Francis Barlow and John B. Gordon--are compared, each at Division or Corps command level.

The end result is illuminating. Certainly, Robert E. Lee is not treated kindly. Grant comes in for some hits, as well. Nonetheless the criticisms are handled pretty well and the author does credit each for their strengths.

At the lowest level of command, Barlow and Gordon, we get an interesting tratment of two commanders who may not be as well chronicled as others. Nonetheless, each served with distinction and both were certainly interesting character studies.

Finally, and maybe most controversial, is the juxtaposition of Thomas (Southern born, despised by his family and mistrusted by some in the North) and Hood. The latter is a perfect example of the "Peter Principle," where one gets promoted above one's level of competence. A terrific division commander, Hood was overmatched as an army (and probably even as a corps) commander. Buell's treatment of Thomas is almost over laudatory. To be sure, the record is clear that Thomas was a stalwart, at whatever level of command he held; he excelled from the start of the Civil War, with his crushing of Zellicoffer's army at Mill Springs to his smashing victory over Hood at Nashville. Nonetheless, the treatment of Thomas is perhaps a bit "over the top," despite his genuine accomplishments and the shabby treatment that he received from Grant and Sherman toward the end of the war.

In the end, a very interesting book, marred mainly by the overenthusiastic treatment of Thomas (even though, I would argue, Thomas deserves much more credit as a general than he is often given).

I enjoyed Mr. Buell's book. As a number of people have noted, the author provides perspectives on Generals Lee and Grant that may be unfair in some respects but are often thought-provoking. The portions on General Thomas explain his greatness in a way I had not read before.

On the other hand, the book's description of a single incident causes me great concern about how much the reader can rely upon the author's descriptions of other events throughout the book.

That one event concerns the so-called Lost Order. On September 9, 1862, General Lee, then at Frederick, MD, issued seven copies of the order (Special Orders No. 191) to his commanders, including D.H. Hill and Stonewall Jackson, directing them to split up and attack Harper's Ferry, VA from three directions, thus dividing his army into four parts. Jackson, not realizing that Lee issued a copy of the order directly to Hill, also issued a copy of the order to Hill, Jackson's subordinate. Hill received the copy of the order from Jackson, but the copy from Lee was somehow lost. Beginning September 12, the Union army moved into Frederick. Incredibly, on September 13, a Union soldier camped on the outskirts of Frederick by chance found the order lying in a field, wrapped around some cigars. The order was ultimately forwarded to General McClellan, leading ultimately to the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) on September 17.

I do not profess to be a Civil War expert, but both books I had read about this incident clearly stated that it was never determined whether Hill received the copy of the order from Lee and therefore should be blamed for its loss. On the one hand, according to those books, Hill always adamantly maintained that he never received the order, and his adjutant supplied an affidavit to that effect. On the other, Lee's adjutant, R.H. Chilton, maintained that, although he did not have a specific recollection or documentary evidence, he was confident that he must have received confirmation that the order was delivered to Hill. Beyond that, no other evidence turned up. No courier confessed carelessness, and the identity of the owner of the cigars was never determined. See, Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, pp. 111-115 and Appendix I; McPherson, Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War, pp. 107-108.

It is certainly fair for an author to suggest that one scenario or the other is the more likely one (in view of the explicit, albeit selfserving, testimony of Hill and his adjutant, I would be inclined to conclude that Hill did not receive the copy of the order, and that in the rush of events [Lee's army was splitting up and moving out] Lee's adjutant did not notice that he did not receive confirmation of receipt). Mr. Buell does not do this, however. Instead, giving no hint of any uncertainty or controversy, he relates one hypothetical scenario as firmly established fact: "Hill . . . received two copies of the special order. . . . Hill snorted at the inept staff work of the high command and tossed away the redundant order. A staff officer retrieved the document and used it to wrap his cigars. When Hill and Lee's army got underway the next morning, September 10, the package was left behind." Buell, pp. 111-112.

Again, I am no expert, but if Messrs. Sears and McPherson are correct in describing the available evidence, Mr. Buell's description is, with all due respect, misleading. He presents the story as gospel, adding vivid details (Hill "snorted" and "tossed away" the order; a "staff officer" retrieved and reused it) that lead the reader to believe that he is relying upon an account by a witness (presumably the messenger or Hill or a member of Hill's staff), when there apparently was none.

This disparity, in turn, causes me to wonder how many other times in the book Mr. Buell may have used similar, apparently misleading techniques to present hypothetical scenarios as fact without alerting the reader that uncertainty exists.

As I have emphasized, I am only a layperson interested in the Civil War. James McPherson apparently did not complain about Mr. Buell's treatment of the Lost Order incident (the book cover includes a blurb by Mr. McPherson praising the book; I have not been able to find his original review), so perhaps I am being unfair. If anyone has other thoughts, I would be delighted to hear them.

I never understood why so many people called this book a "revisionist". The book offered new ideas and new ways of looking at things. The center piece of the book lies in George Thomas whom I admired and I thought this book did a fine job in bringing forth his abilities and accomplishments. The author also tore into Robert Lee as well and many called that "revisionist". Ironically that is not so. Immediately after the end of the war, Lee was critized by many. His status into southern godhood didn't start until after his death when southerners revised their assessment of him and made him into a god-like myth. This was a true period of Lee's historical revisionism. Only in the 1970s and on ward, did the Civil War historians finally began to reverse the trend, bringing Lee down to earth. This book does that very well. I don't exactly agreed with the author's assessment of Grant but I think his admiration for Thomas carried him away although its for a good cause. Grant's military accomplishments during the war was far greater then Thomas'. I do agreed with one previous reviewer who thought that the author should write a biography on Thomas to "get it out of his system". I think thats an excellent idea. George Thomas needs a good biographier!! (It should be interesting to point out that Thomas, a Virginian, stay true to his sworn oath as a United States army officer while people like Lee broke his sworn word of honor and uses his family as an excuse to do so. Who indeed, had the greater honor??)

Mom got me started on Civil War reading 50 years ago, and I've read ever since. Over those years, the gradual refinement in new works, stripping old mythology without creating new, has been fun, adding to understanding of the war and a grand tour through historiography.
"Warrior Generals" presents as a very good idea: in-depth character study of a pair of household-name leaders, and others not so well known. However, that approach was executed only on the dust-jacket.
This book is actually a shallow overall history of the Civil War, and as other reviewers have noted, heavily biased by the author's likes and dislikes of individual actors in the war.
Although shallow, the book is strikingly inventive, the Civil War as reflected in a fun-house mirror. Most distorted is its total misunderstanding of 19th Century military operations: failures in command at all levels, even by fine officers, were most often due to the hopelessly inadequate communications and logistics of the era. The author seems to feel that Civil War command effectiveness should be measured by the standards of radio, air reconnaissance, simultaneous battle-plot, and tracked or air-dropped resupply. At every try, the author's efforts at character study and interaction of officers reduced the Civil War to an alternate-history soap opera. Harry Turtledove doing "Days of Our Lives."
A rare accomplishment in any field of art: to create a work so bad that it transcends its awfulness into comedy. This thing is right at the top of the Civil War "Worst-Dressed List," its near-peers only in the South-had-it-won might-have-beens.