and humor surely help. Warrior s Rage includes all of those as well. A book like Warrior s Rage would normally be on the reading list of every fighting battalion in our Army.
Some will hesitate at that, though, because there is a strong subtext to Macgregor s
account. It s a truism of war that although good units are composed of team players, most soldiers know well that when you close that hatch, few have much good to say for those bastards back at platoon. That is a normal part of a soldier s point of view. The dangers of combat only serve to amplify this tendency. Macgregor does not spare us his opinions about his superiors. He castigates America s generals as a group and often by name for what he sees as their timidity in finishing the job in 1991. By implication, and in many cases by bald statement, a reader of Warrior s Rage would not be surprised that these generals chosen successors have fumbled around in the current war as well. That may turn off some readers, but I would encourage those offended to hang in there. Believe it or not, such things get said about most leaders in the Army maybe even Macgregor. As soldiers, we have learned after a lot of failed operations at the National Training Center let alone on the ground in theater to be brutal on ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but it all starts with the guts to accept criticism. Macgregor himself offers the best
explanation for why his harsh tone still makes Warrior s Rage well worth the read. At one point, describing a particularly headstrong cavalry troop commander (now a serving general officer), Macgregor approvingly quotes Werner Binder, a German officer who fought on the Eastern Front in World War II: Your best commander is always your most difficult subordinate. He always asks hard questions and offers new ways to do things, because he thinks. He may be quick-tempered and occasionally insubordinate, but if you have one like
this, give him the freedom to do what he thinks is right whenever possible. Macgregor did just that, and the outcome was a signal victory. I think Binder s advice may be good for anyone who reads Warrior s Rage. The author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation
Under Fire has never been a shrinking violet Macgregor was always a most difficult subordinate. But he s also one of the smartest and most gifted armored commanders our Army has produced. Warrior s Rage is just the latest fine contribution from a veteran cavalryman who will no doubt stay in the fight for the Army he loves. --Army Magazine, MG Daniel P. Bolger<br /><br />This is the story of the U.S. Army s largest tank battle since World War II, which occurred in February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. It is related here by a participant, an officer who fought the battle from his M1 Abrams tank. Col. Macgregor (Ret.) (lead partner, Potomac League, LLC; Breaking the Phalanx) trained and led Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, into the open desert in pursuit of Iraq s Re --Library Journal
In Warrior's Rage, retired Col. Douglas Macgregor gives us two books. One is a graphic account of the obliteration of an Iraqi Republican Guard brigade by the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during the Gulf War. Since the author filled the number two slot in the squadron, and was instrumental in how it trained and the tactics it used, and since he believed in leading from the front in his own combat tank, he probably witnessed more of the conflict than anyone, and thus is an ideal narrator. His second theme is a blistering critique of the colonels and generals who led the Army and who, he believes, frittered away the monumental victory the company grade officers and enlisted men tried to give them. Both accounts are graphic and passionate and show the author's deep concern for the future of the U.S. Army...The author feels that the abundance of errors in thinking lies primarily in what he calls the corporate culture of the Army. The way to get promoted, as in any bureaucracy, is not to make mistakes. The way to avoid mistakes is not to do anything. And before long you are on the promotion list. Col. Macgregor has written other books on how to improve the Army. Presumably he will continue to do so. He may not always be right, but he is worth listening to. --Sol Schindler, The Washington Times