On 26 February 1991, cavalry troops of Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, charged out of a sandstorm during Operation Desert Storm and caught Iraq's Republican Guard Corps in the open desert along the North-South grid line of a military map referred to as the 73 Easting. Taken by surprise, the defending Iraqi armor brigade was swept away in salvos of American tank and missile fire in what became the U.S. Army's largest tank battle since World War II. Douglas Macgregor, the man who trained and led Cougar Squadron into battle, recounts two stories. One is the inspiring tale of the valiant American soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who fought and won the battle. The other is a story of failed generalship, one that explains why Iraq's Republican Guard escaped, ensuring that Saddam Hussein's regime survived and America's war with Iraq dragged on. Certain to provoke debate, this is the latest book from the controversial and influential military veteran whose two previous books, Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire, are credited with influencing thinking and organization inside America's ground forces and figure prominently in current discussions about military strategy and defense policies. Its fast-moving battle narrative, told from the vantage point of Macgregor's Abrams tank, and its detailed portraits of American soldiers, along with vivid descriptions of the devastating technology of mounted warfare, will captivate anyone with a taste for adventure as well as an interest in contemporary military history.
Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting
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It is that immediacy and intensity of close combat that Warrior s Rage evokes. Macgregor depicts war as it is experienced and fought, not with neat arrows on a well-drawn map, but with seared flesh, grit, blood, dirt and pain. Exhaustion, confusion, fear and death define the world of Cougar Squadron; Macgregor describes every bit of it. Yet he also grants us a glimpse into how soldiers deal with such grim realities leadership, discipline, training
and humor surely help. Warrior s Rage includes all of those as well. A book like Warrior s Rage would normally be on the reading list of every fighting battalion in our Army.
Some will hesitate at that, though, because there is a strong subtext to Macgregor s
account. It s a truism of war that although good units are composed of team players, most soldiers know well that when you close that hatch, few have much good to say for those bastards back at platoon. That is a normal part of a soldier s point of view. The dangers of combat only serve to amplify this tendency. Macgregor does not spare us his opinions about his superiors. He castigates America s generals as a group and often by name for what he sees as their timidity in finishing the job in 1991. By implication, and in many cases by bald statement, a reader of Warrior s Rage would not be surprised that these generals chosen successors have fumbled around in the current war as well. That may turn off some readers, but I would encourage those offended to hang in there. Believe it or not, such things get said about most leaders in the Army maybe even Macgregor. As soldiers, we have learned after a lot of failed operations at the National Training Center let alone on the ground in theater to be brutal on ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but it all starts with the guts to accept criticism. Macgregor himself offers the best
explanation for why his harsh tone still makes Warrior s Rage well worth the read. At one point, describing a particularly headstrong cavalry troop commander (now a serving general officer), Macgregor approvingly quotes Werner Binder, a German officer who fought on the Eastern Front in World War II: Your best commander is always your most difficult subordinate. He always asks hard questions and offers new ways to do things, because he thinks. He may be quick-tempered and occasionally insubordinate, but if you have one like
this, give him the freedom to do what he thinks is right whenever possible. Macgregor did just that, and the outcome was a signal victory. I think Binder s advice may be good for anyone who reads Warrior s Rage. The author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation
Under Fire has never been a shrinking violet Macgregor was always a most difficult subordinate. But he s also one of the smartest and most gifted armored commanders our Army has produced. Warrior s Rage is just the latest fine contribution from a veteran cavalryman who will no doubt stay in the fight for the Army he loves. --Army Magazine, MG Daniel P. Bolger<br /><br />This is the story of the U.S. Army s largest tank battle since World War II, which occurred in February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. It is related here by a participant, an officer who fought the battle from his M1 Abrams tank. Col. Macgregor (Ret.) (lead partner, Potomac League, LLC; Breaking the Phalanx) trained and led Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, into the open desert in pursuit of Iraq s Re --Library Journal
In Warrior's Rage, retired Col. Douglas Macgregor gives us two books. One is a graphic account of the obliteration of an Iraqi Republican Guard brigade by the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during the Gulf War. Since the author filled the number two slot in the squadron, and was instrumental in how it trained and the tactics it used, and since he believed in leading from the front in his own combat tank, he probably witnessed more of the conflict than anyone, and thus is an ideal narrator. His second theme is a blistering critique of the colonels and generals who led the Army and who, he believes, frittered away the monumental victory the company grade officers and enlisted men tried to give them. Both accounts are graphic and passionate and show the author's deep concern for the future of the U.S. Army...The author feels that the abundance of errors in thinking lies primarily in what he calls the corporate culture of the Army. The way to get promoted, as in any bureaucracy, is not to make mistakes. The way to avoid mistakes is not to do anything. And before long you are on the promotion list. Col. Macgregor has written other books on how to improve the Army. Presumably he will continue to do so. He may not always be right, but he is worth listening to. --Sol Schindler, The Washington Times
and humor surely help. Warrior s Rage includes all of those as well. A book like Warrior s Rage would normally be on the reading list of every fighting battalion in our Army.
Some will hesitate at that, though, because there is a strong subtext to Macgregor s
account. It s a truism of war that although good units are composed of team players, most soldiers know well that when you close that hatch, few have much good to say for those bastards back at platoon. That is a normal part of a soldier s point of view. The dangers of combat only serve to amplify this tendency. Macgregor does not spare us his opinions about his superiors. He castigates America s generals as a group and often by name for what he sees as their timidity in finishing the job in 1991. By implication, and in many cases by bald statement, a reader of Warrior s Rage would not be surprised that these generals chosen successors have fumbled around in the current war as well. That may turn off some readers, but I would encourage those offended to hang in there. Believe it or not, such things get said about most leaders in the Army maybe even Macgregor. As soldiers, we have learned after a lot of failed operations at the National Training Center let alone on the ground in theater to be brutal on ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but ourselves, to ask the hard questions and to own up to mistakes. Our Army judges by results more than by form or style. The ability to adapt under fire is the key to winning. Macgregor s Cougars did it at 73 Easting, but it all starts with the guts to accept criticism. Macgregor himself offers the best
explanation for why his harsh tone still makes Warrior s Rage well worth the read. At one point, describing a particularly headstrong cavalry troop commander (now a serving general officer), Macgregor approvingly quotes Werner Binder, a German officer who fought on the Eastern Front in World War II: Your best commander is always your most difficult subordinate. He always asks hard questions and offers new ways to do things, because he thinks. He may be quick-tempered and occasionally insubordinate, but if you have one like
this, give him the freedom to do what he thinks is right whenever possible. Macgregor did just that, and the outcome was a signal victory. I think Binder s advice may be good for anyone who reads Warrior s Rage. The author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation
Under Fire has never been a shrinking violet Macgregor was always a most difficult subordinate. But he s also one of the smartest and most gifted armored commanders our Army has produced. Warrior s Rage is just the latest fine contribution from a veteran cavalryman who will no doubt stay in the fight for the Army he loves. --Army Magazine, MG Daniel P. Bolger<br /><br />This is the story of the U.S. Army s largest tank battle since World War II, which occurred in February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. It is related here by a participant, an officer who fought the battle from his M1 Abrams tank. Col. Macgregor (Ret.) (lead partner, Potomac League, LLC; Breaking the Phalanx) trained and led Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, into the open desert in pursuit of Iraq s Re --Library Journal
In Warrior's Rage, retired Col. Douglas Macgregor gives us two books. One is a graphic account of the obliteration of an Iraqi Republican Guard brigade by the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during the Gulf War. Since the author filled the number two slot in the squadron, and was instrumental in how it trained and the tactics it used, and since he believed in leading from the front in his own combat tank, he probably witnessed more of the conflict than anyone, and thus is an ideal narrator. His second theme is a blistering critique of the colonels and generals who led the Army and who, he believes, frittered away the monumental victory the company grade officers and enlisted men tried to give them. Both accounts are graphic and passionate and show the author's deep concern for the future of the U.S. Army...The author feels that the abundance of errors in thinking lies primarily in what he calls the corporate culture of the Army. The way to get promoted, as in any bureaucracy, is not to make mistakes. The way to avoid mistakes is not to do anything. And before long you are on the promotion list. Col. Macgregor has written other books on how to improve the Army. Presumably he will continue to do so. He may not always be right, but he is worth listening to. --Sol Schindler, The Washington Times
About the Author
Col. Douglas Macgregor, USA (Ret.) is a decorated combat veteran with a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia. He is the author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire and is a frequent guest on television and radio news shows. He is the lead partner of the Potomac League, LLC, in Reston, VA.
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Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
49 of 52 people found the following review helpful
By Dog of War
Format:Hardcover
The Good: This book is a pretty good book detailing the fight the 2nd ACR fought against the Iraqi Republican Guards along the 73 Eastings line. I was a tank platoon leader in the 1st ID during Desert Storm and this book brought back memories. MacGregor takes the reader down "into the trenches" so to speak. If you have not served in an armor unit, you will get a good feel for what it is like from reading this book.
The Bad: Somebody please give MacGregor a pacifier. He constantly whines about how the generals were stupid and how he knew what he was doing and they should have listened to him. He starts the whining in the first couple of pages of this book. Sure, there are politically motivated generals who do not care about the Soldiers, but not all are. It is obvious he has an ax to grind because he had to retire as a lowly colonel while others he served with achieved general stars.
I knew this guy was starting to get full of it when he started criticizing General Franks, the VII Corps commander during Desert Storm. In a nutshell Schwarzkopf tells him to destroy the Republican Guards and Franks says, We can do this. We'll make it happen." After this Macgregor launches into a hissy fit about Shwarzkopf should have fired him because he obvious wasnt the right man for the job, he needed fighting spirit, yada yada yada. What did he want? Franks to jump up on the table, beat his chest and sing the Army song? Like I mentioned earlier I was a tank platoon leader in the 1st ID which was part of VII Corps and after we did the breach we pretty much hauled [...] in order to make contact with the Republican Guard. My ankles swelled up from standing in that darn turret for hours. I remember the passage of lines with the 2nd ACR. We passed by a Bradley with two Soldiers smoking cigarettes next to it looking at us as we rolled past and started the fight.
Overall, if you can get past the whining, this is a good read if you want to feel what Soldiers felt and experienced in the heat of battle.
The Bad: Somebody please give MacGregor a pacifier. He constantly whines about how the generals were stupid and how he knew what he was doing and they should have listened to him. He starts the whining in the first couple of pages of this book. Sure, there are politically motivated generals who do not care about the Soldiers, but not all are. It is obvious he has an ax to grind because he had to retire as a lowly colonel while others he served with achieved general stars.
I knew this guy was starting to get full of it when he started criticizing General Franks, the VII Corps commander during Desert Storm. In a nutshell Schwarzkopf tells him to destroy the Republican Guards and Franks says, We can do this. We'll make it happen." After this Macgregor launches into a hissy fit about Shwarzkopf should have fired him because he obvious wasnt the right man for the job, he needed fighting spirit, yada yada yada. What did he want? Franks to jump up on the table, beat his chest and sing the Army song? Like I mentioned earlier I was a tank platoon leader in the 1st ID which was part of VII Corps and after we did the breach we pretty much hauled [...] in order to make contact with the Republican Guard. My ankles swelled up from standing in that darn turret for hours. I remember the passage of lines with the 2nd ACR. We passed by a Bradley with two Soldiers smoking cigarettes next to it looking at us as we rolled past and started the fight.
Overall, if you can get past the whining, this is a good read if you want to feel what Soldiers felt and experienced in the heat of battle.
27 of 29 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars
Good book on tactical armored combat; lacks strategic level context
October 16, 2009
Format:Hardcover
"Warrior's Rage", by Douglas MacGregor, is the story of the brave men of `Cougar Squadron', one of the units that participated in the world's largest armored conflict since the 1944 Battle of Kursk. In this rather lop-sided Feb 1991 battle, armored elements of the United States Army demolished the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard, suffering relatively few casualties in return. This book is told from the perspective of one of the tactical leaders who was there.
On February 22, 1991, Cougar Squadron entered Iraqi territory with the mission of engaging and destroying the Republican Guard. MacGregor does an incredible job of chronicling the events over the next few days as Cougar Squadron smashed into a much larger force at 73 Easting. Readers will empathize with the fears, frustrations, and exhilarations of armored combat as expertly described by the author. MacGregor also pays a fitting tribute to Sgt Andrew Moller, the sole fatality of this small part of the war. If MacGregor would have focused solely on this aspect of the war, it would have been an outstanding book.
As a battle study, the book lacks a description of how Cougar squadron fit into the overall context of the war. The author did not provide a single map of where the unit fought in Iraq, in relation to other units in VII Corps. There are numerous tactical level charts that show how the sub-units deployed on the battlefield, but readers like me would have benefitted from an operational level chart.
MacGregor argues that the US Army could have defeated the Republican Guard and deposed Saddam Hussein back in 1991. While I will concede that he presents a compelling argument, it is one-sided. MacGregor fails to discuss both the United Nations Security Resolution which gave the coalition the legal authority for DESERT STORM; and he also fails to analyze the political constraints effected by the Bush-41 administration by its desire to end the ground war at the arbitrary 100-hour mark. A discussion of either of these points would have effectively answered the "why" to the question of why we didn't finish the job in 1991. The short answer is that the the United States did not have the political will nor the legal authority to become an army of occupation in 1991. Because of this, the United States had to defeat the Iraqi army, but leave it in a condition strong enough to act as a regional deterrent force against Iran.
MacGregor is a very talented author, making this book a very fast read. If you are looking for great read about modern armored combat as seen from the men on the ground, you won't find a better book. However, the author should have kept the book focused on his area of expertise, rather than presenting a one-sided argument about strategic decisions made by military leaders. His viewpoint only covers the effects of what those decisions were, failing to include any discussion as to the "why" the decisions were made. It's a good book on armored combat, but his jaded opinions overshadow the incredible accomplishments and heroism of a small group of men who were the tip of the spear in Operation DESERT STORM.
The Naval Institute Press provided me with a complimentary copy of the book.
On February 22, 1991, Cougar Squadron entered Iraqi territory with the mission of engaging and destroying the Republican Guard. MacGregor does an incredible job of chronicling the events over the next few days as Cougar Squadron smashed into a much larger force at 73 Easting. Readers will empathize with the fears, frustrations, and exhilarations of armored combat as expertly described by the author. MacGregor also pays a fitting tribute to Sgt Andrew Moller, the sole fatality of this small part of the war. If MacGregor would have focused solely on this aspect of the war, it would have been an outstanding book.
As a battle study, the book lacks a description of how Cougar squadron fit into the overall context of the war. The author did not provide a single map of where the unit fought in Iraq, in relation to other units in VII Corps. There are numerous tactical level charts that show how the sub-units deployed on the battlefield, but readers like me would have benefitted from an operational level chart.
MacGregor argues that the US Army could have defeated the Republican Guard and deposed Saddam Hussein back in 1991. While I will concede that he presents a compelling argument, it is one-sided. MacGregor fails to discuss both the United Nations Security Resolution which gave the coalition the legal authority for DESERT STORM; and he also fails to analyze the political constraints effected by the Bush-41 administration by its desire to end the ground war at the arbitrary 100-hour mark. A discussion of either of these points would have effectively answered the "why" to the question of why we didn't finish the job in 1991. The short answer is that the the United States did not have the political will nor the legal authority to become an army of occupation in 1991. Because of this, the United States had to defeat the Iraqi army, but leave it in a condition strong enough to act as a regional deterrent force against Iran.
MacGregor is a very talented author, making this book a very fast read. If you are looking for great read about modern armored combat as seen from the men on the ground, you won't find a better book. However, the author should have kept the book focused on his area of expertise, rather than presenting a one-sided argument about strategic decisions made by military leaders. His viewpoint only covers the effects of what those decisions were, failing to include any discussion as to the "why" the decisions were made. It's a good book on armored combat, but his jaded opinions overshadow the incredible accomplishments and heroism of a small group of men who were the tip of the spear in Operation DESERT STORM.
The Naval Institute Press provided me with a complimentary copy of the book.
18 of 19 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars
"Major, you must go to Baghdad and end this. You must save Iraq."
October 6, 2009
By Kirk L.
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
So said the Iraqi brigade commander of the Republican Guard unit that then-Major Douglas Macgregor's 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment "Cougars" (Toujours Pret!) had just annhilated at the Battle of 73 Easting in Feburary, 1991. Unfortunately, Macgregor and the rest of the U.S. military had their orders; a ceasefire was soon implemented, preventing 2/2 ACR and the rest of VII Corps from pursuing and destroying their enemy. Consequently, the main body of the Iraqi Republican Guard was able to retreat and later crush Shiite and Kurdish rebellions inside Iraq, keeping Saddam Hussein in power for another 12 years.
There aren't a lot of books published about the First Gulf War, but this is a worthy addition to what is already out there and should spark debate, as it goes against "conventional wisdom". Macgregor takes the reader on a detailed and fascinating accounting of his experiences as operations officer of the famed cavalry squadron who engaged with and destroyed a brigade-sized Iraqi armored formation thanks in large part to the actions of then-Captain H.R. McMaster's Eagle Troop. McMaster is now a Brigadier General and one of the more notable names to come out of the Iraq War, having made news as the commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005, one of the most successful case studies of counterinsurgency warfare practiced by the U.S. military in modern combat.
The book is an extremely compelling read for many reasons, but is not without flaws. As I have noted in two previous reviews of books by LTG (ret.) Ricardo Sanchez and LTC (ret.) Nathan Sassaman, there is a palpable sense of anger, bitterness and frustration on the part of the author; I found myself questioning how much of his views were clouded by the natural self-serving instincts that often pervade autobiographical works. We, the readers must take Macgregor at his word when it comes to his conclusions and his outspoken critique of the army's senior chain of command during Operation Desert Storm. As one reviewer has already mentioned, Macgregor goes out of his way to cast light on his own situation early in the book (referring to himself as an "outcast colonel" during a meeting with CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks, not to be confused with VII Corps Commander LTG Fred Franks, whom the author holds largely responsible for the failure to destroy the Republican Guard and achieve a decisive strategic victory over Iraq in 1991.) and I think the several reminders of his own situation and career detract from the overall body of work.
That said, "Warrior's Rage" is well-written and highly readable. Macgregor skillfully introduces the reader to all of the important characters and members of the Cougar Squadron who played critical roles in the battle, from squad and platoon level all the way up to battalion staff and even those in leadership positions at the regimental level. Again, some of the bitterness creeps in, and the reader will find that quite evident as events unfold and 2/2 ACR prepares to go to war. The battle itself, which was no contest thanks to the superb training, leadership, equipment and aggressiveness of Brig. Gen. McMaster's Eagle Troop, along with that of Ghost Troop and the rest of the cavalry squadron's warriors who were a part of the biggest American armored battle since WWII and its greatest tactical victory. The author goes out of his way to praise the Soldiers, from the the courageous NCOs, and junior officers, to the cavalry troopers who made the victory happen. The book has no shortage of great anecdotes that only add to the cavalry mystique.
However, when it comes to the senior leadership, Macgregor issues a scathing indictment of general officers he felt were too risk averse, saving the majority of his anger for VII Corps Commander, Lt.Gen. Fred Franks, whom the author faults for not accomplishing the mission he was given by CENTCOM commander GEN Norman Schwartzkopf: Destruction of the Republican Guard. It is clear that Macgregor saw himself as the defacto commander of the squadron, giving the actual commander a pseudonym (LTC Larson) and depicting him as a waffling, indecisive martinet who made virtually no real command decisions. Although less-scathing in his language, it is also clear that the author was disappointed with the actions of the 2nd ACR's regimental commander, then-Colonel Don Holder. Were the problems and personalities in the regiment as dysfunctional as Macgregor would have you believe? I wasn't there, so that is for those who were to decide.
In the end, I recommend this book, because it attempts to debunk the belief that Operation Desert Storm was an overwhelming tactical AND strategic victory. He takes on the media-created myth of the operation's unqualified success and ties the erroneous conclusions and self-satisfaction that the Army as a service took from the event to the many struggles and setbacks which have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. The author takes a morally courageous stand in the face of what is sure to be a vitriolic response from those he takes issue with, and his book is a highly controversial one that not only challenges long-established views about Operation Desert Storm, but lays the blame of many of our military's current setbacks and shortcomings in the Middle East at the feet of those making the calls during the First Gulf War.
There aren't a lot of books published about the First Gulf War, but this is a worthy addition to what is already out there and should spark debate, as it goes against "conventional wisdom". Macgregor takes the reader on a detailed and fascinating accounting of his experiences as operations officer of the famed cavalry squadron who engaged with and destroyed a brigade-sized Iraqi armored formation thanks in large part to the actions of then-Captain H.R. McMaster's Eagle Troop. McMaster is now a Brigadier General and one of the more notable names to come out of the Iraq War, having made news as the commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005, one of the most successful case studies of counterinsurgency warfare practiced by the U.S. military in modern combat.
The book is an extremely compelling read for many reasons, but is not without flaws. As I have noted in two previous reviews of books by LTG (ret.) Ricardo Sanchez and LTC (ret.) Nathan Sassaman, there is a palpable sense of anger, bitterness and frustration on the part of the author; I found myself questioning how much of his views were clouded by the natural self-serving instincts that often pervade autobiographical works. We, the readers must take Macgregor at his word when it comes to his conclusions and his outspoken critique of the army's senior chain of command during Operation Desert Storm. As one reviewer has already mentioned, Macgregor goes out of his way to cast light on his own situation early in the book (referring to himself as an "outcast colonel" during a meeting with CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks, not to be confused with VII Corps Commander LTG Fred Franks, whom the author holds largely responsible for the failure to destroy the Republican Guard and achieve a decisive strategic victory over Iraq in 1991.) and I think the several reminders of his own situation and career detract from the overall body of work.
That said, "Warrior's Rage" is well-written and highly readable. Macgregor skillfully introduces the reader to all of the important characters and members of the Cougar Squadron who played critical roles in the battle, from squad and platoon level all the way up to battalion staff and even those in leadership positions at the regimental level. Again, some of the bitterness creeps in, and the reader will find that quite evident as events unfold and 2/2 ACR prepares to go to war. The battle itself, which was no contest thanks to the superb training, leadership, equipment and aggressiveness of Brig. Gen. McMaster's Eagle Troop, along with that of Ghost Troop and the rest of the cavalry squadron's warriors who were a part of the biggest American armored battle since WWII and its greatest tactical victory. The author goes out of his way to praise the Soldiers, from the the courageous NCOs, and junior officers, to the cavalry troopers who made the victory happen. The book has no shortage of great anecdotes that only add to the cavalry mystique.
However, when it comes to the senior leadership, Macgregor issues a scathing indictment of general officers he felt were too risk averse, saving the majority of his anger for VII Corps Commander, Lt.Gen. Fred Franks, whom the author faults for not accomplishing the mission he was given by CENTCOM commander GEN Norman Schwartzkopf: Destruction of the Republican Guard. It is clear that Macgregor saw himself as the defacto commander of the squadron, giving the actual commander a pseudonym (LTC Larson) and depicting him as a waffling, indecisive martinet who made virtually no real command decisions. Although less-scathing in his language, it is also clear that the author was disappointed with the actions of the 2nd ACR's regimental commander, then-Colonel Don Holder. Were the problems and personalities in the regiment as dysfunctional as Macgregor would have you believe? I wasn't there, so that is for those who were to decide.
In the end, I recommend this book, because it attempts to debunk the belief that Operation Desert Storm was an overwhelming tactical AND strategic victory. He takes on the media-created myth of the operation's unqualified success and ties the erroneous conclusions and self-satisfaction that the Army as a service took from the event to the many struggles and setbacks which have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. The author takes a morally courageous stand in the face of what is sure to be a vitriolic response from those he takes issue with, and his book is a highly controversial one that not only challenges long-established views about Operation Desert Storm, but lays the blame of many of our military's current setbacks and shortcomings in the Middle East at the feet of those making the calls during the First Gulf War.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
Awesome book
This tells the story of the 2nd Squadron "Second to None", 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation Desert Storm. Read more
Published 2 months ago by Robert Logue
5.0 out of 5 stars
Nicely done
Echo's what I have heard from my son and others. The highest ranking army generals are more interested in not screwing up than they are of taking some risk and winning!
Published 4 months ago by R. Sealock
4.0 out of 5 stars
Good story
Well, written story but little bit to self-serving about the authors role in the whole push. It bashes his superiors a lot though it can be said that the Generals during the... Read more
Published 4 months ago by UncleDako
5.0 out of 5 stars
good
Enlightening testimony to the actions of the U.S. Army during the actions of desert storm. it is a good read
Published 7 months ago by chris
2.0 out of 5 stars
A disapointing read
I purchased this book in spite of the negative reviews because I wanted to read a first hand account of this great tank battle. Read more
Published 14 months ago by Gary Burke
3.0 out of 5 stars
Daddy knows best
I haven't read the book. Reading the reviews contains a lot of wailing about not destroying the Republican guard. Tactics seem to be confused with strategy. Read more
Published 21 months ago by Sam
5.0 out of 5 stars
outrageous, audacious and wildly irreverent
Outrageous because Macgregor spills his guts. Audacious because it lifts the curtain to show what went on behind the scenes in Cougar Squadron. Read more
Published on March 19, 2011 by Charles A. Krohn
5.0 out of 5 stars
Informative about battle, useful insight to poor current leadership
The battle information provides a picture of what was really going on. Better than a movie and detailed description of Armored capability and tactics along with a dim picture of... Read more
Published on December 31, 2010 by Eugene Katzman
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Indictment of Ineptitude and a Tribute to our Gallant Fighting...
The author brings to this saga both a wealth of scholarly background and insights into the most senior levels of Army decision-making coupled with a moving, sensitive and cogent... Read more
Published on June 12, 2010 by Army Veteran USA
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Must Read for Military Officers of All Ranks
Warrior's Rage is certainly an interesting and engaging story. I had difficulty putting the book down. Read more
Published on November 11, 2009 by TDMZ
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