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44 of 46 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A good book if you can ignore the whining, September 25, 2009
This review is from: Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Hardcover)
The Good: This book is a pretty good book detailing the fight the 2nd ACR fought against the Iraqi Republican Guards along the 73 Eastings line. I was a tank platoon leader in the 1st ID during Desert Storm and this book brought back memories. MacGregor takes the reader down "into the trenches" so to speak. If you have not served in an armor unit, you will get a good feel for what it is like from reading this book. The Bad: Somebody please give MacGregor a pacifier. He constantly whines about how the generals were stupid and how he knew what he was doing and they should have listened to him. He starts the whining in the first couple of pages of this book. Sure, there are politically motivated generals who do not care about the Soldiers, but not all are. It is obvious he has an ax to grind because he had to retire as a lowly colonel while others he served with achieved general stars. I knew this guy was starting to get full of it when he started criticizing General Franks, the VII Corps commander during Desert Storm. In a nutshell Schwarzkopf tells him to destroy the Republican Guards and Franks says, We can do this. We'll make it happen." After this Macgregor launches into a hissy fit about Shwarzkopf should have fired him because he obvious wasnt the right man for the job, he needed fighting spirit, yada yada yada. What did he want? Franks to jump up on the table, beat his chest and sing the Army song? Like I mentioned earlier I was a tank platoon leader in the 1st ID which was part of VII Corps and after we did the breach we pretty much hauled [...] in order to make contact with the Republican Guard. My ankles swelled up from standing in that darn turret for hours. I remember the passage of lines with the 2nd ACR. We passed by a Bradley with two Soldiers smoking cigarettes next to it looking at us as we rolled past and started the fight. Overall, if you can get past the whining, this is a good read if you want to feel what Soldiers felt and experienced in the heat of battle.
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26 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Good book on tactical armored combat; lacks strategic level context, October 16, 2009
This review is from: Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Hardcover)
"Warrior's Rage", by Douglas MacGregor, is the story of the brave men of `Cougar Squadron', one of the units that participated in the world's largest armored conflict since the 1944 Battle of Kursk. In this rather lop-sided Feb 1991 battle, armored elements of the United States Army demolished the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard, suffering relatively few casualties in return. This book is told from the perspective of one of the tactical leaders who was there. On February 22, 1991, Cougar Squadron entered Iraqi territory with the mission of engaging and destroying the Republican Guard. MacGregor does an incredible job of chronicling the events over the next few days as Cougar Squadron smashed into a much larger force at 73 Easting. Readers will empathize with the fears, frustrations, and exhilarations of armored combat as expertly described by the author. MacGregor also pays a fitting tribute to Sgt Andrew Moller, the sole fatality of this small part of the war. If MacGregor would have focused solely on this aspect of the war, it would have been an outstanding book. As a battle study, the book lacks a description of how Cougar squadron fit into the overall context of the war. The author did not provide a single map of where the unit fought in Iraq, in relation to other units in VII Corps. There are numerous tactical level charts that show how the sub-units deployed on the battlefield, but readers like me would have benefitted from an operational level chart. MacGregor argues that the US Army could have defeated the Republican Guard and deposed Saddam Hussein back in 1991. While I will concede that he presents a compelling argument, it is one-sided. MacGregor fails to discuss both the United Nations Security Resolution which gave the coalition the legal authority for DESERT STORM; and he also fails to analyze the political constraints effected by the Bush-41 administration by its desire to end the ground war at the arbitrary 100-hour mark. A discussion of either of these points would have effectively answered the "why" to the question of why we didn't finish the job in 1991. The short answer is that the the United States did not have the political will nor the legal authority to become an army of occupation in 1991. Because of this, the United States had to defeat the Iraqi army, but leave it in a condition strong enough to act as a regional deterrent force against Iran. MacGregor is a very talented author, making this book a very fast read. If you are looking for great read about modern armored combat as seen from the men on the ground, you won't find a better book. However, the author should have kept the book focused on his area of expertise, rather than presenting a one-sided argument about strategic decisions made by military leaders. His viewpoint only covers the effects of what those decisions were, failing to include any discussion as to the "why" the decisions were made. It's a good book on armored combat, but his jaded opinions overshadow the incredible accomplishments and heroism of a small group of men who were the tip of the spear in Operation DESERT STORM. The Naval Institute Press provided me with a complimentary copy of the book.
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16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
"Major, you must go to Baghdad and end this. You must save Iraq.", October 6, 2009
This review is from: Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Hardcover)
So said the Iraqi brigade commander of the Republican Guard unit that then-Major Douglas Macgregor's 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment "Cougars" (Toujours Pret!) had just annhilated at the Battle of 73 Easting in Feburary, 1991. Unfortunately, Macgregor and the rest of the U.S. military had their orders; a ceasefire was soon implemented, preventing 2/2 ACR and the rest of VII Corps from pursuing and destroying their enemy. Consequently, the main body of the Iraqi Republican Guard was able to retreat and later crush Shiite and Kurdish rebellions inside Iraq, keeping Saddam Hussein in power for another 12 years. There aren't a lot of books published about the First Gulf War, but this is a worthy addition to what is already out there and should spark debate, as it goes against "conventional wisdom". Macgregor takes the reader on a detailed and fascinating accounting of his experiences as operations officer of the famed cavalry squadron who engaged with and destroyed a brigade-sized Iraqi armored formation thanks in large part to the actions of then-Captain H.R. McMaster's Eagle Troop. McMaster is now a Brigadier General and one of the more notable names to come out of the Iraq War, having made news as the commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005, one of the most successful case studies of counterinsurgency warfare practiced by the U.S. military in modern combat. The book is an extremely compelling read for many reasons, but is not without flaws. As I have noted in two previous reviews of books by LTG (ret.) Ricardo Sanchez and LTC (ret.) Nathan Sassaman, there is a palpable sense of anger, bitterness and frustration on the part of the author; I found myself questioning how much of his views were clouded by the natural self-serving instincts that often pervade autobiographical works. We, the readers must take Macgregor at his word when it comes to his conclusions and his outspoken critique of the army's senior chain of command during Operation Desert Storm. As one reviewer has already mentioned, Macgregor goes out of his way to cast light on his own situation early in the book (referring to himself as an "outcast colonel" during a meeting with CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks, not to be confused with VII Corps Commander LTG Fred Franks, whom the author holds largely responsible for the failure to destroy the Republican Guard and achieve a decisive strategic victory over Iraq in 1991.) and I think the several reminders of his own situation and career detract from the overall body of work. That said, "Warrior's Rage" is well-written and highly readable. Macgregor skillfully introduces the reader to all of the important characters and members of the Cougar Squadron who played critical roles in the battle, from squad and platoon level all the way up to battalion staff and even those in leadership positions at the regimental level. Again, some of the bitterness creeps in, and the reader will find that quite evident as events unfold and 2/2 ACR prepares to go to war. The battle itself, which was no contest thanks to the superb training, leadership, equipment and aggressiveness of Brig. Gen. McMaster's Eagle Troop, along with that of Ghost Troop and the rest of the cavalry squadron's warriors who were a part of the biggest American armored battle since WWII and its greatest tactical victory. The author goes out of his way to praise the Soldiers, from the the courageous NCOs, and junior officers, to the cavalry troopers who made the victory happen. The book has no shortage of great anecdotes that only add to the cavalry mystique. However, when it comes to the senior leadership, Macgregor issues a scathing indictment of general officers he felt were too risk averse, saving the majority of his anger for VII Corps Commander, Lt.Gen. Fred Franks, whom the author faults for not accomplishing the mission he was given by CENTCOM commander GEN Norman Schwartzkopf: Destruction of the Republican Guard. It is clear that Macgregor saw himself as the defacto commander of the squadron, giving the actual commander a pseudonym (LTC Larson) and depicting him as a waffling, indecisive martinet who made virtually no real command decisions. Although less-scathing in his language, it is also clear that the author was disappointed with the actions of the 2nd ACR's regimental commander, then-Colonel Don Holder. Were the problems and personalities in the regiment as dysfunctional as Macgregor would have you believe? I wasn't there, so that is for those who were to decide. In the end, I recommend this book, because it attempts to debunk the belief that Operation Desert Storm was an overwhelming tactical AND strategic victory. He takes on the media-created myth of the operation's unqualified success and ties the erroneous conclusions and self-satisfaction that the Army as a service took from the event to the many struggles and setbacks which have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. The author takes a morally courageous stand in the face of what is sure to be a vitriolic response from those he takes issue with, and his book is a highly controversial one that not only challenges long-established views about Operation Desert Storm, but lays the blame of many of our military's current setbacks and shortcomings in the Middle East at the feet of those making the calls during the First Gulf War.
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