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Warsaw 1920: Lenin's Failed Conquest of Europe

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This is an excellent, brief history of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. Let me repeat. This is a military history. Its primary concern is with the composition of armies, military leadership, strategic objectives, battlefield tactics, weapons, etc. T. Kunikov's review notwithstanding, it is not a book about the grand political objectives of the Soviet regime or a treatise on the Communist threat to western civilization (although these are taken for granted by the author).

Kunikov's review is typical of the kind of knee-jerk reaction so many Marxist apologists experience whenever they perceive the slightest criticism of Soviet (or Chinese or Cuban) Communism.

As I have said, this is essentially a book of military history which makes only occasional, oblique references to the motives and objectives of the Soviet (and Polish) leaders. The Soviet leaders' desire to spread their revolution to Germany and Western Europe is alluded to in the book's subtitle, "Lenin's Failed Invasion of the West," which, if I know anything about the publishing business, was probably dreamed up by an editor eager to give the book more pizzazz. Subsequently, it is referred to in one short paragraph on page 2, which consists almost entirely of two quotations form Lenin himself; in one sentence on page 6 about the Bolshevik's general belief in the necessity of overthrowing the "established world order;" a phrase on page 7 about "ensuring the survival of Communism in Russia" by exporting revolution to Germany; and another indefinite remark on page 9 about the Communists' expectations of the "immanent triumph of revolution throughout the world." That's it.

The rest of the book's 224 pages consist of a detailed history of military operations during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920, filled with excellent maps, easy to read and understand.

Even the concluding chapter does not discuss Soviet intentions in their invasion of Poland, except for one sentence in which the author refers to Stalin's success in 1945 in achieving "much of what Lenin had set out to do in 1920," and noting "the dark night of Communism that engulfed [Poland] for half a century" thereafter. No one but an ideologically blinded Marxist could deny the truth of that statement.

The Polish attack on the Soviet armies massing on their eastern frontier in 1920 was clearly an act of pre-emptive self defense against an immanent, well prepared Soviet plan to invade their country (similar to Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Syria in 1968). The Soviet invasion was scheduled to be launched within forty eight hours. The Poles were well aware of Soviet intentions because they had the world's most highly developed capability for decoding and reading their opponents radio messages, a talent which was to prove invaluable to the British in World War II.

I find it astonishing that certain reviewers can continue to ignore the openly declared intentions of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and the rest of the Soviet leadership of the time ("World Revolution" was their slogan), as well as all of the facts that have emerged from the Soviet Archives since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian scholars like Viktor Suvorov, Dmitri Volkogonov, and Arkady Vaksburg, as well as their American and British counterparts such as Albert Weeks, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, Ronald Radosh, Richard Pipes and J. Arch Getty, have been using this material for nearly two decades now. Many of the original documents are also accessible to any interested reader in the Yale University Press "Annals of Communism" series, which consists of some twenty volumes of Soviet archival documents edited by American and Russian scholars. But, of course, one must first read the documents, then make up their mind.

In this timely and important book the reader is reminded about an obscure war that had great ramifications. Coming as it did between the World Wars the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921 has been largely forgotten in history. But many leading historians of European history have long recognized that it was pivotal in stemming the Soviet advance into Europe and in saving the Versailles peace conference and a reconstructed Poland (White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 and "The Miracle on the Vistula" andDevelopment of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors). This book is primarily a military history of this conflict and the book is accompanied by a large number of very helpful maps.

The first section of the book examines the two armies that faced eachother, the Russian Red Army which at the time was a creature of Trotsky, complete with commissars and some professional officers. It also included the Cavalry army of Semion Budionny. The Polish army was far less homogenous. It had been built from nothing by the Polish national leader Josef Pilsudski who had helped single handedly to revive Poland as a state. It included Ukrainian allies and Polish units that had fought for all sides during the First World War. For this reason the Polish army suffered terribly during the first half of 1920, watching there state, which had stretched to Kiev, shrink to almost nothing. However during the `miracle on the Vistula' the Polish army was able, in several engagements, to destroy the Russian army that had hitherto been brilliantly commanded by Michael Tukhachevsky (the brilliant general later shot by Stalin).

Arguments that this book is biased hold little water. The premise that Lenin's decision to invade Poland presaged an invasion of Europe may be overstate on the cover to make the subject seem more pertinent, but in fact the book presents a very clear matter of fact story that is neither sensationalist nor extremist in its interpretation of events. In fact there is little room for interpretation in a book that is both short and covers mostly military affairs and the leaders on both sides.

This is a quick read about an important subject. The writing is masterful and the emphasis on military affairs is a pleasant surprise given the fact that so many books today, even ones on war, seem to concentrate entirely on social and economic matters.

Seth J. Frantzman

While other more scholarly books apparently exist out there this is the first book I've read in relation to the little known conflict between Poland and Soviet Russia as they both jostled for position rattling sabres that were more cardboard cutout than steel. But as this book shows it doesn't matter if the war you are in is sidebar stuff to world affairs, when it's your country and your life on the line then it's centre court stuff.

Starting with a bit of background this brief book was a perfect primer for me and the concise nature of the thing was one of it's appeals. Diving straight into the combat sections the author has managed to convey the brutal nature of the fighting between these age old foes and the utter despair and desperation commanders and troops on both sides went through. One wonders as they flip the pages with reckless abandon just how long a certain Polish unit can possibly hold on in the face of Russian assaults and just how far a Russian cavalry unit can possibly push both itself, it's horses and supply lines before an inevitable bloody nose is delivered. Once the scene is set the lively pace just doesn't let up even when rear echelon matters are being discussed such is the impetus implied throughout.

This book succeeds in my view because it takes a little known aspect of history and makes it both interesting from an historical and a military point of view. I devoured it in a single domestic flight.

I think that most readers would have the same reaction I did when hearing of Adam Zamoyski's book Warsaw 1920: gosh, I didn't know Poland and Russia went to war in 1920.

Poland and Russia had a long and often violent joint history. In 1920 there was communist unrest in Germany and Lenin assembled an army to cross Poland and support the German revolutionaries. The Polish, acting on intelligence, preempted any invasion by attacking the Russians. Consequently there is debate as to who "started" this war. The Russians drove back the Poles to the gates of Warsaw but were subsequently routed when the Polish army, under Marshall Jozef Pilsudski, outflanked them. Of interest to me was the youth of the Russian commanders, many in their early twenties and most fated to disappear in Stalin's show trials in the 1930s, and the involvement of figures such as Joseph Stalin (political commissar on the southern front) and Charles de Gaulle (the French military observer).

The strength and weakness of Zamoyski's book are one in the same: a concentrated focus on the military activities in the field. Consequently the reader has a good understanding of the strategies, the battles and why the Polish army routed the Russians. The author is very clear about the military focus but it does leave the reader, especially those without prior knowledge, only the most rudimentary understanding of the political context and even less understanding of the concurrent social and economic effects of the war.

Although Adam Zamoyski is a Polish historian I, without prior knowledge of the subject and independent of any Polish or Russian cultural ties, considered the book to be reasonably impartial. He is clearly pro-Polish and occasionally an adjective or adverb describing the Russians "pops" out as being deliberately negative. However the focus on military rather than political activities definitively minimizes any bias.

The writing itself is quite clear and direct. The material is well organized, primarily on a chronological basis, and benefits significantly from the maps and photographs. The author, presumably recognizing the minimal context provided, has included an appendix with suggested further reading in English.

To my mind the best type of book because I learnt something with every page.

Poland's history is tinged in blood. For a long period the country had been battle ground for warring powers. Thrice in her tragic past Poland was partitioned among big powers. New Polish state emerged thanks to Allied powers during the end of Great War. Soon it incurred the wrath of powerful neighbours. Poland and Russia always at daggers drawn.Supreme Command of Allied powers fixed Poland's eastern frontier along river Bug which came to be called Curzon line. This did not satisfy Poland's strong man Josef Pilsudski. He sought to re establish country's frontier of 1772: the line of Dvina - Dneiper.

By this time Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. Allied intervention in the civil war in Russia made it apparent for Lenin that West intended to stifle Bolshevik revolution. Under the circumstances for Bolsheviks only hope for ensuring survival was to export revolution. To make this possible they established Third International/ Comintern. Wracked by civil strife ,political dissension, mounting unemployment Germany looked a tempting prospect. Road to Berlin lay through Poland. Above facts form background of this book.


Russians mustered overwhelming strength along the Western Front to the north of Pripet marshes. Lenin increased the number of divisions from 5 to 20. The operation was to be supported by armies of South Western Front from Ukraine. Plan of campaign was worked out by Chief of Operations Branch of Red Army General Staff Boris M. Shaposhnikov.Author shows how Poles successfully resisted the onslaught of Russian colossus.


But firstly he provides quantitative/ qualitative features of the forces of the two adversaries. Russian 'Tachanka' impressed me a lot. This weapon was a combination of mobility and firepower. It was a machine gun mounted on a horse-drawn buggy having a crew of three. One man driving the horses and the other two manned the machine guns.It galloped towards the enemy infantry . After coming to a close range it veered around and let loose withering fire before galloping away. Author then gives a topographical analysis of zone of operations which he says resembled a triangle. Front was nearly thousand kilometres long and the wedge bisected the triangle into two halves. This was a great expanse of bogs, rivers , forests called Pripet marshes. What that meant was armies advancing from west to east or reverse would be channeled along either of the two corridors.Either of the adversary armies if advanced too far would find their flanks exposed.


Another striking thing Poles developed techniques for monitoring communications of her foes. Russian ciphers were pierced.By the beginning of 1920s she was listening every radio station in Western Russia. Russian radio security procedures were also loose which made the task easier. Poles knew Red Army massing troops along her eastern border.This made Pilsudski initiate hostilities, for he realised Russia had to knocked out quickly otherwise Poland would be swamped.
Polish army lunged into Ukraine seized Kiev but could not hold out for long. Soon dislodged by forces of Marshal Semion Budionny 's South Western Front. Simultaneously Marshal Tukhachevsky Western Front began its relentless advance which took Bolsheviks to the gates of Warsaw. Disintegration of the Polish state appeared imminent.


Front near Warsaw ran diagonally from northwest to southeast . As Tukhachevski's forces forged ahead , it came to be separated by Red Army units of South Western Front . Two fronts were loosely connected by a weak centre. Pilsudski reasoned the weak centre could be easily brushed aside by launching a strong counter offensive. Wedge can be driven between the two fronts besides turning Tukhachevski's southern flank.Further by exploiting the thrust Poles can fall behind the rear of Russian armies consequently unhinging Tukhachevski 's dispositions facing Warsaw. The manoeuvre was successfully executed which led what some historians call the 'Miracle at Vistula'. Strike resembled what Alexander executed at Arbela in 331 BC. Here it should be remembered the Macedonian pinned down the Persian right, broke through weak left centre and enveloped Persian right wing and fell upon its rear.


Russian Polish conflict was extraordinary in many ways. Unlike the positional warfare in the marshy and muddy terrain of Flanders in Great War; mobility, surprise , manoeuvre formed the hall marks of this campaign. Cavalry proved decisive. Poles while retreating made no attempt to entrench. Their commanders realised its futility. Front was wide and forces available to hold were small. Entrenchments could always be turned by superior Russian cavalry.


Russian repulse at the gates of Warsaw had far -reaching consequences upon the destiny of Poland. Later Soviet dictator took a terrible revenge when he connived with Hitler in partioning the country again. Flower of Polish officer corps was liquidated by NKVD troops in Katyn forest in Byelorussia. Poland has not regained and will never regain her old borders.She had to settle for much disliked Curzon line. Such are the eternal laws of History: For victors the fruits ,the losers the spoils.


Finally, tenor of the book is virulently anti Russian. Author has made some caustic comments and has vehemently berated Bolsheviks. Russian apologists may find this offending. Nevertheless he has done a good job by bringing into limelight a conflict which faded away from human memory . A clash which had profound impact on the course of World History.

Although the Russo-Polish War of 1920 was an important conflict for many reasons - it prevented the armed export of Communism into Eastern Europe in the chaos following the end of the First World War - it is not well known in the West. Noted historian Adam Zamoyski provides an insightful look into this little-known war in Warsaw 1920, which packs sufficient military detail to satisfy specialists but also serves well as a general introduction to the subject. Furthermore, Zamoyski is a gifted writer whose crisp prose moves the narrative along at a good pace and even though the actual text is only 138 pages, there is no sense that it is rushed or incomplete. While it is clear that the author's sympathies lie with the hard-pressed Polish defenders, he is fair to the Soviets and provides good insight into their strengths and weaknesses. Warsaw 1920 is a solid piece of historical writing and highly recommended.

Warsaw 1920 consists of six chapters and begins with the re-creation of the Polish State at the end of the First World War. The author notes that the Poles were aided by an intense nationalism, held together by the glue of Catholicism; a large number of combat-experienced veterans; and strongman Josef Pilsudski at the helm - it was these three factors which proved the salvation of Poland. On the other hand, the author shows how Lenin was determined to destroy bourgeois Poland as a precursor to spreading Communism westward to the rest of Europe and he had the means at hand to accomplish it, with a large Red Army.

In the second chapter, the author covers the strengths and weaknesses of the Polish and Soviet armies, both of which started the war in less than ideal condition. He points to the better quality of the Polish cavalry but the numerical superiority of the Red cavalry. In particular, the Red Cavalry corps, led by Budenny and Gai proved incredibly dangerous in the invasion of Poland and the campaign hinged upon the ability of the smaller Polish forces to counter these mobile strike forces. The author also makes interesting points how the Polish armies were composed of veterans who had served in three different armies in the First World War (Germany, Austrian and Russian) and consequently, had different styles and tactics that often hindered operations in 1920. However, he notes that the Poles had a huge advantage in signals intelligence (SIGINT) which they used to intercept unsecure Red Army communications, giving them some operational advantages. In the third chapter, he describes the Polish advance into the Ukraine and capture of Kiev - which the author assesses as a mistake since it justified the later Soviet invasion - followed by the Soviet counter-response.

It is in the fourth and fifth chapters where the author concentrates on the "Miracle on the Vistula," where Pilsudski defeated the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw and threw their forces back toward Byelorussia. These chapters are exciting and the author does a great job describing the tense days of mid-August 1920, when the iron dice were rolling. To support the text, the volume has a total of 11 mono-chromatic sketch maps, which are simple but effective and depict units down to division level. Using the maps, I could easily follow the author's campaign narrative. There are also 40 B/W photos that nicely augment the text, particularly photos of Stalin and other Soviet leaders as they looked in 1920. The author also provides 9 pages of footnotes and a 3-page bibliography. Overall, a very satisfying book.

How many Americans know that the resurrected Polish nation saved Europe from Communism in 1920 ? Again.
Yes, that is true. Lenin and his goons wanted to bring the blessings of Communism to all of Europe, "over the corpse of Poland ", and he would have succeeed ,save for the courageous and determined Poles under Pilsudski. Some say it was a miracle ( "Miracle of the Vistula" ) and perhaps it was. This history should be more widely publicized in our history books.

This is a sort and concise book (about 150) pages, and it covers the same subject that was done more extensively by "White Eagle, Red Star", which I read and enjoyed several months ago. Having a short book tell an important story compels the author to be very precise in his writing, and relate only the essential events to explain what happened to the reader, especially to one who knows relatively nothing about the subject.

The book details the Polish-Russian War of 1919-1920 which ended when the Polish army routed the Russians at the very gates of Warsaw and pushed them back to the East. It's a compelling story and one that is very well told by the author, who has written several books on Poland and its history.

The politics of Eastern Europe always seem to be complicated, and from the Western perspective it's difficult to discern which side is right in any conflict. The author believes that this Polish victory saved Western Europe from being overrun by the Russians, with consequesnces that would have created Communist states in Germany, other Eastern European states, and possibly even as far West as France. Whether he is correct or not is really beyond knowing, but he is certainly entitled to his expert opinion.

As a proud descendant of Polish ancestors I would like to believe that the author is correct and that, just as Sobieski's army saved the West from the Ottomans at the siege of Vienna, Polish arms once again rescued Europe from a grim future. Otheers may have their own opinions about this, but that's the good thing about book reviewing in this country: we all have our own thoughts, and are free to express them! If Zamoyski is correct, that may be one of the things that Poliand saved for us during those dark days when its army was backed against the eastern edge of Warsaw.

A lot of cliches turn out to be true. Evidence of this can be found in Adam Zamoyski's Warsaw 1920 as it "reads like a novel." The book came in the mail on Wednesday and I finished it on Thursday. Granted, it's only 140 pages long but the narrative that the author constructs is scholarly but very accessible. Previously, all I knew about the events of 1921 came from general surveys of Soviet history. I was grateful to obtain a book that focused on the events of Lenin's grand revolutionary plans for Europe alone. The big prize for the Bolsheviks was Germany and they hoped to invade that nation shortly after rolling through Poland.

Thanks to the brilliance of Marshall Pilsudski, Lenin's fantasies were dashed with the trampling of cavalry. Most of the book can be summed up as follows: it's looks bad, it looks worse, it looks really bad, the Poles are toast, but then they are, in the words of then Major De Gaulle (who was on the scene): "Victory! Complete, triumphant Victory!"

The genius of Pilsudski's maneuver which let to the Miracle on the Vistula still astounds. He gambled his nation, his people, his life, and bought his nation 19 years of collective freedom as a result. Looking at his plan and its effects--retreating Russians ran into the grinder of five independently moving Polish divisions--one has to wonder how few people at the time were able to share Pilsudski's vision. The Marshall was among the greatest of men and this is a stellar history of the Pole's timely defense of the west against a murderous red horde.

This is pretty much a description of each battle, the troops involved, the movements of the troops and the aftermath. Some but not much discussion of where mistakes were made and what the alternate outcomes might have meant. The bottom line of the invasion of Russia by Poland in 1919, was a totally miscalculated decision by Marshall Pilsudski (almost like Hitler) that the Russians were weakened by their Civil War. He had hoped to capture more Russian land and create a Lithuanian/Byelorussian puppet state to his east.

Lenin's response was one of overwhelming numerical superiority in weapons and men but the lack of a logistical model and the idea that the Russians would be able to live off the land like they did in their fight against the Whites. Lenin had hoped for a quick victory in Poland, that would lead to a People's Revolution in Germany that would then merge with the Hungarian Bolshevik Republic to the take over the Balkans. Didn't happen.

The Russian attack was a two pronged approach with Tuchachevsky in the North towards Warsaw and then towards Berlin, and Voroshilov (with Stalin as his political Kommissar) to the South through Lvov and then onto Vienna and Prague. As the Northern attack actually passed above Warsaw, Trotsky (War Kommissar) ordered Voroshilov to attack from the South. Voroshilov refused (Trotsky wanted both him and Stalin executed but was stopped by Lenin) and sent Budionny and his cavalry to try and encircle Lvov. Budionny and his accompanying infantry were fought to a standstill by the Poles and were almost surrounded. These forces then had to retreat being no help to the northern attack.

After almost a year of battle and the deaths of many soldiers on both sides, they ended up almost where the started and signed a peace treaty with boundaries that were the same as were approved final by the Allies at Versailles. [NOTE: During the purges in the late 1930s of the Russian military, all of the officers involved in the Northern prong were liquidated, but Voroshilov and Budionny were left alone. What might have been the outcome of the execution of Stalin on the future USSR and World War 2?]

Zeb Kantrowitz