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Water, Peace and the Middle East: Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin (Library of Modern Middle East Studies, 9)

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In this book, Saskia Gieling examines how the Iranian leaders sacralized, or gave the Iran-Iraq war a religious dimension. She seeks to answer the question of which Islamic beliefs and symbols were used in the sacralization of the conflict. Her study focuses on the central themes of the war rhetoric, mainly the justification of the war and the mobilization of the Iranian population for warfare. As a result of her analysis, Gieling hopes to "contribute to a better understanding of the way Islam is used for political action in Iran" (1). In order to investigate this topic, Gieling adopts a content analysis approach. She analyzes the speeches concerning the war by the ruling elite of Iran, which she defines as those individuals able to frequently transmit positions on foreign policy to unknown persons.
Gieling begins the book with a brief chronological overview of the Iran-Iraq war. In this chapter she details the origins of the conflict, Iraqi offensives and Iranian counterattacks, the role of the international community, the political, economic and social effects of the war on Iran, and the cease-fire negotiations. Gieling then discusses the Islamic theological and doctrinal issues dealing with war among Muslims and how Iranian leaders used these concepts to convey their belief that the war was fought in line with Islamic doctrine. In particular, Gieling looks at how Iranian leaders used Islamic Shî`a beliefs to justify a war they fought against other Muslims and to mobilize the Iranian people to fight against these Muslims. She argues that Iranian leaders justified the war and considered it a jihâd because it was a defense against an attack on Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic republic by Saddâm Husayn, whom they regarded as belonging to the category of bughât or dissenter. She concludes that waging war against Iraq was "therefore justified on grounds that fighting the bughât falls into the category of jihad" (50).
Gieling then looks at specific Qur'ânic terms and notions that played a significant role in Iranian war rhetoric. She argues that Khumaynî divided the war into two sides - Islam and kufr, thus making clear that the war was a religious conflict instead of simply a territorial dispute. For the Iranian leadership, kufr represented all the states and ideologies which opposed the Islamic republic and its ideology. According to Gieling, kufr was essential in drawing the boundary between the Islamic republic and its enemies. As she states, "kufr was used frequently for non-Muslims and for Muslims like Saddâm Husayn, Saddâm-I kâfir (Saddâm the unbeliever)" (82).
Gieling also argues that the Iranian leadership drew on important historical analogies. She notes that the leaders often compared the war to the wars fought by the Prophet in that they were fought to prevent the destruction of Islam. The leadership also drew on the Karbalâ' paradigm. Husayn and his struggles for Islam were held up as a model for Iranians, while Yazid, the alleged murderer of Husayn known for his anti-Islamic attitude, was identified with Saddâm Husayn. As Gieling concludes, "Iranian leaders sacralized the war, by identifying with historical figures who are venerated or, in contrast, despised much in Shî`î belief, but also by association with historical Islamic events in order to make clear that the war with Iraq had strong resemblances to these events" (130).
Gieling notes that there was a significant universalist and religious-national dimension to Iranian war rhetoric. The war was justified because it threatened the survival of the Islamic republic and the universal aspects of the Islamic revolution, mainly the spread of Islam to other countries. Gieling argues, however, that when Iranian leaders talked about Islam it was in reference to `their' Islam, that which was observed in the Islamic republic. Religious remarks were also sometimes tainted with nationalist sentiments. As Gieling notes, "Nationalist remarks by leaders had a religious basis and focused on the idea that Iran was the Islamic country par excellence" (149).
Gieling also analyzes the religious arguments which Iranian leaders used in opposition to peace and those they used to justify their acceptance of UN resolution 598. Gieling argues that Khumaynî, in his speeches, emphasized that peace with the Iraqi regime was against the principles of Islam since it would be peace with immoral people. As Iranian fortunes soured, however, the leaders focused on new messages to pave the way for a cease fire. For example, the leaders drew on the treaty of Hudaybiya concluded between Muhammad and the Meccans in which peace was made with unbelievers to ensure progress. In fact, Gieling argues that the leaders presented the UN resolution as ensuring the survival of the republic and the spreading of the revolution.
Saskia Gieling does a good job supporting her claim that the Iranian leaders sacralized the Iran-Iraq war. She shows how important beliefs and symbols were incorporated into speeches to justify and mobilize the populace for war. It is clear that she has performed extensive research on the subject and has drawn from numerous speeches to support her arguments. Gieling's conclusion, however, merely rehashes her argument and fails to extend it further. While it is interesting to learn the specific methods Iranian leaders employed to sacralize the war, her work is more descriptive than analytical. She does not address important issues such as whether or not the rhetoric was in line with the Iranian leaders' true beliefs or was it merely used as a tool to motivate the people. Similarly, she never addresses the impact that the sacralization of the war had on the people of Iran. While readers learn about the symbols and beliefs involved, they are left guessing about the impact that these symbols and beliefs had on Iranians. The reader never learns if religion was truly a driving force for the Iranian population during the war or if it can be extrapolated that religion has played a similar role in the lives of Iranians in the years since the war.