Customer Reviews

Waterloo: New Perspectives: The Great Battle Reappraised

5 star:		(13)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(7)

 

 

Having read everything I can on the Waterloo battle I still find this book to be absolutely essential. I've read the critics who fault the author on many levels but I must say that he answers several questions that literally no other author has thus far addressed.
1) Why did Picton die crying, "Rally the Highlanders?" Were not the British lines indestructable?
2) How did a few companies of British Guards hold Hougamont against most of a French corps? After all, didn't the German and Nassau troops flee in terror? (see Jac Weller et al)
3) Why did the French Army fall apart and flee for their lives when the Middle Guard was repulsed, yet most could not see farther than twenty feet on the smoke filled battle field? Could it have had something to do with Ziethen's advance, ignored even in the otherwise excellent 'Waterloo Companion'?
4) Did Napoleon really lie about Grouchy's arrival - or did the attack by the Prussians on the Nassau forces on Wellington's left make him think Grouchy truly had arrived?
Until at least one other author addresses these questions I submit that Hamilton Williams is the man to read. Not to mention the fact that his commentary reads like an adventure story and his account of the battle is quite simply the best so far written by anyone.
The attacks on H-W by Peter Hofshroyer should also be taken with a large grain of salt. I was shocked by that until I realized htat H-W stole a march on him by getting to print first with what was certainly the first English language account of the battle to give proper credit to the Dutch Belgians, Prussians and various Germans.
This book belongs in any serious military history collection and truly does offer a "new perspective".

I am the author. I wish to answer the sustained attacks on my books over the last fifteen years by Micheal Le Vean et als. This man and his friends have spent years attacking my books and defaming me, they do so because I would not take part in and opposed their undemocratic coup d'etat to oust Robert Snibbe as president of the Napoleonic Society of America in 1994. Le Vean evens quotes the late Col. Elting to discredit me putting words into his mouth, which cannot now be disputed. Their friend and colleague Peter Hofshroer and his `partner' David Hollins also try to denigrate my work, in Hofshroer's case my book came out first and stole his thunder vis a vis the Prussians , Dutch-Belgian and Germans true role in the Campaign.I have been severely disabled for the last thirty years due to a spinal injury and now a severe heart and lung condition from being housebound and it's been too traumatic for me to counter their lies until now. I cannot, however, continue to accept this venomous spite from these persons without answering them as it's embarrassing to my family. Many people have faulted my sources, (quite rightly) and I have been too unwell to answer but I do so now.
I was approached by Arms and Armour press in 1991 on the recommendation of two historians that I had corresponded with for many years. I was commissioned to write a book about the fall of Napoleon and Waterloo. This I did. However, in 1993, seven weeks before my manuscript was due to be handed in, I had a panicked editor on my doorstep who said that he needed a book on Waterloo and to scrap "the politics"! Being a first time author I was coerced in to starting my manuscript again from scratch, either that or they said they would not publish it. In six weeks I wrote New Perspectives from start to finish, culling it from the original work; Writing, assembling photographs and maps and proof reading this "new work in just six weeks was huge undertaking and one I have never been happy with. It meant that many of my citations were either copied wrongly or numbered incorrectly. I was not even allowed a bibliography on the grounds of cost so I tried to cite as many works in the footnotes as possible. The bibliography appeared in my other book "The Fall of Napoleon" published a few weeks later. This was the first part of my original book, the second part (unpublished) was the machinations leading to Napoleon's return from Elba and King Murat's campaign against Austria in 1815; Waterloo and St.Helena (unpublished) being the last part. Thirty years work cut up and badly produced. Such is the power of the publisher. I also cringed at what the PR said on the jacket, but there again I had no say. Having been disabled for over three decades, I have spent my enforced isolation in researching Napoleonic archives(cited in "The Fall of Napoleon") and obtaining international accounts of the period, mainly by correspondence. Due to my injuries, I have been able to devote all my time to studying rather than being a `part-time' author/researcher with a full-time occupation. After a most vitriolic personal attack by the above named critics, I suffered a severe heart attack in 1994 and withdrew from writing anymore books as I am not well enough to fight back against such personal vindictiveness that follows a publication and the game did not seem to be worth the candle. I also did not feel like answering their personal libels and slanders as to my private life as this is an old trick to make me look guilty by having perpetually to justify myself and therefore look at fault by doing so. Finally, as to my veracity, I was made a Fellow of the International Napoleon Society in 1996 and I was awarded its highest award The Legion of Merit in 2001, for my lifetime services to Napoleonic history. If anyone is in doubt as to the veracity of this, they need only contact the INS or go to their website www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/officers.htm. May I take this opportunity to thank all those readers who have judged my books on their merit and have not been swayed by all the venom generated against me.

I purchased this book precisely because it is one one of the few volumes still in print with anything close to full coverage of the Waterloo campaign, and with more or less the least amount of identity politics. Despite all the author's plugging of his own books-to-come and his claims, which are a good deal too much for the dust jacket and all, the book collapses on simply being a reasonably accurate accurate account of (mostly) the battles of Quatre-Bras and Waterloo (among the French, British, and Dutch/German/Belgian allies). There simply isn't anything terribly new or controversial in his book and I disagree with Peter Hofschroer's remark about its content being thrown in doubt, all other issues with him notwithstanding. The content is still too derivative, too close to previous works and experience (the Siborne, for example) for that to be the case.

The interested reader is challenged to find another volume with the same amount of coverage of the Battle of Quatre-Bras, for example. The author, it appears in parts of the book, does not attempt as much coverage of those areas with which were not evidently well researched (The Prussian contibution, perhaps thus some of Mr Hofschroer's vitriolics). The author does indeed venture to make make his opinions and interpretations, some of which the reader has to take with a grain of salt, but that is his authorial prerogative. We see that Mr Hofschroer clearly enjoys his privilege as well. The author's account is, overall and despite the criticism, surprisingly balanced. The writing is usually good and entertaining. Hamilton-Williams account is by no means a "fiction." I still find his attempts a good deal more useful in guiding me a little closer to the truth than the massive omissions so common in other volumes still in print which purport to cover the Waterloo campaign.

Personally I am tired of hearing all the petty squabbling among historians, amateur and some (huh-hum) professional, over who really won Waterloo, and worse yet the endless bickering among pedantic source hunters. When the reader who has access to enough of the excellent volumes and materials on the subject becomes fairly expert enough, he or she can cross check the common stories, narratives, or sources of quotes, most often without having to be a source hunter. There is criticism, even polemics, and then there is character assassination. I have yet to find a reasonable published account which proves D. H-W deliberately falsified his written account anywhere of the Waterloo campaign. I will wait to hear the author defend himself first before I pass judgement.

Moreover, take with more than just a grain of salt the many unprofessional reviews made by one "Michael La Vean" on this and David Hamilton-Williams other page. They smack of cheap personal vendetta and not anything resembling reasonable criticism. One wonders if they were to research Mr La Vean's own claims (if that is his real name) as to his identity and credentials what would turn up, if anything. I do not believe that a fellow of the International Napoleonic society would engage in ceaseless juvenile ranting as he has done on this site, making such serious and unsupported claims of his own. Furthermore, his methods are of such a common variety internet persona that he almost seems as if to materialize again and again in the guise of a reader from West Point, or from Moscow, London, Brussels, or who knows what other place names with any relevence to matters of Napoleonic military history.

Mr. Hamilton Williams analyzes the entire hundred days campaign in a catholic and imperious manner. What is most striking about his work are the many levels at which it can be read. At the most rudimentary level, the book provides an elegantly written and clearly presented account of the factual events of the hundred days campaign.

Woven in to this factual narrative are nuggets of analysis. Mr. Hamilton-Williams draws unorthodox yet reasonable conclusions about the hundred days campaign. One of the more controversial arguments the book posits suggests that Waterloo was lost due to the incompetence of Napoleon Bonaparte's subordenates, and not the failures of Napoleon himself. And this suggestion does not lack merit. When he returned from Elba, Napoleon was faced with grave disadvantages; some self wrought and others unavoidable. Most dicisive (argues Hamilton-Williams) was the loss of Marshal Berthier, Bonaparte's long time (nearly 20 year's) Chief of Staff. Without Berthier's gift of clear translation of the often garbled and confusing verbal orders of Bonaparte, the cogs of the French military machine began to fall apart, and grave miscommunications occured, miscommunications that led to the downfall of Bonaparte at Waterloo. The other disadvantage worthy of recap was the loss of Marshal Murat, Bonaparte's brilliant cavalry captain. It was his absence, an absence caused by Bonaparte, that resulted in the dismal failure of Marshal Ney's cavalry charge at Waterloo, and the consequent failure of Napoleon Bonaparte at that battle. All of this is fully and more elegantly explained in Mr. Hamiliton-Williams penetrating and scholarly work.

In short, Mr. Hamilton-Williams has provided in <I>Waterloo: New Perspectives</I> an historical gem, that should be read by all scholars of the Napoleonic era.

The reviews of this book on this site are causing me some concern. It seems that the full story about this author and his books has not yet reached everybody. Originally, this was to be the first volume of a trilogy. Volume two did appear, but the publication of volume three was cancelled. This was because information about the author, his activities and the veracity of his research became public knowledge. The publishing director who contracted this author subsequently left his job.

One could outline certain of this author's activities here, the reasons he uses several false names and his personal history. However, that may be considered irrelevant to the issue, which is the veracity of his claims about the Sibornes and the depth and accuracy of his research. Those issues were dealt with in the "First Empire" magazine some years ago and these back issues are available on magweb.com. Potential purchasers of this book are referred to the following articles:

1) "Were the Sibornes Frauds?" in First Empire # 23. This article points out that the allegations against the Sibornes are unsubstantiated and much of the "evidence" produced by this author fabricated. In fact, William Siborne was the target of attacks by the first Duke of Wellington for being "too pro-Prussian" in his account, so the story of Siborne's work being part of a British establishment conspiracy is just that - a story belonging to the realms of fiction.

2) "Waterloo New Perspectives & The Hanoverian Archives" in First Empire # 25. This article examines the file references and contents as given in the book in question and compares them with what is actually in the Hanoverian Archives. It comes to the conclusion that the author invented the file nos. and contents to support his fallacious arguments. Furthermore, a catalogue of the archive's contents has been published and reference to that will show that the author's references are pure fantasy.

3) "Waterloo New Perspectives & The Siborne Manuscripts" in "First Empire" # 26. The author of the book in question made a major issue about how long he had spent researching in Siborne's unpublished papers held in the British Library in London and used material he claimed he had found in them to support his "conspiracy theory". The writer of this article examined the same set of papers and concluded that Hamilton-Williams had again invented files nos. and referred to non-existent documents to support his fallacious arguments.

One could say much more about this author, his books and their contents. The above articles however address the main points and show that this work is very questionable to say the least. It should certainly not be regarded as a work of non-fiction.

This book provides an excellent account of the entire Waterloo campaign and not just the Battle of Waterloo itself. The author touches on the injustices created by Siborne's model & account of the battle that badly portrayed the non-British contingents of the Allied army. Unfortunately, Sibornes account became accepted as historical fact.

The book briefly covers the demise of Napoleon in 1814 (and the treachery of key people in this), his return, and the intriguing political manoeurving and squabbling amongst the Allies at the Congress of Vienna. It was perhaps Napoleon's misfortune that the Allied leaders or representatives were gathered in one place to reach agreement on what action to take against him.

The author gives a good account of the initial French thrust into Belgium and the twin battles of Ligny & Quatre Bras. The author shows that Wellington's slow reaction to the invasion could have cost him dearly if troops of the Netherlands did not decide on their own initiative to hold the position at Quatre Bras. Marshal Ney is given more credit than what normally is given to him in that he had very little time to familiarize himself with his forces & disposition, and that his forces were still closing up to be able to launch an early attack on the Quatre Bras cross roads. However, it was probably Napoleon's biggest errors in not totally confiding with his Marshals, ultimately leading to the mishandling of d'Erlon's troops (that could have decisively defeated the Prussians at Ligny) and delaying the decision to pursue the defeated Prussians. The author also emphasizes Napoleon seems handicapped by the lack of presence of his old Chief of Staff.

The Battle of Waterloo itself is well covered off and the author draws on various accounts and references of the battle. The author gives credit where it is due, especially the non-British Allied forces whose actions are well covered and explained and thereby dispelling many myths that have arisen. In fact, all participants in the campaign are given good coverage and evaluation. Overall, the book shows how closely fought the Battle of Waterloo was, and that d'Erlon's main assault almost succeeded in breaking Wellington's line (if it wasn't for the perfect timing of the British cavalry that was Uxbridge's brilliance not Wellington's). There has been much controversy over the use of French cavalry charges, but as the author points out, Napoleon had nothing else but with to maintain pressure on Wellington's line and this had worked previously at Eylau against the Russians.

The books tends to show there are key moments of decision or indecision that may win or lose a battle/campaign. e.g. Rebecque's & Perpocher's decision to hold Quatre Bras, the tussle for the use of d'Erlon's troops at Quatre Bras or Ligny, the Prussian retreat to Wavre rather than along their lines of communication and supply, the delay in the pursuit of the Prussians, the perfect timing of British cavalry, the delay in the use of the Guard, Steinmetz attack at the hinge of Napoleon's army etc. Hamilton-Williams sums up that Napoleon lost the battle but ultimately his downfall was caused by the treachery of Tallyerand and Fouche in Paris and Napoleon's refusal to use force to ensure his power was maintained.

I found this to be an indepth, well researched analysis of the Waterloo campaign and a thoroughly enjoyable one.

This is a very well written book with lots of interesting new ideas about the Waterloo Campaign of 1815 and a broad perspective that goes beyond the usual British and French-centered approach. Unfortunately the author tries too hard to find controversy and unjustly besmirches the reputation of some good 19th-century historians. But the real - and ultimately fatal - flaw in this book is the inaccurate source notes. In the course of my own research I have checked most of the footnotes and found that very frequently the sources cited by the author are either not related to the issue in the text (and thus do not provide evidence to support the author's allegations) or - even worse - they actually say the opposite of what he has claimed. Such unreliable footnoting greatly reduces the book's usefulness, since you can't be sure if the author actually has any evidence to back his "new perspectives." This is a shame, because the book is a good read and does offer new ideas. I think the book was very hastily written to meet a deadline, and I hope that someday the author prepares a new, carefully revised edition with accurate footnotes. If I could trust what he was saying, I would change my review from two stars to five.

I found Hamilton-Williams' book to be most enlightening, despite certain flaws in its source material. To my knowledge, and I may be incorrect, Waterloo: New Perspectives was among the first english-language books to seriously challenge the long-held notion that the British defeated Napoleon at Mont St. Jean. Simply by challenging the status quo, well-founded or not, Hamilton-Williams appears to have made the battle of la Belle Alliance once again an issue of intense controversy. Whether "meticulously researched" or not, I remain in doubt as to whether subsequent works on the battle emphasizing the Dutch, German and Prussian roles would ever have been written. As for the account itself, it seems well-enough written work, and very informative in areas where citation is not so necessary, such as the depictions of the musket smoke clouding the battlefield, and descriptions of the horrors of receiving artillery fire. The general narrative is also good, especially regarding the Prussians' travails.

I live close to Hanover and have visited the archives on several occasions. Below are my conclusions:

The research done for this book is far from meticulous or painstaking. On the contrary, it is most questionable. For instance, not one of the author's references to the Hanover Archives actually checks out.

The relevant files in the Hanover Archives are:

Hann. 38D - Records of the King's German Legion 1803-1816

Hann. 41 - Files of the General Command, etc.

Hann. 48a I - Army Lists and Journals of the Hanoverian Forces, etc.

On page 372, footnote 25 of this book, the author makes reference to the 'Dornberg MS', saying it is in Hann. 41 XXI 150-6. That is not quite correct. It is in Hann. 41 XXI 152 (6). This mistake could be excused as a typing error. However, the author claims that this file contains 'Major-General Dornberg's own account of the transmission of Grant's information.' It does not.

On page 375, footnote 54, we are told that this 'Dornberg MS' is the same one referred to by the German historian Pflugk-Harttung in his "Vorgeschichte". It is not. Hamilton-Williams is confusing two different MSS. There is one in the Hanover Archives and there was once another in the Berlin Archives that went missing in 1945. Its file ref. was VI. E 58. Pflugk-Harttung printed it in his book, so it would be an easy matter to compare one with the other, if, indeed, the author had ever been to Hanover and referred to the original document.

On page 379, footnote 36, we are told that the 'Notizen MS', 'General Commando MS' and 'Kielmansegge MS' can be found in Hann 38D. They are not in that file and do not appear to exist anywhere in the Hanover Archive. However, these MSS are cited in Beamish's "History of the King's German Legion".

On page 387, footnote 17, we are referred to the 'Baring MS' and are told this can be found in Hann. 41 XXI, Nr. 99-137. It is not there. Baring's report on the Battle of Waterloo can be found in Hann. 41, XXI 152 (8). Again, this is not a mere typing error. The quote the author uses does not come from the report held in Hanover, but from a published article based on a different document, namely Baring's journal. This can be found on page 106 of Pflugk-Harttung's book "Belle Alliance".

On page 393, footnote 7, the author claims there is more from Baring in Hann. 38D, Nrs. 230-43. There is not. The files contain a history of the artillery of the KGL, a history of the expedition to Spain in 1808, a history of the KGL's documents, correspondence and orders, but nothing from Baring.

On page 393, footnotes 2 and 4, we are referred to the Wynecken and Heise MSS in Hanover. There are no such MSS deposited there. However, Beamish cites these MSS in his book.

On page 394, footnote 10, we are referred to a 'Report of the 5th Battalion' in Hann. 48A Nrs. 100-30. This is an incorrect reference. 48A does not exist.

One is left with the impression that this author has never been to the Hanover Archives and has never referred to the original documents, but has merely lifted quotes from printed sources and then attached a likely sounding archive file no. to them.

Despite the controversy over this book it is defintly worth the read. A reader may check the sources as he deems fit and make use of other texts. The main criticism that come from others has been explained by the other and much of the vitriol may indeed come from sour grapes.

Read it, compare it to others and make your own conclusions. This reader highly recommends it