The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in The War for America, 1775-1783 (Contributions in Military Studies) [Hardcover]

Dave Richard Palmer (Author)

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Review

“By any standard, Dave Palmer's book is a little gem. The stated purpose is to uphold the thesis that, contrary to the traditional view, George Washington developed and successfully pursued a conscious, rational, and effective strategy in his direction of the military operations of the American Revolution. The book not only accomplishes this purpose superbly but it also renders a number of other important services.”–Parameters

Product Details

• Hardcover: 229 pages
• Publisher: Greenwood Press (February 20, 1975)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0837175313
• ISBN-13: 978-0837175317
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.6 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #657,529 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars General George Washington: Gifted Strategist, or Just Lucky?, June 5, 2000

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Capt Keith Kopets, USMC - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in The War for America, 1775-1783 (Contributions in Military Studies) (Hardcover)

Has history shortchanged General George Washington, the strategist? Dave Richard Palmer thinks so. "Historians have talked around rather than to the subject.... Washington's generalship and the war's strategic framework are inextricably spliced together.... It was he who executed it and, in most instances, planned it. It is he, therefore, who should receive credit or criticism" (p. xviii; 76).

The historiography of the Revolution offers a wide range of opinions regarding American strategy in the war and the role of Washington as strategist. Depending on which author you read, claims Palmer, Washington was "bold or cautious, brilliant or bumbling, judicious or just plain lucky" (p. xix). This debate provides the impetus for Way of the Fox. Palmer believes the issue is much more complex than the existing literature would have us believe; likewise, Washington possessed a much greater strategic acumen than history has credited him with.

Palmer dedicates part I to exploring the "various ingredients of strategy as they acted to shape the conduct of the Revolutionary War" (p. xix). Part II chronicles the actual planning and execution of American military strategy during the war. Although a sound approach, I have a problem with Palmer's execution: he gives equal weight to both parts of the book.

Part I begins with a general discussion of eighteenth century military strategy and tactics and ends with a specific description of the situation in North America in 1775. Although Palmer is a good writer, he offers six chapters of deep prose where one chapter would have sufficed. His description and analysis of the opposing sides in the American Revolution, particularly that of the English, is the only passage truly germane to part II.

Palmer's description of the British high command is on the mark. London fielded an incompetent war team that deserves much of the blame for the outcome of the war. Palmer correctly indicts the most culpable subjects: King George III, Prime Minister Sir Frederick North, and Secretary of State for Colonies Lord George Germain. Of the three, none "stands charged at the bar of history for possession of any unusual degree of wisdom" (p. 34). Palmer profiles Lord Germain, the central point for strategic direction, as an "ex-army officer convicted by a court-martial of malfeasance in the face of the enemy during the Battle of Minden in 1759" (pp. 35-36).

Part I closes with an assertion and a question. First, Washington could not have achieved either of his goals by pursuing a patently defensive strategy. America went to war with England because it sought territorial aggrandizement and independence. Both goals required aggressive action by Washington. However, Palmer asks, did America emerge free and enlarged because of or in spite of the strategy it pursued?

Part II is the meat of Way of the Fox. Here, Palmer neatly divides the war into four phases: (1) April 1775 to June 1776, when the Americans could attack without fear and had nothing to lose; (2) July 1776 to December 1777, the period when George Washington could not afford to risk his outnumbered Continental Army in pitched battle with the British; (3) January 1778 to October 1781, after the French intervened and provided a legitimacy to the American cause while also counterbalancing the Royal Navy; and (4) November 1781 to December 1783, the negotiation period when the Americans struggled to "win the peace." According to Palmer, General Washington consciously recognized each phase and adopted his strategy accordingly: "In the first period which called for audacity, he was audacious; when the second cried caution, he turned cautious; as decisive victory became feasible, he thirsted for a decision; when events after Yorktown required steadfastness, he became the nation's solid anchor [p. 202]."

General Palmer is a soldier and a scholar. He taught military history at West Point and among his other books focusing on military strategy, he is most famous for his work on the Vietnam War: Summons of the Trumpet (1978).

So, how does Way of the Fox grade out? Palmer presents some valid arguments. Yes, the vast literature of the war generally overlooks Washington's performance as America's principal strategist. General Washington is generally portrayed as a figurehead--an amateur who, with more inspiration and luck than skill, preserved the Continental Army and outlasted the British. Way of the Fox corrects this oversight while showing that yes, "even before the word [strategy] was coined, George Washington had become this nation's preeminent strategist" (p. 204). Although Palmer over generalizes and often lacks the in-depth analysis to carry his arguments to completion, Way of the Fox still passes scholarly inspection. In sum, as the only single-volume work devoted to American military strategy, Palmer's book deserves a space next to Don Higginbotham's War of American Independence (1971) in the war literature of the American Revolution.