Customer Reviews

West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace (Civil War America)

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Building a million plus man army is a gut wrenching task. In 1861, two nations set out to do this while fighting a civil war. During the building process, any military experience becomes a critical asset. Veterans of the War with Mexico, members of the militia, and graduates of private military schools struggle with half-remembered, misunderstood or just plain wrong ideas. However bad they are better than no idea of what to do. At ground zero stand the graduates of West Point, the only fully trained professional military either side has. West Pointers set the professional standard for training and conduct during the American Civil War. Their efforts convert ill-trained armed mobs into veteran armies. Their military thinking controls the military direction and application of the armies they trained. What they considered right and proper conduct became the right and proper way to fight the war. West Pointers, for good or ill, controlled and conducted the American Civil War. While they have nothing to do with the political decisions that lead to war, they have everything to do with waging that war.
Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh brings us a look at how West Point learned about war, trained the cadets and how these lessons applied during the Civil War. Starting with the armed semi-trained mobs during the War of 1812, the author covers the development of America's professional officers. The War with Mexico vindicated the changes after 1814 giving the army a solid foundation while determining the direction taken into the 1850s. West Pointers understanding of moral, leadership and logistics allowed armies to develop. The daunting paperwork requirement of these armies was second nature to these men. They, more than any group, stepped forward and brought order out of chaos.
This is a scholarly, well-footnoted book. The author has many ideas that he supports with logical documented arguments. 40+ pages of footnotes with a 20 page Bibliography testify to the depth of research that went into this book. However, this is a very readable book. The author writes well, having an excellent readable way of presenting that never makes reading this book a chore.
This excellent background book will increase the reader's ability to understand the decisions based on shared training and experiences that determined the direction taken. This book truly tells us how "the old army thus served both in war and in peace".

I listened to the audio version of this book and found it to be a valuable and enjoyable study. It added greatly to my understanding of the Civil War's leadership -- on both sides -- and I learned a lot about the education of nineteenth century military officers. It is a scholarly book that is written with clarity and directness (and an absence of jargon). I think that serious scholars of the conflict -- as well as the armchair historian -- will benefit from reading it (or listening to it). It certainly reshaped my understanding of these iconic American figures. Also, I imagine that people with a West Point connection will get a kick out of the sections on the school's curriculum in the first part of the nineteenth century. This book belongs on the bookshelves -- or in the MP3 players -- of anyone who wants a full view of the Civil War.

The negative customer reviews don't recognize the book's interesting research, as seen in the long list of positive reviews given by real Civil War historians. Furthermore, unlike many Civil War books, Hsieh's study is relatively short and can serve as a good introduction to Civil War history, without making the reader go through an extremely long book. The author made a real effort to make the book readable to people new to the field of Civil War history.

I am not a Civil War scholar. However, I have come to question the scholarship displayed in this work.

I am somewhat familiar with the performance of Phil Sheridan. So I was startled when I find Hsieh saying, "...at the battle of the Wilderness (May 5-7), Maj. Gen. Sheridan and Big. Gen Wilson, ill-served Grant's larger campaign by mismanaging the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry force. That failure caused Hancock to retain a portion of his corps as a reserve to foil a Confederate surprise of his flank - a nonexistent threat that could have been ignored if the cavalry had more effectively conducted its screening and reconnaissance duties."

There are some problems here. Grant, in his memoirs, says, "During the afternoon (5/7) Sheridan sent Gregg's division to Todd's Tavern is search of Wilson. ... he found Wilson engaged with a superior (Confederate cavalry) force supported by infantry and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge." In this quote Grant seems to say the cavalry was doing an effective job of screening.

Dr. Coffey in his book "Sheridan Lieutenants" says, "The intensity of fighting on the Union left led Hancock , whose II Corps' flank the cavalry protected, to believe that his flank had been turned. This prompted Meade to rein in the troopers, forcing them to yield the important crossroads of Todd's Tavern." The fighting may have seemed more intense than it was. Hancock may not have been familiar with the increased volume of fire which resulted from recently equipping the cavalry with Spencer repeaters.

Later, Hsieh says, "After all, the great failing of the Union cavalry in the Overland campaign was the failure to completely conduct screening and reconnaissance functions (Sheridan chose to neglect his task) that predated the rise of Spencer-armed cavalrymen fighting as shock troops."

Here there is a thorough lack of understanding of the differing philosophies on the use of cavalry. Grant fought his western campaigns using cavalry primarily for raids. In his Vicksburg campaign he used no cavalry during the heart of his campaign from May 1 to May 19. However, during that period he sent Grierson on a 600 mile raid to disrupt Confederate command and control.

Starr in his "Union Cavalry in the Civil War" vol. II quotes from Grant's memoirs, "In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more ... under a thorough leader." As a result Grant gave Sheridan command of the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps.

Perhaps Sheridan's greatest mistake(?) was his May 9-24 Yellow Tavern raid. The impetus of this raid was a acrimonious confrontation between Sheridan and Meade regarding the role of cavalry. After this confrontation Meade walked to Grant's tent to tell Grant that Sheridan had said he could whip Stuart if Meade would turn him loose. Grant remarked, "Did Sheridan say that? ... Let him start right out and do it." So Grant told Meade to issue orders, which Meade did.

Meade as commander of the Army of the Potomac chose not to withhold any part of the cavalry command for screening and reconnaissance. In this period of May 1864 as commander of the cavalry corps Sheridan did what he was told. He was not commander-in-chief of the army nor the commander of the Army of the Potomac. He was responsible only for the cavalry corps. Nowhere other than Hsieh's book does one find a comment that Sheridan was insubordinate during this period.

These errors leave me questioning the quality of scholarship in the remainder of the book.

This book is a waste of time, money, and eyeballs. If you're interested in the civil war, look to Shelby Foote.