Scott McClellan was given information to relay to the press about the Valerie Plame incident. Two years later he became convinced he'd been set up to spread lies - maybe not directly by Bush, but certainly by Rove and Libby, and encouraged by Cheney. That was his apparent tipping point. McClellan rethought the whole tenure of his association with the Bush Administration in Washington, began to have epiphanies, and formed new opinions. He doesn't tell us much we didn't already know or suspect, but boy does he tell it. This time around it's coming from a trusted insider who followed Bush to Washington from Texas. Here are a few of his observations:
*Bush believes his own spin (better known as [...]) and demonstrates a remarkable lack of inquisitiveness.
*Bush favored propaganda over honesty in selling the war. Cheney steered war policy behind the scenes, leaving no fingerprints.
*Bush and his team repeatedly shaded the truth, manipulated public opinion, and sold the Iraq situation in such a way that the use of force appeared to be the only feasible option.
*Contradictory evidence was ignored or discarded, caveats or qualifications to arguments were downplayed or dropped, and a dubious al-Qaida connection to Iraq was played up.
*The Bush administration didn't check their political maneuverings in at the door after the win - instead, they maintained a permanent campaign mode, run largely by Rove.
*Presidential initiatives from health care programs to foreign invasions were regularly devised, named, timed and launched with one eye (or both eyes) on the electoral calendar.
*Operating in the campaign mode means never explaining, never apologizing, never retreating. Unfortunately, that strategy also means never reflecting, never reconsidering, never compromising.
*Bush is out of touch, operates in a political bubble, and stubbornly refuses to admit mistakes.
*The press is partially responsible for giving Bush soft questions and enabling the president.
*Despite the expose, McClellan describes Bush as a man easily intelligent enough to be President, possessing personal charm, wit, and enormous political skills, who did not consciously set out to engage in these destructive practices.
*McClellan asserts, "What I do know is that war should only be waged when necessary and the Iraq war was not necessary."
Let's analyze this a little. All administrations - all humans - try to present themselves in the best possible light, usually to the point of self-deception. Bush insisted from the beginning on certain points of discipline in his administration and under his guidance they did it better - in my opinion, beyond better, extending to abuse of executive power. I don't dislike all the items on Bush's agenda, but it's hard to tolerate a presentation so one-sided it borders on dishonesty. I think McClellan is right in that Bush successfully sold us a bill of goods on Iraq. Even Wolfowitz conceded, "Iraq's supposed cache of WMD's had never been the most compelling casus belli. It was simply one of several. For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, WMD's, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on."
So it wasn't WMD's. Bush was influenced by his war cabinet and others to invade Iraq to seize a valuable piece of real estate. This power grab was going to change the balance of power in the Middle East, change history, and create a legacy for Bush - but he forgot to read the history books. They demonstrate how many times we have attempted to democratize a country and failed - starting with the Philipines in 1898. After the Cold War ended, many democratized of their own accord - when they were ready. War is not a thing to initiate on a hunch.
"Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth or easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tide and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events."
- Winston Churchill
