10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
And by assertion and implication, what it doesn't know, April 19, 2010
This review is from: What Science Knows: And How It Knows It (Hardcover)
Franklin doesn't emphasize (although it's implicit in the Preface) what I think is the most important thing to understand about science, which is, we have nothing better and indeed nothing else nearly so good. What Franklin--who is a mathematician and a philosopher--does say at the end of the book is "We cannot believe that what science knows is all there is."
In mathematics his conclusion would be termed "true, but trivial." Other than this however I am in substantial agreement with Franklin's observations and conclusions--that is, when he comes to a conclusion, which understandably isn't always the case. Okay to some specifics:
Can we know that 2 + 2 indubitably equals 4? It has long been the case that the conclusions of logic and mathematics--deductions--follow with certainty from premises or axioms through correct reasoning. But I've always been a little skeptical when the chain of reasoning gets long. Obviously only a mathematician knows--if he even knows for certain--that a two hundred page proof is correct. How Franklin handles this conundrum is to posit something he calls "the practical certainty of normal sense perception." (p. 156) Two plus two does equal four with "only" practical certainty since it is always possible with a kind of Orwellian brain washing that we could all think that five is the correct answer.
Regardless of our sense perceptions, things are a lot less certain when the question is outside of math and logic. Inductive knowledge--the knowledge of science--as most of us know, and as Franklin affirms, is uncertain. Our knowledge of the "real" world, the empirical world, is probabilistic as, for example, are our weather forecasts.
Franklin identifies some enemies of science including Thomas Kuhn and the gaggle of postmodernists who believe that science is merely a "social construction." Franklin charges that "Postmodernism is not so much a theory as an attitude...an attitude of suspicion...unteachable suspicion." (p. 41) It is characterized by the notion that nothing is really known and if it were known it could not be communicated. (p. 43)
But the postmodernists have a point: nothing is certain in the empirical world: somebody may yet live forever. Who's to say? Theirs is a truly trivial point however and one that science acknowledges. After all science is not about certainty. Science is about extending our knowledge in an ever widening sphere that never pretends to reach some ultimate truth.
In Chapter 12, "Actually Existing Science: Institutions for Knowing," Franklin addresses the peer review journal process and shows how it is dependent upon factors that have nothing to do with science, such as personal rivalries, personality conflicts, lack of funding, lack of incentives for referees to be thorough, etc. Here we can clearly see a process that is more social than scientific. This, along with the long-running evidentiary crisis in string theory, gives comfort to the postmodern critique.
Where I think Franklin is wide of the mark is in his understanding of biological evolution. He writes "If the theory of evolution were suddenly found false, medicine, for example, would be virtually unaffected." (p. 220) Actually if evolution wasn't substantially true the relationship between pathogens, between parasites and hosts as well as the effect of drugs on microbes and people would have to be completely reexamined.
Further on Franklin expresses some doubt as to whether four billion years is sufficient time for "Darwinian evolution to achieve results." (pp. 224-225) Additionally Franklin suggests that DNA is insufficiently complex to account for the complexity of the phenotypes, noting that a large proportion of DNA is "junk" in which "a change in it makes no difference to the organism." But this is not correct since much of what was once called "junk DNA" actually signals whether something should be expressed or not. (p. 225) However Franklin does go on to acknowledge that there is more to the development of an organism than can be found in the DNA, including the folding actions of proteins and the effects of epigenetics.
Franklin seems to think there can be serious doubts about whether the burning of fossil fuels is contributing to the rise in the earth's temperature. I say "seems" because in reading his report on pages 229 to 235 it is hard to say for sure exactly where he stands personally. He does say, "In both evolution and climate change, the majority view of the scientific experts is well ahead. In neither case is there any known coherent alternative. But the complexities of the evidence are such that a higher standard of politeness to skeptics who raise serious problems would be well-advised." (p. 235)
In the final chapter, "Is That All There Is?", Franklin concludes (following Hume) that he is opposed to drawing ethical conclusions from what "is" scientifically. But Franklin goes on to accuse biologist E.O. Wilson of doing just that. Franklin quotes a passage from Wilson's book "Sociobiology" and then sums up Wilson's argument thusly: "We cannot know ethical truths (if there are any) except through the urgings of our back-of-the brain plumbing, therefore, we cannot know ethical truths at all." (p. 246) But what I think Wilson is saying is that knowledge of our biology (the limbic system, etc.) can help us to understand ethics. I see nothing in what Wilson has written that suggests he derives "ought" from "is."
Franklin asserts that "the death of a human is a tragedy but the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is merely a firework." (p. 250) He adds, "If the irreducible worth of persons is a fact, must the universe be substantially different from the picture that science alone gives of it?" (p. 251)
The irreducible worth of persons is not a fact; it is something we believe; and the explosion of a galaxy, lifeless or otherwise, is something more than fireworks while the death of a human being may or may not be a tragedy based on circumstances. Here I think Franklin has taken too narrow a view of the cosmos and confused science and ethics.
The World Is Not as We Think It Is
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10 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Saving Science, December 4, 2009
This review is from: What Science Knows: And How It Knows It (Hardcover)
This is a timely book for the future of Science.
The "enemies of Science", the modern irrationalists, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend, and the "pathetic French postmodernists", are finally nailed by Franklin in this "merciless exposé" with the generously acknowledged help of David Stove:
Against the Idols of the Age: and many others. Now the scientists themselves have become the danger to Science itself. Into a climate where the global warming "debate" has degenerated into biased reporting of data and ad hominem attacks on "deniers", Franklin breathes an air of calm and reason, as always, backed up by his own vast knowledge and detailed research.
Like the universe, Science is big, very, very big! But in the same way that space pervades the universe, a principle pervades Science to make it what it is. It is this principle that Franklin seeks and finds in this book. James Franklin is a professor of mathematics at the University Of New South Wales, profound philosopher and author, among other books, of The Science of Conjecture:
The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal and
Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia.
In the process of defining the principle of Science he offers a concise and enjoyable introduction to the vast field of Science in his justification of induction.
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