Customer Reviews

What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building

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I think I'll begin by addressing the two negative reviews posted thus far...

At no point in this book does Feldman argue that the U.S. should have replaced Hussein with another dictator. That kind of statement runs completely against everything contained in this book. In my opinion, only someone that had never read the book could make a claim like that.

As for the other review (posted by someone that simply pastes academic reviews onto Amazon), the view is presented that the U.S. in fact does not owe Iraq much of anything and claims that Feldman presents no argument to the contrary. This type of statement is also in the wrong.

Feldman takes the position in this book that since the U.S. is in Iraq and completely dismantled the government, there is an ethical obligation on the part of the U.S. to see the job finished. A finished job would be a functioning, self-reliant Iraq that can defend itself and promote individual liberties. This book goes about describing the set of ethics the U.S. should abide by.

A lot of people argue about Iraq today as if it were only George W. Bush's problem. This approach is terribly flawed. Iraq in 2003 was a product of (1) Saddam Hussein, and (2) EVERY U.S. PRESIDENT SINCE REAGAN. Washington has had a roller coaster of a ride with Iraq ever since the early 80's. Every decision made by the U.S. since then has contributed to how Iraq would eventually end up. Yes...Hussein is also to blame and should not be given a free pass, but neither should the U.S. As far as ethics go, we owe a huge deal to Iraq. Hussein would have most likely been defeated by Iran in the 80's had it not been for U.S. and other Western support. It's time the U.S. owned up to our decisions, regardless of whether or not George W. Bush went about it in a patently dishonest way.

In the end, Feldman presents an argument that is both ethical and pragmatic. I think his argument is the one that should ultimately be adopted. If you can get past your own partisan issues and listen to Feldman with an open mind, you'll come away with a much better understanding of Iraq and what to do about it.

This is not a discussion of what we owe Iraq, which Feldman states is a decent functioning government, but an analysis of the the issues involved in getting there.

The best parts, for me, were the examples from his experience such as the practical problems facing those who worked in the early occuption, his description of the Republican Palace, the meeting with the Lawyers Association.

The heart of the book is an analysis of the issues involved in achieving the goal such as authority, occupation vs. trusteeship, paternalism, elections, legitimacy/perceived legitimacy, etc.

Condoleezza Rice always takes the concept of "Nation Building" with pleasure into her mouth and tries to explain with frown to the audience how important this task is. The author Noah Feldman is an expert for this concept -- and NATION BUILDING also has his development history: On the occasion of the 1st World War the United Nations formulated guidelines which were still whisked a little with the ideology of the colonial time and carried a little of the gesture of a patriarchal guardianship into themselves, though. After the second World War one lost something of this arrogance and put as an aim into the centre only, that a nation, political ethically lagging behind (at that time Germany), should be brought by the introduction of democracy to the global community standard. Cases like Kosovo or East Timor seemed to confirm the correctness of such a target. In the case Iraq an additional thinking effort must be done. While Condoleezza Rice still compares Germany 1945 with present Iraq a little school girlishly and assumes that everything has to be fixed in the time window of four years, the expert Noah Feldman is there already a little more skeptical. Compare the educational level, the religion dependence, the power of the different population groupings and the complete missing of national feelings of guilt: these different factors forbid the comparison Iraq/Germany actually. [Nevertheless the Washington administration-rhetoric continues to do so.] Noah Feldman seems to recognize the clear difference: Because the wave of terror-acts is not tearing off. Has there been this in Germany, that police stations were classified as collaborator collection places and regularly blown up into the air? Has there been this in Germany 1945, that permanently seeped over the national boundaries from the neighboring countries Christian sympathizers to Germany, which wanted to help to cast out the Americans? NO! The USA have completely underestimated the forming strength of Islamic solidarity and the connected high aggression level . Since the debacle was got going worldwide visibly now (perhaps justified a little recklessly and wrongly)?, the USA owes to the Iraqi people, not to leave the country till at least safety is established against assassinations - this is the NEW, what Feldman is saying. Unfortunately, the installation of a constitution suffices not at all (like 1945-1949 in Germany). The production of a civilian safety as an afterwards defined aim will take up substantially more time or is successful never -- and ends with an out throw of American know-all battalions as formerly in Vietnam. Noah Feldman does not mention this point, he likes to see a positive future, not the flashbacks of nightmare-views. Of course we all hope, there soon will shine the sun of peace and freedom in Iraq -- and the US will take a break, being a global ethic police ...

"A republic to keep, not anarchy or utopia" is the zest of this book. The author strives to rationalize the futility of U.S.'s involvement in a flawed war. He discerns similarities and differences between the chaos in Iraq and those of Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Kosovo, East Timor, Algeria, Uganda, Ireland, Haiti, and Afghanistan.

The book spans 130 pages of well-read and logically evolving description of the heuristic process of nation building. It falls into three chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion.

The INTRODUCTION outlines the objectives of nation building by an occupying power, the relationship between the occupier and the occupied, in the era of democracy, and the mechanism of exit, through election and security safeguards to ensure durable and sovereign government that could maintain order and legitimacy.

Chapter 1, NATION BUILDING: OBJECTIVES, compares the objective of nation building during the Cold War of thwarting the threat of "total destruction" through a "rational-actor model" of states (Germany, Japan, N. Korea) to the present involvement to restoring "civil order" through a "non-state violence actor model" (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, E. Timor, and Somalia).

The absence of any rational model for the Iraq War that toppled a deterrable and strong government is considered a foreign policy blunder that created a failed state, threatening regional instability, with low odds of success of democracy without long, costly, and bloody US support.

The author contends that ethics and morality have a role in International affairs. He cites the examples of Kosovo and E. Timor to prove that Internationalization does not impose ethical comfort, but our national believes that "ethnic cleansing" is immoral lent the needed support.

Chapter 2, TRUSTEESHIP, PATERNALISM, AND SELF-INTEREST starts by the author's admission to the guilt of the U.S. of high-handed behavior that led to a "serious fix", the rash and mistaken disbanding of Iraqi army that created chaos, and the de-ba'thification order of Ambassador Bremer that alienated the middle class. With the absence of civil society, there is little hope to impose security. Hence comes the ethical obligation on the U.S. to produce order through monopolizing violence.

The author confesses that we do not know what we are doing, we do not understand the complexities of the Iraqi society and politics, and we are woefully unprepared for external nation building. He then delves into the modern history of international law in order legitimize occupation, as follows.

The Spanish War:
The Spanish canonists rationalized governing the Indians of the new world through Europeans' "wardship" on their behalf, on the bases that the Indians possess polities, law, religion, and are reasonable men entitled to rule themselves.

Before WWI:
The Annex of the Hague Convention of 1907, restricts the authority of the occupying power to restore order, until cessation of hostilities, without violating property, pillage forbidden, and tax collection for the benefit of the occupied state.

After WWI:
During the era of the League of Nations, trusteeship took the form of a sacred covenant to civilize "underdeveloped" countries until they become able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of modern world. This paternalistic approach entrusted the "tutelage" of the occupied to the occupier, which caused the failure of the British nation building of monarchy in Iraq after WWI. The British imported King Faisel from Arabia without legal legitimacy (Notice the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the past and present: money and oil).

After WWII:
During the United Nations era, trusteeship defines the relationship between principals and agent: settlor creates a trust; trustee confers control; beneficiary gain ability to self-rule. The political power is based on the representative's judgment, acting like an agent, regardless of the opinion of the beneficiary, acting like principals. The Principals ensure her interests are promoted through: freedom of speech, assembly (protest and march), participation, and election. This trusteeship is limited in time and with defined responsibility of supervision. It does not intend to civilize, but to build a self-running machine that can rule itself and protect sovereignty.

Although the author observes few glimpses of the Islamic tradition through "hauza", "shura", and "fatwa", the author has a blind spot for the immense influence of Islamic thinking in that part of the world. That made him erroneously believes that the U.S. is serving the interest of the Iraqi by "seeing it through" and remaining after election to ensure a functioning republic. Although he admits that all Iraqis he had met, wanted U.S. out, he does seem to realize that that consensus undermines all American interferences in the affairs of Iraq, which had caused previous troubles when the U.S. took military bases in the Saudi Arabia. He also erroneously believes that the Iraqi Lawyers Association is an "empty shell" since he does not sense their deep mistrust and skepticism of western politics. Had the author dug into Islamic history, he might have learned that the Islamic Constitution would make the U.S. Constitution look primitive and that Muslims had occupied Spain for many centuries, on her canonists he bases his justification of occupation.

Chapter 3, THE MAGIC OF ELECTIONS AND THE WAY HOME, presents the role of modern election in legitimizing governments. The author contends that election is not a ticket home, but rather a "voice to the voiceless" to ensure large-scale accountability and enforce public preference on the choice of representatives. He cites the dangers that rose after election in Bosnia and Algeria, and concludes that the major task of occupation or nation building is to create the proper environment for election and not obsess with its magic, mystery, or danger. The author entirely misses that fact that western occupation, and American in particular, is the main cause of chaos, of murdering collaborators and resisting the humiliation of occupation by impartial and foreign authority. He skips the events of 1958 when the Iraqis dragged the dead body of their pro-American ruler in the streets of Baghdad to end their alliance with the Baghdad Pact.

At one point the author, Feldman, talks about how the USA should have just replaced Saddam with someone more benevolent and not gone to war with Iraq. Feldman, just how would we have done that? Saddam was very determined to keep his postion in Iraq as leader. He even provenly employed doubles of himself to thwart any attempted assassination overthrow of him by plotters. Also, Saddam killed over a million of his own Iraqis amd terrorized close to all of them while he was in power. Strong state you claim he had, huh? Sure! Terrorizing, national dictators often do manage to have strong states under their sway. Also, he sent SCUD missiles at Israel. Feldman, aren't you Jewish? He was bad for your Jewish cousins, if you are. Think about that for a while. Lastly, the USA has 350 million people. Iraq had around 23 million. We have a right to put ourselves before them in importance due to our much greater numbers.