Kindle Edition
Read instantly on your iPad, PC or Mac, no Kindle required
Buy Price: $61.59
Rent From: $33.39
 
 
   
Buy Used
Used - Good See details
$11.48 & eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping on orders over $25. Details

or
Sign in to turn on 1-Click ordering.
 
   
Have one to sell? Sell yours here
What Went Wrong?: Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters
 
 

What Went Wrong?: Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters [Hardcover]

Trevor Kletz (Author)
4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)


Available from these sellers.


Textbook Student FREE Two-Day Shipping for Students. Learn more

Formats

Amazon Price New from Used from
 
Kindle Edition
Rent from
$61.59
$33.39
 
Hardcover --  
Hardcover, December 1994 --  
Paperback --  

Book Description

0884150275 978-0884150275 December 1994 3rd
This volume features sections and chapters on heat exchangers, furnaces, inherently-safer design and runaway reactions. The book includes process plant accidents occurring since publication of the 1988 edition, for example, the Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex explosion and fire, and the Piper Alpha disaster. The book is also concerned with the immediate technical causes of these diasaters and the changes in design and procedures needed to prevent them from happening again. Trevor Kletz is the author of "Lessons from Disaster: How Organizations Have No Memory" and "Accidents Recur".


Editorial Reviews

Review

The examples were very clear and graphic, with good sketches or pictures. Without a doubt, I strongly recommend this book as required reading for every engineer and supervisor in the process industry and suggested reading for others. - AFE Facilities Engineering Journal

The incidents described could occur in many types of plants, and should therefore be of interest to a wide variety of plant operators. The new fourth edition contains considerable new material, with extensive references. - Mechanical Engineering

This book is recommended for generalists with an interest in industrial safety and safety/process who wish to gain some insight into the realities of plant operations. - IChemE-Institute Of Chemical Engineers

This book should be read by every health and safety advisor and all managers and engineers who work in the chemical and petrochemical industries. It should also be used by those who provide training courses in these industries. - The Safety & Health Practitioner, July 2002 --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

About the Author

Trevor Kletz, OBE, D.Sc., F.Eng., a process safety consultant, has published more than a hundred papers and nine books on loss prevention and process safety, including most recently Lessons From Disaster: How Organizations Have No Memory and Accidents Recur and Computer Control and Human Error. His experience includes thirty-eight years with Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., where he served as a production manager and safety adviser in the petrochemical division, and membership in the department of chemical engineering at Loughborough University, Leicestershire, England. He is currently senior visiting research fellow at Loughborough University and an officer of the Order of the British Empire.

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


Product Details

  • Hardcover: 332 pages
  • Publisher: Gulf Pub Co; 3rd edition (December 1994)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0884150275
  • ISBN-13: 978-0884150275
  • Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 1 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
  • Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,716,861 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

After graduating in chemistry at Liverpool University in 1944 Trevor Kletz joined Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and spent eight years in research, sixteen in production management and the last fourteen as safety adviser to the Petrochemicals Division. In 1978 he was appointed an Industrial (part-time) Professor at Loughborough University, UK. On retiring from ICI in 1982 he joined the University full-time; in 1986 he became a visiting fellow and is now a visiting professor, and also an adjunct professor at the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University.
He has written ten books and many papers on loss prevention and process safety and the 5th edition of his best-selling book, What Went Wrong?, was published in 2009. He is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, the Institution of Chemical Engineers, the Royal Society of Chemistry (all UK) and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. He was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1997.

 

Customer Reviews

9 Reviews
5 star:
 (7)
4 star:
 (1)
3 star:    (0)
2 star:
 (1)
1 star:    (0)
 
 
 
 
 
Average Customer Review
4.6 out of 5 stars (9 customer reviews)
 
 
 
 
Share your thoughts with other customers:
Most Helpful Customer Reviews

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars The standard in process safety incident case reviews., March 23, 1999
By A Customer
We have made this book part of a required reading program for all engineers, as part of our company's process safety program. Anyone involved in chemical or petroleum operations, will benefit greatly from the wisdom that can be gained by learning from other's mistakes. As my old boss used to say, "You can accumulate about 50 years of knowledge in your work life-time. What you need is 100 years of wisdom." By reading this book you can accumulate 100 years of wisdom. The book is a collection of short summaries arranged by topic. This allows for easy short term reading periods appropriate for training classes or casual reading.

ejb

Help other customers find the most helpful reviews 
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No


2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars A Master Class In Hazard Avoidance And Mitigation, May 1, 2006
Amazon Verified Purchase(What's this?)
"What Went Wrong?" is a well thought-out book on practical safety in the chemical processing industry. The book recounts numerous actual process plant accidents and incidents, includes causes and effects, and avoidance and mitigation practices.

Some of the accidents in this book are familiar to most people (Bhopal, etc.), but most are not; this exposure to "new" material is a real strength. Another strength is the focus on "minor," seemingly inconsequential, actions that have major effects. For instance, on page 62, a company was concerned that because heating had to be shut down over a weekend that water lines would freeze, so water was replaced with alcohol. When a fire occurred the sprinklers then fed the fire. This seems obvious in retrospect, but Kletz is trying to develop foresight rather than hindsight. Kletz also includes examples of human error accidents from other fields. (An excellent example concerning radiological medicine is on pages 92-93.) Kletz always avoids simplistic "human error" diagnoses and diligently pursues root causes; he asserts correctly that in human error accidents it is "unfair to put all the blame on the person who adds the last straw."

Chapter seven concerns leaks. Thomas Fuller was right in 1732 when he said "A small leak will sink a great ship." Leaks are easy to discount as minor and routine annoyances. This chapter does an excellent job of discussing most leak-related issues. The section on "Drain Valves and Vents" is particularly well-developed, as is the section titled "Small Cocks," which makes the point that they should never be used as the sole source of isolation (especially for flammable materials above their atmospheric boiling points.) Likewise his remarks at the end of the chapter (page 162) about measurements are insightful: "Whenever possible we should measure directly what we need to know and not some other property from which it can be deduced." This was, of course, one of the major problems that triggered the Three Mile Island accident.

Chapter eight is titled "Liquefied Flammable Gases," and is an extension of chapter seven in many ways (leaks play a role in many LFG incidents.) Kletz also has an excellent discussion of the hazards of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVEs) including dramatic examples from Feyzin, France and Duque de Caxias, Brazil. A great example (a crack propagation problem in a low temperature, nine percent nickel steel tank in Qatar) of how to mitigate and trap problems in a large-scale LFG system is on page 172, and discusses the pros and cons of different types of dike wall construction.

Chapter nine is on pipe and vessel failures. There is a good discussion of vapor cloud explosions, and while I am amazed at the scope of the author's data, even I was surprised (and amused) to find that Table 9-1 included in "transport container" column for vapor cloud explosions the note "Includes 1 zeppelin." Now that's thorough!

The book also discusses ancillary fittings (like flanges and gaskets) and equipment (like centrifuges and pumps), their common failure modes and hazard prevention methods. There is an especially good discussion of heat exchangers, furnaces, and cooling towers in chapter ten. Especially enlightening is the discussion of damage by water hammer, and the example given (see Figure 10-11, "Condensate in the steam...knocked off the impingement plate and damaged calandria tubes") illustrates the folly of ignoring precursor incidents in an accident prevention strategy. In section 10.7 Kletz discusses furnaces, and makes the statement "Never say, 'It must be safe because we have been doing it this way for years and have never had an accident'" which is an axiom that any safety professional should embrace.

Chapter eleven concerns entry into vessels, and notes that in the US each year about 63 people are killed after being overcome in inadequately prepared vessels. Of these, 40 are would-be rescuers. Any business with this type of exposure must insure that they have excellent equipment and training (including recurrent training) for people undertaking these tasks. No matter what training occurs, though, you can't protect from bad judgment. On page 232 an incident is discussed where a worker was trying to shrink-fit a bearing onto a shaft in a pit with an acetylene torch while the shaft was cooled by another worker hosing liquefied petroleum gas onto the shaft with the expected fatal results.

Chapter twelve discusses the hazards of common materials. Many situations in this book concern the misuse of water resulting in boilover, slopover, foamover, frothover, puking, or many other steam or vaporization related accidents. Compressed air is another underappreciated hazard, and is also discussed at length. Especially emphasized are reactions of air and oil mixtures and the importance of using Type 3A molecular sieves, which can avoid issues encountered in operations that dry or purify compressed air. Nitrogen is also discussed. While it is inert, Kletz makes it clear that it is not harmless using several insightful examples, including an unusual liquid nitrogen induced explosion in a pork rind processing operation on page 254.

Throughout the book Kletz emphasizes the importance of process change control, and that even slight modifications are thoroughly evaluated; this is true in all safety communities, not just the chemical processing industry. Excellent examples of training issues are throughout the book, but are specifically delineated in section 22.5 "Poor Training or Procedures."

Appendix one contains a useful discussion of relative rates of different types of incidents, while Appendix two is perhaps the best in the book, as it discusses accident reporting (page 395) and gives five excellent reasons to publish accident reports, advice that is valid in all industries.

"What Went Wrong?" is a well written book with many insights for safety professionals. It is written for the chemical industries, but is readable and useful to safety professionals in all industries. I deal largely with aviation safety (though I have a background in industrial chemical processing), and the parallels are manifold.

I highly recommend this book, and look forward to reading other books by Trevor Kletz.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews 
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No


1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Learn from other people and other companies mistakes, July 11, 2006
Learning from other people and other companies mistakes is better than to gain experience through our own mistakes, especially if those are relate to safety.

An excellent reference for the industrial practitioner interested or involved with Process Safety System, Emergency Shutdown Systems, Safety Instrumented Systems, etc. working in the process industries, who want to learn about real world examples of what can go wrong.

The incidents described could occur in any type of industrial plants, even in yours. This book doesn't provide an exhaustive analysis of process safety issues or risk control. For this type of in-depth information you could try "Loss Prevention in the Process Industries", by F. P. Lees.

Use this book as a safety manual full of stories from which you should try to get what lessons can be learned from the incidents described.

I am an Industrial Practitioner of Process Safety and Control. I have been working for more than 16 years as an Instrumentation, Automation, and Process Safety and Control Engineer for the Oil & Gas Industry. I found this book to be an aid when preparing training material for operators and technicians.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews 
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No

Share your thoughts with other customers: Create your own review
 
 
 
Most Recent Customer Reviews







Only search this product's reviews



Inside This Book (learn more)
Browse and search another edition of this book.
First Sentence:
The following pages describe accidents that occurred because equipment was not adequately prepared for maintenance. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
emergency isolation valves, ammonia explosions, other hot work, process foreman, combustible gas detector, liquefied flammable gases, inherently safer design, blowdown lines, blowdown valve, trip valve, temporary pipe, heat transfer oil, tank overflowed, trapped pressure, following incident shows, rupture disc, runaway reaction, flame arrestors, flare system, gauge pressure, pump suction line, delivery valve, drain point, nitrogen line, pipe failures
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Operations Progress, Operating Experience Weekly Summary, Hydrocarbon Processing, Institution of Chemical Engineers, Chemical Engineering Progress, Process Safety Progress, New York, The Chemical Engineer, Petroleum Review, Chemical Industries Association, South Africa, Case Histories, Mexico City, Chemical Safety Summary, Department of Energy, Safety Management, Hazardous Cargo Bulletin, San Diego, Didn't Know That, Management of Change, Pump Running
New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats
Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Surprise Me!
Search Inside This Book:

Citations (learn more)
This book cites 18 books:
See all 18 books this book cites
 
3 books cite this book:




Suggested Tags from Similar Products

 (What's this?)
Be the first one to add a relevant tag (keyword that's strongly related to this product).
 

Your tags: Add your first tag
 

Customer Discussions

This product's forum
Discussion Replies Latest Post
No discussions yet

Ask questions, Share opinions, Gain insight
Start a new discussion
Topic:
First post:
Prompts for sign-in
 


Active discussions in related forums
Search Customer Discussions
Search all Amazon discussions
   
Related forums



So You'd Like to...


Create a guide


Look for Similar Items by Category


Look for Similar Items by Subject