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When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment

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Mark Kleiman has had an interesting career which included public service, academia and stints in the private sector. He notes at his acknowledgements that, "I realize that I have been preparing to write this book for most of a lifetime..." Kleiman then weighs in on controversies as varied as gun control to drug policy. In an eleven chapters he weaves an interesting argument that produces a tapestry that includes both broad generalizations as well as a healthy number of extremely specific recommendations for action across society as a whole.

As one would expect, crime control - a perennial popular public policy issue - has some well entrenched positions that are assumed by advocates on reflex. Kleiman argues at the introduction that:

"The first step in getting away from brute force is to want to get away from brute force: to care more about reducing crime than about punishing criminals, and to be willing to choose safety over vengeance when the two are in tension."

When grappling with crime control, he advocates additional considerations be factored into a real solution -concentration of resources and direct communication of deterrent threats to likely offenders.

Simply this book is guaranteed to upset almost every reader's comfort level at some point, to prove this I refer you to his sixteen page final chapter innocuously labeled as "An Agenda for Crime Control". Kleiman ultimately concludes that "Liberals will have to swallow the idea that improved coercion is as necessary as improved conditions. Conservatives will have to swallow the ideas that punishment is a cost and not a benefit and that the measure of the efficacy of a threat is how often it does not need to be carried out, plus the fact that providing services to actual and potential offenders can in some circumstances control crime more effectively and more cost-effectively than law enforcement."

This book is a worthwhile investment of your time.

Professor Kleiman employs psychology, economics, game theory, and real-world examples to explain why harsher punishments are often less effective at controlling the behavior of criminals than targeted, swift and certain punishments. He persuasively argues that we can significantly reduce crime and punishment (particularly punishment of the prison incarceration variety) by focusing enforcement resources to make the threat of getting caught and going to jail a real threat thereby reducing the costs on society of crime, punishment, and the steps taken by law-abiding citizens to protect themselves from crime. A thoroughly enlightening read, When Brute Force Fails forced me to think about the costs to society crime causes in a way I had never considered before (the price you pay for gas at the pump would likely be less if you didn't have to drive to your job from your home in the suburbs every day. A home you likely own because it is too dangerous to live in the city and the crumbling infrastructure is no place you want to raise your children.) A must read for policy makers and concerned citizens alike.

"When Brute Force Fails" is interesting, relevant, and informative on many levels. Mark Kleiman has a unique gift to explain the complex historical, economic and sociological aspects of crime research in a straightforward and concise manner. He first makes a strong case that crime is an extremely important and costly problem in America today. Drawing on decades of academic and policy experience he then manages to summarize the history and current state of the field in a fluent and succinct style. He concludes by constructing a convincing argument for his idea of concentrating law enforcement mechanisms in high crime areas as the most efficient means for decreasing the huge burden of crime on American society. This argument is intertwined throughout with relevant data, case studies, and an eye to the practical aspects of crime control that are of interest to the academic, policy analyst, and lay person alike.

This book provides a rare service to anyone interested in our country developing effective and fair criminal justice and drug policies. Mark Kleiman brings together not only his own lifetime's work in research in a highly accessible fashion, but also pulls together the best ideas from other leading thinkers. At all times this book points towards what can and must be done. He gently pushes aside ideological arguments and lays out a realistic path to reducing crime, drug use, and costly incarceration at the same time. His comments on how to better manage the 5 million Americans in probation or parole to help them reduce their drug use and their criminal activity is along worth getting the book. The information on what Hawaii has done through the HOPE probation program, by instituting certain but brief punishments (say a weekend in jail for one dirty drug test) is truly amazing, since many of these offenders were former heavy methamphetamine users. But in Hawaii the right mix of smart policies, properly administered, quickly transformed the behavior of most of the probationers. "When Brute Force Fails" is an instant classic and a must read.

I'm not completely finished reading it yet, but so far it is excellent. Very insightful, and full of useful data and anecdotes to help clarify the arguments being made. Also very readable, which is nice for public policy/social science work.

Kleiman is a brilliant analyst, with seemingly no pre-conceived notions. Both liberals and conservatives will find lots to agree with and lots to challenge their current thinking. Much of the book is very interesting, but the one problem is that many of the policy discussions are just too detailed for the general reader.

More incarceration has helped bring the crime rate down, but at a great cost to society as well as the prisoners and their families. Sentencing must attempt to identify those offenders with the most potential for future crime, and give them longer sentences. To this end, even juvenile criminal history should be considered in sentencing, whereas currently it is not. If parole were more effective, more prisoners could be released without driving up the crime rate too much (or maybe not at all). While simply increasing parole supervision has had poor results, the H.O.P.E. pilot implementation in Hawaii shows smarter parole management can work: consequences for parole violations need not necessarily be severe, and should not be severe for minor violations, but they must be certain, and immediate; e.g. Honolulu tested for drug violations on the spot (rather than sending out the sample). Ankle bracelets providing location, and restrictions on movement, could be applied when there is some parole violation. Drug programs tend not to be cost effective, and should therefore be voluntary, which would increase the benefits per dollar spent. Many addicts cure themselves of clinical dependency (does this include participation in free programs like N.A. and A.A., Kleiman does not make this clear).

The effectiveness of incarceration as a deterrent depends less on the severity than it does on the certainty, and immediacy. In Philadelphia the new DA has vowed to fix the bail system, because "defendants had learned to "defeat the system" by failing to show up for court, wearing down witnesses and causing cases to collapse in large numbers each year". [...]

The "broken window" theory of crime control (don't tolerate minor infractions) works because it enhances perceptions of a strong police presence and encourages neighborhood cooperation. The type of drug dealing it is most important to control are public markets, not only because of perceptions, but because dealers out in the open invite violence for control of territory, and tend to be more violent themselves than the discreet dealer. Gangs should know that violence by some of their members will result in more police attention and enforcement against the entire gang for even minor offenses.

While social programs in general may not be cost effective if measured only by their impact on crime, some may be, or come close: home visits to expectant mothers, outreach to the mentally ill, and reduction in child exposure to lead. Higher taxes on alcohol would reduce crime.

I am a circuit judge and I study and research the most effective ways to sentence an offender. The goals are first to punish for breaking the law, then restitution for the victim, and finally to rehabilitate the person. The research in this book helps in all those things. The public should also read it to better understand crime and punishment.

Wow. Just wow.

Less crime, less punishment. This is something that everyone can get behind. Kleiman makes his points without theoretical abstraction, but points to real life, proven solutions. Why can't we get the ball rolling on this?

This very well written and researched book on crime prevention demonstrates the importance of thinking outside the box when addressing the problems of crime prevention. Short and certain sentences for things like drug offenses appear to work a lot better than harsh parole revocations at reducing the rate of recidivism. Mark Kleiman's analytical skills and years of experience in this field make this book well worth reading for anyone interested in crime and its prevention.

America's criminal justice system has a problem. It locks up about 5 times more people than any other Western country, and the Pew Center calculated in 2008 that 1% of the adult population is now in jail.

What is needed are pragmatic solutions that go beyond slogans like `being tough' on crime, or naive faith in the force of more education. What is needed is a national brainstorm session. Kleiman has provided an excellent start to this. His book is very well researched, and refreshingly pragmatic. He gives a long list of recommendations in this book, foremost among them what he calls `dynamic concentration'. Instead of spreading enforcement resources thinly, so that they have little deterrent effect, concentrate them on a small community. Since there are often positive feedback effects in crime, intense monitoring and quick sentencing may be able to tip these communities into a new, stable, low-crime equilibrium. At this point enforcement can be relaxed and move on to a new area without a rise in crime in the old area.

This is easier said than done, and the case studies discussed by Kleiman reveal that the devil is in the details. The coordination required between several enforcement branches is enormous and the strategy is not free either. So although dynamic concentration is a long way off from solving the national crime problem, it is these kinds of pragmatic ideas that are necessary for eventual success. Hopefully policy makers who read this book will feel encouraged to start experimenting with Kleiman's ideas.