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Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism

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Alvin Plantinga is back for his third very resilient attempt at confuting naturalism via the theory of evolution.
From his science vs. religion exposition, Plantinga relaunches his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) in this popular-level volume: "Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism." Much has changed in twenty years, from the non-theistic cast to the bombastic rants of the New Atheists, but the big change is the sundry ways atheists have attacked theism including the philosophically naïve abjuration of Plantinga's EAAN.

As a high-volume reviewer of apologetic books, I am regularly sent books and E-files that I review on Amazon. The prominent and the unknown scholars behind these philosophical and apologetic works claim to defeat non-theism and attempt to argue faithfully for Christian truth.
Some contain arguments that lack precision as they often take too much for granted when approaching sophisticated unbelieving thought. I have not given their contentions much weight, but their apparent unsupported disputations make books like "Where the Conflict Really Lies" that much more gratifying.

Herein, Alvin Plantinga offers insightful analysis that defies many of our presumptions of what science is and how religion relates to it.
Much of the territory Plantinga surveys will be familiar to philosophers, epistemologists, and apologists, yet less theoretically oriented readers are likely to find it assessable and intriguing--and often related with creditable simplicity.
The central proposal of this work is that the true conflict is not between theism and science, but is between naturalism and science.

Some Christian theists, in selected ways, feel a bit troubled by nominated aspects of modern science. Some non-theists believe that as science progresses theism must depart. But this apparent antithesis--between science and religion--is not logically genuine. The real debate is between truth and error as the author utilizes clear argumentation and numerous illustrations that demonstrate pure naturalism lacks the ontic status and conceptual framework to justify the reliability of human reason.

Plantinga, one of the foremost living philosophers and rock climbing partner of Bas van Frassen, not only answers the detractors, he also patiently demonstrates how to appropriately relate scientific truth with religious truth; seeing an unchanging, omniscient, and rational God in both.

The author reveals that the actual problem between theism and science is one of misunderstanding, tacit assumptions, incorrect definitions, and improper applications: "Here we have another important source of the continuing debate between science and religion. This confusion or alleged connection between Darwinism and unguided Darwinism is one of the most important, perhaps the most important, source of continuing conflict between science and religion. If you confuse Darwinism with unguided Darwinism, a confusion Dennett makes and Dawkins encourages, you will see science and religion as in conflict at this point. ... This confusion between Darwinism and unguided Darwinism is a crucial cause of the continuing debate. Darwinism, the scientific theory, is compatible with theism and theistic religion; unguided Darwinism, a consequence of naturalism, is incompatible with theism, but isn't entailed by the scientific theory. It is instead a metaphysical or theological add-on."

Chapter One is an outline of Plantinga's proposal "to look into the alleged conflict between religion and science; most of the alleged conflicts, however, have to do with theism, belief that there is such a person as God, rather than doctrines..." (P. 3). He sketches relevant ideas from Darwin and Dennett, but focuses his metaphysical punctilio on Dawkins as he argues that there is no true conflict between the theory of evolution and theism. He contends that many modern Darwinians mistakenly conflate distinct philosophical notions when they contend that if evolution, then not theism. The author closes this chapter: "The conclusion can be drawn, I think, is that Dawkins gives us no reason whatever to think that current biological science is in conflict with Christian belief. His reasoning was not impressive" (pp. 30-31).

As Plantinga exposes Dawkins' philosophical ineptitude, he quotes him: "All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way.... Natural selection, the blind, unconscious automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind.... It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker" (Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker). At that juncture Plantinga observes: "The subtitle of Dawkins' book: `Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design.' Plantinga queries: "Why does Dawkins think natural selection is blind and unguided? Why does he think that "the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design?'" Plantinga exposes Dawkins' non sequitur concerning evolution: "Dawkins utterly fails to show that `the facts of evolution reveal a universe without design;' still the fact that he and others assert his subtitle loudly and slowly, as it were, can be expected to convince many that the biological theory of evolution is in fact incompatible with the theistic belief that the living world has been designed. Another source of the continuing debate, therefore, is the mistaken claim on the part of such writers as Dawkins that the scientific theory implies that the living world and human beings in particular have not been designed and created by God."

The subsequent chapter examines the philosophical flaws of Dennett's rigid naturalism that asserts "the living world with all its beauty and wonder, all of its marvelous and ingenious design, was not created or designed ... but produced by a random ... blind... process" (p. 31). After discussing Dennett's arguments, Plantinga perceives: "The scientific theory of evolution as such is not incompatible with Christian belief; what is incompatible with it is the idea that evolution, natural selection, is `unguided.' But that idea isn't part of evolutionary theory as such; it's instead a metaphysical or theological addition" (p. 63).

Chapter Three discusses a thought-provoking topic: the notion that "many theologians, scientists, and philosophers hold that special divine action in the world--causing a miracle, for example--is incompatible with science." But this claim "together with the hands-off theology to which it gave rise is no doubt popular, but it suffers from a common if unhappy condition: it is wholly mistaken" (p. 91). This is correct inasmuch as "classical science is perfectly consistent with special divine action" (p. 90). If one aims to remain philosophically, ontically, and epistemically accurate one must know that one cannot find a real "conflict between classical science and religion," but they are "perfectly consistent" (p. 90).

In the next chapter the author argues that the new scientific picture, including quantum mechanics, offers "even less of a problem for divine special action than classical science, even though the latter doesn't offer much of a problem" (p. 91). He places contemporary scientific research and discoveries under the bright light of demarcated and precise philosophical insights to demonstrate that "we have found no conflict between Christian or theistic beliefs and current science" (p. 125).

The ensuing essay examines the claims of evolutionary psychology and demonstrates that it lacks the metaphysical capacity to deliver a defeater for Christian theism (pp. 129-160). This in turn leads to the Chapter apropos defeaters. He argues that there seems to be a rational defeater for naturalism even as a basic belief inasmuch as one could "have a certain belief which you formed in the basic way and then you learn one way or another that the belief is wrong. I might look at a mountain goat and I might look at a spot 600 yards away and think, `There's a mountain goat there.' Then as I walk towards it I discover that it's just a patch of snow. I formed the original belief in the basic way; I didn't argue to it, I just looked over that way and thought, `Oh there's a mountain goat.' And then I found out I was wrong. So I have a defeater for it. The defeater in this case was my perception that it's a patch of snow as I got closer to it." Plantinga elucidates: "I argue that Simonian science doesn't give a Christian a defeater for the beliefs with which it is incompatible, because the evidential basis of science is just part of the Christian evidential basis; my point here is that this doesn't imply that a Christian can never get a defeater for one of his religious beliefs" (p. 186). He adds: "I'm claiming more strongly that, at least by implication, that it's not the case that science is not a probabilistic defeater for Christian belief. It's not the case that given the existence of science, that somehow makes Christian belief less probable or in some way undercuts it. So it's not just that there's no logical conflict but also that there's no probabilistic conflict either between science and theism."

The author turns to the controversial issue of the fine-tuning argument (FTA) in the next chapter and contends that "the FTA offers some slight support for theism. It does offer support, but only mild support"(p. 224). Various theists from sundry positions will have strong disinclinations concerning this conclusion. Plantinga at that point opines: "A design argument would proceed with premises and proceed to the conclusion that something or other has been designed. Another way that this could go, though, would be that one could simply perceive design. You form the belief that there is design here in the basic way: you're not arguing to it but you just look at it and find yourself with that belief. Francis Crick for example, who is no friend of theism, says that that everything looks so designed that a biologist has to constantly remind himself, `It's not designed, it's not designed! It just evolved!'"

The following chapter on design and irreducible complexity relates to the preceding essay but yields essential distinctions. Plantinga contends that on the balance "Behe's design discourses do not constitute irrefragable arguments for theism, or even for the proposition that the structures he considers have in fact been designed. Taken not as arguments but as design discourses they fare better, they present us with epistemic situations in which the rational response is design belief--design belief for which there aren't strong defeaters. The proper conclusion to be drawn, I think, is that Behe's design discourses do support theism, although it isn't easy to say how much support they offer" (p. 264).

Chapter Ten offers Plantinga's most recent explication of the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). Prior to his central critique of naturalism he makes the case that "theistic religion gives us a reason to expect our cognitive capacities to match the world in such a way as to make modern science possible" (p. 303).
The claim by the New Atheists that the course of evolution is unguided, deficient of teleology "despite its strident proclamation, is not part of the scientific theory as such; it is instead a metaphysical or theological add-on. On the one hand there is the scientific theory; on the other, the metaphysical add-on, according to which the process is unguided... The second supports naturalism, all right, but is not part of science, and does not deserve the respect properly awarded science. And the confusion of the two--confusing the scientific theory with the result of annexing that add-on to it, ... deserves not respect, but disdain" (p. 309).

Plantinga argues that naturalism is in conflict with evolution as he deems naturalism a "quasi-religion;" this in part means the "real conflict lies not between science and naturalism" (pp. 310-311). From the perspective of theism our cognitive "faculties are indeed for the most part reliable," but "suppose you are a naturalist: you think that there is no such person as God, and that we and our cognitive faculties have been cobbled together by [unguided] natural selection. Can you then sensibly think that our cognitive faculties are for the most part reliable? I say you can't. The basic idea of my argument follows: First, the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable, given naturalism and evolution, is low. ... If I believe in both naturalism and evolution, I have a defeater for my intuitive assumption that my cognitive faculties are reliable. If I have a defeater for that belief, however, then I have a defeater for any belief I take to be produced by my cognitive faculties. That means that I have a defeater for my belief that naturalism and evolution are true. So my belief that naturalism and evolution are true gives me a defeater for that very belief" (pp. 312-14). He then quotes non-theists Nagel, Stroud, and Churchland in support (p. 315).

"If we came to believe that our capacity for objective theory [true beliefs, e.g.] were the product of natural selection, that would warrant serious skepticism about its results" (Thomas Nagel).

"There is an embarrassing absurdity in [naturalism] that is revealed as soon as the naturalist reflects and acknowledges that he believes his naturalistic theory of the world .... I mean he cannot say it and consistently regard it as true" (Barry Stroud).

The author notes that a universal defeater is a "defeater for every belief, including that belief, including itself [N&E]. Suppose I believe I've taken a drug that destroys cognitive reliability. If I believe that, then I have a defeater for R in that case and for every belief that I hold including that one. As long as I believe that, I've got a universal defeater. As long as you believe N&E and the probability of R on N&E is low, you have a defeater for everything, any belief you have; including N&E. That means you can't reason your way out of it."

Plantinga further develops his EAAN: "What evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it does not guarantee mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs; but there is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested, not in truth, but in appropriate behavior. ... Indeed, Darwin himself expresses serious doubts along these lines: `With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind?'" (pp. 315-316).
The author then presses: "I want to argue that the naturalist has a powerful reason against [the assumption of cognitive reliability] and should give it up. I don't mean to argue that this natural assumption is false; like everyone else, I believe that our cognitive faculties are, in fact, mostly reliable. What I do mean to argue is that the naturalist--at any rate a naturalist who accepts evolution--is rationally obliged to give up this assumption" (p. 326).

Plantinga makes the following vital distinction a focus: "We are not asking about how things are, but about what things should be like if both evolution and naturalism (construed as including materialism) were true. We are asking about P(R/N&E), not about P(R/the way things actually are). Like everyone else, I believe that our cognitive faculties are for the most part reliable, and that true beliefs are more likely to issue in successful action than false. But that's not the question. The question is what things would be like if N&E were true" (pp. 335-336). This devastates materialistic naturalism as per a powerful defeater for N&E. Christians can, on even unaffirmed evolutionary presuppositions, defeat naturalism with epistemic simplicity. And yes, some devout evolutionary naturalists will declare that they are not persuaded. However, proof is not persuasion and N&E has been given a metaphysical deathblow by the hands of an eminent Christian philosopher. May concrete-minded science buffs as well as new atheist-types be inspired to study philosophy and epistemology as they leave N&E behind.

This is a book that needed to be written; a popular work by a scholar who often writes books that seem to be abstruse to the general reader. It is one of the best books I have read that tackles many of the artificial difficulties between the relationship of science and religion. Plantinga writes in a simple, straightforward manner, yet covers significant issues comprehensively and with reassuring philosophical detail and scholarly research. Lucid, buoyant, and very conversant, this book is the one of the best defenses of theism within Darwinian presuppositions. Since this volume places the assumption of unguided evolution under the scrutiny of rigorous philosophical analysis, it is a must-read for apologists, naturalists, and Christian philosophers; I know of no other volume like this one, and it ought to be compulsory reading in university and seminary courses.
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I employ a different apologetic methodology, a dissimilar epistemic emphasis, and I have many theological convictions that diverge from the author's; nevertheless, Plantinga's EAAN is a potent tool when deployed from the Christian Worldview.

By Mike Robinson,
Author of "Truth, Knowledge, and the Reason for God"

I'm not sure I agree with everything Plantinga has to say here and some I definitely do NOT agree with. However, this is a truly excellent read. It will take some serious concentration on the part of non-scholars and probably for scholars too, but it is readable. Plantinga has his own unique style of writing - sort of like Mr. Spock or an android with just a dash of dry sarcasm - but he is after all a professional logician. For people such as myself this book will verify that naturalistic bias is the real enemy of religion, not science per se. Scientists are not without biases either - biases that exclude things like supernatural religion and paranormal activity. Maybe they should all read Craig Keener's two volume work on miracles. Despite what one reviewer says Plantinga has really done his homework. Of course, he is not a scientist, but he is well-read enough to analyze the logic of certain scientific conclusions. It isn't hard however to see the fallacies in conclusions like "If God intervened in nature, I would never know that I could trust gravity to work"- or "maybe my car would go in reverse when I step on my gas peddle." Scientists think that theologians and philosophers tend to be pitiful with some of their scientific conclusions, but check out some of the philosophy and theology done by scientists - that's really pitiful! I think that a work like this probably bothers materialists/naturalists more than a work like Behe's because Plantinga is doing here what Plantings does best - he is finding logical fallacies in scientific naturalism's critique of biblical monotheism.

This is an excellent book to get a sense of the relation between science and religion in the modern literature. The argumentation in the early sections of the book was not as dense as I was expecting it to be, but this is due primarily to the fact that Plantinga goes to considerable lengths to fully expound the views of the writers he disagrees with. I imagine that some of the concepts and arguments explored in this book will be difficult for those readers who do not have some philosophical training (and by that I mean primarily those who have had more than intro philosophy courses). Yet, for the reader willing to put the time in to understand the ideas at play (and possibly do some side research), the book is an intriguing and provoking work on the conflicts (and concords) between science and religion. Even if you do not, by the end, agree with Plantinga (or agree that Plantinga has successfully established his conclusion), the book should provide good food for thought (even for the most die-hard atheist and/or naturalist).

I imagine most reviews of this book will be influenced by the theological views of the reviewers. I'm a Russellian agnostic, myself. I believe, with Russell, that agnosticism (not knowing if God exists or not) is the only respectable logical position, but I add, as he does, that I no more believe in the Christian god than in Apollo.

Plantinga starts out very well, pointing out that Richard Dawkins and other best selling atheists use jeering more than logic to make their points. Since his book is designed as a popular refutation of modern best selling atheists, he then diverts to Darwinism, and explains, quite accurately, that Darwinian evolution might have been guided by God. This is the official viewpoint of the Catholic Church (that it WAS guided by God) and there's no fault to be found with it.

Then, however, Plantinga goes off the rails as far as I'm concerned. He starts showing up flaws in Darwinism and turns for support to scientists like Michael Behe. Behe is famous for the even more famous Dover trial, which resulted in a verdict against his notion that the "irreducible complexity" of elementary organisms proved that evolution was impossible. Plantinga mentions the trial only once, and only in order to state that the judge's idea of what science is is incorrect. That's true, and atheistic philosophers have made the same point: the law is trapped, for legal reasons, into saying that creationism is "not a science," instead of saying what most scientists believe, that it is bad science.

Plantinga does not, however, point out that Behe's views were thoroughly refuted in the Dover trial, and instead proceeds as if Behe were an entirely respectable arguer, instead of a creationist with an ax to grind. Behe gets an entire chapter. He is not exalted; he is even, to some degree, reduced to someone who simply argues that evolution MAY be too complex to have occurred without divine guidance intervening SOMEWHERE. I grant to Plantinga that this position is philosophically possible, but a chapter on Behe that disregards the Dover trial leaves out too many important issues, and makes Plantinga look slightly foolish as well.

He has another chapter on Fine Tuning. Stenger's THE FANTASY OF FINE TUNING refutes the fine tuning arguments Plantinga uses here. It is copyright 2011, so perhaps Plantinga had no knowledge of it. But his fine tuning chapter is out of date now anyway.

He ends with a long argument, much more complex than what has gone before, to the general effect that science is more compatible with religion than atheism, because religion (which, as often in this book, quickly becomes Christianity with lots of references to Aquinas) believes that, because we are made in God's image, God will give us insight into underlying causes, and will contrive that our mathematics will, amazingly, fit reality -- while this idea of human beings having implicit abilities to discern primal causes is a puzzle for atheistic scientists, who cannot explain why mathematics is so complex, yet so often corresponds with universal law and reality in general.

Fair enough. I want to argue back that earlier religions, which did NOT believe that human beings are made in God's image, nevertheless presided over many scientific discoveries, that Greek weaponry was sophisticated long before its religion was Platonic, and so on. And certainly, at the present time, many scientists are atheists, still more are agnostics, yet these atheists and agnostics continue to be productive and respected scientists. That they are CULTURALLY Christian, or CHRISTIAN BY CULTURAL INHERITANCE, seems to me a very difficult argument to make, and even the simpler related argument that Plantinga makes -- we are made in God's image no matter what we believe -- ties him into philosophical knots, as if his earlier arguments could be simplified for the lay reader, but this one could not.

Nevertheless a very interesting book by a highly competent philosopher. I expect theists will learn important things from it, just as I did.

The book is a fast-paced read and very well argued. I read the whole book in a week. Here are points of interest.

- Some have made blanket statements like "Plantinga supports Michael Behe!" It is worth noting that Plantinga does NOT endorse Behe's argument for intelligent design AS IT is stated in Darwin's Blackbox. Plantinga concludes that it might modestly raise the probability of theism, but that's it. Critics of Behe's argument might concede this much.

- Plantinga DOES employ his idea of Divine Discourse, which makes use of points that Behe has made. However, Plantinga's argument is much more grounded in his epistemology than in anything Behe says in favor of irreducible complexity. Those who are not well-versed in Plantinga's epistemology should take care if they wish to criticize Plantinga's moves at this point. The reason is because their objections have already probably been considered and dealt with, or at least not shown to be decisive, in the literature on Plantinga's epistemology, which has included the rigorous criticisms of epistemologists like Ernest Sosa, Richard Feldman, Laurence BonJour, and so on. Quick attempts at refutation are likely to be ineffective in producing any real progress.

- As someone's whose research specializes in epistemology and philosophy of religion, Plantinga is correct when he points out that Daniel Dennett does not take into account the vast work in religious epistemology by scholars such as Peter van Inwagen, Eleonore Stump, Robert Adams, and so on. He is also right to point out that Dennett's quick dismissal of the design argument should at least have mentioned Richard Swinburne. Popular readers of Dennett might get the impression that there are no serious philosophers who defend religious epistemology or contemporary arguments for God's existence; this is a mistake and rightly called out by Plantinga.

- I found Chapter 4, on Quantum Mechanics, the most difficult to understand, probably largely due to my lack of background knowledge in the area. I found the whole supposed "conflict" to be a nonstarter in the first place.

- Yes, the last chapter does end with another statement of the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), but I think that Plantinga's presentation of EAAN in the book is better than previous ones. In other presentations, the key role that the probability of semantic epiphenomenalism on naturalism/materialism plays is not clearly seen. The presentation in the book puts that front and center, and so I think makes the argument much, much more persuasive.

Plantinga continues to be be a keen and entertaining observer. It's nice to hear a Christian discuss evolutionary psychology. I highly recommend this book.

I'm an ex-philosophy grad student, in general disillusioned with academic philosophy. But here's one thing most academic philosophers get right: before they write about an area of science, they make a serious effort to understand the science. In this case, unfortunately, Plantinga is not most academic philosophers.

Plantinga's book is certainly an interesting entry in the debates about science and religion, mainly because he straddles the divide between the anti-evolutionists and theistic evolutionists. Plantinga used to be clearly in the anti-evolution camp, and even claimed you don't need to be an "ignorant fundamentalist" to be a young-earth creationist, but this latest book is silent on what exactly Plantinga thinks of evolution. I think maybe he's come around on common ancestry but still rejects Darwin's theory of natural selection (or thinks natural selection can do very little). But none of that is clear.

What is clear is that Plantinga makes a fool of himself talking about science. There is a chapter dedicated to giving a cautious but generally positive take on anti-evolutionist Michael Behe's work. The low point of the book comes in this chapter when Plantinga dismisses scientific criticism of Behe's first book, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, with a paragraph of ridicule and the (false) implication that scientists have given no arguments to respond to. Much of the other discussion of science is barely any better.

In spite of Plantinga's evident discomfort with Darwinism, his official view is that evolution by natural selection is compatible with Christianity. Only when scientists go beyond the science to claim that evolution is unguided is there a problem. That much is debatable, but Plantinga also tries to pin all of the blame for public's distrust of evolution on atheistic scientists, which is just disingenuous. Plantinga's previous writings on evolution show he knows perfectly well that there's another obvious reason, that many people perceive a conflict between modern science and the Bible, but this is ignored for the sake scientist bashing.

There's also a chapter re-hashing Plantinga's claim that unguided evolution is highly unlikely to produce reliable cognitive faculties. I suspect some of Plantinga's fans will claim that this section, at least, gives a serious philosophical argument. But I don't see how--Plantinga shows a total lack of curiosity about both what evolutionary biologist would say about his claims, and what naturalist philosophers would say.

Anyway, still interesting enough to be worth the $10 for the Kindle edition--if only for the view of Plantinga's discomfort over evolution. For those who want more detail on how Plantinga screws up the science, you can Google the more detailed explanation I've written at my blog, The Uncredible Hallq.

Plantinga is just wrong. Scientific naturalism does not assert that there is no god. It merely states that there is no evidence for a god; therefore, there is no reason to suppose the existence of any god. As my friend Massimo Pigliucci puts it, there is no more reason to suppose the existence of a god than there is to suppose that an invisible unicorn is standing next to you. The question is meaningless because we have not a shred of evidence of support the proposition and no means to obtain any evidence about the matter; therefore we have no reason to consider the question, much less presume to answer it. That is scientific naturalism.

He mis-identifies the central conflict between science and theism. It is not, as he would have it, about the conclusions to be drawn, e.g., whether evolution of species occurred or not. The central conflict is in the method: scientific method versus belief based on "faith," which in this culture has come to mean belief based on a wish, not on evidence. The Christian theologian Paul Tillich made this essential point in The Dynamics of Faith many years ago. On this point, science and theism are irreconcilable. Their methods are completely different. One is a reliable means of uncovering objective reality, the other is not. Contrary to Plantinga's thesis, this goes to the heart of the conflict between science and theism, and is central to both. Scientific method is science's foundation. When theists speak of methods, they usually dredge up the word hermeneutics, as though pinning a hundred-dollar label on an irreparably flawed concept gives it credence.

Plantinga opens his book with the foregoing mis-statement, followed by guesswork about what could possibly motivate someone to be a scientific naturalist, thereby "rejecting God." Perhaps scientific naturalists are just going through a juvenile, rebellious phase in their personal development, from which some of us never emerge, he opines. What a pity. This is not sound philosophy. It is presumptuous and arrogant propaganda. Plantinga may be a bright fellow but his thesis proceeds from a false supposition, unfounded in fact and oblivious to a critical distinction that is at the heart not only of scientific naturalism but at the heart of science itself.

Furthermore, scientific naturalism does not imply radical materialism, as Plantinga falsely claims. Most scientific naturalists recognize the difference between objective reality and subjective experience, and the importance of emotion, the arts and human longing. To this scientific naturalist, the life experience is revealed Truth from within. This is essential to our values and to our making our way in life but it implies nothing, necessarily, about external reality. For that, we need science. It is in this sense that religion and science complement each other.

Theistic apologists can try as long and as hard as they like. They have been trying for thousands of years. The facts remain: people have been guessing about gods throughout history. We know they are guessing (a) because we know that we do not know, (b) because the thousands of stories that human beings have told about our various gods are vastly different from and inconsistent with each other, (c) because we know that theistic belief is fully explainable by human motivations and desires (we do not wish to die, we wish for the universe to be orderly and kind, etc.) and (d) because most theists admit that their theologies depend on what they call "faith." Considering the damage this sort of thing has done, those of us who reject it have good cause to be a mite put out by the enterprise.

This will not be a popular answer. We all are strongly driven by desire; unfortunately many people are not always willing to take the hard and narrow path. This metaphor is found in the dominant theology of our culture but the minute it threatens a sense of personal security many people are unwilling to apply it. Hypocrisy, too, has a long and tragic history, no less in theism than elsewhere.

That these realities make many people uncomfortable is no reason to reject, much less dismiss, scientific naturalism. It is a worldview that merits far more respect than Plantinga gives it in this remarkably wrong-headed book. I give him a second star for his obvious intelligence but he should put that intelligence to better use.