While America Sleeps [Hardcover]

Donald Kagan (Author), Frederick W. Kagan (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 2000

Historians Donald and Frederick Kagan warn that unless our leaders change their national security policy, the peace and safety that America's power has ensured since the end of the Cold War will disappear. Using comparisons to Great Britain between the World Wars, and analyses of U.S. policies over the last ten years, the Kagans pinpoint the shortcomings of our military and foreign policies to create a superbly researched history.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

In the aftermath of costly victory in World War I, the government of Great Britain downsized its military, avoided confrontations with powers large and small, and attended to domestic matters and quality-of-life issues. While England slept, in Winston Churchill's famous phrase, governments less concerned with sticking close to the hearth rose elsewhere and held sway. The result was World War II and, after it, the cold war.

The post-cold war United States, historians Donald and Frederick W. Kagan argue, resembles that cozy England in many ways. In the wake of Vietnam, the American government has been reluctant to commit its forces to the purpose of policing the world--though, the Kagans write, "if the United States is not to take a leading part in such a constabulary, who will?"--and has pursued a policy of brief, limited military encounters that involve little risk of incurring casualties. This policy, coupled with a long period of reductions in military spending and staffing, will, the Kagans believe, lead to disaster, as some other Hitler, or Saddam, or Kim Il Jung rises to trouble the world. Acknowledging that historical analogies are only approximations, the Kagans earnestly argue that England's and America's respective patterns of "self-deluding pseudo-engagements" have proved and will again prove to be misguided evasions, and that it will be in the world's ultimate interest for the United States to remain militarily strong and unafraid of a fight.

Though readers may not agree with their conclusions, the Kagans make a convincing case backed by thoughtful historical analysis. --Gregory McNamee

From Publishers Weekly

Father Donald (The Western Heritage) and son Frederick, professors of history at Yale and West Point respectively, have combined their talents to produce a frightening story of close parallels between Great Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and America in the 1990s. After 1918, Britain slashed its armed forces and defined its interests in the context of international organizations and agreements. The result, contend the Kagans, was a foreign policy of "pseudo-engagement"Arhetoric unaccompanied by the effective use of forceAthat steadily undermined Britain's credibility. In a series of chapters written in acid, the Kagans argue that the U.S. has set itself up for a similar fall by diminishing its military capacities in pursuit of an ephemeral "peace dividend" and by overextending its armed forces in pursuit of poorly defined responsibilitiesAIraq, the Balkans, North Korea. The Kagans suggest that the U.S. now stands about where Britain did at the end of the 1920sAsomewhere on the bubble: in a position to restore the balance between military power and international responsibility, but facing strong temptations to procrastinate and deny. (It was 1938, the Kagans point out, before the British government faced squarely the consequences of its relative disarmament.) Readers may not agree with the Kagans' analysis of the synergy between military power and national policy, but they will be impressed by the force of their argument and the power of their reasoning. (Oct.)
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 480 pages
• Publisher: St. Martin's Press; 1st edition (September 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0312206240
• ISBN-13: 978-0312206246
• Product Dimensions: 9.4 x 6.5 x 1.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.9 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,372,398 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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62 of 71 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Wake Up Call for the Next President--Real World Security, December 6, 2000

By 

Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: While America Sleeps (Hardcover)

Two proven historians, a father-son team, draw stark comparisons between the post World War I period in which Britain took a gigantic "peace dividend" and allows its national defenses to crumble, and the post Cold War period in which America has done the same. Those who trust the Kagan's analysis-as does the distinguished Colin Gray, master of strategic thinking-may skip the first half of the book and go directly to the second half focusing on the American experience.

This is not, as some might claim, an ideological treatise. It is firmly grounded in history and the authors strive to present a balanced reasonable theme. I believe they succeed. Even for those steeped in the literature of the American military, there are new lessons in this book. Perhaps the three most important lessons are these: 1) regional threats can become global threats without sufficient warning such as is necessary to reconstitute global defenses; 2) successful diplomacy is best founded on the immediate availability of armed force that can be projected to any point on the globe with great credibility; 3) national security, unlike domestic policies, is not something to be achieved by consensus-this is where the President earns their keep, by guiding and forging a consensus in the absence of domestic constituencies for spending on external affairs and external security.

Especially gripping for anyone who anticipates a future in which Dick Cheney and Colin Powell have something to say about our national security, is the authors' analysis of their strategic decisions following the Cold War. Both Cheney and Powell get very high marks for understanding that global strength is a pre-requisite for stability and security. The Powell vision for a Base Force with Atlantic, Pacific, Strategic, and Contingency force elements is categorized as brilliant. Powell does, however, get very low marks for being consistently unwilling to use force to impose order in the absence of clear objectives-the authors are very clear in calling the Weinberger Doctrine (setting conditions under which force may be used) completely out of date and at odds with today's needs. Both President Bush and Chairman Powell are severely castigated for having ended the Gulf War too soon and without a decisive result-the author's compare this to the similarly indecisive outcome of World War I, an outcome that left the aggressors strong enough to come back and fight another day.

The authors then go on to systematically review a series of major foreign policy and defense failures in the Clinton administration, an Administration characterized by a consistent failure to understand and address the mismatch between wandering and vacillating foreign policies and attendant commitments, and the real-world capabilities of a declining military force. Especially dangerous, in the authors' view, was the Bottom Up Review approach that abandoned the Cheney-Powell appreciation for maintaining sufficient force to deter two regional surprise attacks (Russia and Iraq on one side, China and North Korea on the other), and instead adopted the premise that 6 months warning would be available, that reconstitution of both the force and its industrial base was possible, and that forces could be justified only in terms of existing threats, most of them from non-state actors. Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq inspections, North Korea inspections, these are all reviewed and all are found to have left America with a legacy of half measures. "By trying to ignore the problem, to leave it to others, whether the UN or NATO, by declaring it to be of no vital interest to the United States, by refusing to use any force once involved and then to use adequate force once committed, they [Bush Sr. and Clinton] found themselves making the very mistakes that brought defeat and disaster in Vietnam, the fear of which had played so great a role, first in their failure to act and then in their inadequate response."

In their conclusion, the authors find that the next Administration will assume responsibility at a time when the rest of the world has learned, from the past eight years, that America is not willing to summon the forces to defeat aggression; that developing weapons of mass destruction is the fastest means to elicit billion dollar bribes from America; that ethnic cleansing and politically driven mass starvation will not inspire intervention by America. "The most likely American response will be neglect, at first, followed by some attempt at negotiation. If, at last, driven to action, the Americans attack, it will be from the air, employing limited rules of engagement, and it will not destroy the aggressor. Ground forces will almost certainly not be used until the aggressor himself invites them in as part of a negotiation that gives him [the aggressor] most of what he wants. Above all, he should be sure to develop weapons of mass destruction. Even the hint of such a program in a threatening country will bring high-level American officials on top-secret missions to bribe its leaders to abandon the program. They will probably be able to keep the bribe and to pursue the programs they like, as well. These are the lessons America has given the world in the past eight years..."

The book closes by concluding that the strategic pause is gone and it is almost too late. Forces have declined severely (one can only lament the ill-considered Navy program for decommissioning destroyers and frigates that, once decommissioned, are almost impossible to resurrect), coalitions and alliances are in disarray, and non-state actors have learned how to play on the naiveté of the U.S. Government. America's responsibilities for global stability and security are "inescapable", and the next President must make the necessary commitments and be materially and morally ready to meet them.

50 of 60 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars America is in Danger!, October 16, 2000

By 

Steven M. Leonard (Fort Leavenworth, KS) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: While America Sleeps (Hardcover)

"America is in danger."

With a single, direct statement, historians Donald and Frederick Kagan embark on a complex journey that traces the imminent fall of the American dynasty. Exploring the nuances of national security policy, engagement strategy, and the apparent decline of the military, the Kagans offer a provocative portrait of the collapse of modern Rome, a latter-day empire suffering from self-delusion and a general unwillingness to face the inescapable responsibilities upon which the peace and security of the world depend.

In While America Sleeps, the authors draw on historical comparisons with the experiences of Great Britain during the interwar years to build the foundation of their thesis. Following the Treaty of Versailles, Britain was in a position similar to that of America following the Cold War. Postured to exert a major international influence, the British instead slashed their military force structure while assuring themselves that conditions of world peace and technological superiority would more than offset any reductions in strength. But, as the authors state, industry failed to maintain the technological advantage and civilian and military planners did not institute the organizational changes necessary to leverage existing technologies into effective weapons of war.

Britain's declining military, itself facing a burgeoning inability to influence major regional competitors, virtually paralyzed foreign policy during the interwar years. In an era that necessitated an active strategy of engagement, the Kagans assert that Great Britain failed to respond to any crises with decisive action, forsaking her responsibilities as the leading global power of the time. Instead, Britain deluded herself with halfhearted claims of "victory" in a series of indecisive political-military engagements with Iraq, Italy, and Turkey. "The sum of these defeats, though portrayed as victories," according to the Kagans, "had a devastating effect on England's positions at the turn of the decade." The world, especially "regional" competitors such as Germany and Japan, began to see that Britain's "bark was far worse than her bite."

America, according to the authors, is already following a similar path of destruction. We have already mortgaged any technological superiority we possess with the assertion that we have assumed a "strategic pause" that essentially compels our military forces to delay necessary modernization for at least a decade. While the nation enjoys a greater economic prosperity than at any time in our history, the military is struggling through an era of "constrained resources." When the time finally arrives for America to call upon her armed forces - as she inevitably will, the authors contend - the cost and the time required to repair the damage will be an near-insurmountable obstacle. The United States may again earn her reputation as a country that routinely loses the "first battle" in a time when we can least afford to suffer defeat.

Politically, the Kagans believe, we are already following Great Britain's policy of "pseudoengagement." Our "victories" in the past decade have been fundamentally delusional, our foreign policy is now in ruins, and any "strategic pause" that may have existed is now past. America has shirked her inherent responsibilities as the world's preeminent power and no other nation can adequately fill that void. Our failure to deter developing threats can only result in an eventual major cataclysm. And, unlike in years past, America is no longer immune to direct attack.

Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor of History and Classics at Yale University and one of America's foremost historians, together with his son, Frederick, a professor of military history at West Point, paint a bleak picture of our nation's ability to influence the international security environment. In developing their thesis, the Kagans successfully illustrate the relevant historical parallels that preceded the last world war and certainly exist today. Their masterful use of historical example only adds credibility to their arguments.

While America Sleeps is a though-provoking treatise on the role of military power in foreign policy. Despite the authors' foreshadowing of impending doom, their major themes are certainly valid and deserve serious professional consideration. Civilian and military leaders alike should heed their advice: the Kagans challenge the distinct lack of will in our political leaders, dispute our supposed technological superiority, warn us against an over reliance on air power, and discredit the fallacy of just-in-time logistics. While America Sleeps is a remarkably insightful book that is at times controversial and disturbing, and one the most thoroughly penetrating studies of American foreign policy recently published.

28 of 34 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars A Point Too Narrow, February 26, 2002

By 

James E Geoffrey II (Falls Church, Virginia United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: While America Sleeps (Hardcover)

Both Donald and Frederick Kagan have well earned reputations as thoughtful analysts of the current global scene and as intelligent and insightful historians. That is why their newest book, While America Sleeps, is something of a small disappointment. For while the book makes the indisputably correct point that a modern and effective military is the sine qua non of an effective foreign policy, the Kagans fail to offer an explanation of what that foreign policy ought to be and why.

That said, the parallels pointed out by the Kagans between the Britain of the 1920s and 1930s and the United States of the 1990s and early 21st century are remarkable. Especially fascinating is the interesting similarities drawn by the authors between the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I and the 1991 armistice ending the Persian Gulf War. The Kagans note that the peace in both cases was made with a weakened but not absolutely defeated power. They further point out that, to compensate for this fact, the victorious powers imposed an onerous peace which, in order to work, would require a permanent obligation by the victors to impose their terms. That, in its course, would require the victorious powers to maintain large military forces and a willingness to use them should the terms of the peace be violated.

Here the Kagans have hit on the nut of the matter. As the Europeans, particularly the British and the French, are learning to their great cost in the War on Terrorism, military power and a willingness to use it matters. Despite the best hopes of man and the fondest dreams of Eurofederalists, economics, commerce, treaties and international law do not govern the world, brute force still does. The prudent exercise of power, particularly military power, saves lives and makes for a more peaceful world in the long run. At the end of the day, there is no substitute for the prudent pursuit of a national self-interest.

Ironically, though, this is the point at where the Kagans fall down. They point out that in 1919, Britain was the only power capable of acting as a global policeman, and that in 2002, the United States finds itself in a similar position. They rightly point out that, in order to play that role, armed forces of sufficient quantity and quality are essential. Yet, they never tackle the essential question of whether the role of global policeman is appropriate.

Consequently, the Kagans are left offering American policymakers no useful guide to what constitutes an appropriate foreign policy. They correctly point out that the American armed forces were, and remain, badly overstretched. Yet, they never question whether the United States should have been going into places like Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Because of the book's narrow fixation on the necessity of a properly constituted military establishment, the authors never get to the more essential question of when America should use its military power.

The Kagans are not wrong when they say that the phrase, "America cannot be the world's policeman," has become tired and overused by those who are pushing other agendas. However, they are wrong to suggest that the phrase itself lacks a kernel of truth. They ignore the possibility that the United States ought not try to be the world's policeman. Not only because this would not be sustainable in terms of domestic politics, which has to be considered though not slavishly so, but also because being the world's policeman would tend to draw together a coalition of interests hostile to the United States.

The fact is that America is wasting its military resources and its money in the Balkans in a cause in which it has only the remotest of stakes. NATO forms the boundary of America's national interests in Europe, not the Balkans. America currently finds itself leading an alliance of military dependents in the War on Terrorism because, instead of compelling the states of Europe to develop military forces to protect their own Balkan interests, America supplied the forces for Europe.

Similarly, the fact is that, in Haiti, America had no serious interests worthy of a military intervention, but was left with no choice but intervention because American foreign policy was unwisely couched in globalists terms of universal norms. Historically, the United States had been willing to accept any regime in Haiti so long as it danced to America's tune in the global arena. The innovation that the character of the Haitian regime mattered to America's national interest was anomalous and wrong. More importantly, the ability to correct that regime's brutalities is well beyond any power the United States might ever be able to bring to bear.

To be certain, at different times throughout the book, the Kagans make these and similar points. However, in the end, they never make the connection between their contention that America must be a global policeman because it has the power to do so, and that in so doing, America will be drawn into places where its interests are not at stake, and therefore will needlessly fritter away its power. In short, the Kagans conflate the idea that because a nation has the power to do a thing, it must do that thing. They choose the model of a global policeman, rather than the less utopian and more practical model of the balance of power.

For all of that, the Kagans deserve much credit for reminding Americans that an effective foreign policy is inseparable from a strong and modern military. In the global arena, in the final analysis, it is not just "the economy, stupid." Unfortunately, they neglect to go beyond that point, and the result is a book that is really nothing more than a pitch, however necessary, for a bigger defense budget. That is important, but it is ironic. In the end, the Kagans, shrewd and insightful historians though they are, have decided that Kofi Anan has more meaningful things to say about America's foreign policy than Theodore Roosevelt.