Customer Reviews

White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 and The Miracle on the Vistula

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This much goes beyond any doubt in my mind: the history of the Twentieth Century in Europe could have taken on an entirely different path should Poles fail to beat the Bolsheviks at the gates of Warsaw in 1920.

Lenin, following doctrine of Karl Marx, believed that the communist revolution, initiated in Russia, should be taken abroad to the rest of Europe and beyond. He wanted to go global. Time of the capitalistic society was nearing its end, he thought; social conflicts came to their extreme during World War I, hence - it was time to abolish old system and replace it with Socialism, Communism and the so called 'classless society' of eternal justice.

Feeling already victorious in his 'domestic' dispute over who were to rule Russia, Lenin believed time was ripe for other countries.

And let's not forget that the Communist movements elsewhere in Europe following the end of the Great War were strong and lively, especially in Germany. Lenin believed that if Bolsheviks could beat Poland the gates of Berlin would stand wide open to Communist takeover enthusiastically supported by German workers. And then the rest of Europe would fall into their hands.

It did not happen that way, Russians were beaten at the gates of Warsaw, Communist Revolution in Germany run out of steam, Social Democrats and supporters of democracy in general prevailed, Europe was spared horrors of the Gulag System created soon after in the Soviet Union by Joseph Stalin.

Norman Davies in his book attempted to explain in detail what exactly had happened and how did it happen. As far as I can tell this book, originally written, I believe, close to thirty years ago (was it not his doctoral dissertation?), still remains the most comprehensive, complete study of the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920. I tend to agree with some of the reviewers that this book may be somewhat outdated, may be lacking in some illustrative materials such as graphics, maps and so on... bear in mind, thought, this was written when the Iron Curtain was still dividing East from West, archives in Poland and the Soviet Union were not widely opened (if at all) leaving the author certainly to desire much more. Nevertheless, Norman Davies prevailed in writing an (almost) complete story of the war that saved Europe from Communist takeover.

An early and fine book by the distinguished historian Norman Davies. The subtitle "The Miracle on the Vistula" is probably a recent addition by the publisher as it does not appear in the original (1972) edition. Davies takes pains to demonstrate that there was nothing miraculous about the Polish victory. The Polish-Soviet War is known to many from Isaac Babel's great Red Cavalry story sequence. Davies provides a well written and documented narrative and analysis of the Polish-Soviet War. He covers the background, military history, political history, and diplomatic history in a series of well integrated chapters. All chapters are distinguished by Davies' well considered descriptions and judgments about the major actors and historic trends, and excellent selection of quotations from the primary literature (including some from Babel's stories).

In Davies analysis, some type of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Polish state was inevitable. The collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German Empires left an enormous power vacuum in Eastern Europe, particularly the borderlands between central Poland and western Russia. The Soviet leadership, facing great challenges from internal enemies, was convinced that the revolution had to expand, particularly to Germany, to be secure. They also perceived the Polish nationalist regime led by Pilsudski as a tool of western capitalism and inevitable foe. The Pilsudski regime, in fact, was regarded with considerable distaste by the French, British, and Americans, and pursued a strongly independent policy. A more important vision driving the Polish leadership was of a greater Polish state or Polish led federation from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In 1919, the expanding Poles and Soviets slid into conflict in Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine. Polish fears of the Soviets then led to a Polish effort to develop a buffer zone with an unsuccessful conquest of much of the Ukraine while the Soviets were preoccupied with internal enemies. As the Soviets gained the upper hand in the Russian Civil War, they focused their energies on the Poles and rolled back the Polish incursions, followed by an invasion of Poland that reached deep into northern and central Poland. Overextended and straining their primitive supply system to its limit, the Soviets were then pushed back by skillful and vigorous generalship on the part of Pilsudski and his commanders.

Davies shows very well how this happened, with evenhanded discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. He concludes with a thoughtful chapter on the consequences of the Polish-Soviet War. Contrary to the statements of some other Amazon reviewers of this book, he specifically rebuts the idea that the Poles saved Europe from a Communist conquest. In his judgement, and this is backed by a careful analysis of diplomacy and politics in Britain and France, the Soviet defeat was blessing in disguise for the Soviets. A Soviet victory would probably have aroused British and French fears of the Soviet Union to the extent that a direct intervention would have occurred destroying the nascent Soviet state. In Davies analysis, the major consequences of the war were Soviet isolation and a Polish state dominated by the military.

This is a scholarly and impartial account of the Polish Soviet War of 1919-1920. The author is the preminent student of Polish history in the English language. This is an early work but ranks easily with the others. The book has been researched well and is relatively easy to read. It stears clear of many of the myths surrounding the war and traces the conflict from its origins on the borderlands (Kresy) in 1919 to Pilsudski's premptive strike in 1920, the subsequent invasion by the Soviets, and finally the Polish victory and subsequent peace. Well worth a read.

Norman Davies is the foremost scholar on all things Poland. Thanks to his research and passion, those of us who are interested in European history from a Central European perspective have a wealth of resources at our fingertips. This book is no exception- it does an admirable job explaining the lead-up to the haphazard and nearly history-altering Polish-Soviet War; makes battlefield strategies,actions and consequences clear for the non-military historian and casual reader; and manages to be relatively non-biased despite Davies's strong Polish slant in his other books.

I have just one major issue with the book: the proofreading quality is abysmal. Typos abound, in a few places entire paragraphs are repeated, and in some places all of the words run together. Worst of all are the misspellings of Polish names -for readers not already steeped in Polish political figures and spellings, this book could be a doozy. Even Józef Piłsudski (commonly spelled as Joseph Pilsudski in Western Europe and the US)-arguably one of the best-known Poles outside of Poland and one of the most important Poles of all time- didn't escape the orthographical slaughter: he has at least 8 incorrect spellings of his name- some laughably so: Pihudski, Piłeudski, Pifcudski, Pitsudski, Piisudski, Piłcudski, Piteudski and Pi?sudski (with a question mark in the middle of his name). (Amazon can't display Polish letters- the little 3 represents an L with a line through it).


In Krakow, bookshops have entire walls dedicated to Davies's books and posters are for sale bearing his likeness and his work. It's too bad that the abundance of spelling errors detracts from such an accomplishment.

A reasonably well-written book that teases out a forgotten but interesting chapter of 20th century history. The author's prose is robust, and he takes pains to quote from primary sources. I also like his weaving the writings of Isaac Babel into the narrative, as I believe that it brings a sense of color that helps moves things along.

The book is not limited to a Polish viewpoint. Instead, it takes pains to show the Russian point of view as well as that of the Entente. The reference points in English and French politics are particularly revealing. The Battle of Warsaw is strongly downplayed by the author, who holds that the Polish victory was more a fact of Tukhachevskii and Budyenny outrunning their supply lines than anything Pilsudski contrived. It does put to rest the tired belief that General Weygand was the 'architect' of the Polish triumph -- his role was a complete fabrication and it is duly exposed as such.

The only things that would have made this book better include information from the USSR that is now available (and wasn't when this book debuted in 1972). I think there is much to be mined from that source which would clear up many of the mysteries that persist. Additionally (and I can't stress this enough), history writers (particularly UK history writers) have to stop assuming that the average reader has an idiomatic grasp of the French language. My schoolboy French is enough to puzzle out the meaning, but for those who don't 'parlez' they can't even get the benefit of a footnote with the English text. If I wanted to read it in French, I would have bought a French translation.

So -- for all of you Francophile authors who think it's cool to pepper your publications with flashy words like 'Cri de couer' and long passages of French diplomatic discourse, STOP IT!

A relatively short and well-written account of the unknown war of the 20th century, but one that shaped the future of Europe, one that was a major influence on the thinking of major European figures such as Charles de Gaulle, a volunteer in the Polish army at the time, and Stalin, whose friends and enemies were set by this war (to the fatal detriment of his enemies). Though a war of old school cavalry and infantry, it turned out to be the training ground for the Blitzkrieg of WWII, whose major developers were actually the Polish General Sikorski and the Russian Marshall Tukhachevsky. Unfortunately, their political opponents took over power in Poland and Russia and they were ignored, and the only one who did learn the lessons of this war was Nazi Germany. Well balanced and objective.

This military victory over the Soviets is hardly known in the English speaking world. The Poles under Pilsudski attempted not only to remerge after a partition lasting a 120 years but to regain its territorial expanse at the expense of Belarus, Ukrainian and Lithuanian national ambitions. They succeeded in reaching Kiev until the exhausted Reds (who were also fighting Czechs and the Whites) drove them back to the gates of Warsaw. The military miracle on the Vistula saw the Poles push the Soviet forces back and regain the Western territories of the Ukraine as well as maintain Minsk and Vilnius. In the West the Poles fought off the Germans in regaining some of its Western territories, which were subject to intense Germanisation. Norman Davies is an easy read and captures the period and attendant politics well. If anyone is surprised at modern Poland's attempt to push its weight around within the confines of the EU, as well as play a significant diplomatic role with their Eastern neighbours (e.g. support for Georgia in its conflict with Russia) should read this book for enlightenment.

White Eagle/Red Star gives one of the few good accounts
of the Soviet-Polish war of the 1920s. It covers the facts
in a balanced and thoughtful way. The only downside is that
the prose style sometimes lags. Otherwise, if your interested
in this forgotten war, its a great resource.

Few people are aware of the war described by Norman Davies. In 1920, the Polish David defeated the Soviet Goliath. This, at very least, spared Eastern Europe from Communism for 25 years. Possibly, Communism would have gone on to global conquest had it not been for the outcome of this battle.

If you're looking for a great military history of a short, important war in Eastern Europe, look no further. Davies does a great job here of giving a nearly day-by-day military chronicle of the war and the political intrigues in the war, although as a primarily Polish historian, he tends to favor the Polish side of the war. This isn't surprising seeing as how the war was much more important to the Poles than to the Soviets.

This book will only fall short if you have read Davie's newer books first. This skirts heavily on the cultural and societal aspect, is heavy on military and political, and then gives a short 'why this war is important to history' introduction and conclusion.