The transformation of GM (and Ford under Alan Mullaly) in the last few years has been extraordinary, as Wagoner and team have changed a resistant corporate culture, reduced costs, vastly improved quality, and fought entrenched customer perceptions formed by two decades of poor domestic product. The author gives a good narrative of a number of these aspects. Unfortunately, the overall book is flawed enough that I came away disappointed.
The first problem is one outside the author's control - the world has changed for most people and companies in the last several months, including the domestic auto manufacturers - GM's Herculean efforts may end up being too little, too late. This book would have been much more relevant if it was published in Q1 of 08; in Q1 of 09, events have overtaken the details he presents. GM's survival is now contingent on macro issues outside its own control. The author tries to be timely and includes details from as late as December '08, but it's clear that the rapid unfolding of events over a matter of months have impacted a story that was likely researched over a matter of years.
Second, the book is a bit too much of a Wagoner-worshiping puff piece. Everyone at GM is smart, Wagoner's a great guy with impeccable wisdom and people skills, the selection of inside players he presents are all committed to change, quality, globalization, diversity, etc. The only opposing view is an interview with cranky Jerry Flint from Forbes magazine. Holstein accurately presents Flint's views, but obviously doesn't agree. A corollary issue is the repeated "Rick Wagoner told me.." and "in a 2005 conversation with Wagoner, he expressed..", etc., etc. Yeah, Bill, we understand that you're an important journalist seriously wired inside GM - we got it by the 5th or 6th self-important reference to your conversations with Wagoner, Lutz, etc. I didn't buy the book to read about your importance, I bought it to read about the story. And btw, the self-referential approach probably contributes to the homer/puff piece issue - can't be too hard hitting and keep that access, can you?
Finally, the book is badly damaged by numerous detail mistakes. The one I'll particularly note is in the last (obviously hastily written) chapter recounting recent events, where the author all but accuses Deutsche Bank of shorting GM stock because a DB analyst produced a report assigning a value of zero to GM common shares. To quote: "..there was no way to know if Deutsche Bank was shorting GM shares. But how else was there to explain its estimate zero dollars for the share price?" Umm, gee, maybe because the analyst looked at GM's balance sheet (i.e. interest obligations and debt maturity schedule), and its recurring losses, and figured the company was likely to go bankrupt without a government bailout? In a bankruptcy, Bill, the common shares go to, that's right, zero. Unfortunately, Holstein is apparently financially illiterate, a troubling trait in a business journalist - he makes reference on the same page (again blaming the shorts) that "..GM's market capitalization..was less than $4 billion, when the company had reported $178 billion in automotive sales last year, an absurdly low price-to-earnings ratio." Pssst, Bill, that's $178 billion in revenues, not earnings; GM has had negative earnings for years, which is why it's in the straits it's in. If business journalists don't understand income statements, they should get editors who do..or find other work.
In summary, an important story that's still waiting to be told. Maybe when (if?) things stabilize, someone will take it on and produce a better book than this one. I hope so.
