Customer Reviews

Why Nations Go to War

5 star:		(9)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

This very readable book depicts the leadership dimension of modern warfare. It argues, contrary to the dominant view in International Relations, that individual leaders rather than impersonal objective factors are the main cause that determines whether nations will go to war and whether they will continue to fight it to an irrationally prolonged and destructive extent.

The case studies are interesting. And I discovered a number of new and important facts, despite my Ph.D. in Poltical Science. The case of the former Yugoslavia is particularly well-presented and easy for any non-specialist to understand. As a narrative about events and personalities, the book is indeed outstanding.
At the same time I have to voice certain reservations. Although the book is well-reserched and portrays historical events accurately and vividly, it cannot "prove" its thesis, because... well, it is unprovable. History is not a lab experiment to be conducted at will. We cannot test would would happen without this or that particular leader, all other conditions being the same.

It seems to me (just as it seemed to Voltaire) that it is preposterous that everything in the universe should obey physical laws, while a five-foot-tall creature living on the surface of one tiny planet manipulates history through his perceptions and misperceptions. In fact, Stoessinger's book has a goal that is independent of facts and arguments pertaining to the subject matter--to reassert a moral world-order in international politics and, by extension, in politics in general. My seventh edition has seven case studies; Saddam Hussein is called "the war lover"; both Saddam Hussein and Hitler are "absolutely evil," while Stalin is NOT (ostensibly because Stalin "had a few decent traits, and he did not love war for its own sake," but in reality, because Stalin fought against and defeated Hitler, whose concentration camps Stoessinger had barely escaped). The book ends by emphasizing the importance of "moral courage," especially in "dark times" when "absolute evil" must be confronted. But it seems to me this outlook is precisely what has led the warring parties to misunderstand and dehumanize each other throughout history and to launch wars, whose objective was total annihilation of the enemy. If the other side represents the "absolute evil" to be confronted, there can be no talk of empathy and eagerness for accomodation. Only one thing follows: struggle by any means, victory at any cost. I am not sure that Stoessinger has come to terms with the implications of his own conclusion--in so far as people think about politics in unconditional moral terms, they will always define themselves as "good" and the opposing party as "evil." This is the way it has always been. I don't know if mankind will ever be able to rid itself of war, but as long as the solution is sought in the concepts "good," "evil," and "moral courage" ther will be no progress in internatinal politics, nor in the field of study called International Relations.

This book was really quite interesting. Stoessinger writes in a lucid manner, which makes the book a very easy read. However, I have two problems with this book, and after seeing all the positive reviews, I'm sure there are people who will want to hit me on the head for my criticism. Nevertheless, my first problem with this book is its emphasis on the individual as the level of the analysis as well. Stoessinger blames key leaders and individuals as responsible for the various wars addressed throughout this book (ie. WWI, WWII, etc). This seems pretty reductionist to me when there are other levels of analysis to consider as well. To make matters worse, Stoessinger reduces his personal biases against, say, Hitler into a characterization of HItler as "mad." Well, Hitler might have been mad, but there is more to HItler than simple "madness." Second, my problem with this book is that although there are footnotes, Stoessinger purports to see into the mind of leaders such as the Kaiser, Hitler etc. without proving his authority or where he received such personal insights. Oh, I guess I have a third criticism as well. The title of this book is "Why Nations Go to War;" if understanding why nations to go war is the purpose of writing this book, I don't think that devoting one chapter on one conflict (about 20-25 pages) is going to explain why nations to go to war.

On the other hand, this book like I initially wrote, was very interesting. However, to read this book in a vacuum might lead to some pretty big misperceptions about wars in the twentieth century.

I read the 9th edition of WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR in a college interdisciplinary class about the Problem of War & Peace. The book is divided into ten different sections and covers what it lumps together as 9 major wars (the author considers several small wars as coninuations of other wars): WWI, WWII, The Korean War, The Vietnam War, the Bosnian War, the wars between India & Pakistan, the wars between Israel and Arab countries, Saddam Hussein's wars against Iran & Kuwait, the War in Afghanistan & the American-Iraqi War. The last section of the book provides the authors thesis to the question the title of the book raises, why do nations go to war?

I didn't agree with everything that the author wrote. Also, though the book is heavily researched, there are some errors (for instance, recently released documents have proven that the Chinese were working together with the Soviets during the Korean War and weren't just planning on, but were intending for the U.S. to invade North Korea--it was essential to their military strategy). Despite these disagreements and flaws, I found the book fascinating. It provides a fairly thorough backdrop for most of the conflicts it talks about and though the author's assessments of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are questionable, it still provides for a thought-provoking read.

Stoessinger's general thesis to the question of "why do nations go to war?" is that nations don't actually go to war, but the leaders of those nations do. He seems to contend that it isn't the people of the countries who are necessarily at fault and instead, the people in charge are the ones who should be held most responsible. Though there is some truth to this assertion, blaming any single person for a war is a bit absurd. The American Wild West no longer exists. Nations go to war--not people. Stoessinger seems to believe that except in extreme cases (WW II, Bosnian War) war is unnecessary. I tend to accept a more Hobbesian view of human nature and believe that despite the best human efforts, in the fallen world in which we live, war is inevitable. However, though I disagree, I really enjoyed reading the book and found the epilogue especially moving. Recommened for anyone who has an interest in world affairs and history.

Dr. Stossinger's book is a valuable contribution for intelligence analysts wrestling with the strategic intelligence considerations when preparing for war. Stossinger's review of 8 case studies (WWI, Hitler's attack on Russia, Korea, Vietnam, India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arabs, Saddam Hussein, and the Balkans) distills the following determinants as to why nations go to war: the crucial importance of the personalities of leaders, the four sources of misperception (leader's image of himself, his adversary, his adversary's intentions, and his adversary's capabilities and power), and an underestimation of the means and time necessary to win the war. Here, Stossinger contributes to the literature by reinforcing the need to look at war from the enemy's perspective. Strategic intelligence analysts supporting decision makers who are preparing for war should, at a minimum, be addressing seven issues: a clear understanding of the most basic, underlying, issues forming the basis for the problem under consideration; a clear appreciation of how the problem affects one's survival, vital, major and peripheral national interests; a clearly stated political objective that resolves the underlying problem which is complimented with a sound exit strategy and identifiable conditions for knowing when to exit; a strategic self appraisal that assesses one's internal military, diplomatic, and economic condition to determine whether or not the means exist to attain the political objective; a national power assessment comparing the conditions of the other belligerents and interested non belligerents with your previously assessed strategic self appraisal; an integrated political, military and economic strategy to best apply your strategic strengths in pursuit of the political objective; and, the identification and elimination of gaps between the desired political objective and the means to achieve those objectives. Stossinger gives analysts additional perspectives for assessing these seven issues. Each issue should be assessed through the lens of the personalities of each leader of each belligerent nation; assessed for how each of the four sources of misperception shapes each leader's view of the situation; and, assessed for how each leader estimates the means and time necessary to achieve their political and military objectives. This insight reduces the miscalculations characterizing war. Stossinger's book belongs on library shelf of the students and practitioners of strategic intelligence.

"Why Nations Go to War" is a very fascinating book to read as it provides some unique perspectives on the reasons that the author views as the cause of nations to go into conflict. The author uses a clear and simple style of writing that make it easy to read and understand his arguments, propositions and conclusions, even if one does not agree with them.

Basically, Stoessinger argues that the national leaders play the decisive role in bringing nations into conflict. It is the characteristics and ego of the leader that, at the critical moment, makes the difference between nations crossing the Rubicon and ultimately committing to go to war. Other factors such as territorial disputes, economic considerations or clash of religions or civilisations may be contributory but not the main cause for nations to go to war. The author supports his views with some well presented, insightful and compelling case studies.

Stoessinger critically examines the characters, personalities and egos of some of the modern leaders that took their nations to war and shows how poor judgements and wrong perceptions led to disasters and untold suffering for their countries.

This is a well researched book that emphasises the importance of moral courage on the part of leaders to prevent war and not allow their fragile egos to cause unnecessary suffering to other human beings. Although this is easier said than done, this message from the author is compelling.

I recommend the book to anyone with an interest in history, international relations and war.

I was originally required to read this book for a class, but found it interesting anyway :).

In any case, I have always been interested in history, and almost majored in it in college, and so found this book particularly interesting. His concept is so simple, and yet so often overlooked. As I understand it, his basic point is that people often think of wars as being caused by factors such as religious differences, economics, etc. Stoessinger argues that these types of factors are necessary but not sufficient. You also need additional factors, particularly misperceptions.

I think that he makes a pretty decent case for this, his examples are appropriately chosen, and he makes some very interesting observations. I think many of his ideas have very great explaining power and should be a consideration in any discussion of war.

Definitly a recommended read, particularly if you're interested in history or political science.

This is a wonderful book for those looking for another side to the origins of war. The author tells fascinating accounts of the personalities behind decisions. He transcends the traditional explanations and portrays wars as the results of very human dynamics. Excellent stories and insights.

The premise and structure of the book are excellent and I commend the writer for putting together such a comprehensive work. However, I find the author's bias against, and for certain leaders to be highly questionable. It's clear to me that the author's personal opinions precluded him from putting together an objective view of the past.

For instance, the author lambasted Lyndon B. Johnson for his handling of Vietnam but he was extremely apologetic when writing about JFK's involvment in escalating said war. He even went so far as to offer his own excuse for why JFK decided to authorize the use of napalm and defoliating agents. He suggested contextually that JFK was somehow forced into his decisions by his advisors -- as though he couldn't think for himself, or is somehow immune from criticism regarding Vietnam.

Again, after writing about the Korean War, the author slams President George W. Bush for his "axis of evil" speech but then credits former (failed) president Jimmy Carter for being some kind of god-like peacemaker there in 1994. It's completely absurd and disregards many of the problems that continued in North Korea between 1994 and 2001. He acts as though N.Korea was all fine and wonderful until President Bush came along....what a joke. His glaring bias seeps off the pages and discredits his entire work -- which again, is unfortunate because I enjoyed most of the book.

I will say that I think his handling of President Clinton's administration was much more balanced. But again, this only serves to highlight his other more slanted views.

This was one of the best textbooks I have read in college. It covers most of the major wars post world war 2 and gives the history leading up to them. You can see a clear dichotomy where the major power in the world leading up to the conflict causes the conflict through foolish colonization policies. Mostly British for the first half and then the United States. It is a good summary overall and is a must have for any student in International Relations or military history. It is a well written and quick read. 5 stars.

If anyone reading this review is able to contact Dr. Stoessinger, it would be in his interest to suggest him to read Trevor Ravenscroft's "The Spear Of Destiny," for further understanding of Hitler's mind. Many thanks to the messenger!